"Deflection" shots are those taken at a target with a heading crossing
angle--i.e. one in which you must pull lead to compensate for the
target's movement during the time of flight of the bullet.
Tanks don't move that fast. I suspect what you are referring to would
be ricochet shots into the ground and up into the belly of the tank.
Unlikely as a common tactic, but probably possible.
What's really at play here is the fact that even today, tanks and
armored vehicles are hard on the sides and soft on the top/bottom.
Their most likely threat is from other armor or anti-armor ground
forces. When a compromise needs to be made for overall gross weight
reduction it takes place on the top and underside. For this reason,
strafing armor at high angles (dive angles, not lead angles) the
aircraft can be effective against tanks even though the armor of a
tank is usually characterized as being capable of resisting that
caliber of weapon.
Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038
>What's really at play here is the fact that even today, tanks and
>armored vehicles are hard on the sides and soft on the top/bottom.
>Their most likely threat is from other armor or anti-armor ground
>forces. When a compromise needs to be made for overall gross weight
>reduction it takes place on the top and underside. For this reason,
>strafing armor at high angles (dive angles, not lead angles) the
>aircraft can be effective against tanks even though the armor of a
>tank is usually characterized as being capable of resisting that
>caliber of weapon.
>
>
Since I never attacked a tank in a fighter I am giving you hearsay from
fighter pilots who did. They described the attack this way. They would
appproach the tank and their first aim point is behind the tank. They then
walk their fire to the main body of the tank. The assumption is that the fire
that they lay in behind the tank will ricochet up into the soft underbelly
where armor is very thin. It worked better if the tank was on a hard surface
rather than earth At least that is the way the story was told back then. But as
I say, I have never attacked a tank in a fighter. I am just giving what pilots
who did had to say at the time.
Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
> The assumption is that the fire that they lay in behind the tank will
> ricochet up into the soft underbelly where armor is very thin.
Seems kind of stupid to have a soft underbelly in a vehicle which is the
target for anti-tank mines? Is this really true?
Dave
Same reason you have thinner sides than front, and thinner still back.
You can either be really strong in the part that faces the enemy... or
vaguely weak everywhere.
Remember, most AT mines of WW2 all (AFAIK) were pressure-activated,
cutting track and blowing off roadwheels to immobilise the tank.
If you want to put thick armour on the belly, you have to trade off
something else: lose a lot of armour off the front (which gets shot at),
use a smaller gun, or be a lot heavier and slower.
--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill
Paul J. Adam ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
> Saw this mentioned several times. Sounds somewhat implausible.
> A whole lot implausible actually. Was this a common practice, an
> isolated incident blown out of proportions or a myth?
Yes, the practice of bouncing bullets 'off the road' and into the
belly plate of German tanks was employed, and stories of it
are fairly common. But no, it probably did not work.
The .50 AP bullet was capable of penetrating 20 to 25 mm of
armour plate at short ranges and if impact was perpendicular to
the plate, but this would drop off rapidly if the impact angle was
shallow (5 mm at 30 degrees), or if the bullet was destabilised
and yawing. Impact would be shallow angle on ground strafing,
and a bullet that had already lost energy by impact with the road,
and was deformed and probably tumbling, was quite unlikely to
penetrate the belly armour of a tank. It was a vulnerable spot,
but even so the armour plate of a Pz IV was not thinner than
10 mm in any place.
> Is there an approximate tally of German heavy armor (Pz IV
> and up) destroyed by the western allies attack planes?
There is a discussion of the subject, and many related issues :-),
in "Flying Guns -- World War II" (See
http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/volume1/index.html )
and of course in other sources.
The gist is that WWII fighter-bombers were very poor tank
destroyers. They stopped the tank divisions by wreaking havoc
among soft-skinned supply vehicles and the supporting infantry
and artillery units -- a German WWII panzer division was really
a mixed mobile unit, not a unit purely equipped with tanks.
(Incidentally, the same was true of the Stuka's; de Gaulle reported
in 1940 that they did his tanks little harm but destroyed his
fuel trucks, which could not seek cover by leaving the road.)
These aircraft did not have a weapon that was both sufficiently
powerful and sufficiently accurate against tanks. (Rockets were
devastating, but the hit probability was only 0.5%.) On some
occasions when the Allies were left in possesion of the battlefield,
investigation teams were able to compare the claims for destroyed
armoured vehicles of the fighter-bombers with the wrecks left
behind. Very few were disabled by aircraft, less than a tenth of
what the air forces claimed.
Apparently more tanks were abandoned undamaged than were
actually destroyed by the fighter-bombers. So the main effect
appears to have been a moral one. The strafing and bombing
scared the tank crews so much that they drove the tanks into
cover and often jumped out and hid in the nearest ditch. And
perhaps did not survive the attack.
--
Emmanuel Gustin
Emmanuel.Gustin -rem@ve- skynet.be
Flying Guns Page: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/
Displayed at Nellis, there is a disabled T-62 that is a bit gruesome when one
looks inside. It took a kill through the armour on the side; looked like a
single shot. The tank interior was described like a convective oven for its
killing effect.
VL
>Apparently more tanks were abandoned undamaged than were
>actually destroyed by the fighter-bombers. So the main effect
>appears to have been a moral one. The strafing and bombing
>scared the tank crews so much that they drove the tanks into
>cover and often jumped out and hid in the nearest ditch. And
>perhaps did not survive the attack.
>
I'd call that a pretty effective attack. Wouldn't you? (grin)
On 6 Aug 2003, ArtKramr wrote:
Dave Holford hol...@sympatico.ca
> >Seems kind of stupid to have a soft underbelly in a vehicle which is the
> >target for anti-tank mines? Is this really true?
Anti-tank mines were principally intended to immobilize a tank by blowing
off a tread or detaching a bogie wheel, not by actually penetrating the
armor.
Though I must admit, I find the "ricochet theory" a bit (OK, a whole
bunch!) unbelievable. On most surfaces, MG bullets would not ricochet
at all - they would simply bury themselves in the ground. On the surfaces
where they -might- ricochet, they would be badly deformed, tumbling
greatly, lost considerable energy, and with just about zero
penetration. I suppose once, somewhere, sometime, it might have
happened. But as a standard tactic, it seems a way to shoot off a
lot of ordinance to no particular effect.
Cheers and all,
> The gist is that WWII fighter-bombers were very poor tank
> destroyers. They stopped the tank divisions by wreaking havoc
> among soft-skinned supply vehicles and the supporting infantry
> and artillery units -- a German WWII panzer division was really
> a mixed mobile unit, not a unit purely equipped with tanks.
> (Incidentally, the same was true of the Stuka's; de Gaulle reported
> in 1940 that they did his tanks little harm but destroyed his
> fuel trucks, which could not seek cover by leaving the road.)
>
> These aircraft did not have a weapon that was both sufficiently
> powerful and sufficiently accurate against tanks. (Rockets were
> devastating, but the hit probability was only 0.5%.) On some
> occasions when the Allies were left in possesion of the battlefield,
> investigation teams were able to compare the claims for destroyed
> armoured vehicles of the fighter-bombers with the wrecks left
> behind. Very few were disabled by aircraft, less than a tenth of
> what the air forces claimed.
>
A number of aircaft field heavey cannon, up to 75mm especialy for
German aircraft. (Henschel Hs 293, some Ju88s, )
30mm cannon (Mk103 ? ) firing tungsten cored amunition mounted on a
FW190 could penetrate 140mm I believe and the 37mm cannon on some
Stukas had similar penetraion. This is enough for anything but the
front of a WW2 tank.
While the British tried 40mm cannon on their Hurricane I find it odd
that the P47 wasn't fitted with twin 30mm-40mm cannon. By sacrificing
6 of the 8 0.5" MG the massive P47 would have sufferd less performace
drop than smaller aircraft.
At least his way there would be a powerfull AND accurate weapon.
Too bad we have no actual P-47 pilots in this NG to give us actual experience
in this matter. It would save us a lot of conjecture. But I did meet some
German tankers in various Munich bierstubes after the war and they said they
dirtied their pants when they heard the distinctive sound (R-2800's) of P-47's
overhead.
General Bayerlein tried to move Panzer Lehr the short distance by road
from Vire to Le Beny-Bocage (it's a short trip, I've passed the junction
several times). As he put it,
"...by the end of the day I had lost 40 petrol wagons and 90 other
trucks. Five of my tanks had been knocked out, as well as 84
half-tracks, prime movers and SP guns."
>Apparently more tanks were abandoned undamaged than were
>actually destroyed by the fighter-bombers. So the main effect
>appears to have been a moral one. The strafing and bombing
>scared the tank crews so much that they drove the tanks into
>cover and often jumped out and hid in the nearest ditch. And
>perhaps did not survive the attack.
To say nothing of the problems of keeping tanks fuelled when the bowsers
are burning wrecks some miles behind...
There's a very interesting article about the effectiveness of Il-2
against heavy armor. Even though when anyone says Il-2 people
automatically think tank-buster, the effectiveness was nearly
negligent. If they got any, it was by massive application of firepower
or luck. They were excellent against soft targets with rockets, bombs
and guns though. That article could be found at www.batllefield.ru
somewhere. Unfortunately, I could not find it just now. The site is
mostly armor oriented.
>Therefore the
>conclusion so far is that the pilots telling these stories only
>assumed that this technique worked. I
I think we might say that you are "assuming" that the pilots telling these
stories" assumed" this technique worked. right?
No firsthand knowledge but plausible. Recent gun camera
footage of strafing attacks shows a tremendous number of tracers on
ricochet trajectories from low angle strafing passes on dirt
airfields.
I think that API ammo on a strafing pass would have a
reasonable chance of getting enough rounds into the underside of a
tank to destroy it or disable it (or the crew).
Like many war stories, I imagine it has grown somewhat.
A 500 lb bomb would have worked far better.
----== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==----
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>Though I must admit, I find the "ricochet theory" a bit (OK, a whole
>bunch!) unbelievable. On most surfaces, MG bullets would not ricochet
>at all - they would simply bury themselves in the ground. On the surfaces
>where they -might- ricochet, they would be badly deformed, tumbling
>greatly, lost considerable energy, and with just about zero
>penetration. I suppose once, somewhere, sometime, it might have
>happened.
These color gun camera films I've seen lately are instructive.
A lot of what I've seen are grass & dirt airfields, unimproved graded
(but not hard-surfaced) roads, etc. Not conducive to ricochets, right?
But in fact (to my surprise) there are a BUNCH of ricochets, some of
which are apparently tracers, some probably flying spall and debris,
but all of it hot & glowing, bouncing all over the place and clearly
rebounds from the target area.
It also impressed upon me that many of the pilots strafing
weren't particularly accurate - in many cases, not even remotely
accurate. All that is pretty understandable considering the
circumstances (ground fire, 400 mph, low altitude, smoke).
> But as a standard tactic, it seems a way to shoot off a
>lot of ordinance to no particular effect.
The film attests that this is prett much spot on.
-Gord.
> I don't doubt this too much, I've seen lots of tracer
>ricocheting from the sea surface. We used to fire Browning .303's
>from Lancaster nose turrets and likely 10 percent of our tracer
>would bounce. Hell, we used to see bits and pieces of jacket
>sticking into the rubber strip around the windscreens
>occasionally.
>--
>
>-Gord.
I've fired countless thousands of rounds through M2HB BMGs and
richocets do occur even on seemingly soft ground (there are rocks and stones in
most topsoil layers).
However, the problem of geometry can't be overlooked. Any decent billiard
player understands the angles problems involved. So, I find it extremely
unlikely that rounds fired would:
A) Recochet at the correct angle.
B) The utter lack of energy retention due to bullet deformity.
Oh, and the tanker's terror associated with hearing and seeing Jugs in one's
immediate area is most likely the realization that those P-47s may be hauling
a pair of 1,000 pound bombs and a wing full of HVARs.
Sounds like wishful thinking at best.
My regards,
Widewing (C.C. Jordan)
http://www.worldwar2aviation.com
http://www.netaces.org
http://www.hitechcreations.com
It depends on theangle of incidence. If the angle is too steep on a soft
surface there wil be little ricochet. But if the angle is shallow there will
be a lot more. Think of skipping stones across a lake.
>but all of it hot & glowing, bouncing all over the place and clearly
>rebounds from the target area.
>
> It also impressed upon me that many of the pilots strafing
>weren't particularly accurate - in many cases, not even remotely
>accurate.
The again there were many pilots who were deadly accurate
>
>> But as a standard tactic, it seems a way to shoot off a
>>lot of ordinance to no particular effect.
Not true,
>
> The film attests that this is prett much spot on.
Spot on my ass. Look at more films.
There would have been experiments presumably.
>
> There's a very interesting article about the effectiveness of Il-2
> against heavy armor. Even though when anyone says Il-2 people
> automatically think tank-buster, the effectiveness was nearly
> negligent. If they got any, it was by massive application of firepower
> or luck. They were excellent against soft targets with rockets, bombs
> and guns though. That article could be found at www.batllefield.ru
> somewhere. Unfortunately, I could not find it just now. The site is
> mostly armor oriented.
The favoured method for FW190s attacking soviet heavy armour over the
steppes was to fly over the top of the tank and release a 250KG bomb.
This would slide along the ground and impact on the tank. It was
considered an accurate method.
>On Wed, 06 Aug 2003 20:29:07 GMT, "Gord Beaman" (ve...@SPAMrac.ca) wrote:
>
>> I don't doubt this too much, I've seen lots of tracer
>>ricocheting from the sea surface. We used to fire Browning .303's
>>from Lancaster nose turrets and likely 10 percent of our tracer
>>would bounce. Hell, we used to see bits and pieces of jacket
>>sticking into the rubber strip around the windscreens
>>occasionally.
>>--
>>
>>-Gord.
>
>I've fired countless thousands of rounds through M2HB BMGs and
>richocets do occur even on seemingly soft ground (there are rocks and stones in
>most topsoil layers).
>
>However, the problem of geometry can't be overlooked. Any decent billiard
>player understands the angles problems involved. So, I find it extremely
>unlikely that rounds fired would:
>A) Recochet at the correct angle.
>B) The utter lack of energy retention due to bullet deformity.
>
Yes, I agree, I doubt that the ricochetting rounds would be too
worrisome to tanks, although I'm certainly no tank expert...just
doesn't 'feel' too dangerous to me.
--
-Gord.
I don't assume anything. That's what the people have been saying so far.
By definition, the angle at which the bullets would strike the
underside of the tank would be the same as when they hit the road in
front. If the bullets would bounce off something as soft as a dirt
track, why should they be able to penetrate 10mm of armour plate at
the same angle? For this to work, it would first be essential for the
road to be harder than the armour...
Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
There is no doubt that the P-47 pilots made such attacks, and that
they believed that they worked. They weren't necessarily correct in
that belief, however; as has been pointed out, the claims from RAF and
USAAF fighter-bomber units were about ten times greater than the
actual number of tanks destroyed. Some of the possible reasons for
this are included in 'Flying Guns: World War II':
"Given these unpromising circumstances, why did the fighter-bomber
pilots believe that they were achieving such success against tanks?
There can be no doubt that they genuinely thought that they were
destroying them in large numbers. There appear to be several reasons
for that. First, problems with identification. Flying a vibrating
aircraft, with restricted visibility, at low level and high speed and
under the stress of combat, are hardly ideal circumstances for
accurate observation. Add to that the natural tendency for the size
and strength of the opposition to appear magnified, and it becomes
less surprising that any vaguely tank-sized object was classified as a
tank – and usually a Tiger tank! Many of the "tanks" claimed destroyed
were actually armoured cars, troop carriers, armoured recovery
vehicles and soft-skinned transport.
The second problem was the difficulty in observing the effect of
attacks. The cannon shells and HMG bullets fired in strafing attacks
generally carried incendiary or explosive chemicals and caused flames
and smoke to erupt wherever they hit. A tank revving up its engine to
get out of the way can also generate a lot of smoke. Tanks apparently
covered in flames and smoke were confidently reported as "flamers" or
"smokers" and claimed as destroyed, whereas in most cases they would
not have suffered serious damage. The blast effect of rockets and
bombs threw up enough dust and smoke to obscure the entire area, and
pilots frequently believed that it would have been impossible for
anything to survive. They were usually wrong. Large bombs could
disable tanks with a near-miss, but RPs required a direct hit.
Finally, there was the problem of duplicated claims. A disabled tank
seen from the air may not appear damaged, and multiple air attacks
were therefore sometimes launched against tanks which had already been
knocked out."
It is certainly true, however, that many German tankers suffered from
a fear of the fighter bombers and some baled out of their vehicles
when they arrived, even if, logically, a buttoned-up tank was the
safest place to be.
On 6 Aug 2003, ArtKramr wrote:
-snips-
> It depends on theangle of incidence. If the angle is too steep on a soft
> surface there wil be little ricochet. But if the angle is shallow there will
> be a lot more. Think of skipping stones across a lake.
The rocks I selected for stone skipping on lakes were shaped rather
differently than .50 cal MG rounds. And, were imparted a rather different
rotation.
I never tried to skip an elongated rock with a rotation at right
angles to, rather than parallel to, the water surface but I can't believe
that would work at all well.
Certainly not sufficiently well to penetrate tank armor, even the
relatively thin undersurface armor.
But, you could probably scare the hell out of the folks inside.
Cheers and all,
I could only see this as being a successful killing technique if the
crew left the underside escape hatch open, assuming the tank had one.
Otherwise, the bullets will not penetrate armor because:
1. They will not be striking "nose first" with the same vector to
drive the tungsten core into the plate.
2. Probably be tumbling.
3. The angle will not be perpendicular to the base of the tank
(probably glancing), exact angle would depend on the angle of the
aircraft's dive.
4. Energy lost after striking the ground/road.
Maybe the pilots who reported this technique as being successful
didn't notice that the tank crews had left a roof hatch open, and that
was how the bullets destroyed the tanks.
>It is certainly true, however, that many German tankers suffered from
>a fear of the fighter bombers and some baled out of their vehicles
>when they arrived, even if, logically, a buttoned-up tank was the
>safest place to be.
>
With fingers firmly planted in ears.
>I'd guess the pilot's eyes were on flak rather
>than a target a lot of the time.
No point watching flak. There is nothing you can do about it, Watch the
target, there is a lot you can do about that. Never forget why you are flying
the mission in the first place. And it is not to look at flak..Flak is always
there no matter what. Now forget it and get on with the job.
>Well, most of the WW2 USAF pilots were in the new guy category .
>. .250-300 hours, 18-22 years old and off you go, with a few old heads
>to check you out for real.
Just be glad these "new guys" weren't shooting at you. Your casual dismissing
of their abilities doesn't hold with the way the war worked out. We won that
one remember?. Which is more than can be said for wars that came later.
Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
>pilots made such attacks, and that
>they believed that they worked. They weren't necessarily correct in
>that belief, however; as has been pointed out, the claims from RAF and
>USAAF fighter-bomber units were about ten times greater than the
>actual number of tanks destroyed
Well if they destroyed 10% of what they claimed then we know for a fact that
the P-47's destroyed one hell of a lot of tanks. The problem is with the
accuracy of the reporting, not the ability of the P-47's to destroy tanks. If
that were the case no tanks would have been destroyed. But 10% of what was
reported is still on hell of a lot of tanks. So we must conclude that the
P-47's did a damn good job. And a few thousand German tankers would agree with
that assessment.
>I never tried to skip an elongated rock with a rotation at right
>angles to, rather than parallel to, the water surface but I can't believe
>that would work at all well.
Try it and get back to us. There is no substitute for experience.
>No point watching flak. There is nothing you can do about it, Watch the
>target, there is a lot you can do about that. Never forget why you are flying
>the mission in the first place. And it is not to look at flak..Flak is always
>there no matter what. Now forget it and get on with the job.
Well, yes and no. If you watch the flak, you can tell whether you're
dealing with aimed or barrage fire. You can tell the general caliber
of the guns and so estimate the effective range and threat.
I recall one day operating in the panhandle of N. Vietnam in a flight
of four F-105s cruising in spread formation at about 20k feet. We saw
a battery of 85s fire. Lead smoothly rolled into about 30 degrees of
bank and changed heading by about 30 degrees. About ten seconds later,
the 85s burst at our altitude in the airspace we would have been
transiting.
If you've got barrage fire--guns aimed at a sector of airspace, then
you fly through it quickly. If you've got aimed fire (optical or
radar) then you need to jink or they will nail you. Watch the
flak--it's part of the job.
>
>
>Just be glad these "new guys" weren't shooting at you. Your casual dismissing
>of their abilities doesn't hold with the way the war worked out. We won that
>one remember?. Which is more than can be said for wars that came later.
>
>Arthur Kramer
Well, while we may have lost the political war, I reminded one of my
political science students last year when he mentioned the US losing
the Vietnam war, that there are 58,000 names on the Wall. The enemy in
SEA lost (according to various sources) between one and three million
dead. That sort of a ratio would indicate to me that we won a military
victory. And, it also would suggest that our enemies can't sustain too
many victories for themselves with that sort of cost.
And, as for "wars that came later" you might want to consider Desert
Storm and Iraqi Freedom as victories in your list.
Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038
> jshinal_REMO...@mindspring.com (John S. Shinal) wrote in
message news:<3f325945....@text-west.newsfeeds.com>...
> > aartamen wrote:
> >
> > >Saw this mentioned several times. Sounds somewhat implausible. A whole
> > >lot implausible actually. Was this a common practice, an isolated
> > >incident blown out of proportions or a myth? Is there an approximate
> > >tally of German heavy armor (Pz IV and up) destroyed by the western
> > >allies attack planes?
> >
> > No firsthand knowledge but plausible. Recent gun camera
> > footage of strafing attacks shows a tremendous number of tracers on
> > ricochet trajectories from low angle strafing passes on dirt
> > airfields.
>
> By definition, the angle at which the bullets would strike the
> underside of the tank would be the same as when they hit the road in
> front. If the bullets would bounce off something as soft as a dirt
> track, why should they be able to penetrate 10mm of armour plate at
> the same angle? For this to work, it would first be essential for the
> road to be harder than the armour...
Ricochets have three independant variables:
angle
relative hardness of the bullet vs surface
velocity
Makes it a bit more of a chore deciding if something will ricochet.
Any (trained) cop can tell you that a .45 will often ricochet off
automotive glass where a 9mm (traveling at about 50% greater
speed) will penetrate.
--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur
>No point watching flak. There is nothing you can do about it, Watch the
>>target, there is a lot you can do about that. Never forget why you are
>flying
>>the mission in the first place. And it is not to look at flak..Flak is
>always
>>there no matter what. Now forget it and get on with the job.
>Well, yes and no. If you watch the flak, you can tell whether you're
>dealing with aimed or barrage fire. You can tell the general caliber
>of the guns and so estimate the effective range and threat.
The post I was responding to was one about strafing where the poster accused
the pilots of watching the flack instead of the ground targets and as a reult
shooting poorly.. But for purposes of evasive action, you are of course
correct. See my website and the story "Flak, Evasive Action and the Dangerous
Games We Played." But of course that is stuff you are all too well aware of.
>And, as for "wars that came later" you might want to consider Desert
>Storm and Iraqi Freedom as victories in your list.
>
I was talking about wars in which we faced powerful determined enemies where
the outcome was not predictable before the war even began.
On 7 Aug 2003, ArtKramr wrote:
> Well if they destroyed 10% of what they claimed then we know for a fact that
> the P-47's destroyed one hell of a lot of tanks.
I seem to recall that the British did a battlefield survey of
disabled/destroyed German armor. The numbers which could be attributed to
aerial weapons was quite small, as I recall in the 2% range.
Perhaps someone with access to a printed reference to this survey
or a better memory could provide firmer numbers.
Surprisingly, or perhaps not, IIRC, the majority of German armor had no
significant damage at all - they were simply abandoned.
> The problem is with the
> accuracy of the reporting, not the ability of the P-47's to destroy tanks.
Not tanks, apparently. Soft-sides fer certain but tanks seemed to be
only occassionally disabled by aerial attack. OTOH, if the soft-sided
fuel tankers and ammunition haulers are gone, the tanks aren't going
far by themselves - which may explain the considerable numbers of tanks
which were apparently just abandoned by their crews.
> If
> that were the case no tanks would have been destroyed. But 10% of what was
> reported is still on hell of a lot of tanks. So we must conclude that the
> P-47's did a damn good job. And a few thousand German tankers would agree
> with that assessment.
Perhaps - but again if I recall correctly, tanks themselves (as opposed to
the supporting transport) were apparently more or less immune from aerial
attack. Least according to the British counts of actual vehicles on
the battlefield.
Which makes some sense - .50 calibers are almost completely ineffective
against even the top armor of any tank in front line service in 1944-45
while aerial rockets, while effective, were notoriously inaccurate and
nothing but a direct hit will do. Bombs similarly would require a
direct hit or a very near miss to disable a tank which was not the
sort of accuracy generally experienced in the pre-PGW days.
Cheers and all,
>Well, yes and no. If you watch the flak, you can tell whether you're
>dealing with aimed or barrage fire. You can tell the general caliber
>of the guns and so estimate the effective range and threat.
>If you've got barrage fire--guns aimed at a sector of airspace, then
>you fly through it quickly. If you've got aimed fire (optical or
>radar) then you need to jink or they will nail you. Watch the
>flak--it's part of the job.
I've never personally experienced tripleA except for for some over-zealous
Cubans armed with RPKs taking potshots at our Hueys down in GITMO, and some
lunatic Lebonese dropping mortar rounds into Beirut airport while we were on the
taxiway.
However, I'm one of those over 50 guys who plays online combat sims for
recreation Let's face it, piloting a fighter in combat is the domain of the
young and bold. However, unlike the real world age is no factor since there
isn't any flight forces acting on one's body other than gravity pinning one's
butt into a comfy chair.
I play Aces High, the undisputed Rolls Royce of the genre. We have full realism,
and the learning curve is extremely steep. Generally speaking, if you have no
flight experience, you will have a very long and painful period of growth. This
sim is WWII based, so weapon systems are simple, gunsights are even less complex
than the basic reflector sights of the era. However, there's tripleA everywhere
and it is highly lethal to your viritual aircraft. Some is manned, some is AI
directed. The manned guns are brutal if the gunner has decent skills.
For lethality, nothing exceeds the 5" dual mounts of the carrier task forces.
Much of this is manned and you absolutely MUST watch it or you will be dead in a
heart beat. Watching the flak is part of the necessary situational awareness
required to survive in a totally hostile enviroment.
The barrage ack is also dangerous, but at least the odds favor not getting hit.
But, the manned guns will track you, and you must be alert to where the shells
detonate. I prefer to chase the ack up and down, much like a Battleship skipper
would chase salvos. The idea is that the gunners will be constantly correcting
their point of aim, so you head relative to the last burst hoping that the
gunner's correction will be along the predicted flight path rather than along
the altered path. I find it works well most of the time. However, even a blind
pig finds the ear of corn once in a while.
The danger really heightens when you commit to your attack. You jink as much as
possible while trying to avoid such radical maneuvering that your bombs will
miss the target altogether. Obviously, the lower the release point the greater
the chance of scoring a hit. Smart guys release above 10,000 ft to avoid the
remarkable concentration of small caliber ack. The foolhardy fly right into the
teeth of the tripleA and most never emerge on the other side. Those that do are
piloting flying sieves with little chance of getting home.
So, with with my combat flying experience being limited to flying a PC, if you
will, I absolutely agree that you must watch the flak carefully, especially when
below 15,000 feet or you will pay the price.
One more thing about this type of sim. You fly with and against real people.
People, who in many cases have thousands of hours of ACM experience within the
environment of a simulation. Their ACM skills are extraordinary. ACM guru Robert
L. Shaw spoke at an Aces High convention, and was dumbstruck at the skill level
of many players. More than a few combat veteran fighter pilots have tried this
sim and came away horrified at the beating they took. Still others (one an F-15
driver) excel at the sim and are tough cookies to defeat in a straight-up duel.
We even have a WWII veteran Lancaster pilot, who loves to take up the big Lancs,
and even dabbles with fighters.
Just like in the real world, there are two types of fighter pilots, aces and
targets. About 5% of the pilots account for around half of the air to air kills,
with the other 95% comprising the vast majority of the victims. Indeed, the
average AH sim pilot is hardpressed to reach a 1:1 kill to death ratio, while
the better pilots can easily maintain 10 to 30 times that.
For the old fart fighter pilot wannabe (like me), former fighter jocks and even
current fighter drivers, this sim is great fun, it sharpens basic ACM and SA
skills and provides for something more entertaining than watching Discovery
Wings.
If nothing else, you will learn to appreciate the cast iron balls it took to
flying combat missions in WWII aircraft. Can you imagine landing a shot-up F4U-4
deadstick aboard an Essex class CV in the dark? It'll curl your toes. :)
>If nothing else, you will learn to appreciate the cast iron balls it took to
>flying combat missions in WWII aircraft. Can you imagine landing a shot-up
>F4U-4
>deadstick aboard an Essex class CV in the dark? It'll curl your toes. :)
On the bomb run, where flak is usually heaviest. you fly straight and level
with bombay doors open. No turns No evasive action. You just do it. And getting
our toes curled was something we never worried about. And an 88 could do a
lot more to you than that You have never lived until you've see flak that is so
close you can see the red hot core in the midst of the black smoke,, feel the
shock of the explosion and hear the stuff raining. down on the skin of your
plane like rocks in a tin roof.When you see the black puffs the flak is
harmless because all the steel has already dropped away. I would love ot take
everyone on this NG for just one ride through a heavy flak field over Germany.
. Just once. A second time would never be necessary
I's not the flak you see that hurts you, it is the flak you never see.that
kills you..
Go to my website and click on"FLAK".I took that shot in a heavy flakfield out
of the nose of Willie The Wolf. I think that one was over Koblenz.
I recall being told, in my target-shooting days, of a range which had
a lake between the firing point and the targets. On a calm day with no
ripples, they found that if they aimed at the reflection of the target
the bullets would ricochet off the water and hit the target. Of
course, the angle was very shallow.
This is what I wrote in 'Flying Guns: World War II':
"The fighter-bomber pilots pressed home their attacks with great
courage throughout the campaign despite the often ferocious light FlaK
which caused loss rates far above those experienced by fighter units
(one Typhoon squadron suffered 100% casualties in an eighteen-month
period). They were confident that any German tank they spotted was as
good as dead, and they earned a considerable reputation for tank
killing, with substantial claims being accepted. However, British
operational research (OR) carried out at the time (but not publicised
for obvious reasons) presented a more complex picture. As the Allies
were advancing, intelligence officers were often able to examine a
battlefield shortly after an air attack, and what they discovered
causes controversy even today. (Much of this section is taken from Ian
Gooderson's "Air Power at the Battlefront", which explores this issue
in great detail).
The evidence gathered by the OR teams indicated that very few tanks
were destroyed by air attack. A British War Office analysis of 223
Panther tanks destroyed in 1944 revealed that only fourteen resulted
from air attack (eleven to RPs and three to aircraft cannon). During
the Mortain battle of 7-10 August, the RAF and USAAF launched
sustained attacks on a German armoured column over a period of six
hours, claiming 252 German tanks destroyed or damaged in nearly 500
sorties. It was subsequently discovered that there had only been a
total of 177 tanks or tank destroyers deployed by the Germans and just
46 of those were lost, of which only nine could be attributed to air
attack (seven to RPs and two to bombs). During the German retreat from
the Falaise pocket later in August, the RAF and USAAF claimed 391
armoured vehicles destroyed. Shortly afterwards, the battlefield was
examined and only 133 armoured vehicles of all types were found, of
which just 33 had been the victim of any sort of air attack. In the
retreat to the Seine, large numbers of armoured vehicles were left
behind and Typhoon pilots alone claimed 222 destroyed, but only
thirteen out of 388 AFVs examined were found to have been knocked out
by RP attack. In the Ardennes salient, just seven out of 101
knocked-out AFVs were definitely or possibly attributed to air attack,
compared with claims for 90. It should be noted that in the prevailing
circumstances of a continuing retreat, there was no question of the
German Army having recovered any damaged tanks in these later actions,
in fact the battlefields were often littered with undamaged tanks
abandoned by their crews.
One source estimates that probably no more than about 100 tanks were
lost due to hits from air weapons during the entire Normandy campaign.
In contrast, the RAF's 2nd TAF (including elements of the Air Defence
of Britain which took part in the campaign) and the USAAF's 9th Air
Force lost over 1,700 aircraft between them.
The ineffectiveness of air attack against tanks should have caused no
surprise because the weapons available to the fighter-bombers were not
suitable for destroying them. Put simply, the heavy machine guns and
20 mm cannon were capable of hitting the tanks easily enough, but
insufficiently powerful to damage them, except occasionally by chance.
The RPs and bombs used were certainly capable of destroying the tanks
but were too inaccurate to hit them, except occasionally by chance."
More's the pity; the USA had an excellent 37mm aircraft gun in the
inventory - the high-velocity M9 - but never used it. A pair of those
slung under a P-47's wings would have transformed their tank-killing
ability.
> There's a very interesting article about the effectiveness of Il-2
> against heavy armor. Even though when anyone says Il-2 people
> automatically think tank-buster, the effectiveness was nearly
> negligent. If they got any, it was by massive application of firepower
> or luck. They were excellent against soft targets with rockets, bombs
> and guns though. That article could be found at www.batllefield.ru
> somewhere. Unfortunately, I could not find it just now. The site is
> mostly armor oriented.
The Il-2 3M was equipped with a pair of high-velocity 37mm NS-37
cannon, which were capable of penetrating just under two inches of
armour plate at normal firing range - plenty against the side or rear
armour. However, they were difficult to use as the recoil of this
weapon was severe enough to push the nose down on firing. The main
tank-killing weapon of the Il-2 was the PTAB 'cluster bomb'; they
could shower an area with bomblets, to great effect, and they demanded
much less accuracy from the pilot.
>
>These aircraft did not have a weapon that was both sufficiently
>powerful and sufficiently accurate against tanks. (Rockets were
>devastating, but the hit probability was only 0.5%.)
Do you happen to know what the real kill rate was at Falaise? The
Typhoons were supposed to have just about wiped out every bit of useful
armour - was that the only big, verifiable success for rockets?
Cheers,
Dave
--
Dave Eadsforth
> Do you happen to know what the real kill rate was at Falaise? The
> Typhoons were supposed to have just about wiped out every bit of useful
> armour
The battlefield examination team found 33 armoured vehicles
that had been the victim of air attack. The original RAF and
USAF claim was for 391 -- about three times as much as the
total number of wrecked tanks and other vehicles on the
battlefield, and probably also about three times the number
the German had, as they lost almost everything.
You have to keep in mind that the number of German tanks
at Falaise was rather low. No more than about 30 tanks and
armoured vehicles per worn-out 'Panzerdivision' seems to
have been the norm.
> - was that the only big, verifiable success for rockets?
Depends on what you call a success. No large numbers of
tanks were destroyed, but the German stopped their movement
and hid under cover when the sky cleared. Their mobility was
restricted to times when there was a fog or in the dark of the night.
(No moonlight!) As a force they were extremely vulnerable
to air attack. Much of their mobility depended on horses, not
armour.
--
Emmanuel Gustin
Emmanuel.Gustin -rem@ve- skynet.be
Flying Guns Page: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/
And even more depended on horses, my father reported that
it was the number of dead horses at Falaise that shocked him
most when they finally secured the pocket.
Keith
There's a scene in The Dam Busters where the guy playing Barnes Wallis
explains that in Nelson's day the RN gunners used to bounce cannon balls
off the water to improve their effectiveness. No idea if correct or why
though?
--
John
>he evidence gathered by the OR teams indicated that very few tanks
>were destroyed by air attack. A British War Office analysis of 223
>Panther tanks destroyed in 1944 revealed that only fourteen resulted
>from air attack (eleven to RPs and three to aircraft cannon). Dur
Of course these investigating teams belonged to the ground forces and had a
strong vested interest in elevating the effectiveness of ground fire vs air
attack, This is a conflict of interest we saw all during the war and it must be
taken with a grain of salt. Because you read it in a book doesn't make it so. I
have flown over battle grounds where underneath us we saw P-47's leaving
German tanks smoking and burning. The ineffectiveness of air power is a persuit
that the ground forces persue endlessly. And of course without success.
To get a hit right at the water line. The solid shot punched a hole only
so big, and a waterline hit was the most effective way to get the
opposition's attention.
> Do you happen to know what the real kill rate was at Falaise? The
>> Typhoons were supposed to have just about wiped out every bit of useful
>> armour
>The battlefield examination team found 33 armoured vehicles
>that had been the victim of air attack. The original RAF and
>USAF claim was for 391 -- about three times as much as the
>total number of wrecked tanks and other vehicles on the
>battlefield, and probably also about three times the number
The battlelfield examination team was made up of ground forces with a vested
interest in minimising the effectiveness of air attack vs artillery. According
to them air attack was near worthless. And we know that not to be true. Don't
believe everything you read.
Doubt it - operational analysis teams were pretty high-level affairs,
responsible (without checking Dyson, who was OA for bomber command) to
chief-of-staff level. The whole point of OA was to try to get a bias-free,
scientific look at what was actually happening which was as free as
possible from any bias. It was actually one of the effective tools which
Britain introduced which - in some cases at least, like routing atlantic
convoys - made a real difference to the way the war went.
OA would have been going well out of its way to try not to bring any
bias or baggage to the investigation. IIRc the conclusion was that
fighter-bombers were not effective at destroying tanks, but were very
effective at destroying tank formations, advances and distupting retreats
by destroying the supporting soft-skin vehicles, though I'd have to check
that to be sure. This, of course, meant that they were effective enough
to be going on with, though improved methods of attacking the tanks
themselves were (again, IIRC) recommended for research..
--
Andy Breen ~ Interplanetary Scintillation Research Group
http://users.aber.ac.uk/azb/
"Who dies with the most toys wins" (Gary Barnes)
Maybe but standard RN tactic of the day were to kill the maximum
numbers of the enemy crew before boarding and
capturing the ship. Prize money was a very popular addition
to the income of all on board.
Keith
>I seem to recall that the British did a battlefield survey of
>disabled/destroyed German armor. The numbers which could be attributed to
>aerial weapons was quite small, as I recall in the 2% range.
>Perhaps someone with access to a printed reference to this survey
>or a better memory could provide firmer numbers.
>Surprisingly, or perhaps not, IIRC, the majority of German armor had no
>significant damage at all - they were simply abandoned.
In fully-running condition? I.e. -- fueled, armed, usable?
There's not a lot of reason to sit in a large target if that's all it is...
--
A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@nrk.com
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433
> article <20030808092229...@mb-m01.aol.com>,
>ArtKramr <artk...@aol.com> wrote:
>>>Subject: Re: P-47/51 deflection shots into the belly of the German tanks,
>>>From:
>ony.Wi...@quarry.nildram.co.uk (Tony Williams)
>>>Date: 8/7/03 11:41 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>>
>>>he evidence gathered by the OR teams indicated that very few tanks
>>>were destroyed by air attack. A
>ritish War Office analysis of 223
>>>Panther tanks destroyed in 1944 revealed that only fourteen resulted
>>>from air attack (eleven to RPs and three to aircraft cannon). Dur
>>
>>Of course these investigating teams belonged to the ground
>rces and had a
>>strong vested interest in elevating the effectiveness of ground fire vs air
>Doubt it - operational analysis teams were pretty high-level affairs,
>responsible (without checking Dyson, who was OA for bomber command) to
All the more reason. Buck privates didn'l give a damn. High level officers had
their careers at stake
Then again they were those who did as they claimed. Many paid for it with their
lives. Any comment about that?
> ArtKramr <artk...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> >Of course these investigating teams belonged to the ground forces and had a
> >strong vested interest in elevating the effectiveness of ground fire vs air
>
> Doubt it - operational analysis teams were pretty high-level affairs,
> responsible (without checking Dyson, who was OA for bomber command) to
> chief-of-staff level. The whole point of OA was to try to get a bias-free,
> scientific look at what was actually happening which was as free as
That may have been the goal but I wonder how well it was pursued. Elimination
of "bias" can be a tricky effort.
Isn't the Strategic Bombing Survey done after WWII, considered somewhat
suspect as well? The survey basically concluded that strategic bombing
didn't accomplish much. Apparently all done by ground officers with the
alleged goal of undermining air power in favor of grunt power.
Certainly not saying air power won the war as many upper echelon AF
people might claim, but definitely a power force in shaping the battlefield
and warfare.
SMH
Not officers, and IIRC not even service. OA was handled through other
channels, with a lot of the analysis being civilian (IIRC) for
precisely that reason. They had to be able to trample heavily on very
senior toes without fear of comeback (example: E.J. Williams, who'd
been head of Physics here, was IIRC the guy who told the Admiralty their
entire convoy signal code was compromised - and could back it up with
OA evidence: that must have trampled some toes in the signals branch)
>sn't the Strategic Bombing Survey done after WWII, considered somewhat
>suspect as well? The survey basically concluded that strategic bombing
>didn't accomplish much. Apparently all done by ground officers with the
>alleged goal of undermining air power in favor of grunt power.
>
>Certainly not saying air power won the war as many upper echelon AF
>people might claim, but definitely a power force in shaping the battlefield
>and warfare.
>
>
>SMH
>
Not just suspect but by now quite discredited. Remember it was not a military
report, it was an economic one.
I'm unfamiliar with the battle, but if air attack only got 33, what got
the rest (assuming about 130 vehicles were destroyed from the above
numbers)?
--
John
Now there is a truly interesting question. (grin)
The first page I found on the battle has a photo of U.S. infantrymen,
backed by a column of M10 tank destroyers.
Do you suppose they might have got some?
Dave
>If you want to put thick armour on the belly, you have to trade off
>something else: lose a lot of armour off the front (which gets shot at),
>use a smaller gun, or be a lot heavier and slower.
and use more fuel, and needing better transport, and not able to cross
as many bridges.... etc...
a) What air assets were, in that era?
b) Moving ahead, what later weapons were more sucessful? (Assume we
can stop when we reach the GAU-8 but before?)
There is no reason to get defensive here. Ground attack was a
particularly dangerous mission, and I have no intention of questioning
their brave and honorable efforts. However, it has also been my
experience, having served in the AF, that while they might be officers
and gentlemen and skilled pilots, not many were dispassionate observers
or knew jack about anything outside rather narrow interests. Inflated
and erroneous claims, friendly fire incidents, and any number of just
dumb stunts/bad ends were done by guys who would have sworn they knew
what they were doing as they did them. No doubt any number thought they
were really doing the ricochet tank killing stunt, but I'd be very
surpise/interested in any factual support of it actually succeeding.
>However, it has also been my experience, having served
>in the AF, that while they might be officers and gentlemen
>and skilled pilots, not many were dispassionate observers
>or knew jack about anything outside rather narrow interests.
Huh?
-Mike (huh?) Marron
On 8 Aug 2003, ArtKramr wrote:
> I
> have flown over battle grounds where underneath us we saw P-47's leaving
> German tanks smoking and burning.
At what altitude? >8,000 feet certainly? I wonder just how easy it
is to distinguish a tank from a similar sized soft-side vehicle at
distances of a mile and half and up. Particularly, one that is "smoking
and burning" and presumably at least partially obscured thereby.
Particularly by air crew which should, theoretically, be keeping their
collective eyes pealed for enemy fighters and flak rather than
grandstanding the ground action below.
> The ineffectiveness of air power is a persuit
> that the ground forces persue endlessly.
While the air forces continually pursued the doctrine of
air power as the ultimate wonder weapon which made all else
unnecessary and redundant.
> And of course without success.
Air power is not ineffective in all circumstances. But it is
more effective in some than in others and ultimately victory,
even in the current PGW-era, requires putting boots on the ground.
Ground attack in WWII was a marvelous means of disrupting the
enemy. It could destroy trucks, troops in formation, and
morale in general. What it could not do, on any sort of consistant
basis, was destroy heavily armored vehicles such as tanks.
Cheers and all,
In any case, the Army would not have wanted to discredit RAF close
support - they spent much of their time trying to persuade a reluctant
RAF that such support was vitally important!
I've just been reading about Gertman artillery in WW1, and they
developed a technique with delay-action fuzed HE shells at short
range. They would fire the shells to glance off the ground - this
would set the fuze, which would then detonate when the shell had
ricocheted back into the air, over the target.
Artillery? I've read about german soldiers who feared american artillery
more than anything else - it was less intense in volume than on the eastern
front,but much more accurate.
Looking through the photos in Panzers in Normandy, then and now,
a lot were clearly simply abandoned as they ran out of gas.
Others were clearly disabled by mines (tracks and road wheel blown off)
while some showed clear signs of beink knocked out by gunfire (single
penetration of armor)
A few seem to have been hit by rockets as the damage was on the
upperside of the vehicle, probably the most spectacular wreck is
the Mk IV that seems to have been hit by a heavy shell from NGFS ,
the largest piece of wreckage left is the engine block.
Keith
Those bouncing bombs were just too whacky. Why didn't they use
torpedos? Big ones.
Grantland
Because there were anti-torpedo nets across the lakes in front of the
dams. Big ones.
--
Andy Breen ~ Not speaking on behalf of the University of Wales....
Nieveler's law: "Any USENET thread, if sufficiently prolonged and not
Godwinated, will eventually turn into a discussion about
alcoholic drinks."
Guns worked fairly well - the German 37mm and British 40mm, on Stukas
and Hurricanes respectively - until the armour got too thick for them. I
seem to recall the Russians using an early version of a cluster bomb,
dispensing armour-piercing bomblets.
>
>b) Moving ahead, what later weapons were more sucessful? (Assume we
>can stop when we reach the GAU-8 but before?)
I'm not sure there were really any thoroughly successful airborne
anti-tank weapons until you get into cluster bombs like Rockeye and
BL755, and PGMs like Maverick. Remember, one of the primary roles of a
tank is "not being easy to destroy"...
--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill
Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk
Not to mention the fact that no airplane on earth could have lifted
a torpedo with the size of warhead needed.
Keith
On Sat, 9 Aug 2003, Keith Willshaw wrote:
-snips-
> Not to mention the fact that no airplane on earth could have lifted
> a torpedo with the size of warhead needed.
Didn't the US Navy take out a rather large hydroelectric dam in Korea with
torpedoes slung under AD-1s?
-Single- engined aircraft although, admittedly, one honkin' big single
engine.
Cheers and all,
Sadly, each conflict we get involved in nowadays proves that such
mistakes still happen.
>On 7 Aug 2003, ArtKramr wrote:
>> Well if they destroyed 10% of what they claimed then we know for a fact that
>> the P-47's destroyed one hell of a lot of tanks.
According to The 9th Air Force in World War II by Kenn C Rust
the 9th Air Force claims from October 1943 to the end of the
war in Europe included 4,509 tanks and armoured vehicles,
53,811 motor transport. There are some breakdowns of claims
by day or period but no complete day by day list, but usually a
total by month.
>I seem to recall that the British did a battlefield survey of
>disabled/destroyed German armor. The numbers which could be attributed to
>aerial weapons was quite small, as I recall in the 2% range.
Air Power at the Battlefront by Ian Gooderson is the book
written using some of the reports.
La Baleine, 22 armoured vehicles and guns examined, 7
destroyed by rockets, 2 possibly by rockets, 1 unknown
shell, 1 unknown causes, 4 by crew, 7 abandoned. The
survey team noted there was evidence to support the idea
the Germans had abandoned their vehicles when it was
realised air attack was imminent.
At the Mortain counter attack allied fighter bomber pilots
claimed 77 tanks destroyed, 43 probably destroyed, 56
damaged. The examination of the battlefield, which noted
there was German salvage activity so some tanks were
probably recovered (but tanks hit by rockets or bombs
were usually burnt out and so not worth recovering), losses
of tanks, armoured cars and APCs by cause, 15 destroyed
by rockets, 4 by strafing (all APCs), 2 by bombs, 9 abandoned,
4 by crew, 28 by US army and15 to unknown causes.
There are other surveys reported.
>Perhaps someone with access to a printed reference to this survey
>or a better memory could provide firmer numbers.
>
>Surprisingly, or perhaps not, IIRC, the majority of German armor had no
>significant damage at all - they were simply abandoned.
Of 101 tanks surveyed in the Ardennes salient 1 was lost to a
bomb, and 6 were possibly lost to air attack, 36 to AP shot,
8 to HE, 17 were demolished, 22 abandoned, 2 to other causes
10 to unknown causes.
Tanks probably rank second to concrete emplacements as the
toughest battlefield target. It is clear air attack did make some
crews think they were safer outside the vehicle and caused the
abandonment of others, but it is also clear it was the threat of
attack that stopped or slowed movement and the destruction of
the soft skinned vehicles where the fighter bombers had their
greatest effect, not destroying tanks directly.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Very likely but when you consider how may upkeep weapons exploded
against the Mohne dam before it failed ....
IRC old Barnes Wallis did a lot of scale testing to determine the minimum
explosive charge needed
Keith
A shaped charge would be different. 'Moot though, if there were nets.
Grantland
The whole of the Upkeep charge was effectively a 'shaped charge' though,
pressed right up against the dam wall with hundreds of millions of tons
of water behind it. The whole operation depended on the ability to keep
it pressed against the wall.
--
John
You're confusing Monroe effect with containment.
Grantland
Don't be so certain about that - I've an example in one of my OR texts
("OR in World War 2, Operational Research against the U boat", CH
Waddington, Elek Science, London, 1973, conveniently enough) that
includes one of the more interesting exercizes in "Book-Cooking" to
come down the road. One of the studies involves aircraft selection
for ASW patrol. The types included are the PBY (Catalina), the
Sunderland, the Liberator, Halifax II, the Wellington XIV, and the
as-yet unbuilt Warwick. The Warwick numbers assume lethality (Pk) and
availability niumbers (Flight hrs/day) that are better than any other
British aircraft by a factor of 2, and a "Conversion Factor" that
supposedly has something to do with operating economy, but which bears
no relationship to airpcraft and equipment complexity (The biggest
driver in that situation) Looked upon with the cynical eye of a
participant and evaluator of OR studies, the document is clarly a
thinly veiled justifiacation for proceeding with Warwick production.
(As it turned out, the Warwick never reached the standards named in
the report, and in real-life service worked out to be about the same
as the Wellington, in the ASW role.)
The F-111/TFW selection fiasco is an excellent USAnian example of this
fudging of reports as well. The inital selection studies, and the
services that were to use the aircraft, indicated that the best choice
would be the Boeing design with Rolls Spey derivative engines.
Robert S. MacNamara, Kennedy adn Johnson's Secretary of Defence, and
Harold Brown, his Secretary of teh Air Force, didn't want teh Boeing,
and kept requesting more and more tilted studies until they got the
one they wanted - the General Dynamics proposal with the Pratt &
Whitney TF30 engine. While the F-111 eventually turned into a damned
good Medium Bomber, it never came close to living up to its promises
for fighter performance, Aircraft Carrier compatability, or
commonality between versions. (And I don't think that anybody regards
the TF30 as a successful fighter engine)
--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster
> "steve gallacci" <bev...@comcast.net> wrote in message
> news:3F33A6FC...@comcast.net...
> >
> >
> > John Halliwell wrote:
> > >
> > > In article <e64faab.03080...@posting.google.com>, Tony
> > > Williams <Tony.W...@quarry.nildram.co.uk> writes
> > > >I recall being told, in my target-shooting days, of a range which had
> > > >a lake between the firing point and the targets. On a calm day with no
> > > >ripples, they found that if they aimed at the reflection of the target
> > > >the bullets would ricochet off the water and hit the target. Of
> > > >course, the angle was very shallow.
> > >
> > > There's a scene in The Dam Busters where the guy playing Barnes Wallis
> > > explains that in Nelson's day the RN gunners used to bounce cannon balls
> > > off the water to improve their effectiveness. No idea if correct or why
> > > though?
> > >
> > To get a hit right at the water line. The solid shot punched a hole only
> > so big, and a waterline hit was the most effective way to get the
> > opposition's attention.
>
> Maybe but standard RN tactic of the day were to kill the maximum
> numbers of the enemy crew before boarding and
> capturing the ship. Prize money was a very popular addition
> to the income of all on board.
I guess that depends on whether you're after a merchant or
ship of the line.
--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur
The main difference was that merchantmen could usually be persuaded
to heave to without having a broadside fired at them. Prize money
was assessed on ship and cargo and in the case of a ship of
war that ajudication was done by a vice-admiralty court.
if the source I just found is right prize money before 1808
was distributed as follows
12.5% -- to the flag officer commanding
25.0% -- to the commander of the capturing vessel
12.5% -- distributed to the master and lieutenants
12.5% -- distributed to the other warrant sea officers
12.5% -- distributed to the inferior and petty officers
25.0% -- distributed to the "private men", seamen, and marines
Merchant ships and their cargos had ready markets so usually
paid better than warships but a 72 gun ship of the line could
still be worth several thousand pounds, a colossal sum in the 18th century
Keith
In May, 1944, when the Herman Goering panzer division decided to attack south
through the Liri Valley in daylight, trusting to cloud cover to conceal its
movement, B-25 strafers coming in at very low level slaughtered it. They
dropped 500 pounders and fragmentation bombs, but it was mostly the tens of
thousands of rounds of .50 fired at almost point blank range from the rear that
seems to have done most of the damage. Burned out anks, troop carriers, gun
carriers, trucks and artillery pieces--as well as hundreds of dead
Germans--littered the road for miles; your Italian Highway of Death.
During the Korean war, Tactical Air Control Parties could, with confidence,
call in P-51s to stop armor by strafing.
Chris Mark
What would be more effective for strafing -- An F-51 with it's six
50-calibers or an A-1 with its four 20 mm cannon?
-Mike (my money's on the A-1) Marron
>What would be more effective for strafing -- An F-51 with it's six
>50-calibers or an A-1 with its four 20 mm cannon?
>
>-Mike (my money's on the A-1) Marron
Whatever makes the bigger hole. twentymikemike presumably. But the .50 was
adequate, when used correctly and with sufficient volume, to deal with most of
the tanks of WW2/korea era.
Chris Mark
The Americans did some tests in 1951 in Korea, using some USAF and
USMC planes to strafe trucks (the story is on the web somewhere).
Basically the six .50s in the USAF planes did little damage, whereas
the 20mm was devastating.
Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
Art, are those photos taken by you personally? Regarding the
"One goes down" photo..I get a tear in my eye just seeing the
photo. I can't imagine what I would feel if I were personally
watching a planeload of my buds going down like that. Is it
horror, anger, sorrow,...? How the hell did you mentally deal
with watching something like that?
My heart goes out to you for having to go through such experiences.
>
> Arthur Kramer
> Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
> http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
On 12 Aug 2003, Chris Mark wrote:
-snips-
> Whatever makes the bigger hole. twentymikemike presumably. But the .50 was
> adequate, when used correctly and with sufficient volume, to deal with most of
> the tanks of WW2/korea era.
I shouldn't think so - top armor on a T34/85 was 20mm which is just about
at the maximum penetration of an AP .50 caliber round at 300 yards.
But of course, maximum penetration is calculated with a 90 degree
impact - something a strafing aircraft is unlikely to achieve -
anything over 45 degrees is unlikely and something below 30 degrees
more typical.
Cheers and all,
> What would be more effective for strafing -- An F-51 with it's six
> 50-calibers or an A-1 with its four 20 mm cannon?
If the A-1 had four 20 mm cannon (originally two) this
was in no small part because of the feedback designer
Ed Heinemann had been given on the relative merits of
the 20 mm vs. .50 for strafing during his tour of the Pacific
in WWII. The A-1 incorporated quite a lot of this kind
of user feedback -- probably this was an unique example
of aircrew opinion have more influence on a design than
official specifications.
Of course, the F-51 was a poor choice for ground strafing
altogether; much too vulnerable.
--
Emmanuel Gustin
Emmanuel.Gustin -rem@ve- skynet.be
Flying Guns Page: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/
>top armor on a T34/85 was 20mm which is just about
>at the maximum penetration of an AP .50 caliber round at 300 yards.
Some of those P-51 guys would "come in below the dust" on some of their
strafing runs coming up behind those tanks, don't know that top armor was that
much of a factor. In any case, armor on the move in the open was not a cause
for concern but jubilation: "Gentlemen, have we got a Target for you!" That's
assuming weather was cooperating and air was immediately on tap. And
considering the usual terrain of Korea, to come down on the deck and get in as
close as they did, those pilots were not only amazingly skilled, but about as
brave as a human being can get. Sometimes they paid with their lives. But they
saved a *lot* of GIs.
Of course, had the .50 been replaced by 20mm that would have been all to the
good. And had the P-51 been replaced by the AD that would have been all to the
good, too. But you work with what you've got.
As an aside, I remember talking with a pilot who flew the F-80 and F-84 in
Korea and he mentioned that one of the advantages of the P-51 over the early
jets was the ability to take off with a heavy load under density conditions
that wouldn't allow the jets to get airborne. Apparently the F-84 was
especially bad in this regard. If anyone knows more about this, or knows if it
is really true, I would be interested in learning about it.
Chris Mark
>>What would be more effective for strafing -- An F-51 with it's six
>>50-calibers or an A-1 with its four 20 mm cannon?
>If the A-1 had four 20 mm cannon (originally two) this
>was in no small part because of the feedback designer
>Ed Heinemann had been given on the relative merits of
>the 20 mm vs. .50 for strafing during his tour of the Pacific
>in WWII. The A-1 incorporated quite a lot of this kind
>of user feedback -- probably this was an unique example
>of aircrew opinion have more influence on a design than
>official specifications.
A wicked video of the A-1's four 20 mm in action here:
http://skyraider.org/hook/movies.htm
My father also had a great story about playing a deadly
"cat & mouse" game with a NVN grunt -- literally toying with
then greasing him in his tracks -- using the A-1's slow speed,
great maneuverability and four cannon.
>Of course, the F-51 was a poor choice for ground strafing
>altogether; much too vulnerable.
Righto.
-Mike Marron
20mm, definitely.
The .50 was a fine anti-fighter weapon for most of the war, blessed with
a good rate of fire, excellent ballistics, and reasonable lethality.
Against bombers it would have struggled, but the US rarely faced large,
armoured bombers. The RAF started with .303, rapidly found it wanting
and moved to the Hispano; the USAF had the .50 which was a good
all-rounder, even if with hindsight a change to 20mm for many roles
would have been better.
The USN switched to 20mm. the USAF didn't. Difference between Pacific
and Europe, perhaps?
>The .50
>Against bombers it would have struggled
>but the US rarely faced large,
>armoured bombers.
There were enough friendly fire incidents to demonstrate the lethality of US
.50 cal against "large armored bombers."
Chris Mark
Just looking at a German 20mm round compared to a US 12.7 shows one
thing: the cartridge and charge size were about the same, the round
about the same length. The US round trading volume for velocity and
ballistics. I believe 760m/s vs 900m/s.
The Germans had a 20mm cannon known as a Mk 151/20 which was also
available as 15mm Mk 151/15 that had otherwise the same barrel length.
This was a weapon comparable in ballistics (slighly better) to the US
0.50 inch. Its round could carry a small explosive. On the whole the
Germans used the 20mm version as despite the 15mm weapons superior
ballistics as the destructive power was so much more. The Mk151/15
was fairly quickly dropped from the Me109F in favour of the Mk 151/20.
However the Germans continue to show interests in the Mk151/15.
The Focke Wulf Ta 183 Jet fighter (the basis for the Mig 15) was to
have a choice of
4 x 151/15 15mm
4 x 151/20 20mm
or 2 x Mk 108 30mm
Presumably fighter to fighter combat would have made the 15mm round
more effective in terms of scoring hits with 4 guns probably supllying
sufficient rounds.
Not necessarily. The .50 cal was generally more reliable than most of
the 20mm cannon then available, and carried more ammo per weapon.
Unless you can show that 20mm armed fighters were demonstrably
superior strafers (and given the records attained by the P-47 and P-51
in both the European and Pacific theaters that is going to be hard to
do), it is kind of hard to say "20mm definitely", IMO. Remember, the
question regards strafing, not the downing of large, reasonably
armored bombers.
>
> The USN switched to 20mm. the USAF didn't. Difference between Pacific
> and Europe, perhaps?
When did the USN switch to the 20mm during WWII, or for that matter
during the Korean War? AFAIK, the standard remained the .50 cal in
both services until after the Korean conflict, when both began
shifting to the 20mm at roughly the same time (in the same general
timeframe that the A-1 was coming into major service with its 20mm,
the later F-86 variants were also gaining the heavier weapons, IIRC,
as was the new F-100).
Brooks