Bombers from the late cold war
sddso
the B-1, it would have fared more poorly. The country was very
fortunate in the late 1940s that Robert Strange McNamara and the peace
freaks were still in the future.
> Susan & Bill Maddux wrote:
>
> I am looking for anyone who have served with B-52s or B-1Bs. Mostly
> BUFF though, as for the B-1s suck most of the times. I served with the
> 92nd bomb wing at Fairchild AFB, then with the 4300 PBW during Desert
> Storm. I then was forced to work the B-1s at Dyess with the 27/28th
> Bomb squadron. I like taking about the Buffs from any of its long
> life. the B-1 I just like to joke about.
>
> Bill "maddog" Maddux
Susan & Bill Maddux
it will always be if it does not get proper funding and part manufactures.
I never worked on an aircraft that RED BALLed and IFEd as much as the B-1. I
here the F-4s maybe where as bad.
The problem with the B-1 is mostly that Rockwell should have stayed away
from the bid, and let a reall aircraft company build it. MC, Boeing, or
Northrop
sddso <jsp...@dtgnet.com> wrote in message
news:3A0993D7...@dtgnet.com...
John Randolph
Naaah. No way.
"Susan & Bill Maddux" <mad...@fallsnet.com> wrote in message
news:dXiO5.8636$2j....@newsfeed.slurp.net...
Dangerpig
The P-51, B-25, F-86, F-100, OV-10 and T-2 were all junk. Oh yeah, the
Apollo command module was crap also.
sddso
While we're praising North American, don't forget the T-6/SNJ. It could
be said that in the B-1, NA finally sold USAF a B-70 variant. Go look
at the airframe silhouette similarities.
Peace freaks aside (a problem still with us), USAF (1) tried to be the
integrator for the B-1, and (2) attempted concurrent development and
testing. This created headaches because (1) 2Lts were pitted against
the best corporate lawyers for contract negotiations, (2) concurrency
fails proportionate to the technical risk and schedule tautness, and (3)
the people in charge (read: ever greater numbers of fighter pilots) had
less idea what they were doing with each passing year (truer than ever
from 1992 on). The third point has disquieting applications outside the
B-1 world, and indeed has already affected the F-15 adversely.
Many BONE hands figure that if Boeing had done the integration, B-1s
would work better. Of course, no one could have afforded them then.
The BONE unit for ALLIED FORCE had the fewest maintenance aborts of any
outfit & weapon system that went into action.
BUFDRVR
>outfit & weapon system that went into action.
I'd like to see the figures that prove that ! They did very well over there
(even better then us as far as maintenance aborts), but hardly close to what I
would think would be exceptional. If you're talking about fragged aircraft over
target, you're probably correct, however they had 1 and sometimes 2 engine
running spares for each 2 ship launch. Kind of easy to make sure you get the
fragged aircraft in the fight when you've got a 100% spare rate. We flew 6-8
sorties a day and never had the luxury of an engine running spare and only had
a regular spare 50% of the time due to the fact we never had more then 10 jets
on the ramp at a time.
BUFDRVR
"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"
Keith Willshaw
>
> While we're praising North American, don't forget the T-6/SNJ. It could
> be said that in the B-1, NA finally sold USAF a B-70 variant. Go look
> at the airframe silhouette similarities.
>
I just did - no comparison
B-1A - Mach 2 Bomber with Variable Geometry wing , single vertical
stabiliser, conventional tail and 4 engines
B-70 - Mach 3 Bomber with Delta wing , twin vertical stabilisers, Canard
and 6 engines
Keith
sddso
You may have become hung up on details. The key word is *variant*.
Note:
1. Underslung engine pod positioning.
2. Shape/proportion of main body, when B-1 wings are swept all the way
to 65 degrees.
3. Blending of forward fuselage into main body.
4. SMCS control vanes (B-1) vs canard elevators (B-70).
5. Undercarriage positioning--WRT engine pods and distance ratio from
nose/tailtip and wingtips.
6. Cabin/windscreen height and nose sweepdown angle.
Essentially, the B-1 recalls a smoothed-out B-70, aside from the
empennage--a point I can readily concede.
Walter Bjorneby
TU144. Have you ever considered that faced with the same problem aeronautical
engineers might come up with the same solution?
Walt BJ
Keith Willshaw
>
>
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
> >
> > "sddso" <jsp...@dtgnet.com> wrote in message
> > news:3A0E11FF...@dtgnet.com...
> > >
> > > While we're praising North American, don't forget the T-6/SNJ. It
could
> > > be said that in the B-1, NA finally sold USAF a B-70 variant. Go look
> > > at the airframe silhouette similarities.
> > >
> >
> > I just did - no comparison
> >
> > B-1A - Mach 2 Bomber with Variable Geometry wing , single vertical
> > stabiliser, conventional tail and 4 engines
> >
> > B-70 - Mach 3 Bomber with Delta wing , twin vertical stabilisers, Canard
> > and 6 engines
> >
> > Keith
>
> You may have become hung up on details. The key word is *variant*.
>
I think you are confused as to the meaning of the word variant
so lets clarify it
From Websters
<Quote>
one of two or more persons or things exhibiting usually slight differences:
as
a : one that exhibits variation from a type or norm
b : one of two or more different spellings (as labor and labour)
or pronunciations (as of economics \ek-, Ek-\) of the same word
c : one of two or more words (as geographic and geographical) or
word elements (as mon- and mono-) of essentially the same
meaning differing only in the presence or absence of an affix
</Quote>
An RF-111C is a variant of the Basic F-111
A Tornado despite having a similar role and being of
similar design is Not
The B-1 is a different size and shape from the B-70
It uses a different number of engines
It flies at a different speed
It uses a different design Wing
It uses a conventional tail empennage as
against a Canard
Its made of Aluminium instead Stainless Steel
and Titanium
It was designed 10 years after the B-70 by a different
team
It is in short a COMPLETELY different aircraft with more
in common with the TU-160 Blackjack than the B-70
> Note:
>
> 1. Underslung engine pod positioning.
>
> 2. Shape/proportion of main body, when B-1 wings are swept all the way
> to 65 degrees.
>
> 3. Blending of forward fuselage into main body.
>
> 4. SMCS control vanes (B-1) vs canard elevators (B-70).
>
> 5. Undercarriage positioning--WRT engine pods and distance ratio from
> nose/tailtip and wingtips.
>
> 6. Cabin/windscreen height and nose sweepdown angle.
>
> Essentially, the B-1 recalls a smoothed-out B-70, aside from the
> empennage--a point I can readily concede.
And apart from the fact that its a TOTALLY different design
made from different materials
Hells Bells ALL large Supersonic aircraft share certain
design characteristics, form follows function and all
that.
By your logic the TU-160 Blackjack is a derivative of the B-70
as well
Keith
sddso
Absolutely. In fact, they often come with solutions that don't have
problems
John Keeney
Keith Willshaw <keith_w...@compuserve.com> wrote in message
news:8ulpo3$nm$1...@sshuraac-i-1.production.compuserve.com...
>
> "sddso" <jsp...@dtgnet.com> wrote in message
> news:3A0E11FF...@dtgnet.com...
> >
> > While we're praising North American, don't forget the T-6/SNJ. It could
> > be said that in the B-1, NA finally sold USAF a B-70 variant. Go look
> > at the airframe silhouette similarities.
> >
>
> I just did - no comparison
>
> B-1A - Mach 2 Bomber with Variable Geometry wing , single vertical
> stabiliser, conventional tail and 4 engines
>
> B-70 - Mach 3 Bomber with Delta wing , twin vertical stabilisers, Canard
> and 6 engines
>
> Keith
Be kind, Keith, mention that glaring similarity: the engine inlets
are on the bottom.
John Keeney
>
>
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
> >
> > "sddso" <jsp...@dtgnet.com> wrote in message
> > news:3A0E11FF...@dtgnet.com...
> > >
> > > While we're praising North American, don't forget the T-6/SNJ. It
could
> > > be said that in the B-1, NA finally sold USAF a B-70 variant. Go look
> > > at the airframe silhouette similarities.
> > >
> >
> > I just did - no comparison
> >
> > B-1A - Mach 2 Bomber with Variable Geometry wing , single vertical
> > stabiliser, conventional tail and 4 engines
> >
> > B-70 - Mach 3 Bomber with Delta wing , twin vertical stabilisers, Canard
> > and 6 engines
> >
> > Keith
>
>
>
> 1. Underslung engine pod positioning.
On the B-1, yes.
The inlets are on the bottom of the XB-70 but engines are more or less
in the body and the exhaust is dead center of the aft end.
Oh yea, the engines are well forward of the rear end on the B-1 instead
of being the tail end.
> 2. Shape/proportion of main body, when B-1 wings are swept all the way
> to 65 degrees.
Doesn't look any more alike to me than a dozen other planes.
> 3. Blending of forward fuselage into main body.
Hu? Can you explain for me how the forward fuselage can't be
"blended into main body"?
> 4. SMCS control vanes (B-1) vs canard elevators (B-70).
Oh yea, great big square tipped, high mounted canards well behind
the cockpit are really like little pointy vanes on the bottom infront of
the cockpit.
> 5. Undercarriage positioning--WRT engine pods and distance ratio from
> nose/tailtip and wingtips.
Gee, what a surprise.
> 6. Cabin/windscreen height and nose sweepdown angle.
>
> Essentially, the B-1 recalls a smoothed-out B-70, aside from the
> empennage--a point I can readily concede.
Perhaps you better start comparing the B-58 with those two.
sddso
John Keeney wrote:
>
> sddso <jsp...@dtgnet.com> wrote in message
> news:3A0EEF26...@dtgnet.com...
> >
> >
/snip/
> >
> > You may have become hung up on details. The key word is *variant*.
> >
> > Note:
> >
> > 1. Underslung engine pod positioning.
>
> On the B-1, yes.
> The inlets are on the bottom of the XB-70 but engines are more or less
> in the body and the exhaust is dead center of the aft end.
> Oh yea, the engines are well forward of the rear end on the B-1 instead
> of being the tail end.
The B-1's engine pods are on the rear end of the main portion of the
fuselage. Everything aft of them is empennage and its mounting
structure; the increased diameter serves to adhere to the area rule.
One can consider the entire B-70 body below the wing axis as the engine
(and stores bay) pod. The curves and angles along the side and edges of
the B-70's single pod recall those on the B-1's two. The intake
splitters look similar, but the B-1's splitters have a greater sweep
angle, viewed from the side.
/snip/
>
> > 3. Blending of forward fuselage into main body.
>
> Hu? Can you explain for me how the forward fuselage can't be
> "blended into main body"?
The B-70's forward fuselage has an up-angle in relation to the rest of
the body, recalling an outstretched and slightly lifted swan's neck.
Though the underside of the B-1's forward fuselage is flat with respect
to the rest of the aircraft (save the pods), the gentle upsweep of its
upper margin, and bulged crew compartment, create a similar effect.
/snip/
> Perhaps you better start comparing the B-58 with those two.
Can't. Convair made it. Or did they become General Dynamics first?
You write as though you'd never seen the various NA models or artwork,
especially for the LRCA proposals. Some of the same artists had to have
been working for North American over the whole period, from B-70
inception to B-1 acceptance.
If I can interpret the photos at http://www.labiker.org/xb70.html
correctly, the B-70's main gear legs swung down and forward when
extending. Those on the B-1 do the same. Each B-70 and B-1 bogie has
four wheels, but they articulate differently.
The B-1 SPO website (http://www.b1b.wpafb.af.mil/) has photo galleries
for comparison too.
Bill Norcott
The "real" Cold War bomber of course was the B-58 Hustler.
Bill
--
May God deliver us from our friends; we can handle the enemy.
-- General George S. Patton, Jr.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
sddso
I heard it had a rock-solid ride, low level. How was the fuel
consumption?
The B-1 rode a fair bit steadier than any B-52, even at 600 knots. SMCS
really helped out, but I left the field before hard-ride TF was
permitted. Pre-Block A fuel consumption was comparable to a G, but
couldn't match an H. It was a pity that Systems Command declined to
fund the escape capsule.
Jim Baker
The B-1B rides a great deal, not comparable really, smoother low level than
the B-52G I flew before the BONE. I have a "ton" of hours at hard ride TF
and that was better than flying anywhere low level in a Buff during the
summer. You can hear the SMCS "whooshing" as you flew through the
turbulence, what you "heard" in the Buff was the Navs puking in the same
conditions. Didn't really hear it of course because they all had the
courtesy to go cold mic, but you saw the frozen sic sacks on the ramp after
parking the Buff. I can honestly say I never had a sick crewmember on the
BONE in 7 years of flying. I knew guys that did get sick, but usually that
was in the pattern from hamfisted students. Not commenting here on the
relative merits of the weapon system, BD, just the ride low level.
Don't know about that escape module. This is a cheap shot, but the only
time it was used it didn't work correctly. The first time the ejection
seats were used at La Junta, they all failed (primary system) and one failed
primary and secondary and Jim Acklin payed for that with his life. But
after that, they were fixed and worked perfectly everytime they were used.
Cheers,
Jim
BUFDRVR
>turbulence, what you "heard" in the Buff was the Navs puking in the same
>conditions.
ROFLMAO....I've got a ton of respect for our Nav's, those guys can barf their
brains out at the IP and be recomposed by the bomb release, pretty impresive.
>I can honestly say I never had a sick crewmember on the
>BONE in 7 years of flying.
Most BONE WSO's I talk to who have flown BUFF's say the primary reason they
left the B-52 was its horrible ride, air sickness and no windows. Most feel
satisfied with the BONE in all but the window catagory. Most claim to have been
disappointed with the B-1B "day/night indicator" window and say they don't even
try took out it.
>Not commenting here on the
>relative merits of the weapon system, BD, just the ride low level.
>
No contest...I'll concede this one ;)
>The first time the ejection
>seats were used at La Junta, they all failed (primary system) and one failed
>primary and secondary and Jim Acklin payed for that with his life.
Sir, wasn't there also an IP on board in a non-ejection seat similiar to the
BUFF ? What we've been told here in the B-52 community is the LaJunta crash led
to the B-1B IP seat being removed.
>But
>after that, they were fixed and worked perfectly everytime they were used.
Even in some pretty "edge of the envelope" situations like the Dyess "McVASI"
approach incident. Unreal that all 4 got out and the worst injury was a
dislocated shoulder, interestingly enough, caused by the B-1B ACES II restraint
system.
Richard Lamb
sddso wrote:
>
> I heard it had a rock-solid ride, low level. How was the fuel
> consumption?
>
> The B-1 rode a fair bit steadier than any B-52, even at 600 knots. SMCS
> really helped out, but I left the field before hard-ride TF was
> permitted. Pre-Block A fuel consumption was comparable to a G, but
> couldn't match an H. It was a pity that Systems Command declined to
> fund the escape capsule.
Perhaps if it were an essape / return capsle ?
Get's kinda scarry. The Plane could then Be the bomb, just have a
jettesonable
human delivery system (recallable-before, returned-after strike).
Jim Baker
"BUFDRVR" <buf...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20001118075759...@ng-mh1.aol.com...
> >You can hear the SMCS "whooshing" as you flew through the
> >turbulence, what you "heard" in the Buff was the Navs puking in the same
> >conditions.
>
their
> brains out at the IP and be recomposed by the bomb release, pretty
impresive.
I had an RN that would literally puke 4-5 times per sortie. He was a great
bomber too. We took top honors in two ORIs in a row because of him. I don't
know how he could do it, I puke once and I'm done for an hour. There used
to be an RBS site at Hawthorne, NV. The unofficial name for the route was
Vomit Valley. During the summer, the pilots would switch off on flying TA
just so they could get hands on and quell the queasiness. The guys
downstairs, well I don't know why they flew, I couldn't do it.
> >I can honestly say I never had a sick crewmember on the
> >BONE in 7 years of flying.
>
> Most BONE WSO's I talk to who have flown BUFF's say the primary reason
they
> left the B-52 was its horrible ride, air sickness and no windows. Most
feel
> satisfied with the BONE in all but the window catagory. Most claim to have
been
> disappointed with the B-1B "day/night indicator" window and say they don't
even
> try took out it.
>
> >Not commenting here on the
> >relative merits of the weapon system, BD, just the ride low level.
> >
>
> No contest...I'll concede this one ;)
>
> >The first time the ejection
> >seats were used at La Junta, they all failed (primary system) and one
failed
> >primary and secondary and Jim Acklin payed for that with his life.
>
> Sir, wasn't there also an IP on board in a non-ejection seat similiar to
the
> BUFF ? What we've been told here in the B-52 community is the LaJunta
crash led
> to the B-1B IP seat being removed.
The IP was in the front right seat with a student in the pilots seat and
another of the studs in the IP seat. First sortie for the student crew. The
stud in the IP position and the Avionics Instructor in the AI non-ejection
seat never got out. The front right seat failed primary and secondary and
never left the jet taking the IP. The seats (IP & AI) weren't removed for
years, at least at Dyess, but they were never used again either.
> >But
> >after that, they were fixed and worked perfectly everytime they were
used.
>
> Even in some pretty "edge of the envelope" situations like the Dyess
"McVASI"
> approach incident. Unreal that all 4 got out and the worst injury was a
> dislocated shoulder, interestingly enough, caused by the B-1B ACES II
restraint
> system.
Actually, that was at Ellsworth, it was a back injury, and it was caused by
the plane being nearly 90 degrees of roll when the last seat came out. The
seat skipped along the ground as the chute deployed and a bum back was the
result. The guy lived though and is in good shape. I think the jet was
somewhere around 50ft AGL when he came out. I was SOF at DYS that night and
recoved several ELS jets into DYS. All I knew was there was an accident. I
didn't know so couldn't tell them who crashed, and I clearly remember the
faces of the crewmembers when I explained why ELS was closed. Later, I found
out a friend of mine was SOF at ELS that night. He was sitting in the
hammerhead in his vehicle when he saw the BONEs landing lights, very low.
He was puzzling over this apparent optical delusion when he saw the lights
veer hard right, then a ball of fire start rolling towards him. He put the
Suburban in reverse, floored the accelerator and got the hell out of there.
Sounds like fun.
Cheers,
Jim
P.S. I'm off to the Rose Bowl to see UCLA kick USCs ass. If I come back
disappointed, I may want to flame somebody so watch out! :-)
Ron
>BUFF ? What we've been told here in the B-52 community is the LaJunta crash
>led
>to the B-1B IP seat being removed.
>
>
>
>Sir, wasn't there also an IP on board in a non-ejection seat similiar to the
>BUFF ? What we've been told here in the B-52 community is the LaJunta crash
>led
>to the B-1B IP seat being removed.
Yes there was. He was an ex KC-135 copilot of a high school teacher of mine.
My
teacher told me that was about the worst day in his life, when he heard about
his friend going down in that B-1 with no way of getting out since he wasnt
occupying
an ejection seat.
Ron Chambless
Pilot PA-34 Seneca II
"Strange Situations, Wild Occupations. Living my life like a song"
Ron
>approach incident. Unreal that all 4 got out and the worst injury was a
>dislocated shoulder, interestingly enough, caused by the B-1B ACES II
>restraint
>system.
DIdnt that happen up in ND or Montana?
I heard about the McVasi (Having the Mcdonalds in sight so they must know where
they are at. :)
What caused that crash?
sddso
BUFDRVR wrote:
>
> >DIdnt that happen up in ND or Montana?
> >I heard about the McVasi (Having the Mcdonalds in sight so they must know
> >where
> >they are at. :)
> >
>
> It was at Ellsworth, the Col. corrected me in a previous post. The McDonalds
> really had nothing to do with the incident, it was a long held rumor that the
> crews were descending visually on the McDonalds parking lot lights believing
> them to be the VASI's. This is not true.
>
> >What caused that crash?
>
> For the life of me I can't remember all the details. Bad weather, long sortie
> and an over bearing A/C are all I can remember, sorry.
The "official cause" of the 17 November 1988 B-1 loss at Ellsworth was
pilot error.
It was a night approach in intermittent snow showers with conditions
right at minimum ceiling and visibility. At the time, the B-1 was
placarded against flight in actual instrument conditions because of
recurrent problems with intake induction icing; somehow, this did not
apply to approach attempts in weather. ILS approaches could only be
followed to localizer-only minimum altitude because of software hiccups
and shoddy design that Systems Command refused to fix--not high enough
on the priority list.
After a missed localizer-only approach, the crew (a 4x gaggle that had
never flown as a crew before, two San Eval aviators) shot a
non-precision TACAN approach with a lower MDA than the localizer-only.
The pilot descended below MDA, then climbed back to it after the
backenders warned him, only to descend again a few seconds later; the
copilot saw the McD sign out the left windscreen, then the ILS far field
monitor poles out the right windscreen. Before he could warn the pilot,
the right wing sheared off the poles, taking out the right leading edge
slat and right flap. The pilot then pushed the throttles forward to go
around, but (unbeknownst to him) the aircraft was already not
recoverable.
Both pilots initiated ejection without telling the rear station
occupants (no time). Once again, the ACES II systems yanked everyone
clear; the uncommanded right roll rate was so great, and increasing so
quickly, that the OSO (right rear, first out) exited at some 12 degrees
of right roll, but the pilot (left front, last out) exited at 87
degrees. An antenna on the underside of the aircraft's tail snagged a
power line and dragged it almost to the perimeter fence, blacking out
the town of Box Elder; the aircraft continued its right roll and landed
at the edge of the south end overrun, upside down.
Injuries sustained: pilot--mild concussion erasing short term memory,
knee separation, fractured ankle; copilot--bruises and sprained finger;
OSO--bruises and leg nerve injury; DSO--back fracture, cracked ribs.
Fortunately, the jump seats were not in use, thanks only to the B-1 loss
in the pattern at Dyess nine days earlier. By then, SAC had been forced
to give up low level training with occupied jump seats, but had weaseled
back to doing high level sorties with six bodies aboard.
Curious doings followed. RUMINT had it that then-CINCSAC Jack
Chain--embarrassed by the recent crash at Dyess, a glaringly obvious
materiel failure--unofficially preordained the accident board result.
All debris gathering was summarily halted after the CDR and CITS DTUCs
were recovered. Almost instantly, it was officially announced that all
data recorded thereon were to be believed as unassailable truth (this,
in a still not-really-operational aircraft with a history of unexplained
electrical problems); hence, no effort would be expended to hunt down
anything merely physical that would corroborate or disprove the
recordings. Simulated reconstructions of the final few minutes of the
flight "proved" that ice was not a factor, but more than one maintainer
spied large (exceeding one inch in depth, after taxi to recovery area)
accumulations of ice on wing leading edges and forward portions of
landing gear struts when they recovered the aircraft that had landed
minutes before.
The accident board president rammed the conclusions (most no better than
airy psychobabble) down everyone else's throat. The system apparently
didn't take the condemnation very seriously...the pilot made O-6 on
time.
/snip/
sddso
????
By the B-1's time (in contrast with the B-36 days), bombs weren't so big
that anything like that was necessary.
SPO & integration team hints suggest that senior SAC officials insisted
that the B-1 accommodate six, but the capsule could only lift four while
staying "below cost and ahead of schedule" (major buzz phrase back
then). If I recall correctly, this B-1 economy measure made the
F/FB-111 the only operational aircraft ever to utilize a separable
cockpit escape system. Perhaps that was a mixed blessing, courtesy of
USAF's penchant for modifying things, which always meant adding weight.
According to old crew dog tales, more than one F/FB-111 crew sustained
back injuries when the capsule slammed down; the weight had increased,
but the parachute size remained constant. Something had to give, and it
became human spines thanks to increased terminal velocity.
sddso
Jim Baker wrote:
>
> "BUFDRVR" <buf...@aol.com> wrote in message
> news:20001118075759...@ng-mh1.aol.com...
> > >You can hear the SMCS "whooshing" as you flew through the
> > >turbulence, what you "heard" in the Buff was the Navs puking in the same
> > >conditions.
> >
> > ROFLMAO....I've got a ton of respect for our Nav's, those guys can barf
> their
> > brains out at the IP and be recomposed by the bomb release, pretty
> impresive.
>
> I had an RN that would literally puke 4-5 times per sortie. He was a great
> bomber too. We took top honors in two ORIs in a row because of him. I don't
> know how he could do it, I puke once and I'm done for an hour. There used
> to be an RBS site at Hawthorne, NV. The unofficial name for the route was
> Vomit Valley. During the summer, the pilots would switch off on flying TA
> just so they could get hands on and quell the queasiness. The guys
> downstairs, well I don't know why they flew, I couldn't do it.
Why? A sense of duty.
Being able to see outside improves one's motion sickness tolerance no
end. How many pilots could handle a sortie in the gunner's seat without
losing their lunch?
/snip/
BUFDRVR
>I heard about the McVasi (Having the Mcdonalds in sight so they must know
>where
>they are at. :)
>
It was at Ellsworth, the Col. corrected me in a previous post. The McDonalds
really had nothing to do with the incident, it was a long held rumor that the
crews were descending visually on the McDonalds parking lot lights believing
them to be the VASI's. This is not true.
>What caused that crash?
For the life of me I can't remember all the details. Bad weather, long sortie
and an over bearing A/C are all I can remember, sorry.
Ron
>really had nothing to do with the incident, it was a long held rumor that the
>crews were descending visually on the McDonalds parking lot lights believing
>them to be the VASI's. This is not true
I was told by a Dyess 130 pilot that the pilot in the B-1B saw the McDonalds
while on the approach and used it to orient himself on the approach. Who knows
what the real story is or if they even saw a McDs
BUFDRVR
>losing their lunch?
I've flown an entire sortie save 1/2 hour of air refueling in the gunners seat
with no problem, facing backwards is not that a big of a deal for me.
*However*, being downstairs is a different issue. I didn't even know what
motion sickness felt like (never got quezzy in any aircraft, carnival ride
etc.) until one afternoon as a young co-pilot when I volunteered to go down
stairs for A/R (My AC was getting signed off to monitor my A/R with an IP). By
the time the A/R track was over, I was starting to feel sweaty and light headed
and generally poor. The RN looked over at me and said I should go upstairs
before I puke, I took his advice. Since then I've been able to go downstairs
more and more, even spending over 2 hours low level down there last month, but
I don't think I'd be able to puke and stay "in the game" like some of our Navs
do.
Gordon
>Being able to see outside improves one's motion sickness tolerance no
>losing their lunch?
My first duty was on S-3A's and it truly sucked. At 6'2", the seat/window
combination for the SENSO gives you a lovely view of 3 feet of the #1 engine
intake and nothing else. Pilots flopping around on final to the Eisenhower
would literally bounce our heads off the wall in the near-darkness, and it was
pretty common for TACCOs and SENSOs to hurl. I didn't - I just got out of that
duty as fast as I can, volunteering for nice, safe, helicopter duty where I
knew I would always have a huge cargo door next to my seat. I could never
figure out why they had a window in the rear of an S-3 -- you'd have to be
about 4 foot tall to see out of the damn thing.
v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR Aircrew
"Senso, got anything on your radar?"
"Nothing but my forehead, sir."
Jim Baker
> >
>>BUFDRVR wrote:
> > It was at Ellsworth, the Col. corrected me in a previous post. The
McDonalds
> > really had nothing to do with the incident, it was a long held rumor
that the
> > crews were descending visually on the McDonalds parking lot lights
believing
> > them to be the VASI's. This is not true.
> >
> > >What caused that crash?
> >
> > For the life of me I can't remember all the details. Bad weather, long
sortie
> > and an over bearing A/C are all I can remember, sorry.
>sddso wrote
> The "official cause" of the 17 November 1988 B-1 loss at Ellsworth was
> pilot error.
And in fact, it was purely pilot error. Do you disagree with that? If so,
you're the first person I've ever heard that didn't believe that to be the
cause. I know both of the pilots personally although I haven't talked with
either of them in years since I retired. The copilot, now at the Pentagon,
worked for me at the B-1B FTU. He was a patch-wearing IP by then. He told
me the whole story in great detail. The AC was in the first CFIC class for
the B-1B with me and, not telling tales unknown to the general public here,
was an obnoxious, overbearing so and so (as BUFDRVR said he heard). The AC
flew below minimums and hit a pole. End of story. There were lots of links
in the chain that we could discuss, as there are in any accident, but bottom
line is he flew the jet below minimums in an attempt to get to the runway
and hit the pole. If I remember correctly, one result of this accident was
Cockpit Resource Management classes for everyone in SAC due to the effect
the ACs personality had on the rest of the crew, particularly the rookie Co.
> It was a night approach in intermittent snow showers with conditions
> right at minimum ceiling and visibility. At the time, the B-1 was
> placarded against flight in actual instrument conditions because of
> recurrent problems with intake induction icing; somehow, this did not
> apply to approach attempts in weather. ILS approaches could only be
> followed to localizer-only minimum altitude because of software hiccups
> and shoddy design that Systems Command refused to fix--not high enough
> on the priority list.
Not quite. The B-1B in operational use was never placarded from flying in
actual instrument conditions. Never. It was prohibited from cruising in
icing conditions because of the ice that formed on the intake walls and the
inlet radar guide vanes. There were provisions to deice these things, the
inlet guide vanes, but the deicing system didn't work well enough to prevent
ice from breaking off of them and the inlet walls and causing FOD. You could
climb and descend through ice that was light (I may not be remembering all
the intricacies of the restrictions) or trace for cruise or to land. Thats
what they were doing. I could go on about the ILS, but basically we all
learned how to work around it to fly ILS approaches to minimums with no
sweat. But we were restricted from doing it in IMC because it didn't work
as designed. Too bad about that restriction, the AC would've (assumption)
avoided this accident by flying the ILS to minimums. One happy outcome was
the deployment of portable PARs to all the BONE bases. We got to fly them
for several months until a software fix for the ILS was installed. It was
fun and made us better pilots too.
<snip>
> Fortunately, the jump seats were not in use, thanks only to the B-1 loss
> in the pattern at Dyess nine days earlier. By then, SAC had been forced
> to give up low level training with occupied jump seats, but had weaseled
> back to doing high level sorties with six bodies aboard.
The instructor seats weren't in use because of the La Junta accident. After
that accident, we at Dyess never again flew low level with those seats
occupied and I don't think anyone else did either. The accident
aircraft/crew in question flew low level on the sortie before returning to
ELS so the seats weren't occupied. We did fly high level with people in
them mostly because the CCTS couldn't run their syllabus any other way. But
after the Dyess accident where a 337th BMS BONE caught on fire while doing a
touch and go, and subsequent crash, no one ever flew in those seats again,
high or low.
> Curious doings followed. RUMINT had it that then-CINCSAC Jack
> Chain--embarrassed by the recent crash at Dyess, a glaringly obvious
> materiel failure--unofficially preordained the accident board result.
Hmm. Don't know why he would be embarassed about that. He may very well
have been, but he wasn't responsible for the materiel failure that caused
that crash. The frigging four inch fuel line burst or separated following a
chug on a touch and go. I witnessed the whole thing from the touch and go to
the ejections. I requaled the two pilots after a few weeks of down time.
It sure was a sight to behold. I'd never seen flames like that before and
I've seen a Buff crash at Mather and later saw a Tanker go in at DYS on
takeoff. A flame plume vertically bigger than the aircraft from midship to
several dozen feet aft of the tail.
> All debris gathering was summarily halted after the CDR and CITS DTUCs
> were recovered. Almost instantly, it was officially announced that all
> data recorded thereon were to be believed as unassailable truth (this,
> in a still not-really-operational aircraft with a history of unexplained
> electrical problems); hence, no effort would be expended to hunt down
> anything merely physical that would corroborate or disprove the
> recordings. Simulated reconstructions of the final few minutes of the
> flight "proved" that ice was not a factor, but more than one maintainer
> spied large (exceeding one inch in depth, after taxi to recovery area)
> accumulations of ice on wing leading edges and forward portions of
> landing gear struts when they recovered the aircraft that had landed
> minutes before.
Wow, what a bunch of speculation. The CITS recording is unassailable. The
aircraft was fully operational and the unexplained electrical problems
you're talking about were with the MUX system, not the CITS. The only
problem with CITS is its sensitivity. It records problems where there are
no problems It has taken years to weed those bugs out. In fact this was
still a topic of discussion as late as Fall 1997, just before I retired.
But it didn't fail to record all the parameters it was programmed to see.
It just was too sensitive for some of them. So what is it you're talking
about? Do you think the ice was so heavy that it caused the aircraft to
descend below minimums? Was the ice so thick that it reached out and hit
the pole where its absence would have caused the wing to miss the pole? I
don't know what you're implying. It wouldn't be unusual to have large ice
accumulations on aircraft taxiing in during favorable icing conditions. The
pressure drop through the engine inlets is incredible, wringing moisture
from the air and freezing it. In fact though, at altitude, entirely
different conditions can exist that don't cause ice to form, or cause it to
sublimate. That night, on the ground at ELS, conditions were perfect for
icing and that's what the maintainers saw. I saw that happen to me
personally at DYS a few times. No icing light in the pattern although we
descended through a trace layer to get to the pattern, but tons of ice
buildup while taxiing in because of moisture on the ground. The proof of
what I'm saying is the procedure (don't know if its still followed) to land
and shutdown in the hammerhead when there's moisture on the ground and
conditions are ripe for icing. I also think that the northern bases used to
tow aircraft to the hammerhead after aligning the heading system on external
power. You could fire up and get off the ground in five minutes or so
before serious ice could form and once you got above the local conditions
you would be ok (assuming that conditions above the field were ok, of
course). That procedure may have been abandoned though because of the
possibility for error and the high cost of blending out soft FO damage to
the compressor vanes. I just don't know if its still used or not.
Regards,
Jim
P.S. Who are you sddso? Where/When were you a crewmember on the B-1?
Maybe we know each other :-)
Jim Baker
>
>
> Jim Baker wrote:
> >
> > "BUFDRVR" <buf...@aol.com> wrote in message
> > news:20001118075759...@ng-mh1.aol.com...
> > > >turbulence, what you "heard" in the Buff was the Navs puking in the
same
> > > >conditions.
> > >
barf
> > their
> > > brains out at the IP and be recomposed by the bomb release, pretty
> > impresive.
> >
> > I had an RN that would literally puke 4-5 times per sortie. He was a
great
> > bomber too. We took top honors in two ORIs in a row because of him. I
don't
> > know how he could do it, I puke once and I'm done for an hour. There
used
> > to be an RBS site at Hawthorne, NV. The unofficial name for the route
was
> > Vomit Valley. During the summer, the pilots would switch off on flying
TA
> > just so they could get hands on and quell the queasiness. The guys
> > downstairs, well I don't know why they flew, I couldn't do it.
>
> Why? A sense of duty.
You're probably correct. What I meant to say was "...well I don't know how
they flew, I couldn't do it."
> Being able to see outside improves one's motion sickness tolerance no
> end. How many pilots could handle a sortie in the gunner's seat without
> losing their lunch?
Well no kidding. As to your second sentence, probably as many as there were
gunners, sddso. I flew in the gunners seat and the EW seat and didn't puke.
But I knew some gunners and EWs that did, and some pilots too.
Jim
BUFDRVR
>the ejections. I requaled the two pilots after a few weeks of down time.
>It sure was a sight to behold. I'd never seen flames like that before and
>I've seen a Buff crash at Mather and later saw a Tanker go in at DYS on
>takeoff.
Sir...uhh, if you could do me a favor and inform me if you're ever going to
visit the Shreveport/Bossier City area, I'll make sure I'm not flying while
you're here, or I'll arrange for you to fly with me....or have you had the same
luck flying jets as you do watching ? :)
Jim Baker
No I've never crashed one. But have been particularly unfortunate at
watching big jets go in.
I was on alert changeover when I saw the Buff crash. Didn't actually see it
hit the ground, but saw it staggering through the air and then disappear a
couple of miles away followed by the fireball. Watched the whole thing with
the tanker from stagger into the air until touchdown, driving through the
dirt and trees until the explosion. Ironically, my copilot on the sortie
where we watched the tanker (we were doing preflight) was the copilot that
ejected from the Bone in the pattern just a couple of months earlier.
Regards,
Jim
"BUFDRVR" <buf...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20001119103145...@ng-bd1.aol.com...
> > I witnessed the whole thing from the touch and go to
> >the ejections. I requaled the two pilots after a few weeks of down time.
> >It sure was a sight to behold. I'd never seen flames like that before
and
> >I've seen a Buff crash at Mather and later saw a Tanker go in at DYS on
> >takeoff.
>
sddso
Jim Baker wrote:
/snip/
> Regards,
>
> Jim
>
> P.S. Who are you sddso? Where/When were you a crewmember on the B-1?
> Maybe we know each other :-)
I'm the monster from staff who annoyed crew dogs periodically.
Mary Shafer
> sddso wrote:
>> The B-1 rode a fair bit steadier than any B-52, even at 600 knots.
>> SMCS really helped out, but I left the field before hard-ride TF
>> was permitted. Pre-Block A fuel consumption was comparable to a G,
>> but couldn't match an H. It was a pity that Systems Command
>> declined to fund the escape capsule.
> Perhaps if it were an essape / return capsle ?
I'm not nearly as fond of escape capsules (I have no idea what you
mean by a return capsule, unless you're referring to Kim Pateman's
delusion that escape capsules could fly on their own) as some people
seem to be. There was a good reason that Systems Command didn't want
the escape capsule in the B, besides the extra weight, and that's how
capsules worked, both in the B-1 and the F-111.
The only time anyone tried the B-1A escape capsule in real need, it
killed one and injured two badly. That wasn't all the fault of the
capsule, but most of it was. One of the inflatable bags didn't
inflate, making the crash load too high. I think one crew member,
perhaps the one killed, either didn't have his helmet strap latched or
his shoulder straps in place or something similar. The less badly
injured crew member also had something similar, but the more badly
injured crew member was strapped in properly, with helmet strap
latched. These omissions by the crew were not considered to have been
major contributors to the crew's injuries, though, compared to the
sink rate caused by the failure of the inflatable bag.
I think we've discussed F-111 capsules here before. It's my
understanding that it's very unlikely that anyone ejecting from the
later-model F-111 would do so without injury, often major. The
problem with the F-111 is that the cockpit (i.e. the capsule) got
heavier and heavier, but the compartment that held the chutes stayed
the same size, so the chutes ended up undersized, meaning that the
sink rates were so high that injury was pretty much inevitable. The
USAF went to great effort, almost up to the day they retired the
F-111s, to improve the chutes, using the DFRC NB-52B to carry scaled
capsules and improved chutes for drop tests, but the BUF pilots didn't
think the new chutes were that good. I asked one what he thought of
the chances if they went to the new chutes and he just shook his head
and turned his thumb down and told me not to accept if anyone ever
offered me a ride in the 'Vark.
--
Mary Shafer Senior Handling Qualities Research Engineer
sha...@orville.dfrc.nasa.gov
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA
Of course I don't speak for NASA