"China’s nuclear command, control and operations"
Mike
178
China’s nuclear command, control and operations
In July 2005, a Chinese Major General, Zhu Chenghu, said at an
official military
briefing that China is prepared to use nuclear weapons against the
USA,
if its troops are attacked by the Americans during a confrontation
over
Taiwan (Harney, 2005). This declaration stirred turmoil and the
Chinese
Government did not bother to deny or confirm Zhu’s account. Do China’s
nuclear forces have such a capability, if a Sino-American war
occurred? Or is
Zhu’s statement just a political bluff ?
In this article, the author will try to answer these questions by
investigating
the current development and restraints of China’s nuclear command,
control
and communications systems as well as its nuclear targetting and
operational
plans. Examination of these subjects will be helpful not only to
unfold the
strategic priorities China has set, but also to assess the credibility
of the existing
or underlying strategic doctrines it has declared.
1 Nuclear command and control
In China, the political party control and military command systems are
often
mixed, but the principle of ‘Party Commands the Gun’ (dang zhihui
qian)
always prevails.1 Organizationally, the Chinese military have
experienced a
series of changes for decades, and a modern command and control
structure
did not emerge until the early 1980s. China now employs two sets of
military
decision-making mechanisms for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and
the state, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Central Military
Commission (CMC) of the CCP is elected by the party Central Committee.
2
The Chairman of the CMC has a superior, if not the ultimate authority
for
the use of nuclear weapons,3 and it is unlikely that his decisions
would require
a consensus within the CMC or among senior military leaders.
Apart from the Chairman, the CMC comprises a Permanent
Vice-Chairman, who is concurrently General Secretary to the
Commission,
two Vice-Chairmen and four Deputy General Secretaries. Officially, the
Commission needs to report to the Politburo, but as the Chairman of
the
CMC is always the General Secretary of the Politburo and the Vice-
Chairmen
are the Politburo members,4 the CMC effectively exercises an
authoritative
policy-making and operational control over the military through the
Department of General Politics5 (Wang, 2000). The state level CMC was
not
established until 1982 (Jiang et al., 1949–1999; Wu, 2001), although
its
members are identical to its party’s counterpart.6 According to the
constitution,
the state CMC is the state’s decision-making body in military affairs,
including directing and commanding the armed forces. The National
People’s
Congress is entitled to oversee the state CMC by law,7 but in
practice, most of
the Congress Representatives do not exercise this power (Gao, 1997).
Below the Politburo and the CMC are two state-level defence-related
departments: the Ministry of National Defence (MND) and the Commission
on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND).
The
COSTIND separately takes orders from the two CMCs but has no
operational
control over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The MND is
responsible
for military modernization and provides administrative support to the
PLA,
including matters of planning, manpower, budget, foreign liaison and
training
materials. It possesses no policy-making or implementation authority,
and is
not a part of the chain of command, which is mostly exercised by the
Department of General Staff (DGS) (Gao, 1997, p. 178). Headed by the
Chief
of General Staff, the DGS serves as the headquarters for the ground
forces
and contains directorates for the three other armed services: the PLA
Air
Force (PLAAF), the PLA Navy (PLAN), and the Second Artillery (Dier
Paobing). In general, strategic and military decisions from the
Politburo or the
CMC become operational orders at the DGS level, flow through the
Military
Regions (MR, junqu), and arrive at a main-force unit. Orders to
regional
forces also pass through the provincial level.8
China’s major strategic force, the Second Artillery, maintains control
over
China’s nuclear and conventional missile forces.9 The Second Artillery
complex in Qinghe north of Beijing consists of headquarters,
political, logistics
and equipment technology departments, each headed by a PLA major
general. Outside the headquarters, there are six ballistic missile
launch bases
( jidi), each of which is also led by a major general. Every base has
two to
three missile brigades, called ‘the Basic Combat Units’ ( jiben
zuozhan danwei).
Each brigade, commanded by a colonel, operates one type of missile
(Bates
and Mulvenon, 1999). Below brigades are battalions, known as ‘the
Basic
Firepower Units’ ( jiben huoli danwei), each of which is assigned for
specific
targets with six to nine missiles (Military Intelligence Bureau,
2002).
Unlike other military units, direct communications with six launch
bases
pass through the Second Artillery headquarters, bypassing the MR
level. Base
commands, in turn, communicate with their respective launch brigades.
At the
brigade level, two individuals must independently check a launch
order, crossconfirm
each other’s order, and both must agree to launch. In addition to the
silo-based nuclear brigades, there are mobile nuclear forces, probably
including
a mobile brigade command post, a central depot (known as a ‘technical
position’ or jishu zhendi), a transfer point (zhuanzai changping), and
an
assigned set of pre-surveyed launch sites (fashe zhendi), as well as a
set of
reserve launch sites. A mobile nuclear missile brigade is also likely
to have a
set of ‘equipment assurance sub-units’ (zhuangbei baozhang fendui)
[Bates
et al., 2002; ‘Guangrong bang (Glorious Honor Roll)’, 1993)].
As far as the command and control systems of other nuclear forces are
concerned,
in peacetime, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) asserted the
H-6 bombers are assigned to the PLAAF 4th Independent Regiment, and
deployed in Datong (main base), Golmond (dispersal base), Anqing and
three
other unidentified bases (FAS, 1998a; Natural Resources Defense
Council,
2002). However, according to another source, the H-6 bombers now are
chiefly allocated to the PLAAF 8th (Leiyang, Guangzhou MR), 10th
(Anqing
North, Nanjing MR) and 36th Divisions (Wugong, Lanzhou MR). About
tens of the probably nuclear-armed Q-5 attackers are deployed with the
PLAAF 28th Division (Jiaxing, Nanjing MR) and the PLAN 5th Division
(Yantai Laishan, North Sea Fleet).10 China’s Xia class (Type-092)
nuclearpowered
ballistic submarine (SSBN), deployed with the North Sea Fleet, was
assigned to the 9th Submarine Fleet under the direct jurisdiction of
the
PLAN headquarters (Yang, 2001). The Type-094 SSBN was allegedly
launched in 2004. When commissioned, it could come under the same
command and control systems as the Xia. In wartime, strategic bombers
and
SSBNs will come under direct control of the CMC (FAS, 1998b).
2 Nuclear communications
China’s development of strategic communications capabilities has been
largely
based upon indigenous efforts, supplemented by foreign technology
acquisition
and procurement of complete foreign systems. Through decades of
development and modernization, China had built relatively
sophisticated strategic
communications systems. Since the late 1990s, the PLA has developed
the Missile Brigade Control System, the Electronic Command System and
the
Commonly Used Message Processing System to fill the gaps in the
electronic
command of various fixed and mobile missile systems (Xu, 1999). In
1998, the
signal unit of the Second Artillery completed the acceptance testing
of a
digital microwave communications system to support its missile
launches. New
shortwave systems were also deployed (Zhang, 2002). These systems
reportedly
provide the strategic force with all weather and encrypted
communications
abilities (Bao, 1998).
China’s success in attracting foreign companies into its commercial
information technologies and telecommunications market in recent years
has
benefitted the military programmes. Leading companies include Alcatel,
Ericsson, Siemens, Nokia, Northern Telecom, AT&T, Sprint and Motorola.
Major providers of communications satellites and associated technology
include Hughes, Lockheed-Martin and Loral (Stokes, 1994). Currently,
the
Second Artillery headquarters, as a national level command, can use
multiple
transmission systems, including coaxial and fibre-optic cable,
satellite communications,
microwave radio-relay and long-range high frequency radio.11
The Pentagon is convinced that China’s national military and civilian
communications
networks can be capable of supporting the military and civilian
leadership for a wide range of strategic operations (US Department of
Defence, 2003).
In terms of the SSBN communications, it is known that a major maritime
communications network, including a low-frequency (LF) submarine
communication
station and a signal intelligence (SIGINT) centre, has been built
in Hainan Island. After Mao initiated the construction of an extremely
highpowered
very-low-frequency (VLF) station, the Chinese seem to have made
good progress in VLF communications. The General Staff and the PLAN
were given the highest priority for satellite channels when China
launched its
first series of communications satellites in the 1984 (Lewis and Xue,
1994). It
is not clear whether China has mastered the technology of extremely
low frequency
(ELF), but in peacetime, most SSBN communications are conducted
by high-frequency and VLF radio for the sake of capacity. It is also
believed
that China now has created a maritime aircraft squadron for
communications
with its submarine fleet (Polk, 2005).
3 Nuclear operations
In the early days, the operational plans of the Second Artillery were
very
primitive, and were seriously compromised by technological
difficulties. For
decades, China’s medium-range bombers and medium-range ballistic
missiles
(MRBMs) had only enough range to hit Japan, Korea, Taiwan, several US
bases in the Philippines, or Russian Far Eastern cities. When the
Chinese were
expanding and modernizing their missile stockpiles, more operational
options
became available (Gertz, 1999a). Beginning in the early 1990s, China
initiated
a series of nuclear tests and simulations, which indicated that it was
developing
a number of new small warheads with higher yield-to-weight ratios,
possibly
for use on multiple warheads of land-based missiles. The Second
Artillery
also began to use the Global Positioning System (GPS) to improve its
missiles.12 In addition, the new DF-31, and DF-5A missiles are
believed to
have a MIRVed capability,13 on which the Chinese have been working
since
the 1980s.14
The development of China’s nuclear operational capability is not
limited to
the improvement of missile technology. The Second Artillery has been
modernizing
its force structure and logistic departments in order to increase
operational
efficiency in the last two decades. Command units, launch divisions
(fashe fendui) and assurance divisions (baozhan fendui) of the Second
Artillery
have been re-organized on a more unified system. Logistic departments
were
told to increase their protection measures and distribution
efficiency. Chief
Commander of the Second Artillery, General Yang Guoliang reportedly
announced in a party meeting in early 2002 that the Second Artillery
had
acquired a ‘significant improvement in logistic establishment of fixed
bases’
(Military Intelligence Bureau, 2002, p. 2).
The education, training and exercises of the Second Artillery are the
third
focus for improving operational effectiveness. The Second Artillery
has established
one engineering design academy and four research institutes to solve
problems associated with operations, transporter erector launchers and
logistics, command automation, targetting and mapping, and missile and
warhead engineering design. The Second Artillery’s Command College in
Wuhan provides programmes for candidate leaders from headquarters to
launch brigades. The Engineering College in Xi’an is in charge of
training
high-level technicians. More than 70% of the Second Artillery’s active
duty
officers were said to have bachelor’s degrees or above (State Council
Information Office, 2004).
As for exercises, at the end of 1959, the CMC, according to the
principle of
self-centralism (yiwou weizhu), demanded all military units to prepare
for
operations under nuclear conditions (Pan and Tai, 1999). Proper
expertises of
nuclear forces, however, did not systematically materialize until the
1980s.
From the 1990s, the Second Artillery reportedly began to practise
group
launches (sequential missile launches from different bases, daguimo
lianhe
daji) to test response and retaliatory capabilities. The scenario
settings were
mostly about conflicts between Russia and China, but relevant tactics
were
used in the 1995 and 1996 missile firings near Taiwan.
Finally, in order to make the most of its limited missile arsenal, the
PLA
listed several operational principles for the Second Artillery: (1)
unexpected
attack (xianji zhidi); (2) attack at centres (zhongdian daji); (3)
concentration
( jizhing shiyong); (4) consecutive attacks (lianxu daji); (5)
flexibility and mobility
(linghuo jidong); and (6) coordination (miqie xietong) (Military
Intelligence Bureau, 2002, p. 13). Meanwhile, the new generation of
China’s
strategic ballistic missiles is asked to have the ‘Four Highs’ (si
gao): high survivability
before launching; high anti-interception capability; high precision
and
strike capability; and high reliability (Ying, 2002).
4 Tactical nuclear weapons
There have been few discussions on the operation of China’s tactical
nuclear
weapons, compared with those of strategic nuclear weapons. To begin
with,
the division of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons incurred doubts
and criticism
by the Chinese strategists, who, like the Russians,15 believed that a
controlled
nuclear war was unrealistic and linked them to a danger of
escalation.16 From 1961, however, the Chinese began to express their
interest
in developing a tactical nuclear capability. China also noticed the
possibility
of modifying nuclear devices into a smaller and more accurate design17
(Li, 2000).
What did the Chinese expect from tactical nuclear weapons? During the
Cold War, tactical nuclear weapons were said to support conventional
forces
(Zhang, 1998). More specifically, as the Chinese recognized that it
would be
difficult to stop a Soviet invasion by conventional means; the only
choice
open to China was probably to use its tactical nuclear weapons before
it was
too late (Liu, 1986). The Sino-Soviet border crisis during the late
1960s was
the first time that the Chinese were motivated to use their
rudimentary tactical
nuclear weapons, which perhaps included atomic artillery shells and
demolition mines, but not missiles.18 Atomic demolition munitions
(ADMs),
for example, could be used by the PLA to close mountain passes and
otherwise
hamper invading troops.
The Chinese, however, anticipated that the Russians would use tactical
nuclear weapons first (Quan, 2004), as the USSR had deployed hundreds
of
tactical nuclear weapons near the border (Freedom, 1985). In an
unusual
article from the Academy of Military Sciences, the authors assumed an
enemy’s (Soviet) mobilized division would be assigned to destroy 40
Chinese
targets. Forty per cent of the targets (16 targets) would be attacked
by 10–18
nuclear bombs with 25% (10 targets) by air bombing and 35% (14
targets) by
artillery (Xuu et al., 1987). The authors also assumed that the enemy
would
use low-yield atomic bombs to break the front line and high-yield
bombs to
destroy China’s artillery forces, command centres and reinforcements
(Xuu
et al., 1987, p. 108).
After the end of the 1969 crisis, the Chinese increased the number of
their
tactical nuclear weapons with a yield below 30 kilotons along the
border (US
Defence Intelligence Agency, 1972). The Q-5 attackers and H-6 bombers
could also be armed with low-yield gravity bombs (Norris et al.,
1994). Until
the end of 1970s, however, China seemed to lack an operational
capability of
tactical nuclear missiles.19
Despite the military function, the use of tactical nuclear weapons
could
produce political problems for the Chinese. If the Russians did not
use tactical
nuclear weapons first, and the Chinese were forced to use theirs to
stop a
massive Russian land invasion, this would have contradicted China’s
NFU
policy, which had been regarded as the core of Chinese nuclear
strategy. This
could perhaps be an important reason why the Chinese often downplayed
their tactical nuclear weapons in military operations.
China’s ADMs, nuclear artillery and probably multiple-rocket system
(MRS), and more importantly tactical nuclear missiles, were further
developed
from the early 1980s. Several nuclear tests had produced yields
estimated to be
below 20 kilotons (Defence Intelligence Agency, 1979, p. 371), and
more exercises
of tactical nuclear weapons were demanded by the then Second Artillery
Chief Commander Lieutenant General Li Xuge (Ji, 1999). In May 1982,
Deputy Defence Minister Xiao Ke told a French delegation that China
did
not have tactical nuclear weapons assigned at the army divisional
level, but
refused to comment on higher echelons (Lin, 1996). In an exercise of
the same
year, which simulated a Soviet armoured invasion, the PLA ground force
and
the Second Artillery jointly repelled the Soviet attack using tactical
nuclear
explosives. This was perhaps the first time that the PLA acknowledged
manoeuvres involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons.20 In 1988,
the
Chinese tested a 1–5 kiloton nuclear device with an enhanced radiation
yield,
advancing its development of a very low yield neutron weapon (Bulletin
of the
Atomic Scientists, 2003).
From the 1990s, the Chinese developed tactical nuclear weapons as a
part
of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), although they had no
plans to
increase their stockpile of 150 tactical nuclear weapons. China
particularly
demonstrated enormous interest in stand-off weapons such as long-range
land
attack cruise missiles (LACMs) and short-range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs) for
a tactical nuclear role.21 According to Mark Stokes, ‘China’s first-
generation
LACM is likely to be up to twice as accurate as their theater
ballistic missiles.
Successful exploitation of GPS, indigenous and/or foreign-procured
remote
sensing data, and digital mapping technology could permit the fielding
of an
LACM with a circular error probable (CEP) of 16 m or better.22 The
LACMs
are cheaper to produce, generally thought to be one-third the cost of
ballistic
missiles’ (Stokes, 1999a). There will be no technological bars to
placing on
these systems a nuclear payload, once developed.23
Another focus is the SRBM, in which the Chinese have made significant
progress. Although most of them are believed to carry conventional
warheads,
the DF-15 can carry a 10 kiloton neutron warhead or a 20 kiloton
nuclear
warhead with a CEP of 600 m.24 Currently, China’s SRBM force totals
some
650–730 missiles, increasing at a rate of 75–120 missiles per year (US
Department of Defence, 2005, p. 29). It is suspected that the Chinese
might
use nuclear-armed SRBMs to halt US and Japanese forces during a
Chinese
military campaign against Taiwan, if necessary (Harney, 2005). Such
controversial
operations, however, would violate China’s NFU pledge.25
5 Analysis I: strategic targetting and operations
Structuring a targetting list is imperative for a practical
realization of nuclear
strategy. Two concepts, ‘counterforce’ and ‘countervalue’, are helpful
for
comparison of targetting plans. By definition, ‘counterforce’ means
the
employment of strategic forces in order to destroy, or render
impotent, selected
military capabilities of an enemy force under any of the circumstances
in
which hostilities may be initiated. It aims at reaching a victory
while seeking
to spare cities and population. ‘Countervalue’, by contrast, targets
an enemy’s
civilian population centres or places with high concentrations of
noncombatants.
The targets sometime include industries located in urban areas.
Essentially, it is equal to a countercity or ‘city-busting’ policy.
The Chinese did not usually use the terms of countervalue and
counterforce,
but these concepts actually existed in their minds (Yiao, 1998). In
terms
of nuclear targetting, however, China had to yield these concepts to
its technological
limitations. The H-6 and Q-5 were China’s first operational airborne
nuclear delivery systems, and could carry warheads from tens of
kilotons to
megatons yields, but both were very outdated models with inadequate
operational performances. The H-6 had an operational range of about
2400–3200 km, and could carry up to three bombs. However, it lacked a
low-level attack capability and speed. The Q-5 had improved war-
fighting
potential, but it had an operational range of only 400 km and could
only
carry one nuclear bomb aboard (The Miltary Balance 2004–2005, p. 250).
The abilities of the H-6 and Q-5 to penetrate defence systems of
assigned
targets were also very questionable (Li, 2000).
By contrast, the Chinese had higher expectations for their land-based
ballistic
missile programmes. According to a 1964 draft plan, the Chinese
assigned
its future missile programmes to four major targets (Lewis and Xue,
1988).
These targetting plans were later modified as a result of
technological progress
and, more importantly, political changes in the 1970s and 1980s. For
example,
the original design targets of the DF-3 were the US Clark Air Force
base and
Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines, but the DF-3 was later
modified to
attack targets in the Central and Eastern USSR. The DF-4 was at first
aimed at
striking the US Andersen air base at Guam, but the Chinese increased
its range
in order to attack more Soviet cities, including Moscow. Nevertheless,
most of
China’s Cold War ballistic missiles could only carry single nuclear
warheads,
and had to use high-yield warheads to compensate for their weakness.
Their
actual abilities to meet these targetted assignments plans were highly
doubtful.
In the post-Cold War period, China has again revised its strategic
targetting
for the new international environment. Countervalue nuclear targetting
is used
against the USA and Russia, with the former as the primary target.
China’s
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the 54 Base (the 96251
Unit) of
the Second Artillery have been reserved for countervalue missions
against the
US homeland, especially Alaska and western US cities.26 Evidence also
shows
that, since the late 1990s, China has increased the percentage of its
deployed
nuclear missiles capable of reaching the USA from 14 to 70% (Ji, 1999,
p. 255). More recently, all three new DF-31 missile brigades, deployed
in
Hancheng, Shaangxi Province (806), Nanyang, Henan Province (813) and
Laiwu, Shandong Province (820), are believed to target the USA.27
As for Russia, the DF-4 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM)
has
been referred to as the ‘Moscow missile’ since the late 1970s. It has
a range of
4750 km and probably a payload of 1–3 megatons. The DF-5 and DF-5A are
chiefly aimed at the USA, but they are also capable of attacking
Russian
cities.28 China’s medium- and long-range missiles, such as the solid-
fuelled
DF-21/DF-21A,29 could also strike cities in the Far East of Russia.
China’s
missiles may be deficient in precision, but their indiscriminate
countervalue
utility may more or less heighten an adversary’s threat perception
(McGuire,
1999).
By contrast, China’s MRBMs and IRBMs are chiefly assigned to
counterforce
missions, although they are not necessarily nuclear-tipped. Apart from
the 54 Base, different potential targets around China proper were
assigned to
the other five major Second Artillery bases with various missiles
under their
control. The ranges of the DF-21A and DF-3A missiles of the 51 Base
(the
96101 Unit), headquartered in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, cover the
Korean peninsula, Russian Far East, and Japan, including Okinawa. The
52
Base (the 96151 Unit), headquartered in Huangshan, Anhui Province, is
the
most important unit for conducting strikes against Taiwan.30 It
controls the
DF-3A, DF-21A and DF-15. The 53 Base (the 96201 Unit), headquartered
in
Kunming, Yunnan Province, controls the DF-3A and DF-21A to strike
potential
targets in India and Southeast Asia (including the Philippines and
Vietnam). The 55 Base (the 96301 Unit), headquartered in Huaihua,
Hunan
Province, controls the DF-3A, DF-4 and DF-5 missiles, which can strike
Guam and Hawaii. The DF-21A, DF-3A and DF-4 of the 56 Base (the 96351
Unit), headquartered in Xining, Qinghai Province, are capable of
striking
targets in India and Russia. Its Datong brigade also provides the
primary
deployment base for the H-6 bombers (Bates et al., 2002). By striking
military
targets in Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia, not only can
Chinese missiles
destroy large portions of these countries, which pose a potential
threat to
China, but also destruction of the US bases and ports in this area
make it difficult
for the USA to land enough troops and materiel to interfere with
China’s ongoing operations. Besides, the Chinese missiles can strike
Russian
forces during the vulnerable trans-Siberian journey, which they have
to make
to interfere with China in East Asia.
After discussing China’s targetting plans, a further assessment is
helpful to
unearth China’s actual nuclear operational capability. Firstly, China
has
decided not to enlarge its nuclear stockpiles, and therefore its
target list was
never long, compared with those of the Superpowers. How many nuclear
warheads
the Chinese have produced is not clear, but it is generally believed
China has always retained about 400 warheads at hand since the 1980s
(Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2003). Currently, China has 252
strategic
nuclear warheads, including 36 ICBMs, and 150 sub-strategic warheads.
31
During the process of modernization, China has shown little
inclination to
expand its current nuclear arsenal.
Secondly, there has been a huge lag between China’s real technological
capacities and its targetting plans. The Chinese missiles lacked
adequate performance,
and their large CEPs restricted available operations. The CEPs of
the DF-4 and DF-5 are about 1500 and 2000 m, respectively. Despite
enormous
investment, the improved DF-5A still has a CEP of 1000 m.32
Accordingly, the Chinese have to rely on gigantic payloads to make up
for
their inaccurate missiles. Each DF-4 carries one 3.3-megaton warhead.
The
DF-5 is even designed to carry a 4–5-megaton warhead (Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, 2003). In addition, most of China’s ICBMs in
service are
not MRVed, not to mention MIRVed,33 with the exceptions of its new
DF-31
and DF-5A.34 The potentially MIRVed DF-31 is currently China’s most
advanced ICBM, which has an estimated range of 8000 km with a CEP of
300–600 m (Lin, 1996, p. 344). However, it currently carries one 200–
300
kiloton warhead, and until now, only eight DF-31 missiles have been
deployed
(Military Balance 2004–2005, p. 170; Natural Resources Defence
Council,
2002). In terms of the DF-5A, evidence indicates that the current
force of 24
DF-5A missiles is also only deployed with single warheads.35 Some
analysts
therefore are very sceptical about China’s MIRV ability (Center for
Non-proliferation Studies, 2003). With effort, however, China’s ICBMs
may
be significantly improved in the coming decade.
China’s sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are undoubtedly the
weakest
link in its deterrent forces. The JL-1 only has a range of 2150 kms.36
The JL-2,
the sea-based variant of the DF-31, is expected to carry 250-kiloton
MIRVs or
1-megaton single warhead over a range of 8000 km (Shambaugh, 2002).
The
test failure in the summer of 2004, however, demonstrated that the
JL-2 still
needs improvement (Harvey, 2004, pp. 323–328). Compared with the ICBMs
and SLBMs, the Chinese have made more progress in their MRBMs and
IRBMs, and these more accurate missiles could be assigned to
counterforce
missions with lower yield warheads. From available sources, the low
yield
(200–300 kilotons) of the DF-21 could be a reference to such
functions. The
only exception is the DF-3A IRBM. It has been suggested that the high-
yield
DF-3A (3.3-megaton) could be used to attack the US forward deployed
military
bases in East Asia, if necessary (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
2003).
Thirdly, the China’s philosophy of countervalue could be flawed and
such
targetting could be used as the last resort only. As far as missile
technology is
concerned, China’s ICBMs would be likely to miss Los Angeles or
Moscow,
but the Americans and Russians apparently would have more capability
to hit
Shanghai or Beijing precisely with their MIRVed missiles. According to
one
account, the USA only needs 10–15 W76 or five W88 warheads to wipe out
China’s four largest cities (Fievson, 1999). The total destruction of
cities
might perhaps have been acceptable in the Maoist era, but it is now
viewed by
many Chinese leaders as unbearable due to China’s rapid economic
development.
37 In view of this, China’s countervalue targetting is effectively a
suicide
operation, and could only be taken as a last resort if at all.
Fourthly, the Second Artillery is currently China’s strategic force,
but
nuclear missions are not its only tasks. The basic tactics and
operational procedures
of the Second Artillery’s Conventional Missiles Forces (changgui
daodang budui) and Mobile Strategic Missile Forces ( jidong zhanlue
daodan
budui) are almost the same.38 The Chinese also failed to specify which
missile
would be exclusively assigned for nuclear tasks. This could create
serious strategic
misinterpretations.
Finally, on 3 September 1994, China’s then President Jiang Zemin and
his
Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin signed an agreement to de-target
their
nuclear weapons against each other. In 1998, the USA and China signed
a
similar de-targetting agreement.39 Regardless of these agreements, the
Chinese
did not think de-targetting would mean much in terms of military
operations.
They argued that the so-called de-targetted weapons could be turned
against
each other again within minutes (Wang and Wen, 2000). For China,
de-targetting agreements have, at most, political meanings.
6 Analysis II: command and control
With respect to command and control of nuclear forces, Chinese leaders
are convinced
that it is vital to assure that the use of these weapons will always
be responsive to a deliberate and responsible political decision, and
to provide for
maximum possible security against sabotage and unauthorized or
accidental use.
In China, nuclear weapons are used by the following procedures: (1) in
general, the Chairman of the CMC submits the proposal for using
nuclear
weapons, subject to the approval of the Standing Committee of the
Politburo;
(2) in wartime, the CMC holds the ultimate authority for nuclear use,
and the
Chairman has a final say; (3) in the face of a sudden nuclear attack,
the
Central Emergency Command Center (CECC, zhongyian jinji zhanshi zhihui
zhongxin) will authorize the use of nuclear weapons and issue orders
to the
five sub-centres (United Daily, 2000).
In practice, China employs the ‘one-man’ rule. The ultimate authority
to
use nuclear weapons obviously rests on the Chairman of the CMC,
especially
in wartime,40 although consultation with, but not consensus among,
some
CMC members and other senior military leaders may be required (Gates
and
Mulvenon, 1999). The Chinese military, however, seem not to have a
predelegated
power to launch nuclear weapons, when the political leadership is
unavailable.
In terms of the wartime protection of the leadership during the Cold
War,
China constructed an extensive network of hardened, underground
bunkers to
provide a refuge for the leaders of the CCP, Central Government, CMC
and
four PLA general departments in time of crisis or a nuclear war. The
primary
hardened underground command facility used by the CMC was located
under
Yuquanshan in Xishan outside Beijing. The multi-floor underground
facility
was built entirely inside the mountain body and is said to be able to
house
several thousand people. Although China does not have Permissive
Action
Link (PAL) devices, it could follow a set of ‘negative control’
procedures that
have provided the Chinese leaders with much confidence that an
unauthorized
launch would be avoided (Liu, 1994).
In 1986, the PLA established the CECC. The headquarters were still set
up
in Xishan (i.e. the 8th Division of the DGS) with two sub-centres at
Wuwei
(Langzhou MR) and Mianyang (Chengdu MR), each manned by two CMC/
Politburo members. The number of sub-centres was later increased to
five,
with three more at Taiyuan (Beijing MR), Luushan (Jinan MR) and
Weining
(Chengdu MR) (United Daily, 2000). Hohhot, the capital of China’s
Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region, was the reported location of a national
military
command bunker.41 It was believed that there were more than 29
hardened,
underground bunkers across the country, connected to each other via
14 000 km underground and 5000 k underwater cables.42
With these arrangements, however, China still has some command and
control problems, which are mostly technologically oriented, despite
the
efforts being made. Firstly, in terms of efficiency, due to strategic
concepts of
dispersion and concealment, many Second Artillery bases are located in
remote areas,43 and nuclear warheads are stored in unidentified places.
44 The
strategic missile forces were designed without reliance on integrated
systems
beyond the level of the individual missiles, but most of the PLA’s
command
and control systems are manual and there are long delays in
dissemination of
directives as well as logistical supply. To modernize its command and
control
systems, China is preparing to construct a command network capable of
rapidly passing orders and information up and down the chain of
command
and moving intelligence to decision makers at the national and theatre
level.
Yet, it is still regarded as behind the Western standards for
integrating and
controlling complex joint military operations. Foreign export
restrictions also
prevent China from obtaining technology for further improvements.
Secondly, in terms of the early warning systems, since 1970, the
Chinese
have worked on large phased array radars (LPARs) to provide an early
warning system capable of identifying, detecting and tracking targets
in the
air and space over a long distance (Tong, 1984; Xia et al., 1993).
However,
progress was very slow and it was not until the late 1980s that China
had a
basic capability. According to a 1994 report to the US Congress, a
phased-array radar had been deployed near Datong or Harbin to provide
early warning regarding possible Russian attack (Sutter, 1994). Other
ongoing
projects include the satellite-based synthetic aperture radar (SAR),
spacebased
laser detecting sensor, over-the-horizon (OTH) radar and airborne
warning and control system (AWACS).45 China may now have as many as
three OTH sky-wave and two surface-wave OTH radars (US Department of
Defence, 2003). However, due to China’s extensive territory, these
facilities do
not constitute a coherent, national and strategic-level integrated air
defence
system (IADS) (US Department of Defence, 2003), and can only provide
limited regional effects.46 Besides, China is interested in electronic
intelligence
(ELINT) or SIGINT reconnaissance satellites, but China’s current
capability
to develop military photo-reconnaissance satellites is outdated by
Western
standards. More importantly, Chinese satellites lack real-time
reconnaissance
capabilities,47 and most of the Second Artillery’s missiles still have
technical
problems in linking to space systems for detection of an enemy’s
incoming
missiles. With the emphasis on space-based imagery and reconnaissance
satellites
programmes,48 however, China’s C4SR may improve, and its ability to
detect, monitor and target military activities in Asia and the Western
Pacific
Ocean regions may be enhanced over the next decade.49
Thirdly, the Chinese do not possess sufficient capabilities to move
towards
a launch-on-warning (LOW)-type posture for foreign attacks. Strategic
missiles
are unintegrated and they are still based in silos or caves in order
to
survive a first strike. Many land-based strategic nuclear missiles are
liquidfuelled,
requiring about half an hour to fuel before being launched. SLBMs
are solid-fuelled and thus potentially capable of being launched more
rapidly.
However, it is believed that the nuclear warheads are not routinely
carried by
the submarines but stored onshore.50 The slow reaction time
additionally
Table 1 The Chairman of the CMC
Chairman of People’s Revolutionary Military Committee
Mao Zedong 1949–1954
Chairman of the CMC, CCP
Mao Zedong 1954–1976
Hua Guofeng 1976–1981
Deng Xiaoping 1981–1989
Jiang Zemin 1989–2004 (19 September)
Hu Jintao 2004 (19 September)-
Chairman of the CMC, PRC
Deng Xiaoping 1983–1990
Jiang Zemin 1990–2005 (8 March)
Hu Jintao 2005 (8 March)-
Figure 1 The command and control systems of the Chinese military.
Source: Shigekatsu Kondo
et al., East Asian Strategic Review 2003 (Tokyo: National Institute
for Defence Studies, 2003),
p. 182.
prevents the Chinese from effective retaliation. To compromise
survivability
and retaliation, China may follow a delayed second-strike strategy.
This
means China can at best retaliate after withstanding a nuclear strike,
rather
than attempting either a launch-under-attack (LUA) or a LOW-type
policy. It
is not clear, however, in what timeframe China would retaliate after
an initial
nuclear attack—hours, days, weeks or months (Center for Non-
proliferation
Studies, 1998).
Finally, since the late 1990s, the PLA has been actively upgrading its
communications
system by leveraging commercial information technologies to
create a high-tech electronic environment capable of supporting a
modern
military in peacetime and wartime (Hughes, 1999). According to one
estimate,
the Chinese Government allocated approximately 20% of its total
telecommunications
budget to dedicated PLA communications systems (Zhongguo, 1995;
Liu, 1997). Since 1992, the capacity of the PLA communications
networks has
increased at least 10-fold. There are currently at least four military
networks: a
military telephone network, a secure telephone network, an automated
command system and an integrated field communications network. The
automated
command system links ground force units with the PLAAF and PLAN
units (Stokes, 1999b, p. 44). Civil telecommunications satellites such
as the
ZX-6B and ZX-8 are also used for military communications.51 The
Pentagon
annual reports asserted that China’s military and civil communications
network could be capable of supporting a wide range of military
operations
(US Department of Defence, 2003). Nevertheless, it cannot be denied
that the
gaps of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities
between civilian
and military sectors are actually expanding rather than contracting,
and
technicians are flowing to the civilian sector due the better
earnings. The PLA
could have problems attracting high-quality technicians into service
in the
long run (Military Intelligence Bureau, 2003, p. 15).
7 Conclusion
Nuclear command and control systems allow the execution of wartime
missions
in conformity with the given nuclear strategy and include strict
measures to eliminate the possibility of unauthorized or accidental
firing of
weapons. Since it became a nuclear power, China has made many efforts
in
this regard, but still has insufficiencies. China’s command and
control systems
suffer technological problems, despite the efforts being made. Its
command
and control network is generally regarded as far behind the Western
standards
for integrating and controlling complex joint military operations.
Foreign export restrictions also prevent China from obtaining
technology for
further improvements.
As far as targetting and operations ate concerned, for many observers,
China pursued the employment of missile forces in an attempt to damage
or
destroy the enemy’s most populous cities under any of the
circumstances in
which hostilities were initiated. However, this is an
oversimplification. With
the development of missiles and relevant technologies, the Chinese now
have
more assets to counter foreign threats: nuclear countervalue attacks
against
US and Russian cities by the ICBMs/IRBMs, and the nuclear/conventional
counterforce targetting at foreign military bases. Nevertheless,
China’s current
striking capability is still insufficient, especially in terms of the
ICBMs and
SLBMs, and it will take more time to upgrade the C4ISR systems.
In terms of tactical nuclear weapons, the Chinese have not emphasized
tactical
nuclear weapons politically, and the available evidence shows that the
Chinese would be likely to use tactical nuclear weapons against
massive conventional
attacks. The use of such weapons, nevertheless, could contradict
China’s NFU commitment.
To sum up, China’s actual nuclear posture is more aggressive than its
oftcited
NFU policy, and the Chinese are constantly preparing for a more
offensive
nuclear posture against other nuclear powers, particularly the USA,
although China’s nuclear operational capability is still far behind.
General
Zhu Chenghu’s intimidation may be currently lacking credibility, but
it has
expressed China’s ambition that nuclear weapons will no longer be a
means of
the last resort, and the use of its nuclear deterrent is always an
indispensable
approach to realizing national objectives.
1 The Constitution of People’s Republic of China, China, 1982, Article
19.
2 Organizational Law of the Chinese Communist Party (Zhongguo
Gongchandang Zhuzhi
Zhangcheng), China, 2002 revision, Article 22.
3 The Constitution of People’s Republic of China, 1982, Article 93.
4 Chairman of the CMC is often the President of the State. Currently,
the third Vice-Chairman Xu
Caihou is not a member of the Politburo, but he has a post in the
Central Secretariat.
5 Organizational Law of the Chinese Communist Party, Article 23.
6 The CMC expanded from eight to 11 members and added the commanders
of the PLAAF,
PLAN, and the Second Artillery in 2004. Air Force and Navy officers
were also appointed
Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff, reflecting China’s emphasis on
joint capabilities and interservice
coordination (US Department of Defence, 2005, p. 1).
7 The Constitution of People’s Republic of China, 1982, Article 94.
The Chairman of the State CMC
is elected by the National People’s Congress. The rest of the CMC
members are nominated by the
Chairman.
8 Regional units were controlled administratively by the MR
commanders, but the DGS in Beijing
could assume a direct operational control of any main-force unit.
9 The Cultural Revolution disturbed the establishment of the Second
Artillery, however. The first
commander of the Second Artillery General Xiang Shouzhi was detained
in a correction camp
before he could assume his office and his nomination was soon revoked.
Only after 10 years could
he return to his post.
10 China—Military Organization (2005). The same source argues the
PLAAF 4th Independent
Regiment now deployed the J-8 fighters, not the H-6 bombers.
11 The DGS Communications Department (Zong canmoubu/tongxinbu) most
likely leads C4I modernization
in the PLA. This unit is the PLA’s signal corps, responsible for
building, operating, and
protecting the military’s communications infrastructure (US Department
of Defence, 2004).
12 China currently has three Beidou satellites for positioning
missions. IISS, The Military Balance,
2004–2005, London, IISS, 2004, p. 260.
13 The Military Balance 2004–2005, p. 250. A classified NAIC report
revealed that during the 1999
test an undetermined number of decoys decoupled from the primary
warhead and spread out in
different directions when the payload reached space (Gertz, 1999b, p.
1).
14 Lewis and Hua asserted that the Chinese began to study MRVs and
MIRVs in 1970 as a response
to US deployment of multiple warhead systems, but lowered the priority
of the effort in March
1980 after more than a decade of problems. Work on multiple warheads
was resumed on 10
November 1983, however, when the First Academy included them in the
DF-5A modification
programme (Lewis and Hua, 1992, pp. 21–22).
15 Soviet Marshal Zhukov once clearly pointed out that his country did
come to a view that tactical
nuclear weapons could not be used except as ‘an act of suicidal
desperation’. A. J. R. Groom,
British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, London, Frances Pinter, 1974,
p. 220.
16 In 1955, China’s governmental media New China News Agency
(Xinhuashe) quoted a nuclear
physicist that, even if nuclear weapons could be used ‘tactically’,
they were still WMDs and their
large-scale and indiscriminate damage could not be prevented (Langley
Hsieh, 1962).
17 The US–USSR confrontation in Cuba may enhance this interest.
18 The US Defence Intelligence Agency suggested China did not possess
tactical nuclear-capable
missiles at that time, but it could probably have ADMs (US Defence
Intelligence Agency, 1976,
pp. 3–15).
19 Segal (1985), p. 58. Lin (1988) also held a similar view. See The
US Defence Intelligence Agency
(1979), p. 142.
20 A Ningxia Daily article said, ‘Our troops’ nuclear strike
capability zeroed in on the targets, took
the enemy by surprise and dealt his artillery positions and reserve
forces a crushing blow. The
exercise was characterized as implementing our army’s new task in
organizing training under
modern conditions’ (Ribao, 1982; Associated Press, 1982). According to
other sources, the
Chinese newspapers had discussed the use of Chinese tactical nuclear
weapons against Soviet
attacks in 1979 (Garrett and Glaser, 1984; Lin, 1999).
21 The LACMs and SRBMs were assigned to the Second Artillery, while
the ASCMs and ALCMs
were in the hands of the PLAN and PLAAF respectively. The first LACMs
to enter production
probably would be air-launched from bombers. This second-generation
LACM will have both tactical
and strategic attack roles and thus may be a nuclear capable system.
See United Daily
(1996).
22 The CEP means the radius of a circle around a target with which 50%
of warheads aimed at the
targets are predicated to land.
23 According to the Department of Defence (2005, p. 29), China’s
first- and second-generation
LACMs remain under development, however.
24 It was widely suspected that the CEP of the DF-15 is now much lower
than 600 m. Lower estimates
of the DF-15’s CEP have been discussed in the Hong Kong and Taiwan
media, but 600 m
is the only verifiable number in open sources (Natural Resources
Defence Council, 2002). The
USA regarded China’s first-generation SRBMs as not possessing a true
precision strike capability,
but later generations could have greater ranges and improved accuracy
(US Department of
Defence, 2005, p. 29).
25 The nuclear use on Taiwan is justified by some Chinese officials as
not violating China’s NFU
pledge, as Taiwan is not an independent country to China. Some
officials in the Foreign Ministry,
however, have made promises that China’s nuclear weapons will not be
aimed at Taiwan, but they
failed to provide an NFU guarantee to the American troops involving in
China’s military campaign
against Taiwan (United Daily, 1999a, b).
26 The DF-5 missiles of the 54 Base, headquartered in Luoyang, Henan
Province, can strike targets
in the CONUS and Europe (Macko, 1998).
27 Lin (2004, p. 13). The Military Balance 2004–2005 (p. 170),
however, argued there is only one
DF-31 brigade, and 3 DF-5A brigades.
28 The ranges of both missiles are over 10 000 km (Lewis and Hua,
1992).
29 The solid-fuelled, mobile DF-21A can carry a 600 kg warhead with a
yield of 200–300 kilotons.
According to the Chinese classification, it is an MRBM, but The
Military Balance 2004–2005
(p. 170) classifies it as an IRBM.
30 According to an official US sources, China has deployed some 650–
730 mobile M-9 and M-11
SRBMs to garrisons opposite Taiwan. Deployment of these systems is
increasing at a rate of
about 100 missiles per year (US Department of Defence, 2005, p. 4)
31 The number of China’s ICBMs may reach up to 60 by 2010 (Military
Balance 2004–2005, p. 251;
US Department of Defence, 2004; Ying, 2002, pp. 33–34).
32 Ji (1999), p. 255. For one comparative example, the CEP of the old
American MX Peacemaker
was less than 100 m (Robertson, 1987), pp. 211–212.
33 An MRV system releases two or more RVs along the missile’s flight
path at a single target, which
land in a confined area at approximately the same time. The more
sophisticated and flexible
MIRV system releases two or more RVs to independent targets over a
wider area over a longer
time. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists argued the Chinese had had
the MRV/MIRV technology
for more than 20 years, but they had chosen not to use it. This
account, however, lacks credibility,
and most analysts agreed the technological difficulties had stalled
the Chinese MIRV
programmes (Stokes, 1999a).
34 The DF-21A MRBM was said to be MIRVed, too (Sugiyama, 2003), but
The Military Balance
2004–2005 (p. 250) does not regard it as a MIRVed missile.
35 Based on the DF-5A throw weight and warhead shroud, the missile
could be equipped with six
re-entry vehicles with each re-entry vehicle weighing 600 kg (the size
of the single warhead on the
DF-21). The DF-5A second stage apparently has four vernier engines,
which reportedly fire for
190 s after the main missile engine cuts off. Thus, the DF-5A could
direct a warhead bus over a
fairly large arc covering an array of aim points. However, the exact
status of this programme
cannot be confirmed based on open sources (Erickson, 2005, p. 79; The
Military Balance 2004–
2005, p. 170).
36 The Military Balance 2004–2005, p. 250. The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists (2003) even said
that the JL-1 only has a range of 1000 km. Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, ‘Chinese nuclear
forces’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. A Chinese source argued
the JL-1 has a range of
3000 km, but he also admitted the weakness of a short range (Li, 2000,
p. 275).
37 Marshal Xu Xiangqian admitted that ‘In the past, we don’t care
about losing one city or one
place, but now, we never easily give up any of them’ (Xu, 1993, p.
354).
38 The major operation plans of these two missile forces, according to
a Taiwanese source, include
three levels of strikes, and the Chinese did not differentiate nuclear
and conventional situations:
(1) structural strikes ( jiegouxing daji) address the enemy’s centers
of gravity, such as command
centers, traffic hubs, electric facilities, industrial areas with
‘acupunctural strikes’ (dianxueshi daji);
(2) air and sea mastery, to ensure advantage in air and at sea with
the use of missile forces; major
targets would be the airports, naval bases, early warning systems,
anti-air defence systems and
other relevant military facilities; (3) deterrence strikes (weizhexing
daji), also called ‘deterrence
battles of missiles’ (daodan weizhezhan), which aim to attack the
enemy’s political, economic and
military targets. Such battles include two forms of attack: warning
attack (xuuda) and real attack
(shida). The former is to demonstrate China’s determination and to
weaken enemy’s will by inflicting
warning attack against certain targets with military value. The latter
is the extension of
warning attacks. Such strikes, which are expected to be precision
attacks, are essentially a real war
(Military Intelligence Bureau, 2002, pp. 11–12).
39 On 18 June 1998, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhu Bangzao
in a public occasion
called for a US–Chinese agreement on a NFU nuclear policy, rather than
the re-targetting of missiles
away from each other’s territory as a confidence-building measure.
Following such a policy,
Zhu argues, China and the USA have no need to sign an accord on the de-
targetting of weapons
aimed at each other, and an NFU agreement is more meaningful. However,
the USA did not
think that Sino-American relations had yet reached a level where
bilateral NFU and detargetting
could be addressed in a mutually acceptable way (United Daily, 1998,
p. 13).
40 The Constitution of People’s Republic of China, Article 93.
41 Arbin and Fieldhouse (1985), pp. 290–291. Hohhot (‘Green City’ in
Mongolian) is located to the
north of Beijing near the border with the People’s Republic of
Mongolia.
42 China Defence Today, ‘National Command’; http://www.sinodefence,com
(last updated:
unknown).
43 In 1985, the Commander of the Second Artillery, General Li Xuge,
made a proposal, later
approved by the CMC, to re-deploy units of the Second Artillery from
remote areas to towns and
cities. This proposal was aimed at improving not only the living
standard of the Second Artillery,
but also the backward communication systems.
44 Only one stockpile site for the storage of nuclear weapons has been
identified so far. This site consists
of three vaults in a ridge about 22 km from the Koko Nor weapons
fabrication complex.
Some of this space is probably used for nuclear weapons inspection and
retrofit. FAS, ‘China’s
Nuclear Weapons Research and Development Production and Related
Facilities’; http://www.fas.
org/irp/dia/product/prc_72/app_e.htm (last updated: unknown).
45 China Defence Today, ‘National Command’; http://www.sinodefence,com
(last updated:
unknown).
46 According to The Military Balance 2004–2005 (p. 170), China
currently has two tracking defence
stations. One is at Xinjiang Province, covering Central Asia, and the
other is located in Shanxi
Province, covering the northern border.
47 China may be developing a system of data relay satellites to
support global coverage. Moreover,
Beijing has acquired mobile data reception equipment that could
support more rapid data transmission
to deployed military forces (US Department of defense, 2005, p. 35).
48 China has two remote-sensing satellite programmes known as Ziyuan-1
(ZY-1), also known as the
China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite, and ZY-2. China launched the
ZY-1B in October 2003. A
third ZY-2 satellite was launched in October 2004. ZY-2 payloads
probably are digital imagery
reconnaissance satellites and have worldwide coverage. China also
tested new film-based imagery
satellites and small digital imagery satellites in 2003 and 2004 (US
Department of Defense, 2005,
p. 35). According to the IISS, however, the Chinese currently have
only 2 ZY-2 military satellites
operating for ISR missions (The Military Balance, 2004–2005, p. 260).
49 In the next decade, Beijing most likely will field a range of
space-, air-, sea- and land-based intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance systems and may deploy an improved
film-based photoreconnaissance
satellite. In the interim, China probably will exploit commercial
SPOT, LANDSAT,
RADARSAT, IKONOS and various Russian satellite imagery systems (US
Department of
Defense, 2004).
50 Nuclearfiles Organization, ‘De-Alerting Nuclear Weapons’, a project
of the Nuclear Age Peace
Foundation; http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policies/
article-de-alerting-nuclear-weapons.htm (last updated: unknown).
51 The Military Balance 2004–2005, p. 259. The Chinese also have a
military communications satellite,
Fenghuo, which was launched in 2003.
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Martin Montonion
> from International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 7 (2007) 155–
> 178
> China’s nuclear command, control and operations
> In July 2005, a Chinese Major General, Zhu Chenghu, said at an
> official military
> briefing that China is prepared to use nuclear weapons against the
> USA,
> if its troops are attacked by the Americans during a confrontation
> over
> Taiwan (Harney, 2005). This declaration stirred turmoil and the
> Chinese
> Government did not bother to deny or confirm Zhu’s account. Do China’s
> nuclear forces have such a capability, if a Sino-American war
> occurred? Or is
> Zhu’s statement just a political bluff ?
> In this article, the author will try to answer these questions by
> investigating
> the current development and restraints of China’s nuclear command,
> control
> and communications systems as well as its nuclear targetting and
> operational
> plans....
You might also be interested in the DOD Annual Report to Congress:
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009:
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf
Regarding the question whether China might use their nukes first, the
report states:
"While there is no evidence that China’s doctrine of “no first
use” has changed, the fielding of these forces, along with a projected
new class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
(SSBN)/submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in 2009-2010 enabling
a credible sea-based deterrent, will give China’s leaders greater
flexibility and options for strategic strike than previously available.
While U.S. strategic forces still far outnumber those of China, China
would be able to inflict significant damage on most large American
cities with these survivable systems."
And:
"China’s 2008 Defense White Paper states that the Second Artillery
Corps: 1) sticks to China’s policy of no first-use of nuclear weapons,
2) implements a self-defensive nuclear strategy, 3) strictly follows the
orders of the CMC, and 4) takes as its fundamental mission the
protection of China from any nuclear attack."
However:
"Given the above missions for China’s nuclear forces, the conditions
under which China’s “no first use” policy applies are unclear. The
PRC government has provided public and private assurances that its “no
first use” policy has not and will not change. PRC writings indicate
internal PLA support for this policy. Nevertheless, periodic PRC
military and civilian academic debates have occurred over whether a
“no first use” policy supports or detracts from China’s deterrent,
and whether or not “no first use” should remain in place. Questions
also continue regarding whether or not a conventional strike on
China’s strategic forces would nullify China’s “no first use”
pledge. These debates add a further layer of ambiguity to China’s
strategic intentions for its nuclear forces."
Also make sure to have a look at Figure 6 of the report, they have
projected the ranges of China's strategic missiles on a worldmap, so
that you can see which of them might land on your head one day. Spoiler:
If you live in Brasilia or Argentina, count yourself lucky.
--
Cool links for aspiring physicists, from a Nobel laureate:
http://www.phys.uu.nl/~thooft/theorist.html
