JSF X-35B Achieves Vertical Takeoff to Sustained Altitude
Ken Garlington
http://www.lmaeronautics.com/image_gallery/videos/jsf_videos.html)
http://www.lmaeronautics.com/news/press/jsf/jsfpr010624.html
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
June 24, 2001
JSF X-35B Achieves Vertical Takeoff to Sustained Altitude
PALMDALE, Calif. - The supersonic Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter X-35B
launched vertically, held its position and landed vertically today. The
event was a first for a JSF demonstrator and a critical validation of the
revolutionary shaft-driven lift fan propulsion system.
"This lift fan system is a unique, next-generation leap in technology - the
same sort of aviation advance we saw when jets replaced piston engines,"
said Harry Blot, a former Harrier test pilot who now serves as vice
president and deputy program manager for the Lockheed Martin JSF. "We
decided on this approach because the fan multiplies engine power and
provides tremendous lifting force with less engine strain. It also has huge
payoffs in terms of freedom in designing the next-generation Joint Strike
Fighter."
At 6:30 a.m. PDT at the Lockheed Martin plant in Palmdale, pilot Simon
Hargreaves engaged the lift-fan propulsion system, and the plane rose
straight up to a sustained position at an altitude of about 25 feet above
the ground.
"This was a stunning success. The lifting power is incredible and the
handling is extremely precise," said Hargreaves of BAE SYSTEMS, a veteran
Harrier pilot. "The flight occurred with minimal pilot inputs - I was
essentially a passenger. This speaks volumes about the quality of the
aircraft and the propulsion system."
Hargreaves held the 35,000-pound X-35B in a stabilized position for 35
seconds, checking to ensure the flight controls responded properly before
returning the plane gently to the ground.
"This is absolutely breakthrough technology," said Tom Burbage, executive
vice president and general manager of the Lockheed Martin JSF program. "Our
team has worked tirelessly to make this system safe and reliable and to
bring STOVL performance to an extraordinary new level. We knew it would
work. Now we're getting to prove it."
Subsequent flights will include conversions to and from conventional and
STOVL modes, transitions from wing-borne to jet-borne flight, short
takeoffs, and vertical landings. Flight-test operations will move first to
Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., then to Naval Air Station Patuxent River,
Md., where the aircraft's sea-level capabilities will be demonstrated to the
sea services. The aircraft completed its wing-borne flight requirements last
November.
The X-35B, designed to meet U.S. Marine Corps and Royal Navy/Royal Air Force
requirements, features a unique propulsion system in which a drive shaft
from the Pratt & Whitney JSF119-611 engine turns a counterrotating lift fan
that produces cool-air lifting force during STOVL operations. The
front-mounted fan works in concert with an articulating rear duct and
under-wing lateral-control nozzles to generate nearly 40,000 pounds of
lifting power. Rolls-Royce produces the fan.
"We are proud to have played a key role in Lockheed Martin's innovative
STOVL solution," said Charles Hughes, Rolls-Royce vice president of JSF.
"The X-35B has offered Rolls-Royce an exciting opportunity to team with
aerospace industry leaders to work on a tremendous challenge. Our team has
been excited by the challenge, and has responded enthusiastically to
tackling the complex technical issues and integration."
Walt Sirmans, Pratt & Whitney's program manager for the Lockheed Martin
JSF119 engine program, said, "The extraordinary performance and rock-solid
controllability demonstrated today confirms this concept and our readiness
for the next phase."
The Lockheed Martin team approach to the flight-test program is based on
fielding and flying a demonstrator that is virtually identical to the
production model, so both technical risk and cost are reduced before the JSF
's production phase. Advanced manufacturing methods already demonstrated by
the Lockheed Martin JSF team will reduce manufacturing time by 66 percent
and manufacturing costs by more than 50 percent over legacy fighter
aircraft.
"What makes today's feat even more remarkable is the fact that it was
achieved at 2,500 feet elevation in the high desert, where engine
performance is typically lower compared to sea-level operations," Blot said.
"The airplane held its above-ground position at significantly less than full
throttle."
Lockheed Martin, in partnership with Northrop Grumman and BAE SYSTEMS, is in
competition to build the JSF for the United States and United Kingdom.
Government selection of a single contractor for the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development phase is set for fall 2001.
CONTACT:
John Kent
(817) 763-3980
e-mail: john....@lmco.com
Jim Saye
(404) 213-7714
e-mail: james....@lmco.com
John Halliwell
Garlington <Ken.Gar...@computer.org> writes
>"This lift fan system is a unique, next-generation leap in technology - the
>same sort of aviation advance we saw when jets replaced piston engines,"
And the original Pegasus wasn't?
>said Harry Blot, a former Harrier test pilot who now serves as vice
>president and deputy program manager for the Lockheed Martin JSF. "We
>decided on this approach because the fan multiplies engine power and
>provides tremendous lifting force with less engine strain. It also has huge
>payoffs in terms of freedom in designing the next-generation Joint Strike
>Fighter."
>
>At 6:30 a.m. PDT at the Lockheed Martin plant in Palmdale, pilot Simon
>Hargreaves engaged the lift-fan propulsion system, and the plane rose
>straight up to a sustained position at an altitude of about 25 feet above
>the ground.
Almost forty years after the Harrier, stuff like this still excites
people?
--
John
Preston, Lancs, UK.
Mike Yukish
> In article <aBGZ6.1608$bS2.83...@newssvr17.news.prodigy.com>, Ken
> Garlington <Ken.Gar...@computer.org> writes
> >"This lift fan system is a unique, next-generation leap in technology - the
> >same sort of aviation advance we saw when jets replaced piston engines,"
>
> And the original Pegasus wasn't?
It was. They feel the lift fan is a jump over the Pegasus. For the same reason a
turboprop is much more efficient than a turbojet or turbofan at low speeds, a
lift fan driven by the engine should be much more efficient than a straight
through jet thruster (Pegasus). The negative is it is more complicated, and goes
unused in horizontal flight.
> >At 6:30 a.m. PDT at the Lockheed Martin plant in Palmdale, pilot Simon
> >Hargreaves engaged the lift-fan propulsion system, and the plane rose
> >straight up to a sustained position at an altitude of about 25 feet above
> >the ground.
>
> Almost forty years after the Harrier, stuff like this still excites
> people?
If it is much more efficient than the Pegasus then yea, that should excite
people.
John Halliwell
writes
>John Halliwell wrote:
>> And the original Pegasus wasn't?
>
>It was. They feel the lift fan is a jump over the Pegasus. For the same reason a
>turboprop is much more efficient than a turbojet or turbofan at low speeds, a
>lift fan driven by the engine should be much more efficient than a straight
>through jet thruster (Pegasus). The negative is it is more complicated, and goes
>unused in horizontal flight.
Basically then, we've gone back 40 or 50 years to a time when lift and
propulsion were separate in VTOL designs. All of them failed (the Forger
made it out of necessity - perhaps the exception) to achieve anything of
any significance.
It's more complicated and more prone to failure, therefore more
dangerous (but we know all that anyway), so we throw the last 40 years
in the bin and start again!
>> Almost forty years after the Harrier, stuff like this still excites
>> people?
>
>If it is much more efficient than the Pegasus then yea, that should excite
>people.
Maybe they should dig out the design for the P.1154 (1962) on that basis
then?
Mike Yukish
> In article <3B39D340...@psu.edu>, Mike Yukish <may...@psu.edu>
> writes
> >John Halliwell wrote:
> >> And the original Pegasus wasn't?
> >
> >It was. They feel the lift fan is a jump over the Pegasus. For the same reason a
> >turboprop is much more efficient than a turbojet or turbofan at low speeds, a
> >lift fan driven by the engine should be much more efficient than a straight
> >through jet thruster (Pegasus). The negative is it is more complicated, and goes
> >unused in horizontal flight.
>
> Basically then, we've gone back 40 or 50 years to a time when lift and
> propulsion were separate in VTOL designs. All of them failed (the Forger
> made it out of necessity - perhaps the exception) to achieve anything of
> any significance.
Apples and Oranges. The Forger has a separate powerplant for lift, doesn't it? The X
plane only has a separate fan. Still one engine. The Forger had all of the
inefficiencies of a turbojet, but double the engine weight.
And revisiting concepts from the past is not bad. The first plane was a canard. It
still has advantages. The B-2 is an application of the many-years-old concept of the
flying wing.
> It's more complicated and more prone to failure, therefore more
> dangerous (but we know all that anyway), so we throw the last 40 years
> in the bin and start again!
Helicopters are also more complicated and prone to failure, as they essentially use a
fan to hold themselves up. We seem to have figured out how to make them safe,
handling situations like multiple rotors and engines and gearboxes, etc... The
X-plane configuration is more complicated than a Harrier's, but probably a lot
simpler than a helicopter's. The highest thrust condition on the engine is hovering.
If the engine can run at a lower rating for the same lift, wear and tear go down and
reliability goes up. Your blanket statement about more prone to failure is
unjustified.
And besides, the Harrier with its nozzles flies around with this big heat seeking
missile target amidships, which is not where you want to get hit.
Kurt Plummer
planet and have NO airfields to operate from.
Militarily, it /may/ be true that precision TBM's and UCAV bombers and conventional
cruise will eventually re-threaten fixed-base airfields to the extent that a move out
into the boondocks is needed. But WHY? When you can simply use the turbofan's
massive range advantagement to continually challenge the ballistic footprint or
targeting?
And targeting is the real key here. Once an enemy can track small targets, you're
right back to 'all eggs in 1 basket, now guard that basket!' strategies at which
point your open air roadbasing starts to look silly if the Upper Tier/THAAD/ERINT
miss a few and a sealed HAS would have been 'so convenient' for the frag or gas
shower.
And it takes /thousands/ of pounds of ordnance and gas to make -any- airpower basing
mode work. Why create a deliberate bottleneck of long-vs.-short runway on the
airlift needed to bring it all in, quickly?
Which is the real kicker because if you can't haul it in fast enough (with a
similarly STOVL dumptruck) and if you are 'magnifying' your targeting signature
/because/ of the logistics problems (with trucks etc.)...
Then you are again screwing yourself for _nothing_.
STOVL 'works' only when you can't afford anything else better and want to pretend you
have an air force. Giving the world STOVL airpower with afterburning is just making
our lives miserable for No Good Reason, IMO.
Kurt Plummer
Who wishes that some engineer with a bit of forthright honesty and experience in this
kind of thing would step forward and say how much penalization there has been, both
in 'cousining' of multiple substructures through design and component test and in
specific volume-waste for the actual 'associated but unused' STOVL capability
inherent to a three-service, 'one' plane approach to our followon dorito fighter. I
bet if they did, we would understand how big a farce J-SF really is.
Eric Van Camp
requirements drive internal volume and weapons box size. And don't forget
to have them compare cat/trap associated aerodynamic requirements and scar
weight with that of the "STOVL penalty" for both contractors. The original
DARPA/ARPA ASTOVL concept was an 18K# GWE supercruiser that carried only A-A
weapons internally...
...I wonder how it got so large??
They've hovered a supersonic, LO design with a GWE in the 26K# range --
that's pretty impressive to any dispassionate observer. Whether they've
done so in a fashion that addresses "environmental" issues (acoustics, heat,
velocity) remains to be seen.
Kurt Plummer <ch1...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:3B3A121D...@earthlink.net...
Kurt Plummer
Is this the F-16XL 'shape' with root-ejectors? Pardon me while I laugh my ass
off.
Is it the 'big canard' with permanently visible side-rotating nozzles? The one
which didn't survive Lockmarts' own 'will it balance for approach/transition'
modes STOVL studies?
Ooooh, stop it! My ribs are hurting!
If there was a single mistake made in the entire JSF program (success rational)
it was a refusal to design a _competitive USAF_ platform to toss in the ring
against the F-22 in the same way that the F-16 'ran against', and beat, the
F-15, not on absolute capability but on 'acceptable lo$$es' force structure
costs. Sacred Cow Slaughter Prevention.
A single-hole ATF would have required a big-bay internal volume for bombs /and/
missiles. Just as the F-22 does. It probably would have been subsonic. Just
as the F-22 /isn't/ (screw 'local hero threats' it comes down to _sortie rates
to radius_).
STOVL does nothing to add to the supersonics equation and hampers VLO with all
those damn cutout doors. It of course _reserves_ that forward fuselage bay
volume for plenum well structure, the other services can use it for an added
tank but most added fuel volumeing 'requisition' is in the outer wing panels and
a lower rated G trade.
Since BOTH JSF's now run with a 2Klb JDAM that is hardly a fair marker of merit
and even with SDB, 'more=merrier' target foldering means a multirack that is at
least GBU-32 level for total carriage box.
I will admit that I am curious to know what kinds of structural options can be
traded between a 90-100knot approach and a 135 knot controlled crash at sea. I
don't think it is enough to justify the lost gas which BOTH the USAF and Navy
strategies of extending beyond the range of hostile theater/littoral
'encirclement', either by land or by missile, require in todays expeditionary
intervention mindset.
What I am sure of is that a drone platform that weighs half as much and uses
SRGPS can in any case be made to operate from smaller carriers with lower
lift/inertia control penalties and the precision of a robot on-approach.
All while combattively carrying out missions that are both longer and farther
out, with the kinds of contemporary small munitions/systems enablers required to
silence the threat ADGE and airfields so that 'anybody and his F-teen uncle (or
B-2)' can then prosecute the infrastructure war. Casually. With Hammer JDAM.
When they finally get there.
The only thing a STOVL JSF brings to that equation is utility from a smaller
deck as an A/A escort to a 90 odd PE impact B-2 dumptruck against the eventual
basein arrival of ATF-22's. Even for FletDef it is inferior to simple range
extension beyond the threat surv/targeting radius and a good sized ring of AEGIS
to catch any sneakers.
In any case, drones will outrange BOTH tactical platforms and outsortie them
BOTH in 'realtime' for original force size and 'pilot fatigue' as a function of
continuing acceptable lo$$es.
While, whatever the JSF was ASTOVL 'predesigned' to be, the fact is it is _not_
'Air Dominance intended', nor supercruise easing to the radius-repeat problem.
But simply another bomb truck when you don't have or can't risk better strategic
(CM and B-2) systems.
Kurt Plummer
Eric Van Camp
anything about the Navy or the USAF buying STOVL? Service requirements
define what the contractors design to; if you want to quibble about
requirements, I direct you to the ACC, OPNAV, HQMC and OSD staffs. Navy
requirements drive internal volume toward the high end. USAF requirements
for range haven't been impeded one iota by the USMC requirements. Depart
the realm of hypotheticals and tell us how USMC requirements drive the
contractors to a 26K# empty aircraft. Do you know what each of the services
asked for?
Root-injectors? Permanently visible side-rotating nozzles?? No,
delta-canard shaft-driven lift fan circa 1994-1995 (LM 130 IIRC).
Kurt Plummer <ch1...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:3B3AFAF1...@earthlink.net...
Eric Van Camp
the USAF buying STOVL? Service requirements define what the contractors
ACC, OPNAV, HQMC and OSD staffs. Depart the realm of the hypothetical and
tell us what each of the services have asked for...not what you think they
need. How do we get to a 26K# aircraft (empty) based on USMC STOVL
requirements?
Root injectors? Permanently visible nozzles?? No,
delta-canard/shaft-driven lift fan circa 1994-1995 (LM 130 IIRC).
Kurt Plummer <ch1...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:3B3AFAF1...@earthlink.net...
Kurt Plummer
'expeditionary' force.
The USN may /need/ to buy some if they get told it's small-carriers or nothing
and they want to maintain a realistic sortie rate.
Look at the X-32 and notice that the ENTIRE fuselage is basically filled with
either engine or nozzle, the latter of which is 2/3rds or more of it's length.
What for? Why to match shadow of airplane and CofG. Naval and USMC needs. Now
there's a brilliant design.
Look at the X-35 and see that the entire forward fuselage which SHOULD be
weapons bay is in fact either gas or plenum.
Ask yourself, when these pipedream fools get told that "NO! A 40million dollar
jet is NOT 'cheap'" and are sumarily instructed to come back with a force mix
that -is-, how they are going to stuff in a second seat for a UCAV operator.
Which on an either-or with missiles are just about the only 'cheap' option left?
Companies may write to some -basic- specs but are increasingly being given wide
margins of leeway in their actual execution, for cost. The greatest 'right of
design' being simply the refusal of ridership on the bandwagon of stupid
military ideas.
Why Stupid?
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/jsf.htm
Lastly, specs, weights and schedules-
>>
At the time, several government organizations were working on next-generation
strike aircraft. The US Navy had been working in secret on an advanced stealthy
strike aircraft named the A-12 Avenger II, but the program ran into financial
trouble, and was cancelled shortly after going public in 1991. The Navy
requirement
remained open.
The USAF wanted a replacement for the F-16, while the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA) was investigating a next-generation "short takeoff, vertical
landing" (STOVL) aircraft for the US Marine Corps to replace the Marines' AV-8B
Harrier II.
In 1993, the Clinton Administration instructed the USN and the USAF to form a
joint development effort for a next generation strike aircraft. No funds were
allocated for flight development, however, and the effort was little more than a
paper project.
The next year, ARPA joined the project with their STOVL attack aircraft
requirement, which not only was of considerable interest to the USMC but also to
the British Royal Navy, which wanted a next-generation STOVL aircraft to replace
the Sea Harrier. Program activity reached a critical mass, and took off.
* The JSF concept that emerged from this consensus did not define a single
aircraft, but three different aircraft based on common technology. The USAF
wanted an
affordable conventional attack aircraft with stealth, advanced avionics, and low
life-cycle and operational costs, along with high reliability and good range,
speed, and warload.
>>
>>
The answer was to develop a "baseline" conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL)
aircraft at a base price for the USAF requirement, and variants at a higher
price
incorporating the features for CV or STOVL operations.
>>
>>
The military is determined to hold the line on costs for the JSF. They are fixed
at $28 million US per aircraft for the CTOL variant, $35 million for the STOVL
variant, and $38 million for the CV variant. Initial operational introduction is
scheduled for 2008 at earliest.
>>
>>
When the US Congress made noises about cutting back or killing the
F-22 Raptor program in the summer of 1999, the USAF began to waver on their
commitment to JSF, apparently as a political ploy.
The USMC was publicly critical of the USAF for taking actions that jeopardized
the JSF, as the Marines are heavily committed to the new aircraft and does not
want any delays in obtaining it.
>>
>>
The Boeing JSF configuration for the CTOL and CV variants was similar, though
STOVL features were deleted and traded for more fuel capacity. The stubby wing,
which has a span short enough to allow it to be conveniently stowed without
folding even on the smaller British carriers, also provides large fuel capacity,
giving the
Boeing design considerable range.
>>
>>
For the CTOL and CV variants, the lift fan was deleted and replaced with
additional fuel tanks. The wings and tail are smaller for the CTOL version.
>>
http://vectorsite.tripod.com/avf22.html
If the Marines want STOVL smart attack then why don't they replace the AH-1 and
the AV-8B simultaneously? That will get them a /reasonable/ LH-carrier
'beachhead' force (16 instead of 8 each) which can perform a mission role
similar to a smart-targeting A-10 (2hrs@200nm) while having the 2-crew doctrine
and the above-MANPADS performance to be safe and aggressive in LIC
environments. Hopefully in a 12,000lb/15 million dollar empty weight category.
If the USAF wants a light strike fighter, why don't they fucking /build one/?
Cheap and sweet and 'fast' to the starting line without all the 'other systems
insert' problems that alternately big-little wings, STOVL margins and range-X
wing, expand the internal volume useage while pushing right the service dates?
Something that could be CALF-16 ready-replacement for multinational export by
now? Hopefully in a 17-22Klb/20-22million dollar empty category.
If the USN wanted an ATA/AX/AFX why didn't they /build one/? With more payload
and better range figures off of aerodynamic stealth than we are seeing today.
Indeed if they are 'littoral' commited why do they -need- something that will go
650nm?
God knows what price:weight, the USN 'need'. They are just fucked up for
specing a reasonably capable system and they can't be trusted to include all the
'option extras' that will, for instance, finally make the F-18E/F somewhat
worthwhile.
The only thing you get by combining roles into one airframe is three services
unhappy with the others 'weight', literal or otherwise on their development
costs for expected performance and a production ramp schedule which effectively
mandates three separate service entries and flight tests -after- it's too late
to make major changes to a 'common=low cost' EMD configuration.
THEN you can talk about what it does to the development risk vs. fallout factor
on the industry side of the equation.
KP
Brad Benson
wrote:
- snip -
>If there was a single mistake made in the entire JSF program (success rational)
>it was a refusal to design a _competitive USAF_ platform to toss in the ring
>against the F-22 in the same way that the F-16 'ran against', and beat, the
>F-15, not on absolute capability but on 'acceptable lo$$es' force structure
>costs. Sacred Cow Slaughter Prevention.
- snip -
Small point here - the YF-16 (not F-16) flew against and beat the
YF-17 (not the F-15). The F/A-18 evolved from the YF-17, but is a
very different aircraft....
Cheers,
Brad Benson, CP-ASMEL/IA
Airport Insight - The first airport guide and directory for Palm!
http://www.notamd.com
Kurt Plummer
The F-15 was -beaten- by the F-16. Numbers to numbers, General-D to MACDAC.
Congress is yer daddy.
You can pretend all you like that the 'roles and missions are different'. It
doesn't matter. Both for total production and -role specific- addons/modifications,
the F-15 is totally outclassed as an inventory adaptive and serving machine by it's
little brother.
LANTIRN wasn't designed for the Eagle, they had Pave Tack 8 years before, it was
designed for the rinky dink ratmobile which couldn't afford to carry a 1,200lb
centerline pod, even if it /could/ trade the EW for it.
AMRAAM wasn't designed for the Eagle, it can carry 4 510lb Sparrows just fine. It
was designed to fit the 'both pylons today!' blunderjetten. 8 years after it should
have been available.
Where numbers of _loseable_ jet fighters are pre-ARH critical, you buy something
that you can afford to crunch a bunch of.
Guess which sextoy that is? "Oh yeah, I'm 'so proud' to be a Kami, errr, Viper
Driver..." Snicker.
The Hornet was just an NIH Navy consolation prize that 'dun good' by comparison (one
eye shut, the other blind...).
KP
Jonathan Stone
Kurt Plummer <ch1...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>Wrong,
>
>The F-15 was -beaten- by the F-16. Numbers to numbers, General-D to MACDAC.
>Congress is yer daddy.
>
>You can pretend all you like that the 'roles and missions are different'. It
>doesn't matter. Both for total production and -role specific- addons/modifications,
>the F-15 is totally outclassed as an inventory adaptive and serving machine by it's
>little brother.
>
>LANTIRN wasn't designed for the Eagle, they had Pave Tack 8 years before, it was
>designed for the rinky dink ratmobile which couldn't afford to carry a 1,200lb
>centerline pod, even if it /could/ trade the EW for it.
>
>AMRAAM wasn't designed for the Eagle, it can carry 4 510lb Sparrows just fine. It
>was designed to fit the 'both pylons today!' blunderjetten. 8 years after it should
>have been available.
>
>Where numbers of _loseable_ jet fighters are pre-ARH critical, you buy something
>that you can afford to crunch a bunch of.
>
Not the F-22, thats for sure.
John A. Weeks III
> Wrong,
>
> The F-15 was -beaten- by the F-16. Numbers to numbers, General-D to MACDAC.
> Congress is yer daddy.
Yer smoking ozone here. The F-15 is a late 1960's/early 1970's program,
while the F-16 is a late 1970's and early 1980's program. The Eagle was
flying operationally before the Falcon was even on the drawing board.
There was no competition or flyoff between the two programs. The
missions of the two planes do have some overlap, but the F-15 was
designed first and foremost to be an air superiority fighter with no
costs held back, while the F-16 was the low-cost high volume medium
fighter.
-john-
--
====================================================================
John A. Weeks III 952-891-2382 jo...@johnweeks.com
Newave Communications FAX 952-953-4289 http://www.johnweeks.com
====================================================================
Kurt Plummer
Publicity model shots of the Eagle and indeed /design implementations/ of it's
basic 'what wiring do you want in the pylons?' all show a supported A2G role long
before the Not A Pound baloney became well known. Like the F-14 it was convenient
to ignore it's superior multirole capabilities until it was too late and look what
it brought them.
It doesn't matter when it was designed, though FX first flew within 5 years of the
ACF and was TF-15 intro'd into service by Ford at Langley (74-75) within a single
year of the competition IIRR. BOTH jets are a mix of the wow and the mundane and
can and should be considered fully _1970's_ baseline.
However, what DOES matter is production and implementation of upgrade. There the
F-15 and F-16 -both- 'shared the eighties' (look at the C-PSP in 1983-84 for
instance) and yet the Viper got all the goodie cash while the Eagle got to
basically sit still on some very important, very /basic/ (EW and PSP upgrade)
capabilities.
God knows how much time we could have saved giving AIM-7 strapdown and ARH instead
of funding a 400lb, 'everything microsized please' replacement.
The Eagle is functionally near worthless at present as a 'leads the way' Air
Superiority platform without heavy EA escorts because it cannot suppress en-route
threats like both the Hornet and Falcon can and it's ALQ-135 just ain't enough to
hide, fuck the door, but the entire BARN behind.
The F-15 is indeed out of production now while the best models of the F-16 are
'yet to come' (to foreign users). Suh-praz Suh-praz.
As usual, we blew it when we thought that a lightweight fighter with an HPBR
turbofan could 'go places' while carrying half it's payload weight in gas and a
bunch of MSIP aftermarket gear which would presumeably let it 'do things' that the
baseline Eagle could've done better, years earlier, with a far less risky internal
volumetric/carriage plan.
What we in fact discovered was that 'small makes bigger' each and every
developmental hurdle in a linear timeline fashion for production lots where
integration is supposed to be 'modular'..
ASPJ is the tops of this list but I still laugh to think what all those hotshot
viper pilots must have thought of themselves without LANTIRN, AMRAAM, Seek Talk,
D-Mav, WASP, MSOW, GPU-5, SRARM and assorted other toys. 'Planned, and paid
for'. But never received.
Cheapest grade hamburger for the grinder if they had anything above the shoulders.
Because if the Russians had come for U.S. (and NATO) in the period 1979-1984, we
would not have been able to stop them with anything but Nukes. And that sucks.
Because all that cash in tacair 'A models' (and even C.25/.30) was supposed to
give us a 'flexible response' and it didn't. Not one bit.
After 1984 it's iffy because we had more or less upgraded everything to a basic
'better than them' standard, across the board. But we were still missing crucial
warwinners like JTIDS and AMRAAM and JSTARS. And we still 'owned the night' like
a bunch of myopic shrews. And we still counted on REFORGER in a bluewater
environment almost certain to see the first-light of an atomic dawn
Thank god for the dumbass AfG's, may they never know how much we owe for letting
them spreading their legs for 3 years and /then/ volunteering the hardware to
really Bite The Bear Back...
KP
Paul J. Adam
<ch1...@earthlink.net> writes
>Because if the Russians had come for U.S. (and NATO) in the period 1979-1984, we
>would not have been able to stop them with anything but Nukes. And that sucks.
And you think airpower would have mattered much back then? When the US
ground forces were based around M60 tanks, and NORTHAG's best tanks were
Chieftains with Leyland engines? (Chieftains did good work in 1990
against T-72s, but mobile and reliable they weren't)
Shades of Russian generals sipping cocktails on the Champs-Elysees
asking "So, who _did_ win the air war?"
>And we still counted on REFORGER in a bluewater
>environment almost certain to see the first-light of an atomic dawn
Back then, going nuke at sea suited Us better than Them.
--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill
Paul J. Adam ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk