Definition of art
Bruce Attah
A strange comment from "jim" provoked a BIG question from "annie", see below.
Can annie be answered. Only a week or two ago, "drookes" asked for a
reasonably brief definition of art, and no-one responded.
Guess what. I'm going to try.
> Re: Is Howard Hodgkin an artist?
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> From annie <matthew....@balliol.ox.ac.uk>
> Organization Oxford University
> Date Wed, 15 Jan 1997 16:02:23 +0000
> Newsgroups rec.arts.fine
> Message-ID <32DCFF...@balliol.ox.ac.uk>
> References 1 2
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> jim wrote:
> >
> > Bruce Attah wrote:
> > >
> > > Well, is he?
> > >
> > > Does any one who's seen his current retrospective, or is otherwise
> > > familiar with this man's work have an opinion on this?
> > >
> [snip]
> >
> > well bruce there cant be any doubt that he is a painter who
> > paint's for the sake, of among other things, painting
> > so it is undeniable that he is an artist.
>
> I'm sorry. I need further elaboration on this point. I don't understand
> how this can be true. Perhaps someone can tell me (as much as this is
> possible) what their ultimate definition of Art is.
>
> NotMatt
>
A WORKING DEFINITION OF ART, BY BRUCE ATTAH
=============================================
(snipped from an article I've writte, (c) Bruce Attah, 1997)
Art has notoriously been given many absurdly inadequate definitions, a
good number of which have appeared in this newsgroup. One of the most
famous is "significant form", supplied by Clive Bell. Some definitions we
hear quite often are "self-expression", "exploration of the inner self",
"beauty", "creativity", "the imitation of nature", "whatever the artworld
says is art", "whatever an artist says is art", "useless objects",
"challenging experiences", "paintings made for the sake of painting" and a
whole bunch of other woefully inadequate pseudo-definitions, most of which
are actually tendentious devices intended to promote a particular way of
looking at or valuing art.
As a result of this proliferation of bad definitions, it is not surprising
that many people have thrown up their arms in disgust, and proclaimed that
the effort of trying to define "art" is not worthwhile. Referring to
Wittgenstein, they remind us that we do not need to know the definition of
a word in order to use it properly. Some stop there, while others claim
that "art" is a word like "game", which, according to Wittgenstein, is
simply not amenable to a satisfactory definition, because it is a word
that covers many threads of meaning, which, though bearing "family
resemblance" to one another, have no essence in common. I happen to think
Wittgenstein's argument is flawed, but that is by-the-by, as my defence of
the possibility of defining the word "art" does not depend on Wittgenstein
being wrong.
We CAN use a word properly without ever defining it, but it is generally
better to at least try to define the word if there is contention (as there
is, in the case of "art") about what sorts of objects rightly fall under
its heading. One difficulty with "art" is that the word is used in
several interrelated ways, and there is sometimes confusion about _which_
way, exactly, someone is using the word. Basically, there are broad and
narrow meanings of the word, it can be difficult to determine from context
whether a person is using the term broadly or narrowly. Another
difficulty is that some people are motivated to exploit and increase the
confusion that already exists about what can and cannot be art. This
particular difficulty has arisen in the twentieth century, with the
institutionalization of bourgeois rebellion against the bourgeois, though
its roots quite probably go all the way back to the French Revolution.
Whatever difficulties exist, or have been claimed to exist, to thwart the
would-be definer of "art", reflection on the contexts of its use, and in
particular, the sorts of arguments that are rallied on the sides both of
defence and prosecution when the legitimacy of a certain work's claim to
be "art" is called into question reveal that most people will accept that
something is art as long as it meets certain conditions, and doubt that it
is art if it fails to meet certain conditions.
As a result of my own reflections on these matters, I am going to present
here a definition of art that I believe will accommodate MOST things that
have been claimed and accepted to be art, while excluding MOST things that
have not had such claims made or accepted on their behalf. I do not
intend that this definition should be seen as an ULTIMATE definition of
art, but as a working definition. That is to say, it is somewhat
tentative, and subject to modification. Nevertheless, I believe that you
could point it at any object in a museum or art gallery, or in your
friend's house, or in a hole in the ground, and the definition will almost
invariably correctly determine whether the thing is art or not.
Furthermore, I believe that this definition of art works equally well for
the art of all cultures in all periods of history and in all media (not
just plastic arts).
Before I go on to the definition itself, allow me to add one further
point: I have already noted that "art" has broad and narrow meanings, and
that these meanings are interrelated. The definition I am going to
provide only provides the narrowest meaning of art, the meaning we intend
when we concern ourselves with matters of _aesthetics_.
Here is the definition, then:
Art, used as a countable noun, refers to any tradition or profession of
making works of art, as in "the art of painting" and "the art of music".
(This is not circular, as I will define "works of art" below.) When used
as an uncountable noun, art refers collectively to a set of works of art,
as in "museum of art". To say that something is art is to say that it
belongs to the set of things which are works of art. Art may also mean
the set of qualities that cause a thing to be a work of art, as in the
phrase "there is art in it". Lastly, art may refer to the ability, the
skills, both mental and physical, required to make art, as in "the art
that went into making that sculpture".
Since the above depends on a definition of a work of art, here it is:
A work of art is an artefact made in a fine art medium that reflects the
intentions of its author (or authors) to do ALL of the following through
the agency of the artefact itself:
1) to please by the elegance of the whole, and parts, and the
relationships between the parts of it,
2) to hold the attention of a potential witness, and to provoke
particular thoughts and particular emotions, determined by the artist, in
the witness -- these being emotions and thoughts judged by the author (or
authors) to be of a kind desirable for a good person to have,
3) to reflect the sensibilities of the author (or author),
4) to be valuable and memorable as a result of success in objectives (1),
(2) and (3), above.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This definition can be clarified further if I explain my use of some of
the terms it employs:
"artefact"
"fine art medium"
"reflects the intentions"
"valuable"
"sensibilities"
Ask me about these, and I might explain them later. Meanwhile, you've got
something to be going with.
Bruce Attah
wsparker
Bruce Attah wrote:
>
> A WORKING DEFINITION OF ART, BY BRUCE ATTAH
> =============================================
>
> (snipped from an article I've writte, (c) Bruce Attah, 1997)
>
> Some stop there, while others claim
> that "art" is a word like "game", which, according to Wittgenstein, is
> simply not amenable to a satisfactory definition, because it is a word
> that covers many threads of meaning, which, though bearing "family
> resemblance" to one another, have no essence in common. I happen to think
> Wittgenstein's argument is flawed, but that is by-the-by, as my defence of
> the possibility of defining the word "art" does not depend on Wittgenstein
> being wrong.
Why mention Witt then? Though he is the greatest philosopher that ever
lived. I hope both you and he agree on where the flaw lies.
BTW, defining "art" is as difficult and as usless an endeavor as
defining "language."
>
> We CAN use a word properly without ever defining it, but it is generally
> better to at least try to define the word if there is contention (as there
> is, in the case of "art") about what sorts of objects rightly fall under
> its heading.
Well, you have "at least" tried the unnecessary.
> I am going to present
> here a definition of art that I believe will accommodate MOST things that
> have been claimed and accepted to be art, while excluding MOST things that
> have not had such claims made or accepted on their behalf.
Weakness number one: doesn't include ALL things that have been claimed
and accepted to be art. AND doesn't exclude ALL things that have been
claimed and accepted as art.
Weakness number two: includes and excludes based upon "claims" which
are impossible to identify adequately.
> I do not
> intend that this definition should be seen as an ULTIMATE definition of
> art, but as a working definition. That is to say, it is somewhat
> tentative, and subject to modification.
Weakness number three: IOW: "definition is subject to modification to
accomodate changes in the situation."
> Nevertheless, I believe that you
> could point it at any object in a museum or art gallery, or in your
> friend's house, or in a hole in the ground, and the definition will almost
> invariably correctly determine whether the thing is art or not.
Weakness: IOW we should depend on this definition to identify art
objects according to the author's crafted defintion.
> Furthermore, I believe that this definition of art works equally well for
> the art of all cultures in all periods of history and in all media (not
> just plastic arts).
Weakness number four: Suspiciously grandiose claim of the definition to
include all modalities of perception, all cultures in the western and
nonwestern worlds.
This definition identifies physical art objects AND musical objects, and
poetic objects. Though it draws the line on conceptual objects.
>
> Before I go on to the definition itself, allow me to add one further
> point: I have already noted that "art" has broad and narrow meanings, and
> that these meanings are interrelated. The definition I am going to
> provide only provides the narrowest meaning of art, the meaning we intend
> when we concern ourselves with matters of _aesthetics_.
I thought this was going to identify art objects (physical and
non-physical), across all cultures, all media, thru all of history. Now
we are including a "narrow" meaning of art.
>
> Here is the definition, then:
>
> Art, used as a countable noun, refers to any tradition or profession of
> making works of art, as in "the art of painting" and "the art of music".
> (This is not circular, as I will define "works of art" below.)
> When used
> as an uncountable noun, art refers collectively to a set of works of art,
> as in "museum of art". To say that something is art is to say that it
> belongs to the set of things which are works of art.
Great, and what determines if said objects belongs? (I can't wait)
> Art may also mean
> the set of qualities that cause a thing to be a work of art, as in the
> phrase "there is art in it".
okay...
> Lastly, art may refer to the ability, the
> skills, both mental and physical, required to make art, as in "the art
> that went into making that sculpture".
The art of dentistry... .
>
> Since the above depends on a definition of a work of art, here it is:
>
> A work of art is an artefact made in a fine art medium...
Oh, a "fine art medium" that hedges your bet.
> that reflects the
> intentions of its author (or authors) to do ALL of the following through
> the agency of the artefact itself:
>
> 1) to please by the elegance of the whole, and parts, and the
> relationships between the parts of it,
The "Fountain" has some very gracious curves; beautifully translucent
porcelin surfaces; a modonnaesque resonnance, or aura; a
buddah-muteness... .
>
> 2) to hold the attention of a potential witness, and to provoke
> particular thoughts and particular emotions, determined by the artist, in
> the witness -- these being emotions and thoughts judged by the author (or
> authors) to be of a kind desirable for a good person to have,
"Fountauin does this to wit:
> to hold the attention of a potential witness,
definitely holds attention
> >and to provoke
> > particular thoughts and particular emotions, determined by the artist, in
> > the witness --
definitely does provoke thoughts and emotions
> > these being emotions and thoughts judged by the author (or
> > authors) to be of a kind desirable for a good person to have,
Some thought it was immoral to show a plumbing fixture in a museum,
therefore majority rules and, since a non-good person would have
undesireable thoughts and emotions it was not art at the time?
But now when "good" people see it in a museum and honor the tradition
from which it survived and generated for over 80 years it is art. But
when bad people come into the museum of art in which the object resides
it is no longer art while they look at it... Am I getting this right?
>
> 3) to reflect the sensibilities of the author (or author),
Dadaesque to begin with, questioning the nature of art eventually,
ultimately becoming an icon or modern art, generatng oodles of other art
objects (Warhol's FEX) and loads of discourse . Therefore it reflects
the sensibilitries of its author Marcel Duchamp, most important artist
of this century.
>
> 4) to be valuable and memorable as a result of success in objectives (1),
> (2) and (3), above.
Definitely memorable definitely valuable (helped define art, ushered in
modernism, essential component to the large glass. But since only "good"
persons don't like it I guess it fails as art.
>
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
> This definition can be clarified further if I explain my use of some of
> the terms it employs:
Though this definition can't "be clarified further," and probably will
remain dead in the water and sinking, it *requires* that it be supported
further by explaining how you are using the terms below.
> "artefact"
> "fine art medium"
> "reflects the intentions"
> "valuable"
> "sensibilities"
>
> Ask me about these, and I might explain them later.
I can't take the risk, you "might" explain them: that doesn't encourage
the further investment of my effort.
Tugi
Bruce Attah wrote:
>
> A WORKING DEFINITION OF ART, BY BRUCE ATTAH
> =============================================
, as my defence of
> the possibility of defining the word "art" does not depend on Wittgenstein
> being wrong.
>
> We CAN use a word properly without ever defining it, but it is generally
> better to at least try to define the word if there is contention (as there
> is, in the case of "art") about what sorts of objects rightly fall under
> its heading.
Brave attempt, Bruce...
Your definition of art work reflects the intentionalist mimetic concept
of art
- as representation of 'particular thoughts' and/or 'particular
emotions' or
romantic 'sensibilities'. There is some of good old Aristotle's and
formalist's
'unity in variety'('the whole', although I like that 'relationships'
better
than 'to please')
I am a bit confused with 'desirable emotions for a good person to have',
with the
use of the 'fine art medium' and particularly with 'elegance'.
There is nothing wrong in the attempt to define art. It is wrong to
claim
that one definition is the only and the final one. Some would say that
there is no
point in definitions if the former is true. I do not agree. After all,
how would we
make our living. It seams that in our language
terms are defined negativelly. This is the reason why, particularly
after
Saussure, there is a number of people that suspect in the value of
definitions.
--
/_~
TUGI______________________ (/9 6`) _____________________________
Melbourne, Australia (/~\) t.co...@sab.unimelb.edu.au
\`/
~
Andrew Werby
Bruce...@insignia.co.uk (Bruce Attah) wrote:
Andrew Werby
[It seems the body of this post was inadvertantly deleted. I will try again:
Bruce...@insignia.co.uk (Bruce Attah) wrote:
de...@deni.demon.co.uk
In article <5c0phk$a...@lanshark.lanminds.com>,
Andrew Werby <dre...@lanminds.com> wrote:
>
> Bruce...@insignia.co.uk (Bruce Attah) wrote:
[Well I suppose this definition of art is just as valid, I am almost
speechless, what words could
compare]
deni
-------------------==== Posted via Deja News ====-----------------------
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Post to Usenet
de...@deni.demon.co.uk
In article <5c0phk$a...@lanshark.lanminds.com>,
Andrew Werby <dre...@lanminds.com> wrote:
>
> Bruce...@insignia.co.uk (Bruce Attah) wrote:
I will admit Andrew that your initial concept of what you didn't say,
almost shocked me, but after a period of profound thought, which your
article inspired, I think quintessentially you may have a point.
In my work I had always had a belief that content was important, but I
can see now that what *isn't* said is equally as valid and challenging.
I thank you for opening my eyes to this perspective hopefully I shall
become a better artist for this insight.
deni moore
Primalass
Tugi:
I think that "desirable emotions" and "elegance" in the sense that they
were used are perfect terms. Select any piece of work you can think of
depicting hell, rape, war or violence - the object of the artist
regardless of how they choose to evoke such a visual is to evoke an
similar antipathy from the witness to the horror (whether internal or
external, imagined or real) they are attempting to portray. The
"desirable emotion" would in this case be a realization of and sympathy
for the artist's own repulsion by these visions which were often
unconsidered before in such terms by the witness.
"Elegance" is, in my opinion/interpretation of Bruce's definition, in the
turn of mind and is created by the statement the piece of art makes. To
use an example <smile>, the faucet-as-fountain is an elegant irony, though
not necessarily elegant in form itself and would thus qualify because it's
intended statement was made by this elegant irony, not by the beauty of
form. To use a literary corollary, Dr. Suess was hardly ee cummings but
there exists a delightful absurdity in his "poetry" that I can appreciate
as an art while still recognizing the supremacy of cummings' skill and
imagery.
Tatyanna Patten
Prim...@aol.com
Bruce Attah
> > > "sensibilities"
>
> In normal use, the term may refer to moral or aesthetic values. It is not
> always easy to to say of a particular preference that it is a moral or an
> aesthetic one, and I am not going to bother. I do not believe that moral
> values should be excluded from consideration in a work of art, either in
> deciding whether a thing is a work of art, or in deciding the value of the
> work.
>
I should qualify the above, quickly, by saying that an artefact that seeks
only to convey what are clearly moral sensibilities and makes no attempt
to convey purely aesthetic ones is not a work of art -- but this state of
affairs is accounted for in my definition, because I make it a necessary
condition that the would-be artist seek to show elegance in the work.
Bruce.
Bruce Attah
>Bruce...@insignia.co.uk (Bruce Attah) wrote:
At first I thought Andrew Werby's empty reply to my "definition" article
was an exercise in light-hearted sarcasm, and it might indeed have been,
but he has now provided a fuller reply (which I received by e-mail) in
which he raises some serious objections to my definition, each of which
merits an answer. Most of the objections result from his reading certain
key expressions I have used in ways that I did not intend -- precisely the
terms that I said I would need to explain or define before my definition
could be understood with full clarity.
With Andrew's permission, I am forwarding the message to the group
I have given my definition of terms at the bottom of a reply I made to
wsparker's objections, and I hope that a reading of those will show my
definition not to be quite as narrow as Andrew says it is.
>Bruce...@insignia.co.uk (Bruce Attah) wrote:
[This is my third try- if this one gets destroyed in transmission
I'm giving up.]
Bruce...@insignia.co.uk (Bruce Attah) wrote:
.. a definition of a work of art, here it is:
>
[Bruce said he was trying for a "narrow" definition, and this one
definitely is that.]
>A work of art is an artefact made in a fine art medium
[So artifacts made in media that are not historically associated
with fine art are out. This certainly eliminates the art/craft
disputes that have vexed the rest of us; all that craft stuff is
out the window. Also all experimental work that dares to include
materials not in the canon- say farewell to Rauschenberg, Stella,
David Smith, Bruce Conner, Kienholz, and just about every sculptor
born since World War II. Oh, and forget about Picasso's collages...]
that reflects the
>intentions of its author (or authors) to do ALL of the following through
>the agency of the artefact itself:
>
>1) to please by the elegance of the whole, and parts, and the
>relationships between the parts of it,
[So all those so-called artists who are trying to disturb you, not please
you, are out- goodbye Munch, Grosz, Dix, and at least half the contemporary
artists in the world.]
>
>2) to hold the attention of a potential witness, and to provoke
>particular thoughts and particular emotions, determined by the artist, in
>the witness -- these being emotions and thoughts judged by the author (or
>authors) to be of a kind desirable for a good person to have,
[This is tough, not only does the artist have to provoke emotions, but they
must be precisely the emotions intended by the artist; any deviation on the
part of the spectator disqualifies the work as art. Not only that, but
there is a citizenship test here. So we eliminate those (hitherto considered
to be) artists who tried to probe the dark side of the psyche- bye-bye
Bellmer, Schiele, and Francis Bacon.]
>
>3) to reflect the sensibilities of the author (or author),
[Although one could claim that anything done by an author will reflect his or
her sensibilities to some degree, if this is to be a primary consideration,
we have to dismiss all art done to please a client; like Michealangelo's
Sistine chapel and all art commissioned by the Church, the State, and by
private individuals.]
>4) to be valuable and memorable as a result of success in objectives (1),
>(2) and (3), above.
["Valuable" these days is equivalent to "made by a celebrity", and has little
to do with 1,2, and 3 above. (An artist who is not a celebrity need not lose
heart. Any item owned by a celebrity also becomes valuable, as we learned at
the recent Jackie O auction, so if one's work is donated to somebody famous,
it too can become "art".) "Memorable" is not an objective criterion; but
varies with the capacity of the viewer. Some people remember art they didn't
like at all; others immediately forget art they found quite pleasing.]
[So what can someone who wishes to be an artist under Bruce's definition still
do?
Abstract art, by its nature, cannot be expected to elicit the same response
from
every viewer, so we can eliminate all that. In fact, it seems that any work
which
is subject to different interpretations by different viewers is to be excluded.
It
seems that we are left with program art; where "every picture tells a story".
(But
only nice stories, we don't want any bad thoughts and emotions stirred up.) And
make
sure when making your "pleasing" and "elegant" compositions, that you stick to
the
tried and true artist materials- no experimentation will be allowed. Make sure
you
become famous somehow, so your work will be valuable. But don't ever get a
commission
in which you have to please a client; only show your work to those with good
memories;
and whatever you do, don't leave anything to the imagination...]
Andrew Werby - United Artworks
Bruce Attah
wsp has raised some objections to my definition of art. I think they can
all be dealt with fairly swiftly.
In article <32E205...@olympus.net>, w...@olympus.net wrote:
Commenting on my preamble, he asked,
> Why mention Witt then?
Because (as I made clear in the original post), his ideas have been used
as a basis for some writer's claims that "art" cannot be defined. I was
giving some historical background.
He did not like that I said I thought an argument Wittgenstein presented
was flawed:
> Though he is the greatest philosopher that ever
> lived. I hope both you and he agree on where the flaw lies.
I've heard it said, by people who are well-placed to know, that
Wittgenstein was the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century, but
even if he is the greatest that ever lived, that does not imply that he
never presented an argument that was flawed. As a great philosopher, with
a keen grasp of logic, he would have known this.
He averred,
> BTW, defining "art" is as difficult and as usless an endeavor as
> defining "language."
Which simply repeats, without support, a contentious claim that I
discussed, and put aside as mistaken, in my preamble.
He went on to list some alleged weaknesses of my definition:
> Weakness number one: doesn't include ALL things that have been claimed
> and accepted to be art. AND doesn't exclude ALL things that have been
> claimed and accepted as art.
It is not a weakness of a definition that it does not include ALL things
that have been claimed to belong to the category defined. Robert Maxwell
claimed to be an honest businessman, and was accepted by many as such.
Stalin regarded himself, and was regarded by many Russians as a just
ruler. Whales were once regarded by many as giant fishes. Lots of people
think chimpanzees are monkeys. Yet definitions of "honest businessman",
"just ruler", "fish" and "monkey" do not need to include Robert Maxwell,
Joseph Stalin, whales and chimpanzees.
When devising a definition of a term, one needs to acknowledge the
possibility that some uses of that term cannot be accommodated in a good
definition (such use may be mistaken).
> Weakness number two: includes and excludes based upon "claims" which
> are impossible to identify adequately.
I would like to answer this objection, but I cannot, because he has not
told me which of my claims are "impossible to identify adequately". Until
this happens, I shall follow my own instinct that there is no problem
here.
> Weakness number three: IOW: "definition is subject to modification to
> accomodate changes in the situation."
It is not a weakness of a definition merely to acknowledge fallibility.
The definition may be quite right, or it may need some adjustment. I am
confident that it is at least broadly right. I have not said that
unspecified "changes in the situation" might change the sort of definition
needed.
[I had said:]
> > Nevertheless, I believe that you
> > could point it at any object in a museum or art gallery, or in your
> > friend's house, or in a hole in the ground, and the definition will almost
> > invariably correctly determine whether the thing is art or not.
>
>
> Weakness: IOW we should depend on this definition to identify art
> objects according to the author's crafted defintion.
My intention was not to urge people to rely on the definition in order to
distinguish art from non-art (though it might serve that purpose in cases
of doubt), but to encourage them to test the definition by considering it
in the light of objects you know to be either art or not.
> Weakness number four: Suspiciously grandiose claim of the definition to
> include all modalities of perception, all cultures in the western and
> nonwestern worlds.
A "suspiciously grandiose claim" is not a weakness of a definition unless
the definition fails to live up to that claim. I designed the definition
expressly to live up to that particular claim. Test it.
> This definition identifies physical art objects AND musical objects, and
> poetic objects. Though it draws the line on conceptual objects.
It does indeed. I believe that many products of "conceptual art" are not
art, and I expect that such objects will therefore not fall within the
ambit of my definition.
I believe, too, that no unifying definition of art can include all the
other categories of art I have mentioned AND all of conceptual art,
without being so general as to exclude a great many things that are
obviously NOT art.
[I had said:]
> > Before I go on to the definition itself, allow me to add one further
> > point: I have already noted that "art" has broad and narrow meanings, and
> > that these meanings are interrelated. The definition I am going to
> > provide only provides the narrowest meaning of art, the meaning we intend
> > when we concern ourselves with matters of _aesthetics_.
which prompted wsparker to say,
> I thought this was going to identify art objects (physical and
> non-physical), across all cultures, all media, thru all of history. Now
> we are including a "narrow" meaning of art.
"Art" has some very broad meanings indeed: there is, for instance, an art
to answering the telephone and there is an art of hosting dinner parties.
Cobbling is an art and so is lying. Indeed, anything that can be done
with exceptional skill or finesse can be "raised to a fine art". This is
not the sort of art we are talking about. Rather, the narrower use of the
word that is normally the subject under discussion when "aesthetics" is
brought up. In other words, the definition is intended to identify "art
objects (physical and non-physical), across all cultures, all media, thru
all of history".
When I launched into the definition itself, he responsed to the following line
> > To say that something is art is to say that it
> > belongs to the set of things which are works of art.
with
> Great, and what determines if said objects belongs? (I can't wait)
notwithstanding that I had already written this:
> > (This is not circular, as I will define "works of art" below.)
This gave me the impression that wsparker was impatient to disagree with
me, since all he had to do was read the next paragraph to discover my
answer to that question. The answer is in my definition of a work of art,
so the implied objection in the question is spurious. He really couln't
wait.
> The art of dentistry... .
Once again, wsparker has leapt into the breach without reading ahead. My
definition of a work of art is designed to exclude such things as the art
of dentistry (see also my comment on the "narrow" meaning of art, above).
[I had said that works of art are necessarily made in a fine art medium]
> Oh, a "fine art medium" that hedges your bet.
The conclusion that my reference to a "fine art medium" is a bet-hedging
strategy has been reached by dint of another impatient leap. What is or
is not a fine art medium is a contentious matter in aesthetics, and I
warned in my post that I would have to explain some of my terms, including
this one, in order for my definition to be clearly understood. I did not
supply these explanations in the original article, because I was pressed
for time.
In fact, there is nothing bet-hedging about my definition of a fine art
medium, which is, as far as I know, original. I'm still working on it,
but this is roughly it:
A fine art medium is a category of artefacts which can be used to
communicate emotions and ideas through the intelligent (and potentially
total) control of their form, with the number of different forms and the
number of different sets of emotions and ideas that can be so represented
being inexhaustible and running the gamut of ideas and emotions that human
beings are capable of communicating.
Practically, a fine art medium cannot evoke all emotions and ideas without
there being conventions to make this possible, or without the skill and
imagination of authors being up to the task of representing them. The
limits, then, on what a fine art medium can communicate are human and
social.
What I strongly want to distinguish my version of a fine art medium from
is one based on a list of "fine arts" which would turn out to be subject
to modification. Such lists, which I believe emerged in the 18th century,
are lists of whatever society at a given point in time pays attention to
as fine art, and this dependency on society's fickle attention makes them
contingent. (Yet the traditions enumerated in such lists would all
qualify as fine art media under my definition.)
[wsparker went on to try to demonstrate that, by my definition, Marcel
Duchamp's "Fountain" is a work of art, proof of which would undermine the
definition, since I have earlier said that I do not believe that
"Fountain" is a work of art. His strategy was to consider my
pre-conditions for a thing's being a work of art one at a time, and
arguing that "Fountain" met each of them:]
> The "Fountain" has some very gracious curves; beautifully translucent
> porcelin surfaces; a modonnaesque resonnance, or aura; a
> buddah-muteness... .
These things may well true, but the qualities were not put there by the
author with the full set of intentions my definition requires. Considered
as an artefact, "Fountain" was created by tipping a urinal on its back and
signing it. These actions did not endow it with whatever "graceful
curves" or "porcelain surfaces" it may possess, nor can we with any
confidence infer from looking at the object that the author intended that
these qualities should enhance the value of it.
> definitely holds attention
> definitely does provoke thoughts and emotions
I doubt that "Fountain" has the attention-holding qualities you claim for
it, or the thought-provoking ones. What people pay attention to, as I
have said elsewhere, is the placement of the object in a museum, and the
alleged reasons for that placement. More to the point, the artefact does
not ++reflect the intentions of the author++ that it should, by holding
the audience's attention and provoking particular thoughts and emotions,
be valued. The test would be to see if an identical object, encountered
anywhere (recall my remark about holes in the ground), would lead you to
infer that the object was probably made with such intentions, even if you
knew nothing about the original.
[For a moment, wsparker changed tack, and apparently tried to argue that
my definition of art does not work because, when applied to "Fountain", it
permits an object's status as art or not-art to change over time, or
depending on who is looking at it, which would be implausible:]
> Some thought it was immoral to show a plumbing fixture in a museum,
> therefore majority rules and, since a non-good person would have
> undesireable thoughts and emotions it was not art at the time?
>
> But now when "good" people see it in a museum and honor the tradition
> from which it survived and generated for over 80 years it is art. But
> when bad people come into the museum of art in which the object resides
> it is no longer art while they look at it... Am I getting this right?
Unfortunately, this argument arises out of a misreading of my claim that
the thoughts and emotions we infer that the work is designed to provoke
are those
> > ...judged by the author (or authors) to be of a kind desirable for a
> > good person to have...
It is irrelevant what "some" thought about the desirability of the
thoughts that would go through the minds of witnesses, since my definition
specifies that it is the _author_ (or authors) of the work whose idea of a
"good person" counts.
Also, whether the thing is a work of art or not does not depend on whether
the people looking at it are "good" or "bad" people in the opinion of the
artist.
Perhaps what I said was not very clear, and I need to find a better way of
expressing it, but the intended implication is that if the work appears
intended to set off pious thoughts and emotions in the audience, it can be
understood that the author of the work believes that piety is a good state
of mind -- if the thing is a work of art, while, if, on the other hand,
the audience is inclined to infer that the thoughts and emotions evoked
(say, a desire to buy and eat lots of Acme brand chocolates) are not what
the _author_ believes to be good thoughts and emotions to have, the
audience is entitled to doubt that the thing is a work of art.
Actually, I don't think this "desirable thoughts" bit helps my definition,
but the objections raised by wsparker are beside the point.
[Returning to his original strategy of trying to show that my definition
allows "Fountain" to be a work of art, wsparker continued thus:]
> Dadaesque to begin with, questioning the nature of art eventually,
> ultimately becoming an icon or modern art, generatng oodles of other art
> objects (Warhol's FEX) and loads of discourse . Therefore it reflects
> the sensibilitries of its author Marcel Duchamp, most important artist
> of this century.
I grant that the work may very well reflect the sensibilities of Marcel
Duchamp, but since it fails to meet some other requirements of a work of
art, we do not need to argue this point. I grant, too, that the object
may have generated "oodles of other art...and loads of discourse", but my
definition of art says nothing about the generation of discourse or other
art. Possessing the ability to generate art or discourse is not either a
necessary or a sufficient condition for a thing's being a work of art,
according to the definition I presented, so this objection is spurious.
> > 4) to be valuable and memorable as a result of success in objectives (1),
> > (2) and (3), above.
>
>
> Definitely memorable definitely valuable (helped define art, ushered in
> modernism, essential component to the large glass. But since only "good"
> persons don't like it I guess it fails as art.
Even if "Fountain" is valuable because it "helped define art", or because
it "ushered in modernism", or because it is an "essential component" to a
work of art, these facts are irrelevant to the object's status as art or
non-art. None of these sources of value, according to my definition, are
capable of making an object into an art object. They are neither
necessary nor sufficient conditions for being a work of art.
The mention of good persons not liking the work rests, once again, on a
misunderstanding of my reference to the good person in my definition, and
so is irrelevant.
[in response to my half-promise to explain my terms, wsparker wrote,]
> Though this definition can't "be clarified further," and probably will
> remain dead in the water and sinking, it *requires* that it be supported
> further by explaining how you are using the terms below.
I disagree that my definition cannot be clarified further. I think that
an explanation of my terms will make the definition easier to understand,
and less easy to misunderstand. I do not think that such an explanation
of terms amounts to "support" for my definition, since such a
clarification does not bring in new evidence.
Here, then is a quick glossary:
> > "artefact"
An artefact is anything made with a particular purpose in mind by a person
or by people acting in concert. It need not be a physical object, as I am
using the term, but might be a body of text, an image, a performance or an
combination of any number of such items.
> > "fine art medium"
See my description of this given earlier.
> > "reflects the intentions"
It needs to be reasonable to infer from the artefact that the maker or
makers had the sorts of intentions my definition requires.
> > "valuable"
Whatever other value the artefact may have, it is only the values that
arise from success in fulfilling the intentions listed that has bearing on
whether an artefact is art or not. For instance, a painting may be valued
because it is by one's grandmother, or because it covers a stain on the
wall. Neither of these reasons has any bearing on whether the painting is
a work of art or not.
> > "sensibilities"
In normal use, the term may refer to moral or aesthetic values. It is not
always easy to to say of a particular preference that it is a moral or an
aesthetic one, and I am not going to bother. I do not believe that moral
values should be excluded from consideration in a work of art, either in
deciding whether a thing is a work of art, or in deciding the value of the
work.
"elegance"
I realize I need to explain my use of this term: I might have used beauty,
but some definitions of beauty that have been used in aesthetic discussion
make such a choice of term problematic. In any case, what is elegant is
not always what one would call strikingly beautiful in ordinary speech,
and not everything that is beautiful is elegant. Elegance carries
connotations of efficiency (in avoiding redundancy), proficiency, in
contrast with clumsiness and ineptitude, purpose, in contrast with
aimlessness, the integration of parts, as opposed to their being merely
lumped together, and subtlety rather than crudeness. I believe that all
works of art aim to exemplify some of these values, and many aim to
exemplify them all.
I hope this has made things a little clearer.
Bruce Attah.
wsp
Bruce Attah wrote:
>
> wsp has raised some objections to my definition of art. I think they can
> all be dealt with fairly swiftly.
Well you certainly wrote a swift ten-page paper!
I went into your definition of art blasting at anything that moved! I
try to punch some holes and get going. It was destined to be a dead
pre-first draft. It took me a few minutes to write. It is the best I
could do before the coffee got cold.
The reason I go in there blasting is simple. I know definitions of art
are always limited. I learned that first in Philosophy of Aesthetics a
million years ago. I also know your definition will be very constrained
to conform somehow to your personal tastes.
I sense the only thing wrong with your problematic definition, like
most, is that it will get more cumbersome and "ugly." You will have to
continue adding terms and defining them and get all caught up in a
tangled mess. I think this is because it is your intention from the
outset to restrict what can be called art.
If one were to widen the field, take an inclusive approach, that is
exciting to me. You would eventually shed light on what it means for
humans to "make things special" or you might eventually account for the
"Art" in the craft of plumbing (fixtures)!
Anyway, I thought it was fair that I would go in blasting... Now I think
I was unfair, sorry.
Andrew Werby
de...@deni.demon.co.uk wrote:
>In article <5c0phk$a...@lanshark.lanminds.com>,
> Andrew Werby <dre...@lanminds.com> wrote:
>>
>> Bruce...@insignia.co.uk (Bruce Attah) wrote:
>I will admit Andrew that your initial concept of what you didn't say,
>almost shocked me, but after a period of profound thought, which your
>article inspired, I think quintessentially you may have a point.
>
>In my work I had always had a belief that content was important, but I
>can see now that what *isn't* said is equally as valid and challenging.
>
>I thank you for opening my eyes to this perspective hopefully I shall
>become a better artist for this insight.
[Bruce thought I was being sarcastic; and you, if you aren't being
sarcastic in your turn, are crediting this empty reply with more
profundity than it deserves. This was the result of a technical snafu,
nothing more- Bruce received my actual reply via e-mail and quoted it
in full in one of his posts to this thread. Unfortunately, the
clarifications that he promised would broaden his definition somewhat
seemed to be missing- did anybody else see them, or has the same daemon
that was chopping at my posts turned its attention to him? Perhaps
there are dark forces out there that don't want this issue
elucidated....]
Tugi
The 'desirable emotions' imply the existence of subject that
a priori and intentionally determines the measure of desirability
of an object and hence the definition implicitly excludes a
number of our century theories that assert that the intention of
an artist (ideas and/or emotions) is not a necessary condition for
our aesthetic experience of an art work. Moreover, saying that art
works are objects eliciting predetermined emotions excludes objects
which we would call art works on the basis of our emotions but
regardless of the fact that our emotions (as emotions of a witness)
possibly do not match the emotions defined by the artist as
'desirable'.
I believe that recognizing a faucet as an irony requires a
significant individual and/or social sensitivity and, you would
probably agree, that there is (and was, and will be) a number of
people who would not share your experience of the facet as an
'ironic statement'. I am not saying that the definition is wrong
and I am not saying that you are wrong recognizing ironic
statement; I am merely concluding that there are different
experiences and that it is precisely what is problematic in the
definition of aesthetic experience with 'desirable emotions'. After
all, our different understanding of the expression 'desirable
emotions' testify not just about our different understanding but
also about our different emotions regarding the issue.
If we agree that emotions can be different in relation to same
object, than it is not difficult to conclude (as Ingarden, for
example, did) that same art objects could trigger different
aesthetic experiences.
Can we say that those who are not sharing our 'desirable'
experiences do not recognize art? Can we say that they have
'undesirable' emotions? Moreover, what do we know about emotions
of other? We do not have meta-emotions and are not Gods to judge
someone's emotions and to measure their desirability.
Even if we would have 'same' emotions, is an artist the one who
determines which emotions are desirable? Is he/she God? Even in
Bible (and regarding the definition), God only knows what *good* is
('God's ways...) and we are only following commandments. Yes,
sometimes artist is still recognized as God; only when a language
is the tool for determining that desirability, because only in
language we can experience *same* emotions (as emotion=emotion) and
arrogantly measure experiences.
Is the 'desirable emotion' a matter of some kind of social-
linguistic consensus? Those who believe in, for example, 'male and
female gaze' or social - economical determinism in art would
probably agree; agree to the certain extend, therefore acknowledging
at least the binary difference. And, again, a chosen part would
agree about the measure of desirability, but what about the other
part or parts?
Or, are these, 'desirable emotions' the matter of a moment in space
and time - the moment of ones confirmation of individuality with the
plain fact (?) that the naming of a desirability assumes the
position of power? Is one witnessing own being by recognizing
particular 'contents', recognizing 'meanings' or empathy with
elicited 'particular emotions'?
Paraphrasing Gombrich: psychoanalysts see genitals and wombs in
everything...Are we all sharing 'desirable' or/and 'undesirable'
emotions? If we can not even name a recognizable phenomenal
appearance (are depicted 'old shoes' a kind of social criticism,
exciting shapes on surface, or symbols of genitals
(male or female?)) than how could we assume that we do transfer
particular, and, moreover, 'desirable' emotions?
Or, is this just a matter of something, as you nicely say,
'unconsidered before?' That is, not some kind of transferred
'desirable' content, but just an powerful silence, an empty space
and informational vacuum for an alternative -- for intellect same
as for emotions.
Can we say that artists always attempt to 'portray something' and
to evoke the named ('desirable') emotions in witnesses? Maybe they
often do something similar as mathematicians often do: solve
problems just for the sake of pleasure in doing it - experiencing
options and results (therefore also emotions) 'unconsidered before'.
Can we be sure that an artist wanted to 'convey' the emotions that
we have while witnessing an artwork? Is the expression of Bernini's
Saint Theresa the 'representation' of religious ecstasy or of an
orgasm (Lacan); furthermore, is our consequent conclusion relevant
to our experience, and can wee (as witnesses) see our
emotions as desirable for Bernini? Does the fact that someone does
not see 'religious ecstasy' in the Bernini's sculpture gives us a
reason to suspect that it is not an art work? Or, it may be that
the belief that we share the 'ready-made' emotions, is just another
vanity of egocentric human minds which, in old metaphysical
tradition, can not conceive the absence without the linguistic
speculations with presence.
Yes, Saint Theresa is coming; yes, God exists; yes, there are
desirable emotions; yes, art work is elegant...Or?
What does 'elegant' mean? Saying that art work is elegant is
similar to saying 'art is beautiful' or 'art is significant form'.
It sounds good and truthful. It sounds beautiful. There is a
discipline about 'beautiful' and about art works as beautiful objects
and processes. For centuries the 'beautiful' has been the subject of
debates...Consequently, some would not see the point to merely
substitute the term with 'elegant' when you can choose between
numerous understandings of 'beautiful' of the past...
As an 'elegant expression,' the 'irony' is in your example somehow
opposed to a 'beautiful expression'. It seems that your
understanding of 'beautiful' excludes 'cognitive'. On the other
hand, the understanding of 'beautiful' as the result of cognitive
experience in relation to an art work is not the invention of
postmodernists. The use of a term 'beautiful' for describing
cognitive experiences of objects or process' can be found in
thought of ancient Greece and is ubiquitous in modernist
aesthetics. Certainly, in our time we can use 'elegant' to
emphasize our understanding of the cognitive character of
aesthetic experience ('simple', 'clear', 'clever') but, on the
basis of implicite romantic and intentionalist notions I am still
not convinced that this is the reason for the substitution of
'beautiful' with 'elegant' in the particular definition. 'Elegant'
still means too much and hence so little. That is why it sounds
beautiful (now the 'beautiful' in myth-poetic sense as opposed to
logical-discursive).. Not because of the presence of the meaning,
but because of the absence of anchored signified. It appears that
the 'elegant', as it is used in the definition of art, and as
applied in your understanding of terms (I apologize if I did not
get it right), is not elegant, but beautiful. It seems that in our
time the word 'beautiful' is also beautiful. As long as we are
still waiting for definitions to be recognized as poetry, the
'elegant' for art works is too beautiful to be in a definition
('definition' in rationalist sense) and maybe still not enough
beautiful to be art.
Because of contemporary crisis of metaphysics and hence
definitions, every courageous attempt to define art deserves our
attention. This is the reason why I appreciate the attempt. On the
other hand I tried to point out that not to be aware that another
definition is merely another interpretation, another more or less
beautiful play with alternatives already provided (and, if you will,
'limited') by society (and not by The Author), would be just another
vanity.
deni
I wrote in reply to Andrews empty posting:
>>I will admit Andrew that your initial concept of what you didn't say,
>>almost shocked me, but after a period of profound thought, which your
>>article inspired, I think quintessentially you may have a point.
>>
>>In my work I had always had a belief that content was important, but I
>>can see now that what *isn't* said is equally as valid and challenging.
>>
>>I thank you for opening my eyes to this perspective hopefully I shall
>>become a better artist for this insight.
>
Andrew replied to my raffish remarks on his article:
>[Bruce thought I was being sarcastic; and you, if you aren't being
>sarcastic in your turn, are crediting this empty reply with more
>profundity than it deserves. This was the result of a technical snafu,
>nothing more-
Oh no Andrew, it never crossed my mind that you may be having
'technical' problems.
I thought it was rather amusing, "The definition of Art" = "nothing"
> Bruce received my actual reply via e-mail and quoted it
>in full in one of his posts to this thread. Unfortunately, the
>clarifications that he promised would broaden his definition somewhat
>seemed to be missing- did anybody else see them, or has the same daemon
> that was chopping at my posts turned its attention to him?
Ask Bruce, I thought he made his reply to you and Mr Parker?.
>Perhaps
>there are dark forces out there that don't want this issue
>elucidated....]
There you go again trying to scare me with the supernatural, well I wont
have it! I'm keeping all the lights on from now on, so there!
--
deni moore
....don't laugh....it might be the ultimate definition of art
t.co...@sab.unimelb.edu.au
In article <rmccQxAi...@deni.demon.co.uk>,
deni <de...@deni.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> I wrote in reply to Andrews empty posting:
> >>I will admit Andrew that your initial concept of what you didn't say,
> >>almost shocked me, but after a period of profound thought, which your
> >>article inspired, I think quintessentially you may have a point.
> >>In my work I had always had a belief that content was important, but I
> >>can see now that what *isn't* said is equally as valid and challenging.
> >>
> >>I thank you for opening my eyes to this perspective hopefully I shall
> >>become a better artist for this insight.
> >
> Andrew replied to my raffish remarks on his article:
> >[Bruce thought I was being sarcastic; and you, if you aren't being
> >sarcastic in your turn, are crediting this empty reply with more
> >profundity than it deserves. This was the result of a technical snafu,
> >nothing more-
>
> Oh no Andrew, it never crossed my mind that you may be having
> 'technical' problems.
>
> I thought it was rather amusing, "The definition of Art" = "nothing"
>
See, Bruce, this has been an excellent example illustrating how easylly
absence turns into presence, how our imagination fills the empty space, how
meaning and emotions are not necessarily 'transfered' by the medium.
Regarding our discussions we had some months ago on
'linguistic messages' and artist's intentions, and also in relation to
your intentionalist definition of art, my point has been, and still is,
that this kind of an "empty space," a space that is open to more or less
creative response
of a viewer, is a specific difference of art. If an empty space and 'technical
snafu' can be named 'sarcasm' by 'mistake', than we should recognize the
possibility that we make such 'mistakes' in the relation to art works.
Moreover, such interpretations that are not 'correct'(even from artist's
point of view) do not imply that we do
not recognize or appreciate art correctly. On the contrary, a creative
response might be the necessary condition of an aesthetic experience.
As I said before, it might be that art does not function according to
behaviourist
or popular semiotic model of communication:
sender - message - receiver
Therefore, the referential function (representation and
communication)is opposed to aesthetic function
and the process could be eassyer described not by:
(artist) - (art work) - (viewer)
but
(artist) - (art-work) (art-work) - (viewer)
Instead of conclusion, just a quote I picked in this news-group
some time ago:
"Computers are useless, they can give you only answers"
Pablo Picasso
Tugi
Bruce Attah
> See, Bruce, this has been an excellent example illustrating how easylly
> absence turns into presence, how our imagination fills the empty space, how
> meaning and emotions are not necessarily 'transfered' by the medium.
A message can be ambiguous, and even when a message is unambiguous, people
may misread it. This is not to say that messages in general do not
communicate meaning. Artists may at times fail to communicate through
their work the ideas and emotions they wish to communicate. Also, some
part of the audience may be unable to read a work which has been
successfully read by others, but these facts to not imply that works of
art are not generally intended to communicate meaning and emotions or do
not generally succeed in doing so.
> Regarding our discussions we had some months ago on
> 'linguistic messages' and artist's intentions, and also in relation to
> your intentionalist definition of art, my point has been, and still is,
> that this kind of an "empty space," a space that is open to more or less
> creative response
> of a viewer, is a specific difference of art.
If by "intentionalist", you are referring to Wimsatt & Beardsley's
position on what they call the "intentional fallacy", my definition is not
intentionalist, because it does not require the audience to know anything
about the artist (other than what the work itself reveals) in order to
determine whether or not a given artefact is a work of art, or indeed to
know, necessarily, if the work is successful. According to Wimsatt, talk
of the artist _as_revealed_through_the_work_ does not fall foul of the
so-called intentional fallacy, and I do not ask for any other sort of
attention to be payed to the artist (as distinct from the work).
BTW, I do not believe that the intentional fallacy is a fallacy at all.
There are times when knowledge of certain facts about an artist will
improve one's appreciation of that artist's work. If that counts as
intentionalism, then I do not believe there is any tenable alternative to
intentionalism in aesthetics.
> If an empty space and 'technical
> snafu' can be named 'sarcasm' by 'mistake', than we should recognize the
> possibility that we make such 'mistakes' in the relation to art works.
I never claimed that art is always correctly understood by the audience.
The sorts of mistakes that occur in the interpretation of art are the same
as the kinds of mistakes that occur in communication generally. A
meaning is missed, because attention was elsewhere, or because the
vocabulary used is not recognized; a meaning is erroneously read into the
communication, because such a meaning is expected, or because an accident
is taken for an intentional act, and so on.
That such misinterpretations occur in art, and that their nature is to
some degree predictable, far from casting doubt on the idea that at least
part of art's normal role is to communicate, reinforces it. Predictable
and explainable errors are a usual feature of communication, and the types
of error that occur are predictable and explainable precisely because they
reflect the mechanisms by which a system of communication works.
> Moreover, such interpretations that are not 'correct'(even from artist's
> point of view) do not imply that we do not recognize or appreciate art
> correctly.
If I misinterpret a work of art, the likelihood that I will incorrectly
evaluate it is increased, because part of a work's value comes from its
meaning. This becomes apparent when we notice that "profound" and "banal"
are very powerful evaluative terms that are part of the language of art
_appreciation_. Yet these words are clearly dependent on
_interpretation_. If I miss some profound meaning in a work, I may
mistakenly think it trivial, and therefore of little aesthetic value.
Conversely, by misinterpretation, I may think I discern profound meaning
in a work that is actually quite banal, and thereby overvalue the work.
There are endlesss ways in which an error in interpretation may lead to an
erroneous evaluation of a work.
> On the contrary, a creative
> response might be the necessary condition of an aesthetic experience.
One does not need creativity, in any normal sense of the word, in order to
percieve a pink flower as pretty. So, too, with a simple, fairly
unambitious work of art -- creativity is not required in the response.
If a work is complex in structure or meaning, however, appreciating all
its nuances will assuredly require a measure of intelligence, and possibly
creativity, but I think it is quite clear that creativtiy is not a
"necessary condition of an aesthetic experience", let alone THE necessary
condition.
> As I said before, it might be that art does not function according to
> behaviourist or popular semiotic model of communication:
> sender - message - receiver
> Therefore, the referential function (representation and
> communication)is opposed to aesthetic function
> and the process could be eassyer described not by:
> (artist) - (art work) - (viewer)
> but
>
> (artist) - (art-work) (art-work) - (viewer)
You are asking me to believe that a painter communicates a message to a
painting, and a painting, once painted, is then able to communicate a
message (not necessarily the same message that was communicated to it by
the painter) to the viewer. I find this model nothing short of
preposterous. To say that something that is clearly incapable of reading,
analysing, getting meaning from, or acting upon a communication is the
target (as opposed to the channel) of any communication (by someone who is
not deluded or mad) is absurd. To go on to say that an entirely static,
passive, inanimate object such as a painting or a marble sculpture
originates messages which it communicates to a sentient being is comical.
You seem to be using the word "communication" in a wildly eccentric
fashion that you cannot reasonably expect other speakers of English to
understand.
I suggest that the "popular" model you describe is the only one that makes
sense.
As for your assertion that "the referential function (representation and
communication)is opposed to aesthetic function", I fail to see how it
follows from the statement that preceded it. In any case, whether or not
it does follow from that statement, it is wrong. There can be beautiful
representation and beautiful communication, and to recognize such beauty
is to partake in an aesthetic experience. Moreover, representation and
communication are tools available to artists in all the acknowledged media
of art, and what is represented or communicated, as well as how, are
normally important factors affecting the enjoyment and evaluation of a
work of art.
> Instead of conclusion, just a quote I picked in this news-group
> some time ago:
>
> "Computers are useless, they can give you only answers"
> Pablo Picasso
If Picasso said that, he was seriously ill-informed about computers (but
that should surprise no-one, since he died in 1973).
t.co...@sab.unimelb.edu.au
I (Tugi) wrote:
>> See, Bruce, this has been an excellent example illustrating how easily
>> absence turns into presence, how our imagination fills the empty space, how
Bruce...@insignia.co.uk (Bruce Attah) wrote:
> A message can be ambiguous, and even when a message is unambiguous, people
> may misread it. This is not to say that messages in general do not
> communicate meaning. Artists may at times fail to communicate through
> their work the ideas and emotions they wish to communicate. Also, some
> part of the audience may be unable to read a work which has been
> successfully read by others, but these facts to not imply that works of
> art are not generally intended to communicate meaning and emotions or do
> not generally succeed in doing so.
Bruce, I am not saying that messages do not communicate meaning. I am
also not saying that art works do not also communicate particular
meanings and emotions. All I am saying is that, in the relation to your
definition of art, the success in communication of meaning/emotions can
not be the aesthetic merit and the specific difference of fine art
because communication with other asentient being is a consequence and not
nececerily the aim of art production . Let me please try to simply
explain our main disputable issue which your definition of art implies.
You obviously believe in "correct" meanings or emotions which an art work
mediates between artist and viewer. This means that in your understanding
an artwork is a body that carries ideas or emotions. That is to say, an
art work is a 'form' that transfers a particular 'content' or, to put it
in semiotic terminology, it is 'signifier' of particular 'signified.' If
you believe that that there are "correct" (original) interpretations
(meanings and emotions) than you believe that the relation between
signifier and signified is determined once and for all on one to one
basis. You anchor a metaphysic relation between signifier and signified.
What does it mean?
This implies the possibility of the separation of signified from
signifier (content from form) what is very disputable in various modern
understandings of art since there is a kind of consensus that
self-present signifieds do not exist (unless you are religious), and, as
Lotman has put it, 'you can not separate life from living tissue'.
Therefore, what we do with our interpretation of an art work is merely
substituting something we believe is a separate part of an art work
(content) with another expression (also a sign) often not recognizing
that this what we call 'content' is in fact a completely different
utterance (which would necessarily also consist of 'form' and 'content').
We could call it 'another original' in modernist fashion or 'another
copy' in postmodern understanding. According to both, your definition
that relies on "correct" interpretation would be of time. Your definition
implies the existence of omnipresent meanings and hence the theological
concept of universe, because meanings are in your model given a priori
and what we do is merely transfer them. And again, there is a certain
consensus in our century theories that *we* are creators of our universe,
and both as 'artists' and 'creative readers' (or viewers). The concept I
am arguing for could be traced to Wolfgang Keller's notion of 'open
systems,' Saussure's 'arbitrary relation of signifier and signified',
G.F. Gadamer's notion that 'understanding is always a productive
activity', Nietzsche's 'appropriation' appropriated by postmodernists,
and is parallel to modernist art tradition which, by its existence,
denies the orthodox concept of passive art experience.
I wrote:
>> ...in relation to
>> your intentionalist definition of art, my point has been, and still is,
>> that this kind of an "empty space," a space that is open to more or less
>> creative response
>> of a viewer, is a specific difference of art.
Bruce answered:
> If by "intentionalist", you are referring to Wimsatt & Beardsley's
> position on what they call the "intentional fallacy", my definition is not
> intentionalist, because it does not require the audience to know anything
> about the artist (other than what the work itself reveals) in order to
> determine whether or not a given artefact is a work of art, or indeed to
> know, necessarily, if the work is successful. According to Wimsatt, talk
> of the artist _as_revealed_through_the_work_ does not fall foul of the
> so-called intentional fallacy, and I do not ask for any other sort of
> attention to be payed to the artist (as distinct from the work).
If eliciting 'desirable emotions' from an artist's point of view is a
necessary condition for something to be an art work, as it is stated in
your definition (Sorry if I did not get it correctly) than this means
that artist's intentions are embodied in an art work with a potential to
trigger particular 'desirable' response (ideational or affective).
This is what I call 'intention'. I allow that such intentions are
often the case in visual arts although I would say that this is rather
the specific of advertising than art. But even in advertising so called
'informational input ' rarely corresponds to 'informational output'.
There are a lot of anecdotes witnessing that even carefully planed
campaigns after thorough research of market and cultural idiolects often
fail to transfer particular 'desirable' messages. In communication
which requires precise transfer of information it is recognized as 'noise'
in channel of communication, it distracts the message in 'highly
articulated systems'. In natural language linguists would often
call it a 'creative potential of language'. Consequently the 'noise' is in
art the realm of possibility, an exciting wormhole to unknown equal to
first spot on canvas or a line on an empty piece of paper. It is the
attempt and possibility to reach unknown and not the shaping of
desirable. "To modern novelist the purpose of writing is to find out what
he wanted to say" (A.Rob-Grillet), that is to say, to experiment with
something that does not exist and not to represent something that already
exists, as, for example, the 'concept of desirable'. Communication is
not a purpose of art; it is a consequence. Bruce, you are
underestimating the role of an artist. And you are underestimating
the role of a viewer.
Bruce:
> BTW, I do not believe that the intentional fallacy is a fallacy at all.
> There are times when knowledge of certain facts about an artist will
> improve one's appreciation of that artist's work. If that counts as
> intentionalism, then I do not believe there is any tenable alternative to
> intentionalism in aesthetics.
Bruce, improving implies advancing...Advancing of appreciation?
Are you serious?
In our time this is something you can find only in Panofsky and some art
historians who are afraid of loosing their subject matter.
And you are right, there is no non-metaphysical alternative for
metaphysics of presence. As I see it, our histeric time is aware of
metaphysical caracter of any future anchoring and at the same time,
paradoxically requires a redefinition of traditional disciplines.
But this does not justifie the ignoring of the shift in understanding
which asserts that there are no 'correct contents' as there are no
'final solutions'. Moreover, this does not justifie further applieing
of the alienated intentionalist model to appreciation of art when it
clearly appears as the limitation of the individual
freedom of choice.
Tugi:
>> If an empty space and 'technical
>> snafu' can be named 'sarcasm' by 'mistake', than we should recognize the
>> possibility that we make such 'mistakes' in the relation to art works.
Bruce:
> I never claimed that art is always correctly understood by the audience.
> The sorts of mistakes that occur in the interpretation of art are the same
> as the kinds of mistakes that occur in communication generally. A
> meaning is missed, because attention was elsewhere, or because the
> vocabulary used is not recognized; a meaning is erroneously read into the
> communication, because such a meaning is expected, or because an accident
> is taken for an intentional act, and so on.
> That such misinterpretations occur in art, and that their nature is to
>some degree predictable, far from casting doubt on the idea that at least
> part of art's normal role is to communicate, reinforces it. Predictable
> and explainable errors are a usual feature of communication, and the types
> of error that occur are predictable and explainable precisely because they
> reflect the mechanisms by which a system of communication works.
Who has a right to say that his/hers appreciation of an art work is the
'correct' one? Professionals? Artists? (what about art works of those who
are not alive any more?). Or, are you calling for an Hitler or Stalin to
prescribe a 'correct appreciation'? Moreover, you speak of 'content' and
'content' is not the art work. It does not exist allone. Content is not
present. It is, as you say, in the system of communication. But system is
continually changing so each viewing of an art work is different. This is
a reason why we like to see a same art work again... Our appreciation is
different each time...unless we do not have a creative attitude in
relation to the object, that is to say, unless we pack the art work into
a small mental box, anchor signifier and signified and turn it into a
banknote of logical-discursive reasoning. Cartesian logic would call the
procedure - 'iconography' and the result - 'improvement of appreciation'
(Panofsky). I seriously doubt in positive implications of such an
'improvement' to the appreciation. By the way, what do you think about
Bernini's Saint Theresa? Is she 'coming' (Lacan) or is it a 'religious
ecstasy'communicated after all? What is the error in these
interpretations? Do you think that such knowledge is only relevant for
appreciation? And, if it is, are you sure that you are still enjoying in
sculpture or in the knowledge?
I appreciate your scientific, structuralist enthusiasm. On the other hand,
even Saussurean concept implies that meta-language does not exist and that
our knowledge is based on differential relations which never refer to
self-present reality, hence on 'system', which is not freezed in time
(as some readers have assumed).
We can speak about errors in communication between identical software or
codes in specialized artificial languages, but we,
as intelligent creatures, do not have an unifying and
once for all defined software. This makes our living beautiful.
Can you imagine the horror if we all would think same and with thoughts
permanently in efficient, but dead loops?
Poor computers. What a lousy existence.
Tugi:
>> Moreover, such interpretations that are not 'correct' (even from artist's
>> point of view) do not imply that we do not recognize or appreciate art
>> correctly.
Bruce:
> If I misinterpret a work of art, the likelihood that I will incorrectly
> evaluate it is increased, because part of a work's value comes from its
> meaning. This becomes apparent when we notice that "profound" and "banal"
> are very powerful evaluative terms that are part of the language of art
> _appreciation_. Yet these words are clearly dependent on
> _interpretation_. If I miss some profound meaning in a work, I may
> mistakenly think it trivial, and therefore of little aesthetic value.
> Conversely, by misinterpretation, I may think I discern profound meaning
> in a work that is actually quite banal, and thereby overvalue the work.
> There are endless ways in which an error in interpretation may lead to an
> erroneous evaluation of a work.
There is no warranty that something, today acknowledged as artistic,
would be considered artistic in the future. In our time it is not
surprising when enjoyment in objects, previously recognized as a low
taste amusement, in the perspective of a different generation clearly
appears as a paradigmatic aesthetic experience. A number of scientists
are aware that 'scientific truths are better regarded as relationships
holding in some limited domain' (David Bohm) and are extremely careful
when discussing 'right' and 'wrong' aware that, for example, 'Einstein
was right but it was Newton who takes credits for sending people in
space'. The awareness that there are no final values assigns an enormous
responsibility to art criticism and this is a reason more for art
criticism to rise above still socially acknowledged role in advertising
'truth'- commodity and recognize the rhetoric character of artwriting. (I
do not mean 'rhetoric' in negative sense) Certainly, every aesthetic
judgment requires explanation for it asserts the judgment as objective,
but if aesthetic merit is recognized in connotations, than it is
impossible to determine judgment criteria simple because there can be no
objective criteria for imagination. I understand the paradoxical
situation of contemporary criticism, but a head in a send is not a
solution and is certainly unfair to colleagues artists.
Tugi:
>> ...a creative
>> response might be the necessary condition of an aesthetic experience.
Bruce:
> One does not need creativity, in any normal sense of the word, in order to
> percieve a pink flower as pretty. So, too, with a simple, fairly
> unambitious work of art -- creativity is not required in the response.
> If a work is complex in structure or meaning, however, appreciating all
> its nuances will assuredly require a measure of intelligence, and possibly
> creativity, but I think it is quite clear that creativtiy is not a
> "necessary condition of an aesthetic experience", let alone THE necessary
> condition.
Some people find Barbie beautiful but this does not automatically imply
that all of them have had an aesthetic experience. 'Pretty' is a very
'sticky' expression and I personally have negative connotations regarding
the word if it is used as an aesthetic judgment of an art work.
Therefore, I also allow our different understanding of the term
'creativity'. Let us assume that there is a difference between 'making'
and 'creating'. However, before 15th century creating has been the
privilege of God alone, and than, until our century, the privilege of
genius. People say that we live in democratic societies, so 'creativity'
is not the privilege of artists any more. Some say that we all can be
creative. So, we are trying...trying...trying... Some of us are writing
deffinitions of art, some of creativity, some of 'pretty'. Some
recognize, as for example William Shatner does, that 'people read into it
things that were not intended' (on Star Trecks and the fandom). I assumed
that in English 'being creative' does not have divine connotations any
more and I read 'the dead of the author' primarilly as 'the birth of the
reader'. After all, if you have a right to write definition of art why
would someone be without the privilege to understand it in a different
way, as a question, and even perhaps not related to your intention. It
does not underestimate your argument. Moreover, it gives it a lasting
relevance.
Since there are no definitions without necessary conditions to define the
class I offered a one... I would not discuss on natural beauty versus
aesthetic beauty although it might be an interesting topic for the group.
I would just note that 'pretty' is a word that we are sharing with
different connotations, unless it is applied in proposition where the
context determines meaning and limits connotations. Words are words and
flowers are flowers and our sharing of the same signifiers does not mean
that we are sharing the same experience. 'Flowers are pretty' is a
sentence we were writing in our first notebooks; in primary school we
were thought that flowers are pretty and sometimes even that we have to
paint flowers red because 'all people see flowers red' (refering to Harry
Chapin's poem 'Flowers are Red'). It was even before we started to chop
flowers in pieces to discover their structure. Now we know the structure
of a flower, some of us know that we all 'see and paint flowers red' and
we use a floscula 'flowers are pretty'. And what else do we do? We are
not looking for a message in flower because it is not modern to ask 'what
God wanted to say with a flower' but we still have a habit to chop, as
Peter Schjeldahl says: "The pure critical instinct aims to chop up,
reduce, and explain away any object." Yes, we have to be creative to see
the beauty of a flower.
>> As I said before, it might be that art does not function according to
>> behaviorist or popular semiotic model of communication:
>> sender - message - receiver
>> Therefore, the referential function (representation and
>> communication)is opposed to aesthetic function
>> and the process could be easier described not by:
>> (artist) - (art work) - (viewer)
>> but
>>
>> (artist) - (art-work) (art-work) - (viewer)
Bruce:
> You are asking me to believe that a painter communicates a message to a
> painting, and a painting, once painted, is then able to communicate a
> message (not necessarily the same message that was communicated to it by
> the painter) to the viewer. I find this model nothing short of
> preposterous. To say that something that is clearly incapable of reading,
> analysing, getting meaning from, or acting upon a communication is the
> target (as opposed to the channel) of any communication (by someone who is
> not deluded or mad) is absurd. To go on to say that an entirely static,
> passive, inanimate object such as a painting or a marble sculpture
> originates messages which it communicates to a sentient being is comical.
> You seem to be using the word "communication" in a wildly eccentric
> fashion that you cannot reasonably expect other speakers of English to
> understand.
Yes! Yes! You are finally close! This I see as a one of crucial points
of our century art theory: there are neither divine nor artist's final
anchored referents, messages are not merely transferred by the medium as
an original but created in a direct interaction between artist and art
work and again between viewer and art work. What Ingarden calls - 'areas
of indeterminacy' to be filled out by viewers semiotics calls
'connotations', linguistics -- the 'realm of combination' and
phenomenology -- 'inter-subjectively dialogical relation.' In our time it
is often known as 'appropriation' or, for example, 'textual poaching'.
This is a reason why art work appears as an 'open form', a 'floating
chain of signifiers' and even a 'living subject' of communication.
Certainly, I will not go that far, as you suggested, to see an art work
as a kind of 'I Ching' which is 'answering to all our questions'(although
the parallel can be an interesting topic for a serious research); an art
work can not originate messages without a viewer ('reader', 'spectator'
or 'recipient') and it does not give only artist's answers. It primarily
(as an art work) generates our questions, but only in a case if we have a
creative attitude, therefore, if we are not satisfied with first 'correct
content' or with 'meaningful' words of art professionals that come to our
mind. Aesthetic experience is wholly a relation 'here and now'... After
the anchoridge of 'differential relation' it does not exist any more.
Experience changes. It is not, as you say, improving, but often changing
into experience of once own interpretation.
>I suggest that the "popular" model you describe is the only one that makes
>sense.
You suggested that an art work is a channel of communication. That is,
the channel for transferring 'content' (emotions or concepts). This
implies that the 'content' exists a priori and therefore an art work is,
as a copy of the content subordinated to the original. Can't you allow
the possibility that 'content' is not present? Or you really think that
all that artists do is representing 'reality' and/or preexisting emotions
or/and ideas? Where do you think new ideas come from? From dead loops of
computer? Luckily, 'absence' does not allways immediately changes into
'presence', hence, allowing the appearance of different experiances and
different interpretations. Following Saussure we can conclude that in
natural language the model of unidirectional communication is
questionable. Contemporary linguistics asserts that the model
'encoding-decoding' does not resemble human communication and that our
language is neather advancing nor is a static 'system'. Correspondingly,
a contemporary AI research are focused to imitations of human 'fuzzy
logic', the logic that would not exist acording to the "popular" model of
unidirectional communication you are supporting. I would ask: how could
it happen that you missed this in any serious book on semiotics? We were
probably reading a number of same books, how could it happen that we have
such a different understanding on same issues? We were reading
*different* things in *same* books. We were creative in the process of
reading by accepting the same 'facts' as hypothetical and relating them
to our previous knowledge, directing our opinions by our emotions and
investigating new links and possible relations. And finally we meet here
in a 'cloud' to discuss. Discuss what? Whose *reading* was right and
whose was wrong and not which writers were right or wrong. By the way, my
reading is right.
> As for your assertion that "the referential function (representation and
> communication)is opposed to aesthetic function", I fail to see how it
> follows from the statement that preceded it. In any case, whether or not
> it does follow from that statement, it is wrong. There can be beautiful
> representation and beautiful communication, and to recognize such beauty
> is to partake in an aesthetic experience. Moreover, representation and
> communication are tools available to artists in all the acknowledged media
> of art, and what is represented or communicated, as well as how, are
> normally important factors affecting the enjoyment and evaluation of a
> work of art.
There is nothing that can not be beautiful. But, let me first try to
clarify the terminology because it looks that I have been
'misunderstood'.
re-presentation
State of being instead of something else, substitute.
An art work is not a substitute of nature nor of ideas or emotions or
transcendental truths. The term assumes metaphysical quantitative
difference between phenomena and is the heritage of idealist philosophy
(mimesis).
referential function same as 'ideational', 'prepositional', 'descriptive'
function It serves to communication of descriptive knowledge (of closed
concepts) and tends towards 'high articulation' of signs within the
closed system of communication. (the relation of signifier and signified
on one to one basis). Or, to put it metaphorically: building towers of
Babylon.
aesthetic function Triggers aesthetic experience with signifiers as 'free
radicals' and allows a new knowledge to be gained. It tends to 'low
articulation' of signs and to opening of closed systems of communication
from within the systems. Or, metaphorically: exiting deconstruction of
towers of Babylon.
Certainly this distinction can not be easily used as an aesthetic merit
and, Bruce, I agree with you that these functions can not be easily
separated. They are a part of communication and exist hypotheticaly. As
tendencies they could be easily noticed in for example, comparing a
drivers experience of a traffic signal and a viewers aesthetic experience
of a painting. I wanted to emphasis that art is not a kind of
communication as it is popularly understood in terms of above simple
scheme 'sender-message-receiver'. The aim of art production is not the
function that is usually assigned to a document - to store or to transfer
knowledge,(the relation between 'naming' and 'reality') but principally a
heroic attempt to rise above the known knowledge into unknown, to
question existent codes (and not to copy them) and, as Foucault says, to
create 'an opening where the subject... endlessly disappears'.
And I do agree with you that 'representation and communication are tools
available to artist'. But they are tools and consequences, and not
necessarily objectives of art production. Equally as your intention
behind your definition of art was not to educate us, to inform us,(I hope
so) but rather, as we use to name it, to rise questions, primarily to
yourself, to *play* with your knowledge in such a way to satisfy criteria
that are usually considered to be criteria for a good definition. You had
a 'canvas', 'frame' and 'tools' and you wanted to see what is going to
happen with it, to see whether you can pronounce unpronounced. This is a
reason why I respect your attempt. I read an aesthetic play in it and I
do not need you to 'correct' me regarding my emotional experience. On the
other hand theory names and classifies. It aims to fix differential
relations, to determine and communicate truth. Rational discourse allows
us to 'be serious together’ in frameworks of the empire of logos, to
'exchange' abstract ideas alienated from experience, to articulate
answers and even to try to measure right and wrong, good and bad, and all
other dichotomies.
Art is different. What we appreciate in an art work is an emotional
quality we name 'aesthetic experience' which is, in my opinion, founded
on the fact that an art work questions our own idiolect, or to say it in
another way: by an acquaintance with an object we are in a position to
possibly redefine anchored and alienated classes, over the process in
which we experience an object as a subject. I do not really mean that an
object is physically exchanging information with us and I do not say that
we have to be aware of our internal dialogue and convulsive cognitive
search for sense ('sense' in every sense). An art work can, just with its
own *untranslatable* integrity, *trigger* the clash of our own previously
anchored epistemes. The drama happens in us, as viewers. The result is
redefinition of system, a new order between synapses, the order that
frees the neural dead-loops and opens tiny free receptacles to new and
unconceived diferential relations. The shift in the order sharpens our
sensitivity and activates the brain chemistry. The consequence is the
pleasure of 'illumination' (in psychological sense). It is not relevant
to *define* *what* is communicated with the object as long as it is still
enough open to further challenge our imagination. Art-true is not in
present quotations and a value is, in fact, the metaphysical measure of
individual experience. We are not supposed to merely reed answers in an
art work but to recognize questions, and not questions communicated from
another medium, but questions that are in us - refracted from the art
work and, in the scope of our expectations, absent but necessary.
>> "Computers are useless, they can give you only answers"
>> Pablo Picasso
> If Picasso said that, he was seriously ill-informed about computers (but
> that should surprise no-one, since he died in 1973).
Again, it seams that we saw different things. You underlined 'computers'
and I focused my attention on 'answers'. As you say, it is not strange if
Picasso was 'ill- informed' about computers. To me the significant weight
has been given to 'questions' (absent but implied) and to the distinction
'question-answer' as the measure of 'usefulness'. Regarding the fact that
in our time even art is sometimes seen as the passive information
exchange between identical software, we can even wonder whether
computers are really that useful as our, probably shared, optimism has
been asserting us during last decades...
To see an answer, we have to be able to articulate a question. The
potential of an art work to generate questions is more important than any
possible answers. This is the reason why I believe that the concept and
practice of 'correct art interpretation' are wrong.
Bruce Attah
In article <8550746...@dejanews.com>, t.co...@sab.unimelb.edu.au wrote:
a very long and very difficult-to-read article in which the names of a
thousand postmodernist and other writers were dropped (half of whom I've
never heard of), and a million startling definitions were supplied.
I read it all, and I read it carefully (applause, please), but I will not
attempt to answer all of it (do I hear sighs of relief?), partly because
I'm not sure I understand all of it, and partly because the attempt would
be futile: no-one would read the tome of an article that would result, and
the one person who should would not understand it, since Tugi and I seem
to be divided, quite spectacularly, by a common language.
I'll just offer my responses to a few odd bits. Even so, unfortunately,
my post threatens to be almost as long as the original to which I am
replying:
> ...That is to say, an
> art work is a 'form' that transfers a particular 'content' or, to put it
> in semiotic terminology, it is 'signifier' of particular 'signified.'
One problem I have with your article is that you insist on putting things
in semiotic terminology, which, to me, clarifies nothing. Instead of
reading you, I find myself wading through an amniotic lake of jargon.
> And again, there is a certain
> consensus in our century theories that *we* are creators of our universe,
> and both as 'artists' and 'creative readers' (or viewers).
Actually, in case you haven't noticed, there is no such consensus. Rather
a lot of people (myself included) do not accept the metaphysics of
postmodernism.
> "To modern novelist the purpose of writing is to find out what
> he wanted to say" (A.Rob-Grillet)
Is Robbe-Grillet here presuming to speak for _all_ modern novelists, or
surreptitiously making a prescription, telling modern novelists what he
thinks they _should_ be doing, just as Greenberg made prescriptions to
painters, thinly disguised as historical observations?
> Bruce, improving implies advancing...Advancing of appreciation?
> Are you serious?
Let us imagine that I know nothing of the rules of football. I go to
watch a match. The game looks to me as if it might be interesting, but my
experience is, on the whole, frustrating, because I do not know what is
going on. Later, someone explains to me the rules of the game, and I go
to see another match. I enjoy it much more -- my appreciation has been
improved.
Yes, I am serious, appreciation can be improved by knowledge.
> Who has a right to say that his/hers appreciation of an art work is the
> 'correct' one? Professionals? Artists? (what about art works of those who
> are not alive any more?). Or, are you calling for an Hitler or Stalin to
> prescribe a 'correct appreciation'?
Listen, and listen close: the premise that there are correct
interpretations of messages does not imply your conclusion that
individuals must defer to others with authority in order to know what the
correct interpretations are.
Read this little playlet:
Diner: Waiter, there's a fly in my soup!
Waiter: A spy in your soup? Is he comfortable?
Diner: A fly, goddamit! I said a FLY!
Waiter: A fly, you say? But of course, it's fly soup, sir!
To what authority did the waiter turn in order to know that his first
interpretation of the diner's message was wrong, and the second correct?
BTW, I know the snide purpose of your slipping in a reference to Hitler
and Stalin, and you have not got away with it.
> Moreover, you speak of 'content' and
> 'content' is not the art work. It does not exist allone. Content is not
> present. It is, as you say, in the system of communication.
I did not say that content is in the system of communication. Do not put
postmodernist words into my mouth when what I actually have said clearly
contradicts them. If content is 'in' somewhere, it is in the message.
The system is essentially contentless (keeping the same sense of
'content'). The sentence, "The world is round," can be said to contain a
reference to the fact that the world is round. The English language,
however, contains no such reference. Similarly, a portrait by Rembrandt
of Saskia contains information about a particular woman which the art of
painting does not contain.
> But system is
> continually changing so each viewing of an art work is different. This is
> a reason why we like to see a same art work again... Our appreciation is
> different each time...
because our appreciation is incomplete, not because the system is changing.
> By the way, what do you think about
> Bernini's Saint Theresa? Is she 'coming' (Lacan) or is it a 'religious
> ecstasy'communicated after all? What is the error in these
> interpretations? Do you think that such knowledge is only relevant for
> appreciation? And, if it is, are you sure that you are still enjoying in
> sculpture or in the knowledge?
Lacan chooses to see Saint Theresa's ecstasy as sexual, rather than
ecclesiastical. Bully for him. His preference for the profane over the
sacred is symptomatic of the fashionable thinking of his time, but if you
think that the ambiguity Lacan imagines he finds in Bernini's portrayal of
the saint is proof that any interpretation will serve equally well for any
work of art, you have got another think coming.
Consider these possible interpretations:
She's having a fit.
She's giving birth.
She's eating ham.
She's a lawyer summing up her case.
She's a group of engineers planning a refit of the Severn Bridge.
She's a metaphor for International Direct Dialling.
Are they all equally plausible?
> I appreciate your scientific, structuralist enthusiasm.
I am no structuralist, any more than I am an "intentionalist", or a
formalist. Nor has my argument been scientific, though it has sought to
be logical. Nor was my definition of art "mimetic". You seem quite
unable to resist putting ill-fitting labels on my words. I get the
impression that you are trying desperately to fit my ideas into
pigeonholes -- such is not the most flexible or creative way of thinking.
> Some people find Barbie beautiful but this does not automatically imply
> that all of them have had an aesthetic experience.
Why not?
> ...However, before 15th century creating has been the
> privilege of God alone, and than, until our century, the privilege of
> genius. People say that we live in democratic societies, so 'creativity'
> is not the privilege of artists any more. Some say that we all can be
> creative.
If you create, you are creative; if you do not, you are not. Creativity
has NEVER been a privilege reserved for artists. Nor has it ever been the
preserve of God. The ability to make the world out of nothing is not the
creativity of which we speak. Try not to confuse two entirely different
ideas simply because they have similar labels.
> After all, if you have a right to write definition of art why
> would someone be without the privilege to understand it in a different
> way, as a question, and even perhaps not related to your intention.
Under Australian law, I have no doubt, you have every right to
misunderstand people as wildly as it suits you. No-one is ever likely to
jail you for that. Some people, myself included, might, however, come to
doubt your ability to think clearly on abstract matters.
> Yes! Yes! You are finally close! This I see as a one of crucial points
> of our century art theory: there are neither divine nor artist's final
> anchored referents, messages are not merely transferred by the medium as
> an original but created in a direct interaction between artist and art
> work and again between viewer and art work.
I have just finished describing your ideas about communication in terms
that included the words 'preposterous', 'absurd', and 'comical' and the
phrase 'wildly eccentric', yet you say I am now close!
> I will not go that far, as you suggested, to see an art work
> as a kind of 'I Ching' which is 'answering to all our questions'(although
> the parallel can be an interesting topic for a serious research);
I suggested no such thing. I wish you would stop putting words into my
mouth -- especially the sorts of words you do put into my mouth.
BTW, your idea and mine of what counts for 'serious research' are very,
very different.
> You suggested that an art work is a channel of communication.
I have said that successful works of art provoke feelings and thoughts in
the audience, according to the intentions of the artist. If they do so by
serving as a channel of communication, fine. Communication of some sort
is usual in art, and art media are always capable of serving as channels
of communication. Where I have said that works of art operate as channels
of communication, I have only done so in order to contrast my view of how
communication works in art with yours, which I consider ridiculous. It
has not been my intention to give the impression that the primary purpose
of art is to impart information -- especially knowledge -- as I do not
believe that.
> Where do you think new ideas come from?
From people, of course (including artists).
> Following Saussure we can conclude that in
> natural language the model of unidirectional communication is
> questionable.
Why should I follow Saussure? Why should I follow anyone? Why must I not
rely on my reason? Your endless name-dropping drives me nuts -- it makes
me wonder if you ever think for yourself.
> Correspondingly,
> a contemporary AI research are focused to imitations of human 'fuzzy
> logic', the logic that would not exist acording to the "popular" model of
> unidirectional communication you are supporting. I would ask: how could
> it happen that you missed this in any serious book on semiotics?
Fuzzy logic is a system of logic, no more, no less. It differs from
classical logic in that it treats truth and falsity as opposite ends of a
continuum of degrees of truth, whereas classical logic obeys the 'law of
the excluded middle', under which propositions are understood to be either
true or false, and never both or neither or something-in-between.
As a system of logic, fuzzy logic contains axioms and operations, but no
statements about the world. It has nothing whatsoever to say about
"unidirectional communication", whatever that may be.
If I ever came across the idea in a "serious book on semiotics" that fuzzy
logic would not exist according to the unidirectional model of
communication (as you misleadingly label it) that I am supporting, I would
fling the book down in disgust, hurling epithets such as 'idiot' and
'fool' at the author. Please tell me the titles of any books where you
have read such ideas, so that I can avoid them.
> The aim of art production is...
> principally a
> heroic attempt to rise above the known knowledge into unknown, to
> question existent codes (and not to copy them) and, as Foucault says, to
> create 'an opening where the subject... endlessly disappears'.
This is a prescription disguised as a description, once again. Not all
artists want to do these things, and you are wrong to suggest that they
do, or should.
> ... What we appreciate in an art work is an emotional
> quality we name 'aesthetic experience' which is, in my opinion, founded
> on the fact that an art work questions our own idiolect, or to say it in
> another way: by an acquaintance with an object we are in a position to
> possibly redefine anchored and alienated classes, over the process in
> which we experience an object as a subject.
Yet again, you are prescribing. Art does not have to question 'idiolects'
(or anything else). Nor does it have to cause redefinitions of 'anchored
and alienated classes' (or anything else) in order to be art.
> We are not supposed to merely reed answers in an
> art work but to recognize questions, and not questions communicated from
> another medium, but questions that are in us - refracted from the art
> work and, in the scope of our expectations, absent but necessary.
If answers are presented, we are supposed to read them. If questions are
presented, we are supposed to read them, also. All, providing, of course,
that the answers and the questions are interesting. There is a hidden
prescription here, that art should provide questions rather than answers.
It is a very unwise prescription.
Also, when we read either questions or answers from a work of art, we
should not confuse any questions or answers that we already have "in us",
with those presented in the work. If we do so, we will certainly misread
the work, and misevaluate it, as a result.
> To see an answer, we have to be able to articulate a question. The
> potential of an art work to generate questions is more important than any
> possible answers. This is the reason why I believe that the concept and
> practice of 'correct art interpretation' are wrong.
It is not true that a work should provoke questions rather than offer
answers. The chief value of questions (other than as light entertainment)
lies in their potential to lead to answers. A work of art may ask
questions or supply answers, or do neither. It is not your job to tell
the artist which to do.
Even if it were true that works of art ought to question rather than
answers, it would not follow that audiences ought to cease to try to
interpret works correctly. The audience would still need to know what
questions a work was asking, if any, and that it was not asking questions
if it was not.
The reason correct interpretation is important and desirable is that
incorrect interpretation leads to incorrect evaluation, and incorrect
evaluation leads to less good art being made.
Bruce Attah.
PS
There are loads of other things I could take you up on. There are plenty
of things in your post that I have not bothered to reply to, which I
nevertheless do not agree with -- and it is not because I don't have
answers. Rather, it's because I just can't be bothered. There's only so
much a person can write in one evening.
RSDC / White Crow
On Tue, 11 Feb 1997 11:11:22 -0600, t.co...@sab.unimelb.edu.au wrote:
(a conversation between Tugi and Bruce)
<snip>
> I say that the
>transfer of content is a tendency specific to the language of theory and
>history ('logos' and 'epos') and not to art. That is to say, art does not
>tend to transfer the truth but to articulate naming in relation to
>context. Therefore, the communication is just a consequence and not an
>objective. If you take a painting for an representation of reality
>('correct content'), as in the example of Saskia's portrait, you are
>speaking about *document* and the relation of naming to reality and not
>about the relation of naming to context. This inevitably leads to
>criteria of the painting in reality (or what we take for reality).
Could you elaborate on this, please (or provide reference for review)?
I do not understand the difference between 'transfer the truth' and
'articulate naming in relation to context.
<snip>
>>> The aim of art production is...
>>> principally a
>>> heroic attempt to rise above the known knowledge into unknown, to
>>> question existent codes (and not to copy them) and, as Foucault says, to
>>> create 'an opening where the subject... endlessly disappears'.
>
>> This is a prescription disguised as a description, once again. Not all
>> artists want to do these things, and you are wrong to suggest that they
>> do, or should.
>
>No, this is not disguised prescription. This is a prescription. I do not
>have to disguise...I am an artist and I sincerely say what I think. The
>difference between our reasoning is that I admit that every description
>is prescription, and it seams that you are not aware of that. Or you are
>the one who consciously disguise prescriptions behind 'correct
>interpretations'.
>
>>> ... What we appreciate in an art work is an emotional
>>> quality we name 'aesthetic experience' which is, in my opinion, founded
>>> on the fact that an art work questions our own idiolect, or to say it in
>>> another way: by an acquaintance with an object we are in a position to
>>> possibly redefine anchored and alienated classes, over the process in
>>> which we experience an object as a subject.
>
>> Yet again, you are prescribing. Art does not have to question 'idiolects'
>> (or anything else). Nor does it have to cause redefinitions of 'anchored
>> and alienated classes' (or anything else) in order to be art.
>
>You are right. I am prescribing.
<snip>
What do you think are the questions art should be asking today? What
are the answers it should be giving?
BTW, I have enjoyed reading this exchange. Thank you both for the
efforts.
amos
Peter B Dunn
RSDC / White Crow wrote:
>
> What do you think are the questions art should be asking today? What
> are the answers it should be giving?
>
> BTW, I have enjoyed reading this exchange. Thank you both for the
> efforts.
>
long? Define it, find the reality of the world with art and the reality
without. Are we nothing but self-indulgent creators, doing visual
masturbation or is there a pantheon of meaning for you, for me, and the
next guy.
t.co...@sab.unimelb.edu.au
In article <330AD0...@sprynet.com>,
Peter B Dunn <pbd...@sprynet.com> wrote:
>
> RSDC / White Crow wrote:
> >
> > What do you think are the questions art should be asking today? What
> > are the answers it should be giving?
> amosWhy do you propose purpose in art. What is it that has made art exist
so
> long? Define it, find the reality of the world with art and the reality
> without. Are we nothing but self-indulgent creators, doing visual
> masturbation or is there a pantheon of meaning for you, for me, and the
> next guy.
Tugi(the one of 'next guys'): Peter, by speaking about the 'definition'
of art's longevity you also suggested the nececity of the 'purpose', and
with the ‘pantheon of meaning’, the pantheon we are all supposed to
share, you implied the purpose.
I do not think that we are self-indulgent creators (we would not be
creators by being 'simultaneously' self-indulgent), and I do not think
that we can ultimately escape from 'a pantheon of meaning', but to
‘masturbate visually’in an intelligent way (sounds funny but I like it as
an alternative 'definition of art')is an exciting opportunity to shake
the 'pantheon of meaning'. To shake it from within... My argument in
previous discussions has been just that: the Pantheon has to be shaken to
*experience* sense and beauty.
The meanings are not given once for all. The 'world' and the 'reality'
are changing every day, every moment. They are not frozen in the
pantheon. To experience every moment of our life differently is
beautiful. Art does not exist within a death pantheon -- it *is*
beautiful... -- /_~ TUGI______________________ (/9 6`)
_____________________________ Melbourne, Australia (/~\)
t.co...@sab.unimelb.edu.au \`/ ~
-------------------==== Posted via Deja News ====-----------------------
Tugi
I (Tugi) wrote, (from a conversation between me and Bruce 'Re:
Definition
of Art'):
(...)
>> ...the
>> transfer of content is a tendency specific to the language of theory and
>> history ('logos' and 'epos') and not to art. That is to say, art does not
>> tend to transfer the truth but to articulate naming in relation to
>> context. Therefore, the communication is just a consequence and not an
>> objective. If you take a painting for an representation of reality
>> ('correct content'), as in the example of Saskia's portrait, you are
>> speaking about *document* and the relation of naming to reality and not
>> about the relation of naming to context. This inevitably leads to
>> criteria of the painting in reality (or what we take for reality).
On Thu Feb 20 17:42:53 1997, satt...@us.net (RSDC / White Crow),
amos wrote:
>Could you elaborate on this, please (or provide reference for review)?
>I do not understand the difference between 'transfer the truth' and
>'articulate naming in relation to context.
If a painting is 'depicting' an ugly person it does not imply that the
painting is ugly. It is naive to assume that the painting is
nothing more but a statement about the real depicted person, although
we can not deny that paintings are often seen and treated (in the past
equally as we still witness today) merely as visual documents.
I am sure that you are aware of the difference between a family
photograph
with the recognized principal purpose to 'represent' real persons and
situations
'portrayed' from reality (or what we take for reality), and an art
photograph which is primarily focused on maintaining the certain
integrity
of visual structure even in a case when it is also concerned with the
representation of a particular motif.
(On 'syntagmatic' and 'paradigmatic' differential relations and a
consequent difference between 'communication’ and 'poetry' see R.
Jakobson,
although a corresponding concept could be found in other modernist and
poststructuralist writings)
Or, let me put it differently using an example in cinema which is
traditionally understood as a 'discursive' and 'meaningful' medium.
One violent scene in a movie does not mean that the movie is violent.
A violent scene
does not 'witness a real event', it does not name an event from reality,
and therefore it is not the document of the real event (with existential
parameters). On the other hand
we know that a particular scene is staged, so it also *existed* in front
of
the camera. The space and time represented have been a 'real’ play
‘registered’ by a camera. Hence, the shot is representation.
But the 'real' event is just an element of the
composition in the cinematic whole. Therefore, a scene in a movie has
a function of naming within the structure of the movie. This is the
relation 'naming - context'. Violent scene does not tell us a truth,
moreover, we could conclude that it 'lies' about the event
(the event did not really happen); but it has
a function in an art work. Therefore, the representational quality of
cinematic camera is applied as a tool; the 'real event' (hence, the
illusion of the real event) is an element of the composition...
The scene does not aim to tell us anything about reality since it's
purpose is
to function within the realm of combination (in cinema diegesis).
What we experience as art is neither in 'correct content
interpretations'
nor in quotations.
Recognizing 'visual quotations' in art works like Mona Lisa's or
Saskia's
smiles may be experienced as information about 'real'(?) personalities
but it
does not tell us anything about 'art-truth’ of paintings.
Now, just for the moment, let's return to photography :
"You can always ask, pointing to an object in a photograph
- a building, say- what lies behind it, totally obscured by it...
You can always ask, of an area photographed, what lies adjacent
to that area, beyond the frame. This generally makes no sense asked
of a painting."
Stanley Cavell
Cavell in this quote understands photography as a document of reality.
I think, and I believe that we both agree, that photography can be more
than that...
But he has a point describing the relation to document.
So, what does an art photographer think about a person who, in
a gallery, in front of his 'good' photograph, asks about, for example,
buildings that are 'supposed to exist' left or right from the frame?
I believe he/she thinks similar as Rembrandt would think if asked about
his wife’s smile in the painting.
Regarding references and distinction between 'naming-context',
'naming-reality'
see Jan Mukarovsky. I haven't found much on English, but maybe you
might have a better luck...
><snip>
>>> The aim of art production is...
>>> principally a
>>> heroic attempt to rise above the known knowledge into unknown, to
>>> question existent codes (and not to copy them) and, as Foucault says, to
>>> create 'an opening where the subject... endlessly disappears'.
>
>>> ... What we appreciate in an art work is an emotional
>>> quality we name 'aesthetic experience' which is, in my opinion, founded
>>> on the fact that an art work questions our own idiolect, or to say it in
>>> another way: by an acquaintance with an object we are in a position to
>>> possibly redefine anchored and alienated classes, over the process in
>>> which we experience an object as a subject.
(...)
> What do you think are the questions art should be asking today? What
> are the answers it should be giving?
Interesting old questions with constantly changing answers...
Again, here are main points from my discussion:
In aesthetic sense there are neither significant ready-made answers
nor questions *contained* in art objects.
Our relation to the objects could trigger answers and questions.
'Recognizing' questions (not necessarily 'artists questions')
seem to me more significant specifics to art acquaintance than finding
artists
answers.
I am 'prescriptive' but I would not go that far to try to name
'big problems of the civilization'... They are named and hence
alienated from individual experience and individual responsibility...
The 'questions', that I am pointing to, occur during the art
acquaintance ('artist-art work and 'art work-viever')and are the matter
of
individual experience -- the only experience in which questions can
appear
as an existential movens and
not as an already defined, descriptive and alienated, social clichés.
I do not intend to add to these clichés answering to your
already frozen ancient 'big questions'
with another linguistic framing.
As a mater of fact, I think I just answered...
Tugi
Peter B Dunn
>
> Tugi(the one of 'next guys'): Peter, by speaking about the 'definition'
> of art's longevity you also suggested the nececity of the 'purpose', and
> with the ‘pantheon of meaning’, the pantheon we are all supposed to
> share, you implied the purpose.
>
> I do not think that we are self-indulgent creators (we would not be
> creators by being 'simultaneously' self-indulgent), and I do not think
> that we can ultimately escape from 'a pantheon of meaning', but to
> ‘masturbate visually’in an intelligent way (sounds funny but I like it as
> an alternative 'definition of art')is an exciting opportunity to shake
> the 'pantheon of meaning'. To shake it from within... My argument in
> previous discussions has been just that: the Pantheon has to be shaken to
> *experience* sense and beauty.
>
> The meanings are not given once for all. The 'world' and the 'reality'
> are changing every day, every moment. They are not frozen in the
> pantheon. To experience every moment of our life differently is
> beautiful. Art does not exist within a death pantheon -- it *is*
manner. I dislike the lament of what is art's purpose. We all (as
artists) give and bring self-created images (or music, so as to not
offend our sound colleagues) that some how are transmutable. When I say
that there is a transmutability I mean that art is didatac. There are
three states of art 1) personal creativity 2) the objective of the
viewers and 3) the combination of the two first states. These states are
all appreciated for what they are. They are inclusive. Art is inclusive
etc. . . I do have a problem with the Idea that art is a certain world
creation for all to take beauty and meaning. I read an article by Jean
Baudrillard titled the AESTHETIC ILLUSION. I disagree with most of the
article, but is well written. Within the first paragraph, Jean states
"Artists thought they were painting religious pictures but in fact were
making works of art. Are our modern artists, who think they are making
works of art actually doing something else?" It is an interesting
statement that he makes. Of course it only based on a temporal
perspective of the renaissance that we have the opinion that it was Works
of Art. I think artists (myself included) have the problem of trying to
throw our arms around the world in a great big hug or beats us all with a
newspaper for all of our evils. I say we should make and do whatever we
want and let it happen, if it doesn't happen so be it. In a sense visual
masturbation is good. It is good for art. When I was a graduate
student, an instructor said to me "Peter, playing is the most important
thing in making art." Wdo not need to question the state of art. If we
make art and are artists, we are the state of art.
Peter B. Dunn
M. Pinto
art is the visual trace which culture leaves to posterity.
On Wed, 19 Feb 1997, Peter B Dunn wrote:
> RSDC / White Crow wrote:
> >
> > What do you think are the questions art should be asking today? What
> > are the answers it should be giving?
> >
> > BTW, I have enjoyed reading this exchange. Thank you both for the
> > efforts.
> >