Village Voice article on "Political Correctness"-bashing
Ron Newman
stories on the "Political Correctness" controversy, by Micahel Berube
and Richard Goldstein. I haven't read the whole thing yet,
but it looks provocative. The cover reads:
WANTED FOR INTELLECTUAL FRAUD
Allan Bloom, author, The Closing of the American Mind.
Guilty of cultural jingoism.
Roger Kimball, author, Tenured Radicals.
Assaults the humanities.
Eugene Genovese, historian, Marxist reactionary.
Double agent.
Dinesh D'Souza, author, Illiberal Education.
Batters mutlticulturalism.
Robert Brustein, critic and producer.
Impersonates a liberal.
Camille Paglia, author, Sexual Personae.
Counterfeit feminist.
--
Ron Newman rne...@bbn.com
Roger Lustig
>Some alleged offenses from the Village Voice "INTELLECTUAL FRAUD"
>list could, indeed, pass as intellectual fraud:
>> Double agent.
>> Impersonates a liberal.
>> Counterfeit feminist.
>Others, even on the author's own terms, do not seem to imply fraud:
>> Guilty of cultural jingoism.
>> Assaults the humanities.
>> Batters mutlticulturalism.
>Rather, they look like sins against the VV author's political agenda.
>Dare I say: sins against PC?
Dare anything you want -- but dare to read the article. It's a corker.
And, yes, he accuses Bloom of passing off a lot of bullshit, and has an
impressive example.
In fact, one of the most telling points the author has (oops, two of
them -- have) is the LACK OF EVIDENCE these guys come up with. Both
Kimball and D'Souza tell the tale of Sixties radicals now in tenured
jobs -- but the only tenured rad. they interview at length -- either one
of them -- turns out to be Stanley Fish, who is too old to be a Sixties
type, and was never involved with radical politics, either.
In short, where's the beef?
Roger
> Mike Cherepov
> not representing my employer
Mike Cherepov
list could, indeed, pass as intellectual fraud:
> Double agent.
> Impersonates a liberal.
> Counterfeit feminist.
Others, even on the author's own terms, do not seem to imply fraud:
> Guilty of cultural jingoism.
> Assaults the humanities.
> Batters mutlticulturalism.
Rather, they look like sins against the VV author's political agenda.
Dare I say: sins against PC?
Mike Cherepov
not representing my employer
Mike Godwin
>The current issue (6/18/91) of The Village Voice has 2 cover
>stories on the "Political Correctness" controversy, by Micahel Berube
>and Richard Goldstein. I haven't read the whole thing yet,
>but it looks provocative. The cover reads:
>
> WANTED FOR INTELLECTUAL FRAUD
[Text deleted]
> Robert Brustein, critic and producer.
> Impersonates a liberal.
>
> Camille Paglia, author, Sexual Personae.
> Counterfeit feminist.
I am at a loss as to how either of these writers is arguably
fraudulent.
--Mike
--
Mike Godwin, | To see a world in a grain of sand
mnem...@eff.org | And heaven in a wild flower
(617) 864-0665 | Hold infinity in the palm of your hand
EFF, Cambridge, MA | And eternity in an hour
Antonio Leal
> [refs. to Vill.Voice article ommited]
> In fact, one of the most telling points the author has (oops, two of
> them -- have) is the LACK OF EVIDENCE these guys come up with. Both
> Kimball and D'Souza tell the tale of Sixties radicals now in tenured
> jobs -- but the only tenured rad. they interview at length -- either one
> of them -- turns out to be Stanley Fish, who is too old to be a Sixties
> type, and was never involved with radical politics, either.
>
> In short, where's the beef?
In an an article in the N.Y.T.Book Review of 91.05.05, Camille Paglia
(one of the VV's "wanted") argued the following:
"In 'Tenured Radicals', which treats trendy showboating professors with
the irreverence they deserve, Roger Kimball makes one statement I would
correct - he suggests that the radicals of the 60's are now in positions
of control in the major universities. He is too generous. Most of this
country's academic leftists are no more radical than my Aunt Hattie.
Sixties radicals rarely went on to graduate school; if they did, they
often dropped out. If they made it through, they had trouble getting a
job and keeping it. They remain mavericks, isolated, off-center. Today's
academic leftists are strutting wannabes, timorous nerds who missed the
60's while they were grade-grubbing and brown-nosing the senior faculty.
Their politics came to them late, secondhand and special delivery, via
the Parisian import craze of the 70's."
[The article was titled 'Ninnies, Pedants, Tyrants and Other Academics',
and a footnote at the end threathened publication (this was an adaptation)
as an article in Arion: A Journal of the Humanities and the Classics
(745 Commonwealth Av., Rm. 435, Boston, MA 02215).]
---------------
Recommended books of the week:
Bryan Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer
P.G.Wodehouse, The Luck of the Bodkins
--
Antonio B. Leal Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Bell: [412] 268-2937 Carnegie Mellon University
Net: a...@ece.cmu.edu Pittsburgh, PA. 15213 U.S.A.
Roger Lustig
>In article <70...@archive.BBN.COM> rne...@bbn.com (Ron Newman) writes:
>>The current issue (6/18/91) of The Village Voice has 2 cover
>>stories on the "Political Correctness" controversy, by Micahel Berube
>>and Richard Goldstein. I haven't read the whole thing yet,
>>but it looks provocative. The cover reads:
>> WANTED FOR INTELLECTUAL FRAUD
>[Text deleted]
>> Robert Brustein, critic and producer.
>> Impersonates a liberal.
>> Camille Paglia, author, Sexual Personae.
>> Counterfeit feminist.
>I am at a loss as to how either of these writers is arguably
>fraudulent.
Funny you should mention it; Paglia is not discussed in the article, nor
does Brustein get more than a little coverage. I think the headline
writers got out of hand.
Do read the article, though; it's the best discussion of Bloom's Berries
yet.
Roger
Mike Godwin
>Funny you should mention it; Paglia is not discussed in the article, nor
>does Brustein get more than a little coverage. I think the headline
>writers got out of hand.
>
>Do read the article, though; it's the best discussion of Bloom's Berries
>yet.
I plan to. Need to get over to Harvard Sq. and buy a Village Voice.
One of the things that immunizes Paglia from too many attacks, of
course, is that her book, while entertaining in short doses, is
hard to read all the way through. (I have done it, though.)
Whatever one may say about Paglia, one cannot say she is
"fraudulent," as that would imply she is trying to copy
something else. In fact, however, she is sui generis.
--Mike
--
Mike Godwin, | To see a world in a grain of sand
mnem...@eff.org | And heaven in a wild flower
(617) 864-1550 | Hold infinity in the palm of your hand
Mike Godwin
Is the article by Paglia or about Paglia? I confess that I can't read
much in the NYT Book Review without laughing these days.
>Dig the letters from last week; some of Paglia's assertions in that
>article ARE pretty amazing.
Such as?
> How much inaccuracy before it's fraud?
Inaccuracy, no matter how great, is not fraud. Fraud is deliberate
misrepresentation. It is certainly possible to be inaccurate--even
extremely inaccurate--without being fraudulent.
I take it you have not read Paglia's book?
>Well, surely if she's trying to PRETEND she's something she's not, or
>passing herself off as something she's not, or passing a statement she
>knows is wrong off as fact -- that's fraud. Sui generis or not.
Precisely what do you think she is pretending to be, Roger?
I think you can do better than rely on second-hand sources.
Village Voice headline writers are not the best second-hand
sources in any case.
I read the Berube article in the Voice, by the way. Thought it
was quite good, although it's fairly apparent in his passing
remark about Paglia that he isn't clear about what she's saying
either.
Roger Lustig
>In article <10...@idunno.Princeton.EDU> ro...@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Roger Lustig) writes:
>>Funny you should mention it; Paglia is not discussed in the article, nor
>>does Brustein get more than a little coverage. I think the headline
>>writers got out of hand.
>>Do read the article, though; it's the best discussion of Bloom's Berries
>>yet.
>I plan to. Need to get over to Harvard Sq. and buy a Village Voice.
I should update this: Brustein and Paglia are mentioned in passing in a
SECOND article on the subject. Not a whole lot, though.
>One of the things that immunizes Paglia from too many attacks, of
>course, is that her book, while entertaining in short doses, is
>hard to read all the way through. (I have done it, though.)
Did you make it through the NYT Book review article without laughing?
Dig the letters from last week; some of Paglia's assertions in that
article ARE pretty amazing. How much inaccuracy before it's fraud?
>Whatever one may say about Paglia, one cannot say she is
>"fraudulent," as that would imply she is trying to copy
>something else. In fact, however, she is sui generis.
Well, surely if she's trying to PRETEND she's something she's not, or
passing herself off as something she's not, or passing a statement she
knows is wrong off as fact -- that's fraud. Sui generis or not.
(I know a friendly hog-caller named Sooey Generous.)
Roger
Francis Muir
Roger Lustig writes:
How much inaccuracy before it's fraud?
Inaccuracy, no matter how great, is not fraud. Fraud is deliberate
misrepresentation. It is certainly possible to be inaccurate--even
extremely inaccurate--without being fraudulent.
Wow. Methinks Mike doth expound the Law according to Judge Roy Bean. Luckily
I am just returned from a dinner at the Garrick with one of my cousins, a
Chancery QC, and I can set this matter straight. Deliberate misrepresentation
does not constitute fraud, it is merely an element thererof. Fraud is the
intentional perversion of truth in order to induce another to part with
something of value. Where, for Heavens' sake, is the something of value that
Paglia is attempting to detach from our keeping? Our wits? I see I have my
work cut out setting rec.arts.books back in shape.
Fido Redux
Mike Godwin
>
>Wow. Methinks Mike doth expound the Law according to Judge Roy Bean.
Mike wasn't expounding the law at all. It would have been unfair to
Roger to require that he use the legal meaning of "fraudulent." My
point, however, was that even the broader, nonlegal meaning of
"fraud" does not apply when one is merely inaccurate.
Fido should no more assume legal significance in everything I
post here than I should assume that his every r.a.b. posting is
oily.
Roger Lustig
>In article <10...@idunno.Princeton.EDU> ro...@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Roger Lustig) writes:
>>Did you make it through the NYT Book review article without laughing?
>Is the article by Paglia or about Paglia? I confess that I can't read
>much in the NYT Book Review without laughing these days.
For me, it's "without snoring." But not Paglia. It was by her, and
about 3 or 4 weeks ago.
>>Dig the letters from last week; some of Paglia's assertions in that
>>article ARE pretty amazing.
>Such as?
Oh, start with the general tone indicating that she's Figured it All
Out. That, as a young student, she saw Godot and "recognized" it as a
work of "exhausted modernism." Not "saw," not "interpreted;" she KNEW.
She also takes all kinds of shots at the French -- she's a real
Francophobe: tells us, for instance, that Saussure's work is simply
wrong, without giving examples or anything.
Then there's the bit about Elvis, which is funnier than Bloom on Mick
Jagger. I'm not going to quote the whole thing, either here or in
rec.humor.unintentionally.funny; ya gotta read it.
>> How much inaccuracy before it's fraud?
>Inaccuracy, no matter how great, is not fraud. Fraud is deliberate
>misrepresentation. It is certainly possible to be inaccurate--even
>extremely inaccurate--without being fraudulent.
OK: but can't we assume intent if someone passes themselves off as a
scholar, and EVERYTHING is wrong?
Where fraud is Occam's choice, because someone who obviously knows a
great deal would need an amazing string of coincidences to get THAT MUCH
wrong in an article --and coincidentally, it's the one they write for
the popular press...
>I take it you have not read Paglia's book?
No, not yet. Not sure why I should; you tell me.
>>Well, surely if she's trying to PRETEND she's something she's not, or
>>passing herself off as something she's not, or passing a statement she
>>knows is wrong off as fact -- that's fraud. Sui generis or not.
>Precisely what do you think she is pretending to be, Roger?
>I think you can do better than rely on second-hand sources.
>Village Voice headline writers are not the best second-hand
>sources in any case.
Well, from this article, quotes in other articles about her I've read,
and so on, I think she's CLAIMING to have Figured it All Out, even
though she's short on support in many cases. Is the refutation of
Saussure in the book?
>I read the Berube article in the Voice, by the way. Thought it
>was quite good, although it's fairly apparent in his passing
>remark about Paglia that he isn't clear about what she's saying
>either.
So, TELL US already!
8-)
>
>
Roger
Mike Godwin
>Oh, start with the general tone indicating that she's Figured it All
>Out.
There is no doubt that she is arrogant. For me, that is part of
her charm.
>She also takes all kinds of shots at the French -- she's a real
>Francophobe: tells us, for instance, that Saussure's work is simply
>wrong, without giving examples or anything.
Like many other post-poststructuralists, she opposes the notion that
the connection between signifier and signified is wholly arbitrary.
Since making this argument takes more space than a newspaper (or
Usenet audiences) will generally give you, it is no wonder she merely
asserted it, to let you know where she stands.
>Then there's the bit about Elvis, which is funnier than Bloom on Mick
>Jagger. I'm not going to quote the whole thing, either here or in
>rec.humor.unintentionally.funny; ya gotta read it.
The difference, of course, is that she likes Elvis, while Bloom hates
Jagger. She likes pop culture generally, while Bloom hates and fears
it.
She has an excellent (and intentionally funny, I think) comparison
of Elvis and Byron in SEXUAL PERSONAE. It's so good that I think I'm
going to use it as one of my sample quotes for WHOLE EARTH REVIEW.
>OK: but can't we assume intent if someone passes themselves off as a
>scholar, and EVERYTHING is wrong?
I don't think this can be said of Paglia. While I don't agree with
many of her interpretations of literary works, there is little doubt
that she is a scholar.
>Where fraud is Occam's choice, because someone who obviously knows a
>great deal would need an amazing string of coincidences to get THAT MUCH
>wrong in an article --and coincidentally, it's the one they write for
>the popular press...
So far, the errors you have adduced to support the charge of fraud
are a) she's arrogant, and b) she wrote something funny about Elvis.
Are you sure you didn't leave something out?
>No, not yet. Not sure why I should; you tell me.
Because it reclaims the notion that Man can be a noble opponent
of nature, because it suggests a new take on sexuality in literature
and in life, and because it's eminently readable. You read Paglia
for the same reason you read any other interesting critic--because
she helps you see old works in new ways.
>Well, from this article, quotes in other articles about her I've read,
>and so on, I think she's CLAIMING to have Figured it All Out, even
>though she's short on support in many cases.
At this level of abstraction, I'm not even sure what you're saying
she's claiming to have figured out. In my opinion, she may be wrong,
but she is not a fraud.
>Is the refutation of
>Saussure in the book?
No. It does not fall within the subject matter of the book.
>So, TELL US already!
I've told you as much as I feel I can without going into too much
detail for this medium. My suggestion is that you find a copy of the
book and take a look at it--see if you'd like to read it. If not,
so be it.
Ian G Batten
> Like many other post-poststructuralists, she opposes the notion that
> the connection between signifier and signified is wholly arbitrary.
> Since making this argument takes more space than a newspaper (or
> Usenet audiences) will generally give you, it is no wonder she merely
> asserted it, to let you know where she stands.
Saussure's original work related to language, and I don't think there is
much debate about it. Where the debate centres, and what Mike is
discussing, is the application of it to texts.
I don't think anyone would seriously doubt that the relationship between
``dog'' and a four legged mammal that goes ``Woof!'' is anything but
arbitary. If, to take a hackneyed example, we swapped the roles of
``cat'' and ``dog'' in the language we would be left with an equally
useful language provided everyone knew of the change.
Where the debate comes, and where Mike and I would part company, is over
the application of the same ideas to texts. If we both agree on the
meanings of the words, is there some non-arbitary relationship between
the meaning of the text and the text itself?
ian
Mike Godwin
>Saussure's original work related to language, and I don't think there is
>much debate about it. Where the debate centres, and what Mike is
>discussing, is the application of it to texts.
This is correct.
>I don't think anyone would seriously doubt that the relationship between
>``dog'' and a four legged mammal that goes ``Woof!'' is anything but
>arbitary. If, to take a hackneyed example, we swapped the roles of
>``cat'' and ``dog'' in the language we would be left with an equally
>useful language provided everyone knew of the change.
I agree with this as well. The arbitrariness of the connection between
word and meaning at this level is inarguable.
>Where the debate comes, and where Mike and I would part company, is over
>the application of the same ideas to texts. If we both agree on the
>meanings of the words, is there some non-arbitary relationship between
>the meaning of the text and the text itself?
This is correct as well. I take it that Ian would answer "No" to this
question, whereas I would answer "Yes."
Fiona Oceanstar
>>Is the article by Paglia or about Paglia? I confess that I can't read
>>much in the NYT Book Review without laughing these days.
And Roger L. replies:
>For me, it's "without snoring." But not Paglia. It was by her, and
>about 3 or 4 weeks ago.
I have a friend who found his father dead--on a Sunday afternoon, in
an armchair--with the NYT Book Review clutched in his stiffening hands.
My friend, who was eighteen at the time of this event, used to quip,
"I'd always thought that the NYT Book Review could bore a person to death,
but didn't expect to have so dramatic a confirmation."
--Fiona O.
Mike Godwin
>
>I would argue that any reading of the text that is made is as valid as
>any other, and that the author's reading has no status over any other.
So, it is just as valid to read ULYSSES as a cookbook or as a history
of the French Revolution as it is to read it the way Joyce would
read it?
Roger Lustig
>In article <-&#+#*=@uzi-9mm.fulcrum.bt.co.uk> i...@fulcrum.bt.co.uk (Ian G Batten) writes:
>>I would argue that any reading of the text that is made is as valid as
>>any other, and that the author's reading has no status over any other.
>So, it is just as valid to read ULYSSES as a cookbook or as a history
>of the French Revolution as it is to read it the way Joyce would
>read it?
Poorly framed question. NOBODY can read it as Joyce would read it, of
course! He, after all, WROTE it. That's the ONE reading we CAN'T have
-- from the viewpoint of the writer. With his motives, his set of
ideas, network of allusions, metaphors, puns, etc.
We can recoup some of them. In some cases, we can be sure that Joyce
meant to make an allusion, etc.
But in some cases we can't, and sometimes (we can be pretty sure) he has
said something that we CERTAINLY get in a way different from his way.
Sometimes we hear echoes of words or phrases that he didn't hear, or
didn't hear as we hear them.
And we CERTAINLY relate the book to our own experience -- how could we
not -- and to our own reading. Joyce was incapable of reading the book
as I do.
(And he certainly couldn't read it with knowledge of, say, The
Bloomsday Book by Harry Blamires.)
Now, I don't know what you mean -- Is it as valid to read it as a
cookbook? "Valid" -- what means that in this context? If you can
interpret it as a cookbook in a way that impresses lots of other
readers, well, that sounds like a measure of validity to me. If you get
the charge out of reading it that you normally do when reading
cookbooks, well, what does THAT suggest?
Pork kidneys, I suppose. Mrkgnao.
Likewise, if you can see an allegory of the French Revolution, good for
you. If you can see it and impress others, that's even better. Think
of all the allegories, interpretations, readings, etc. that make sense
to us now, that didn't make sense before someone pointed things out to
us? (Not necessarily in _Ulysses_.)
How CAN an old book mean what it used to? Why is it that some books get
read 300 or 400 years after they were written? "Timelessness?" That
smacks of tautology. It's the reinterpretability that makes them great.
Look at Merchant of Venice. Anti-Semitic or not? You can read it both
ways. You can also read it as subverting both positions. A properly
historicist view condemns it; interpretations wrt modern life change
things. As they should.
How can we read about Poldy Bloom without thinking of the story of Jews
in our century? Joyce could do that; I know I can't. Suspending
knowledge is not the same as not having it. Likewise, how do we read
the book in light of Irish independence and all that's happened since?
how do we read it if we've read the Wake? How did Joyce read it after
reading the Wake?
For that matter, how do we read it if we've read _Ulysses_ before?
Edward T. Cone shows (somewhat after Diderot) that we necessarily give
reread books at least three different kinds of reading. One of these
(the first) was NEVER undertaken by the author, and is the only one we
MUST experience.
Did Joyce read the book with Molly at the center? Leopold? Stephen?
Two of them, or all three? Just what IS the relationship of each to the
structure of the novel? I can think of a gazillion readings right
there. Some of them have more focus on cooking than others...
Roger
Mike Godwin
>course!
Ian, however, said specifically that the author's reading isn't
privileged. Roger, your remarks here address a different argument from
the one I was making.
This framing of the question should make it simpler for you:
Is it just as valid to read ULYSSES as a cookbook or as a history
of the French Revolution as it is to read it as a multithematic
novel set in Dublin?
>Sometimes we hear echoes of words or phrases that he didn't hear, or
>didn't hear as we hear them.
Try and make your arguments apposite. Nothing I said disputed any
of this.
>And we CERTAINLY relate the book to our own experience -- how could we
>not -- and to our own reading. Joyce was incapable of reading the book
>as I do.
Right. Nothing I wrote should be interpreted to the contrary.
>Now, I don't know what you mean -- Is it as valid to read it as a
>cookbook? "Valid" -- what means that in this context? If you can
>interpret it as a cookbook in a way that impresses lots of other
>readers, well, that sounds like a measure of validity to me.
Yes, but the question is whether you (or anyone) can interpret as
a cookbook "in a way that impresses lots of other readers." I note
that "impressing lots of other readers" suggests a democratic
theory of interpretational validity. If your reading doesn't impress
lots of other readers, does that make it less valid, Roger?
>Likewise, if you can see an allegory of the French Revolution, good for
>you. If you can see it and impress others, that's even better.
Where did this link between validity and impressing others come
from, Roger?
Most of your comments don't really address the question I asked.
I realize you were on a roll, however, and when you get that way,
you start writing lots of paragraphs that may be only tangentially
connected to what I was trying to say.
Suffice it to say that I wasn't trying to privilege authorial
readings. I was addressing the issue of whether all readings are
equally valid. That's what Ian wrote.
Ian G Batten
In article <1991Jun17....@eff.org> mnem...@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes:
> [ I write ]
> >Where the debate comes, and where Mike and I would part company, is over
> >the application of the same ideas to texts. If we both agree on the
> >meanings of the words, is there some non-arbitary relationship between
> >the meaning of the text and the text itself?
>
> This is correct as well. I take it that Ian would answer "No" to this
> question, whereas I would answer "Yes."
If I'm not being antagonistic, I would would my position as follows:
The classic realist text portrays people and events as though they
happened, without overtly drawing attention to its own literary nature.
Obviously it uses the devices of literature to gain this effect, but
they are subordinate to the purpose of conveying an intended meaning.
To quote an example I saw this morning, in the opening of ``Bleak
House'' you have the mud and rain standing as a metonym for bad weather
which in turn stands metaphorically for decline and sadness. This acts
like the conventions of film-making --- the zooms and pans, the waves
rolling on beaches --- to convey easily what would otherwise take
inordinate amounts of space.
However, the text itself selects from the set of things you could write
about the subject and writes only some of them. By this means it
foregrounds the things that are written and draws attention to them
against the things that aren't. A subtext will emerge, perhaps
unintended by the author, consisting of the patterns of difference and
similarity between other texts of the same genre, other texts perhaps
unrelated or even at the time unwritten and ``real'' events.
So far, I think, so uncontentious.
It can be argued that the nature of the selection subverts the claims of
the realist text to reality. What is understood by the reader is drawn
from how he interacts with the text. This will vary from one reader to
another.
Where some modern thinking causes debate is in its removal of any status
accorded to one viewpoint over another. The pattern of differences is
between the text as written and the reader's experiences and
expectations. Likewise it was fashioned against a backdrop of the
author's experiences and expectations.
I would argue that any reading of the text that is made is as valid as
any other, and that the author's reading has no status over any other.
In that sense the author is accorded no more knowledge of his work than
any other person is. This is not to say that the author is unimportant
to the reading. Knowledge of the author's identity, opinions and
experiences will clearly affect a reading. What it does not accept is
the notion that the author has a privileged standpoint which is superior
to any other position.
This debate becomes more clearcut the further we move from the 19th
century novel. Texts which recognise their own fictionality, and
perhaps their own status as texts, depend more and more on their
differences from other texts. Because they allude to meaning, rather
than providing it directly, they provide wide scope for interpretation.
In the preface to the revised edition of ``The Magus'', Fowles complains
about people who treat symbolism within texts as akin to a crossword
puzzle, thinking that the author has explicitly hidden a finite set of
meanings which are there to be gleaned. This is a caricature of the
close reading school of criticism which does not stand much examination,
but perhaps shows one extreme position. By contrast I believe it was
Eliot who stated that any meaning seen by a reader is there.
To take a trivial example, you could compare the standard soap opera
with the worst sort of realism --- a seemingly endless succession of
events which are portrayed as ``real'' and offer little scope for
mis-interpretation. But beneath the easy understanding of what has
happened, nothing else is conveyed. Note that the classic realist text
usually carries far more weight than this --- I am selecting a
caricature of the serial novel on the 19th century.
Conversely, a rich and complex text such as ``Twin Peaks'' carries much
of its meaning with allusion, metaphor and metonym. This makes its
interpretation more complex and more related to the experience of the
viewer, but offers the potential of more meaning. The debate would
centre on whether the meaning is inherent in the text or derived from
its relationship to other texts, and whether the author has any better
insight than any other person.
ian
Fiona Oceanstar
reason) more comprehensible to me than previous such ventures in this
newsgroup, Ian Batten writes:
>The classic realist text portrays people and events as though they
>happened, without overtly drawing attention to its own literary nature.
I have a problem with this position, which is: "How does one divorce
the text from its own contextual reality?" How can a classic realist
text portray people and events as though they had actually happened?
Sure there's no *overt* reference to its being literary: there doesn't
*need* to be one, because the language, the font, the ink, the paper,
the binding, the setting in which it's read, and so on--all of these
things shout loudly and clearly to the reader, "This is just a story
that Dickens wrote, and serialized in a magazine for popular consump-
tion." That's the beauty of *all* reading--that the content (as opposed
to form) of the text is only the merest fragment of the experience.
Much, much more is provided by the reader--by the entire physical
and psychological context. (Why do I get the feeling that I'm re-invent-
ing the wheel here, on something that some post-structuralist lit-crit
theorist said in the 60's, but I haven't read the book yet, so I
don't know any better?)
I agree, of course, that a description of the differences between
realism and modernism must include the appearance of explicit
self-referentiality at the level of *content*. But this does not
imply that realist texts "portray people and events as though they
happened." (Or have I entirely missed the boat here, by having failing
to parse--I *tried*, believe me--some of the previous threads about
the reader and the text?)
--from a po-mo do-mo wannabe,
Fiona O.
Bergmann
>of the French Revolution as it is to read it the way Joyce would
>read it?
Don't know about _Ulysses_ -- I've never been tempted to fry up
some piss-stinking kidneys. Yum. Nora Ephron's _Heartburn_
is another story, though: the protagonist is a writer of
cookbooks, and she hands out recipes for all kinds of things --
they're even indexed. At one point she says something like: "I
notice that I haven't given you any recipes in a while, but it's
hard to do that when you are moving the plot forward." (I've tried
the vinaigrette, and the linguine alla cecca, and they're both
excellent.)
Francine Prose's short story "Tibetan Time" describes a curried
ratatouille that I have been moved to imitate. This is a lovely
story, btw (it can be found in Prose's collection _Women and Children
First_). A poignant description of a young woman who goes to a
one-day Buddhist retreat to help her cope with her recent divorce.
Neither book works well as a history of the French Revolution, however.
Annette
Fiona Oceanstar
who are joining this meta-thread without knowledge of its previous
installments? I'm sure you must have hashed it out last fall or some
time, but I forget what the conclusion was. What do you mean, when
you say a reading is "just as valid"?
--just tryin' to shed a bit
of darkness,
Fiona
Janet M. Lafler
>In article <1991Jun19....@eff.org> mnem...@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes:
>>So, it is just as valid to read ULYSSES as a cookbook or as a history
>>of the French Revolution as it is to read it the way Joyce would
>>read it?
>
>Don't know about _Ulysses_ -- I've never been tempted to fry up
>some piss-stinking kidneys. Yum. Nora Ephron's _Heartburn_
>is another story, though: the protagonist is a writer of
>cookbooks, and she hands out recipes for all kinds of things --
>they're even indexed. At one point she says something like: "I
>notice that I haven't given you any recipes in a while, but it's
>hard to do that when you are moving the plot forward." (I've tried
>the vinaigrette, and the linguine alla cecca, and they're both
>excellent.)
Actually, cookbooks can make excellent reading themselves. I recommend
The Moosewood Cookbook and The Enchanted Broccoli Forest, which are both
often quite funny. The introduction to The Book of Tofu, by William
Shurtleff and Akiko Aoyagi, is (unintentionally) a scream. (Can you tell
I'm a vegetarian?) Cookbooks for particular regional and ethnic cuisines
often contain a lot of interesting background and descriptions which high-
light the customs surrounding food in that particular culture. And most
cookbooks include some musings on the philosophy of cooking and food, and
the pleasures of eating.
Wonderful stuff. But if you take to reading cookbooks, don't do it when
there's nothing to eat in the house.
/Janet
--
send mail to: repn...@leland.stanford.edu
Did you know that 87% of all statistics are made up on the spot?
Barrie K. Trinkle
>is another story, though: the protagonist is a writer of
>cookbooks, and she hands out recipes for all kinds of things --
>they're even indexed. At one point she says something like: "I
>notice that I haven't given you any recipes in a while, but it's
>hard to do that when you are moving the plot forward." (I've tried
>the vinaigrette, and the linguine alla cecca, and they're both
>excellent.)
>
to learn to cook. I keep it with my cookbooks in the kitchen. (Yes,
really!) When I read the paragraph on making mashed potatoes for one,
I rushed right to the stove to try it out. (Life imitates Art.)
The bread pudding is also outstanding.
Barrie
Roger Lustig
>In article <10...@idunno.Princeton.EDU> ro...@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Roger Lustig) writes:
>>Now, I don't know what you mean -- Is it as valid to read it as a
>>cookbook? "Valid" -- what means that in this context? If you can
>>interpret it as a cookbook in a way that impresses lots of other
>>readers, well, that sounds like a measure of validity to me.
>Yes, but the question is whether you (or anyone) can interpret as
>a cookbook "in a way that impresses lots of other readers." I note
>that "impressing lots of other readers" suggests a democratic
>theory of interpretational validity. If your reading doesn't impress
>lots of other readers, does that make it less valid, Roger?
Exactly. We need a standard for "valid;" I disagree with the "all
equally valid" idea as much as I disagree with "only one valid" idea.
The democratic standard isn't bad, if we limit ourselves to readers of
the book -- in one sense; in another, it's utterly bogus. Note also
that I counted personal satisfaction as another possible standard.
>>Likewise, if you can see an allegory of the French Revolution, good for
>>you. If you can see it and impress others, that's even better.
>Where did this link between validity and impressing others come
>from, Roger?
From the way people tend to work and think. Most of us try our ideas
out on each other.
>Most of your comments don't really address the question I asked.
>I realize you were on a roll, however, and when you get that way,
>you start writing lots of paragraphs that may be only tangentially
>connected to what I was trying to say.
Actually, I was on rye bread last night, and not a roll. 8-)
I admit, I was trying to muddy the waters of "authorial intent;" at teh
same time, pointing to what it is we DO when we read and develop a
"reading."
>Suffice it to say that I wasn't trying to privilege authorial
>readings. I was addressing the issue of whether all readings are
>equally valid. That's what Ian wrote.
Indeed. And part of my point is that our OWN readings change so much
over time, due to the nature of the reading process, that the issue of
the "validity" of ONE reading seems beside the point. One can, at best,
speak of a SET of readings ot be considered.
Roger
Fiona Oceanstar
re-create (faithfully or otherwise (-:) any of the meals featured
in _The_Flounder_? Now *there's* some fancy cookin'. YOW-za!
--Fiona (drooling)
Mike Godwin
>Mike, would you mind defining "validity" for those (all 1.7 of us (-:)
>who are joining this meta-thread without knowledge of its previous
>installments? I'm sure you must have hashed it out last fall or some
>time, but I forget what the conclusion was. What do you mean, when
>you say a reading is "just as valid"?
In this context: "just as valid" means "just as good" or "just
as acceptable" or "just as insightful."
Hope that helps.
Lisa S Chabot
Janet warns:
But if you take to reading cookbooks, don't do it when
there's nothing to eat in the house.
Although it can be okay to do if there's nothing much to
eat in the house. When I was poor starving senior (ah!
those happy years), I used to read the exotic recipies in
The Joy of Cooking while eating my plainer fare, making
those humble meals a bit more than they were. The smell
of the roasting meat with my rough bread.
Now these many years later, I have coins to burn (and not
just their sound) on my very own spaetzle maker and three
kinds of peppercorns, and so I read net news to spice up
my Cheetos and mineral water.
Er.
--
sh: 1384 Memory fault - core dumped
Mike Godwin
>Exactly. We need a standard for "valid;" I disagree with the "all
>equally valid" idea as much as I disagree with "only one valid" idea.
Well, okay. But a popularity contest for validity doesn't appeal
to me.
>I admit, I was trying to muddy the waters of "authorial intent;" at teh
>same time, pointing to what it is we DO when we read and develop a
>"reading."
But I wasn't talking about "authorial intent." I brought up Joyce
as a reader, and not as a writer.
>Indeed. And part of my point is that our OWN readings change so much
>over time, due to the nature of the reading process, that the issue of
>the "validity" of ONE reading seems beside the point. One can, at best,
>speak of a SET of readings ot be considered.
I have never argued in favor of a *single* valid reading for anything.
Ian G Batten
> reason) more comprehensible to me than previous such ventures in this
> newsgroup, Ian Batten writes:
> >The classic realist text portrays people and events as though they
> >happened, without overtly drawing attention to its own literary nature.
>
> I have a problem with this position, which is: "How does one divorce
> the text from its own contextual reality?" How can a classic realist
> text portray people and events as though they had actually happened?
In the same way as journalism does, perhaps, before the ``New
Journalism''. The text purports to serve as a transparent window which,
although it limits what is seen, does not distort what can be seen. The
text purports to give you the experience of the events, rather than the
experience of reading.
Representational art implicitly claims that it can be assessed by how
well it mimics reality, and part of that mimicry is its transparency.
Others art foregrounds the process of the art itself, rather than what
--- if anything --- it claims to represent.
> I agree, of course, that a description of the differences between
> realism and modernism must include the appearance of explicit
> self-referentiality at the level of *content*. But this does not
> imply that realist texts "portray people and events as though they
> happened." (Or have I entirely missed the boat here, by having failing
> to parse--I *tried*, believe me--some of the previous threads about
> the reader and the text?)
I think I should have inserted a ``claims to'' or ``can be seen as'' or
something it there.
ian
Ian G Batten
> In this context: "just as valid" means "just as good" or "just
> as acceptable" or "just as insightful."
This is all rather judgemental. In order to make your assessment of
``just as good'' you must have some way of taking two readings of a text
and ordering them. I have a slight suspicion that as an internal
dialogue ``my'' reading will always win, simply because if I am exposed
to a reading that is ``better'' I will adopt it as mine. But to move
outside my own mind I don't see a reasonable scheme to use to arrive at
this ordering.
I think Roger Lustig (passim) has posited what a reasonable test,
although he has backed off from it slightly. Can you convince other
people of your reading? This, after all, is essentially how most other
intellectual debates progress. We are then left with the problem of how
individuals are influenced, of course.
What I think I'm trying to say is that I don't know by what means I
arrive at a reading and I certainly don't know how I would order two
possible readings. I could do it, but I couldn't explain how. Nor, I
suggest, can anyone else. If number theory is undecidable, literary
texts certainly are :-) Therefore taking the ``votes'' of a large
number of non-understood processes seems of little advantage. But I
don't see what else we can do.
ian
Ian G Batten
> >over time, due to the nature of the reading process, that the issue of
> >the "validity" of ONE reading seems beside the point. One can, at best,
> >speak of a SET of readings ot be considered.
>
> I have never argued in favor of a *single* valid reading for anything.
I personally feel that given a set of possible readings I have no
process I could express which would exclude one reading from the set. I
could do it, but I couldn't explain how. By induction, from the
infinite set of readings I can't express how I arrive at the finite set
that I regard as ``mine''.
Mike can, I think, because he recognises a certain inherent meaning in the
text and can measure the reading against that meaning. I hope that's a
fair statement of his position. I think he is arguing that because he
can see a meaning in the text that is more than arbitary, he can measure
the fit between some reading and that inherent meaning. [[ I'm not
trying to set up a straw man --- I'd welcome being corrected. ]]
I'm arguing essentially that texts be assessed not a representational
art, even if they purport to be representational. Composers ascribe
``meaning'' to their works but listeners may hear other things. I don't
think people start claiming inherent meanings in symphonies, for
example. I claim that texts have a similar claim on meaning. Mike
claims there is a basic meaning. I think.
ian
Richard Caley
mg> In this context: "just as valid" means "just as good" or "just
mg> as acceptable" or "just as insightful."
Then why is it an interesting measure when applied to readings?
`Valid' implies a judgemental approach to readings which I am not at
all happy with. Why valid/good/acceptable/insightful rather than
funny/useful/frightning?
What are you getting insight into? The author and his society have
been put offside. Are you extracting something from the text? I've
seen lots of bits of textual analysis, but few seem `insightful' in
the sense I would hope a reading of, say, Ulysses would be.
Is a reading which extracts lots of complex relationships between bits
of the text more `valid' than one which gives the reader insignts into
themselves, the author, or the subject? How about a reading which just
gives the reader a good laugh?
Aside: has anyone read Eco's bok `The Limits of Interpretation'? Looks
fun, though I'm only a couple of chapters in. The arch proponant of
the validity of mul;tiple readings talking about whether there are
types of reading which do not make sense.
--
r...@cstr.ed.ac.uk This is starting to look too much like work!
Ian G Batten
> Must everything have a scheme? As a practical matter, few people
> disagree that a reading of ULYSSES as a cookbook is less valid
> than most readings.
Lustig and I say that the ability of a reading to convince others is a
test. You say that you don't think that sort of democracy is viable.
Now you say the above.
ian
Mike Godwin
>I personally feel that given a set of possible readings I have no
>process I could express which would exclude one reading from the set. I
>could do it, but I couldn't explain how.
Ah, but does this say more about the process of exclusion itself or more
about one's (in)ability to explain that process?
>I'm arguing essentially that texts be assessed not a representational
>art, even if they purport to be representational.
The irony, of course, is that your very sentence here is
representational. You are representing that "you" are "arguing"
that texts be "assessed" a certain way.
It is one of the ironies of discussions like this that almost
all attacks on the representationalism of texts are themselves
highly representational. (Some of Derrida, it seems to me, escapes
this generalization.)
> Composers ascribe
>``meaning'' to their works but listeners may hear other things. I don't
>think people start claiming inherent meanings in symphonies, for
>example.
Analogizing texts to music begs the question you are trying to answer.
What if texts are *not* like music?
>Mike
>claims there is a basic meaning. I think.
Not necessarily a *single* basic meaning.
Mike Godwin
>In my opinion, Ian is correct.
I have no trouble with Ian's notion that the author's reading should
not be privileged merely because she is the author.
> Mike, I think your arguments are pretty
>silly and extreme - for instance, if I wrote a book and told you that in
>order for my book to be read correctly you must read it while standing on
>your head you would probably laugh in my face (at least I hope you would).
You are conflating two issues here. Easy to do--Ian did it as well.
There is the issue of whether authorial intent should determine (or
limit) one's readings. On this, I agree (I think) with Ian and you
that it should not. Then there is the issue about whether one can
say a reading is valid or not. This is an entirely separate issue.
To illustrate it, consider a Freudian interpretation of "Hamlet."
There is little doubt that Shakespeare had not heard of Freud, so
therefore did not consciously set out to incorporate Freudian themes.
But there are quite a few valid Freudian readings of "Hamlet"--
these readings are clearly grounded in the text. One can find strong
evidence in the text for these meanings.
>Intention is a very hard thing to prove, especially if the person who's
>intention you are trying to discern is dead.
Lots of things are hard to prove. Some people think this is true
of existence itself. But "proof to reasonable satisfaction" is a
lower standard, and is met in many spheres (not just literary
interpretation) every day.
>Mike, if you really want to read ULYSSES as a cookbook or as a history of
>the French Revolution then by all means do so.
You miss my point, I guess. I don't want to read the book as either.
I think such readings are insupportable--that you can't prove their
validity to any sane person's satisfaction.
>If Joyce were alive, he
>would probably be tickled pink with the idea. :-)
Seems as if you have some knowledge of authorial intent here.
Joan Shields
>>
>>I would argue that any reading of the text that is made is as valid as
>>any other, and that the author's reading has no status over any other.
>
>So, it is just as valid to read ULYSSES as a cookbook or as a history
>of the French Revolution as it is to read it the way Joyce would
>read it?
In my opinion, Ian is correct. Mike, I think your arguments are pretty
silly and extreme - for instance, if I wrote a book and told you that in
order for my book to be read correctly you must read it while standing on
your head you would probably laugh in my face (at least I hope you would).
Intention is a very hard thing to prove, especially if the person who's
intention you are trying to discern is dead.
Mike, if you really want to read ULYSSES as a cookbook or as a history of
the French Revolution then by all means do so. If Joyce were alive, he
would probably be tickled pink with the idea. :-)
Joan
"And now a giant insect mutation
Will swoop down and devour white man's burden
Starting out with all of the sensitive ones
Better make like a fly if you don't want to die
Look out there goes Gordon!"
Mike Godwin
>In article <1991Jun19.2...@eff.org> mnem...@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes:
>> In this context: "just as valid" means "just as good" or "just
>> as acceptable" or "just as insightful."
>
>This is all rather judgemental.
Right. One might just as easily say "This is all rather human,"
since humans cannot help making judgments.
>But to move
>outside my own mind I don't see a reasonable scheme to use to arrive at
>this ordering.
Must everything have a scheme? As a practical matter, few people
disagree that a reading of ULYSSES as a cookbook is less valid
than most readings.
>What I think I'm trying to say is that I don't know by what means I
>arrive at a reading and I certainly don't know how I would order two
>possible readings. I could do it, but I couldn't explain how.
I order readings by a) how true they seem to be to the text or
author's intentions (take your pick) and by b) how much insight
they offer. The domain of (a) is not coterminous with that of (b).
This is what most people do, and it only becomes problematic
when you try to compare literary criticism to, say, number
theory.
>If number theory is undecidable, literary
>texts certainly are :-)
Oops. Too late!
Mary Ellen Foley
about a different region of India, including some of Jaffrey's memories
of living in or visiting the area. Much more than just a bunch of good
recipes, although it is that, too. Includes wonderful photographs as well.
[Warning: this isn't the only cookbook by that title that's currently in
print -- make sure the author is Madhur Jaffrey.]
On the subject of thinking about good food while eating bad -- reminds me
of a time a friend was telling me about a recipe called "The Better-Than-
Sex Cake". I can't remember it all, but after you bake half the cake, you
spread caramels on top of it and let them melt, and then put on nuts, and
then pour in the rest of the cake batter, then there's a couple of different
layers of icing, and you serve it with whipped cream and some sauce. I would
never make this thing in a million years, and I asked my friend where she got
it. Seems her friend was in the Peace Corps in Chad, and spent long nights
after meager dinners of insects (no joke) dreaming up the things she'd cook
when she got back to Western Civilization :-), and one of them was this
fantasy cake.
--
Warning! Opinions in posting are farther away than they appear!
^^^^^^^^
Barbara Hlavin
>Joann Zimmerman writes:
>
> [discussion of cookbooks deleted]
>>
>>Or even if the evidence from the mirror suggests that there's been too
>>damn much food in the house. Following Kingsley Amis' lead in _The
>>Anti-Death League_, where one of the characters is in hospital to dry
>>out, and reads bartending guides, which he claims are "pornography",
>
>I have bored friends twice with my spiel that "Gourmet" magazine is
>more pornographic than "Playboy" ever was, so I'll keep it brief.
>Somehow gluttony is seen as more comic than deadly by the modern
>world...but...it warn't always so.
>--
>Jeff Davis <da...@keats.ca.uky.edu>
>play golf by phone!
Yes, this sin business is full of subtlety. The mother in _The
Screwtape Letters_ is guilty of gluttony not because she eats
too much, but because she's *fussy* about her food, and causes
trouble for other people. "Oh, no!" she cries. "You've given
me far too much! Please take it back and bring me a piece of
toast -- not too dark, with just a *teensy* bit of butter."
I think _The Anti-Death League_ is one of Kingsley Amis' best
books, along with _The Green Man_ and _Lucky Jim_. All written
before he became so disgustingly misogynistic -- I couldn't
finish _Jake and the Women_. And I'm no longer interested in
reading anything else he writes. He never did like women very
much, but I find him seriously twisted now.
--Barbara
"Play golf by phone!" Well, why not? Phone tag is a well-established
game, played by millions.
--
Barbara Hlavin "Give me books, fruit, french wine and fine
tw...@milton.u.washington.edu weather and a little music out of doors,
played by somebody I do not know."
Francis Muir
In this context: "just as valid" means "just as good" or "just
as acceptable" or "just as insightful."
This is as absurd a statement as I have seen for some time, and,
reading rec.arts.books as I do, I see some pretty absurd stuff.
I suspect that Mike is trying to say that he meant to say "just
as good", or "just as acceptable", or "just as insightful", but,
unfortunately, came up with "just as valid". Somehow we were to
supposed to divine that Mike did not mean valid but one of the
other three words (which are themselves not equivalent). We were
first to believe in "authorial intent", and then to have this magic
power of divining the Godwin mind, wherein words do not enjoy their
usual meaning. Come off it, Mike. You misspoke. Why not admit it?
It's no big deal. We are none of us perfect.
FIDO
fra...@hanauma.stanford.edu, where words speak for themselves and are
not parking tickets to be validated.
Joann Zimmerman
>Janet warns:
> But if you take to reading cookbooks, don't do it when
> there's nothing to eat in the house.
>Although it can be okay to do if there's nothing much to
>eat in the house.
Or even if the evidence from the mirror suggests that there's been too
damn much food in the house. Following Kingsley Amis' lead in _The
Anti-Death League_, where one of the characters is in hospital to dry
out, and reads bartending guides, which he claims are "pornography", I
have for many years used cookbooks as a method of persuading myself
*not* to eat in those situations where I recognise that it's just my
brain begging for a little gustatory romp, and not an actual attack of
incipient starvation (or lowered blood sugar).
In any case, cookbooks can indeed be great literature. To my mind,
M.F.K. Fisher's _The Art of Eating_ (a collection of 5 small books) is
the best starting place. From there, you can branch out into her
wonderfully evocative memoirs.
Some of the most lyrical writing on wine that I have encountered
(although I am no serious oenophile) occurs in the chapter on wine in
Richard Olney's _French Menu Cookbook_. God, it's enough to make me
book my ticket for Bordeaux tomorrow ...
--
ERRSIGTOOOLD - signature boring and out of date
...!cs.utexas.edu!ccwf!jzimm
Mary Anne Walters
Just to recommend a few -- any of the cookbooks by Jane and Michael Stern are
tons of fun to read. I love _Square Meals_ (and have baked the so-called
"Red Bread" from a recipe by the Army's Sustenance Research Lab) and _Real
American Food_ too. There are others, but I don't remember the titles.
Of course, the Sterns are better known now, I think, for _The Encyc. of
Bad Taste_ and are the collecters of _Elvis World_ and _Sixties People_
as well. An interesting couple.
--Mary Anne
--
= o "The whole French nation swims, for 3 weeks every summer,
= _ /- _ [in the tour de France]...But the English take no interest
= (_)> (_) in the Tour. 'A bicycle race,' they say. 'How deadly.'"
Nancy Mitford
Mike Godwin
>I suspect that Mike is trying to say that he meant to say "just
>as good", or "just as acceptable", or "just as insightful", but,
>unfortunately, came up with "just as valid".
Okay. But I'd still say "valid," since the word denotes what I
want to say--one definition of "valid" is "founded on evidence
or fact; sound." Since this is how I measure an interpretation when
I say I find it "good" or "acceptable" or "insightful," what
precisely is your problem, Francis?
I think you were just in a mood to find something "absurd."
>Somehow we were to
>supposed to divine that Mike did not mean valid but one of the
>other three words (which are themselves not equivalent).
Indeed they are not. I use "valid" in several different ways.
I suspect you do too.
"Divining" which way is not hard. Readers "divine" particular
meanings from textual contexts all the time.
>We were
>first to believe in "authorial intent", and then to have this magic
>power of divining the Godwin mind, wherein words do not enjoy their
>usual meaning.
If you don't believe in authorial intent, how can you say I
misspoke? Doesn't that require that you know of a) my authorial
intent, b) what I wrote, and c) an inconsistency between the two?
(It occurs to me that you are trying to make a joke. Ha, ha. Good
one.)
No one has to "divine" what I mean. One can look at the sentence in
its textual context, and if there is still confusion, one
can simply ask.
Since Fiona asked the question outside of a specific context, I saw no
reason not to mention several uses of the word "valid" with which
I happen to be familiar due to my own experience as a one-time
graduate student of literature.
>You misspoke. Why not admit it?
I'd be happy to admit it, but I don't see how I misspoke.
Perhaps you misread?
>It's no big deal. We are none of us perfect.
I would not dream of claiming to be.
Bergmann
Don't know if this counts: reading _The Flounder_ taught me not
to cut up my vegetables too much. (This is the scene where he and
his wife -- Ilsebill? Isolde? -- have people over for dinner, and
they are making this wonderful stew, and their guests, "used to
flaccid curry chicken," ask for more, again and again.)
Other than that, the only thing I remember about _The Flounder_
is the horrifying Father's Day scene.
Annette
Mike Godwin
>Then why is it an interesting measure when applied to readings?
I don't know that it is interesting to say whether a reading is
valid ("sound" or "based on evidence or facts"). Is every judgment
one makes supposed to be an interesting judgment?
>`Valid' implies a judgemental approach to readings which I am not at
>all happy with. Why valid/good/acceptable/insightful rather than
>funny/useful/frightning?
Because some readings are not merely unuseful--they are genuinely
mistaken. It is possible to misread a work, I strongly believe.
A theory of interpretation that does not distinguish between
valid and invalid readings is one that denies the possibility of
misreading a work.
Determining whether a work has been misread is relevant to all
sorts of questions--such as whether Salman Rushdie should be
condemned for writing a deliberate affront to fundamentalist
Moslems.
>What are you getting insight into? The author and his society have
>been put offside. Are you extracting something from the text? I've
>seen lots of bits of textual analysis, but few seem `insightful' in
>the sense I would hope a reading of, say, Ulysses would be.
Perhaps you are reading the wrong criticism, then. I can recommend
some insightful critics, if you like.
>Is a reading which extracts lots of complex relationships between bits
>of the text more `valid' than one which gives the reader insignts into
>themselves, the author, or the subject? How about a reading which just
>gives the reader a good laugh?
The answers to your question are "no" and "no," assuming that these
readings are valid (grounded in the text).
Jeff Davis
[discussion of cookbooks deleted]
>
>Or even if the evidence from the mirror suggests that there's been too
>damn much food in the house. Following Kingsley Amis' lead in _The
>Anti-Death League_, where one of the characters is in hospital to dry
>out, and reads bartending guides, which he claims are "pornography",
I have bored friends twice with my spiel that "Gourmet" magazine is
Ian G Batten
> >art, even if they purport to be representational.
>
> The irony, of course, is that your very sentence here is
> representational. You are representing that "you" are "arguing"
> that texts be "assessed" a certain way.
Now there's an interesting area. Suppose we set up two strawman
positions. In position ``A'' texts have a absolute meaning which can be
determined by some generally known method. In position ``B'' texts have
no inherent meaning and can be read in essentially any manner. Assume
that people only write about what they believe.
Position B has rather a problem. Its position subverts itself. Any
statement that ``texts have no inherent meaning'' can be read as ``texts
have an inherent meaning'' or, indeed, ``my fish live in a large bowl'',
and therefore fall under their own weight.
Does this mean that any position isomorphic to ``B'' is false? No,
merely that it contains contradictions. (*)
ian
(*) As I re-read this I was struck by a little piece of intertextuality
:-) Should an English Software Engineer with an interest in modern
critical theory admit to having read ________. All of it. Entries by
e-mail as to who I'm thinking of.
ian
Joan Shields
Aw, come on, Mike, you made a pretty silly off the cuff remark. Surely
you didn't expect such a sloppy brush off to be ignored?
As to the subject of interpreting a literary work.
Interpret - vb. 1. to explain or tell the meaning of : present in
understandable terms
2. to conceive in the light of individual belief, judgement, or
circumstance : construe
3. to represent by art : bring to realization by preformance
By definition (I think we can agree that #2 is appropriate) when a work is
interpreted it cannot be done so without personal or cultural bias and, as
Mike himself pointed out, outside works by other authors. An
example: Shakespeare's HAMLET - a 17th century interpretation is bound to
be quite different than one done today - as Mike stated, we have knowledge
of Freud today, Shakespeare and his contemporaries did not. Ok, let's
take Mike's example one step further - me, I'm not a big fan of Freud's.
While some his ideas are still fresh and widely applied others have sunk
to dogma. Freud's work is in and of itself an interpretation based on his
own personal and cultural biases so, using Freud to interpret HAMLET is in
essence using an interpretation to interpret a work. If someone believes
that Freud was right then a Freudian interpretation of HAMLET is correct
BUT if someone does not hold with Freud then what? Since Shakespeare
could not have written HAMLET with Freud in mind (let alone could the author
of the original HAMLET legend) using Freud to interpret the play is an
example of personal, cultural, and time bias (time as in we exist at a
time AFTER both Freud and Shakespeare but BEFORE some unknown person who
may come up with a better idea). I'll conceed that at a given time and
place a specific interpretation of a specific work is correct however, as
time and place change so must the interpretation - it cannot be constant.
Simply put, interpretations are fickle creatures, dependent upon the winds
and tides of the day - their validity is in the eye of their beholder.
Of course, your milage may vary... :-)
Joan
"The dancing was desperate, the music was worse
They bury your dreams and dig up the worthless"
Richard Caley
mg> To illustrate it, consider a Freudian interpretation of "Hamlet."
mg> There is little doubt that Shakespeare had not heard of Freud, so
mg> therefore did not consciously set out to incorporate Freudian
mg> themes.
I think this a bad example. Although old Bill couldn't have knowledge
of Freud's theories, he was almost certainly aware of the kinds of
behaviour which those theories describe. So any `Freudian' themes in
Hamlet are easily explicable as being the result of plain old good
characterisation.
A better example might be reading _Hamlet_ as a history of the French
revolution. I would not be suprised if one could come up with an
interesting reading of this type. Assuming that this is so, there
seems to be no way of saying this is invalid without referring to
external facts, yet there is something unsatisfactory about such a
massive anachronism.
--
r...@cstr.ed.ac.uk _O_
|<
Mike Godwin
Right. There is no inconsistency. Think about it.
Okay, in case you still think it's inconsistent, consider:
a) You and Lustig were saying that convincing others is a test of
validity.
b) I said that few people disagree that a reading of ULYSSES as a cookbook
is less valid than other readings.
c) Does it follow from (b) that I agree with (a)? Can you imagine how
this might not follow?
Mike Godwin
>In article <1991Jun20.2...@eff.org> mnem...@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes:
>
>Aw, come on, Mike, you made a pretty silly off the cuff remark. Surely
>you didn't expect such a sloppy brush off to be ignored?
This is a misattribution. Usually I chastise myself in private rather
than in public. Fido did the honors here.
>Interpret - vb. 1. to explain or tell the meaning of : present in
>understandable terms
>2. to conceive in the light of individual belief, judgement, or
>circumstance : construe
>3. to represent by art : bring to realization by preformance
>
>By definition (I think we can agree that #2 is appropriate) when a work is
>interpreted it cannot be done so without personal or cultural bias and, as
>Mike himself pointed out, outside works by other authors.
Ah, but one doesn't have to be a Freudian in order to see a
Freudian interpretation of a work. We are not so bound by our
biases as all that.
I think #1 is occasionally appropriate as well, by the way.
>If someone believes
>that Freud was right then a Freudian interpretation of HAMLET is correct
>BUT if someone does not hold with Freud then what?
Then such an interpretation is still valid if it is grounded in
the text. Surely one can interpret verses of the Bible without
being a Christian or Jew, eh, Joan?
One can generate interpretations without agreeing with those
interpretations.
> Since Shakespeare
>could not have written HAMLET with Freud in mind (let alone could the author
>of the original HAMLET legend) using Freud to interpret the play is an
>example of personal, cultural, and time bias (time as in we exist at a
>time AFTER both Freud and Shakespeare but BEFORE some unknown person who
>may come up with a better idea).
It's not an example of a bias if I, a non-Freudian, use Freudian
theory to interpret "Hamlet." It's an example of my using an interpretive
tool.
> I'll conceed that at a given time and
>place a specific interpretation of a specific work is correct however, as
>time and place change so must the interpretation - it cannot be constant.
I think you need to distinguish between correctness and validity.
I wouldn't dream of equating the two.
Mike Godwin
>mg> To illustrate it, consider a Freudian interpretation of "Hamlet."
>mg> There is little doubt that Shakespeare had not heard of Freud, so
>mg> therefore did not consciously set out to incorporate Freudian
>mg> themes.
>
>I think this a bad example. Although old Bill couldn't have knowledge
>of Freud's theories, he was almost certainly aware of the kinds of
>behaviour which those theories describe.
I think this is what makes it a *good* example, actually. That's
certainly why I chose it.
Francis Muir
Joan Shields writes:
Mike Godwin writes:
(White Space)
Aw, come on, Mike, you made a pretty silly off the cuff remark. Surely
you didn't expect such a sloppy brush off to be ignored?
This is a misattribution. Usually I chastise myself in private rather
than in public. Fido did the honors here.
Am I missing something? Surely Miss Shields was indeed referring
to a Godwin post? Lucky I'm not the sensitive type else there'd
be hell to pay...
Fido
and you can quote me on that...
Richard Caley
In article <RJC.91Ju...@brodie.cstr.ed.ac.uk> r...@cstr.ed.ac.uk (Richard Caley) writes:
mg> To illustrate it, consider a Freudian interpretation of "Hamlet."
mg> There is little doubt that Shakespeare had not heard of Freud, so
mg> therefore did not consciously set out to incorporate Freudian
mg> themes.
rjc> I think this a bad example. Although old Bill couldn't have knowledge
rjc> of Freud's theories, he was almost certainly aware of the kinds of
rjc> behaviour which those theories describe.
mg> I think this is what makes it a *good* example, actually. That's
mg> certainly why I chose it.
Then you must be trying to say something different from what I thought
you were. All the above would support would be an argument that we can
use terminology to discuss a book which the author could not have
known about. Hardly a stunning observation.
I thought you were trying to give an example of finding _ideas_ in a
text which the author is very unlikely to have known about. I find
that rather more intriguing.
--
r...@cstr.ed.ac.uk _O_
|<
Mike Godwin
>Then you must be trying to say something different from what I thought
>you were. All the above would support would be an argument that we can
>use terminology to discuss a book which the author could not have
>known about. Hardly a stunning observation.
Ouch. That sure stings.
>I thought you were trying to give an example of finding _ideas_ in a
>text which the author is very unlikely to have known about. I find
>that rather more intriguing.
A Freudian interpretation of "Hamlet" might well be based both on
the assumption that Shakespeare had insights into what drives human
character *and* the assumption that he did not have the systematized
set of interpretive tools provided by psychoanalysis.
Joan Shields
>In article <42...@beguine.UUCP> jo...@med.unc.edu (Joan Shields) writes:
>>Interpret - vb. 1. to explain or tell the meaning of : present in
>>understandable terms
>>2. to conceive in the light of individual belief, judgement, or
>>circumstance : construe
>>3. to represent by art : bring to realization by preformance
>>
>>By definition (I think we can agree that #2 is appropriate) when a work is
>>interpreted it cannot be done so without personal or cultural bias and, as
>>Mike himself pointed out, outside works by other authors.
>
>Ah, but one doesn't have to be a Freudian in order to see a
>Freudian interpretation of a work. We are not so bound by our
>biases as all that.
We are very much bound by our own personal and cultural biases - it's the
way we see our world. I'm certain that I have a quite different outlook
than you although many of our views may be similar. My view of the world
is biased by my personal history just as yours is biased by your own. To deny
that is to claim complete objectivity and I for one have yet to be convinced of that.
(Using Freud to interpret Shakespeare's HAMLET even if one does not hold
with Freud's views)
>Then such an interpretation is still valid if it is grounded in
>the text. Surely one can interpret verses of the Bible without
>being a Christian or Jew, eh, Joan?
I said nothing about interpreting Freud - I said that to use Freud to
interpret a work is using an interpretation (rather biased, IMO, in many
respects) to interpret a work. Anyone is welcome to interpret the Bible
or anything other literary work as far as I'm concerned. That statement
has nothing to do with this argument. I have been saying that
interpretations of works change throughout time and are colored by a
critic's personal and cultural biases - there is nothing wrong with that -
it is to be expected and even adds to the interpretation. In neither of
my posts have I proposed any sort of elitism, quite the contrary.
>One can generate interpretations without agreeing with those
>interpretations.
I'm sorry but I do not understand this statement. How can one present an
interpretation of a text if one does not believe in that interpretation? I
see that as being somewhat hypocritical but perhaps I'm just mistaken or
overly naive.
>It's not an example of a bias if I, a non-Freudian, use Freudian
>theory to interpret "Hamlet." It's an example of my using an interpretive
>tool.
I'm afraid it is a matter of bias as Freud's interpretations are biased in
the first place. When you use a tool, any tool, you must be aware of any
and all flaws that tool possesses. For instance, it is very dangerous to
use a hammer that has a cracked handle - dangerous for the person behind
you at least :-).
I thought about this last night and have come up with a wonderful example,
well, IMHO. Perhaps (IMHO) the easiest and most accessible way of seeing
interpretations of literary works is to watch a play (or film) of that
work. Take HENRY V, the Olivier and Branagh versions, and compare them.
Olivier's version was produced in the 1940s, it was interpreted in such a way
as to be, in essence, a World War II propaganda film. It is a classic,
both as a film and as a valid interpretation of Shakespeare's play.
About 50 years later another version of HENRY V is produced - this time
war is not nearly as glorified as it was before - it's a different
interpretation, just a valid as Olivier's or any of the others before
them. Interpretations of Shakespeare ebb and change throughout the years
and throughout the world. Look at HAMLET again, look how many different
valid interpretations have been done. And yes, we can even go back to the
Bible, how many different religions have been formed via different
interpretations of the same book - and how they have changed throughout the
years.
I say again, though in terms a bit clearer and more agreeable, any
interpretation of any work is valid in the time and place it was made. It
is also subject to the inevitable personal, cultural, and time bias of the
interpreter.
Joan
"Take thou no scorn,
Of fiction born,
Fair fiction's muse to woo;
Old Homer's theme
Was but a dream,
Himself a fiction too."
INFIDEL
(Mike Godwin) writes:
>A Freudian interpretation of "Hamlet" might well be based both on
>the assumption that Shakespeare had insights into what drives human
>character *and* the assumption that he did not have the systematized
>set of interpretive tools provided by psychoanalysis.
Typical of the arrogance of psychoanalysts who claim that their
"systematized set of interpretive tools " lead to new fundamental
insights into, say, Shakespeare.
On the other hand, the insights gained by reading S. in the context of, say,
Japanese power struggles during the reign of the Tokugawa shogun, are valuable.
That is, Shakespeare had something to say about these events even
though he knew of none of their empirical details.
On the one hand we are questioning the relevence to truth of formallized
interpretation, and on the other, of historical interpretation.
John W.
Perth
Bergmann
>In any case, cookbooks can indeed be great literature. To my mind,
>M.F.K. Fisher's _The Art of Eating_ (a collection of 5 small books) is
>the best starting place. From there, you can branch out into her
>wonderfully evocative memoirs.
Thank you for this recommendation -- I had meant to read M.F.K.
Fisher ever since, three years ago, I read an article in the i
Washington Post celebrating her 80th birthday (this included the recipe
for a "carriage sandwich" in which you sliced baguette lengthwise,
buttered it, put some other fillings in, wrapped the whole thing
very carefully, and then *sat* on it for the length of the journey.
Which made the butter melt, and also led to a desirable flattening
of the whole thing.) So now I have finally gone and checked out
a bunch of her books, and I am very happy with what I have read
so far.
I started with _Alphabet for Gourmets_ (which is one of the books
collected in _The Art of Eating_ but is also available on its
own). Fisher does not really write just about food -- she writes
about people (herself, her friends, and her family) and the role
that food plays in their lives. So "A" is for "Alone," "H" is for
"Happy" (this features a description of pretty disgusting
fried-egg sandwiches which a neighbor used to prepare for Fisher
and her sister when they were children), "S" is for "Sadness," and
"W" is for "Wanton" (and the different ways in which men and
women use dinners for sexual conquest). And all this is a pleasure
to read because Fisher writes amazingly well -- she has a wonderful
way of describing "the need for more spice and excitement" in
our lives, and she has some much-needed ironic distance from
herself (after presenting her recipe for "kasha," she notices that
this is pretty much a rich-bitch adaptation in which some sturdy
peasant dish is jazzed up with a lot of expensive ingredients.
I loved her for that -- the Silver Palate women could learn a
lot from Fisher.)
I wish I could quote the episode from "Q" is for "Quantity" in
which the author is entrusted to cook dinner for herself and
her sister, and decides to make "Hindu Eggs." And because of
the need for more spice and excitement mentioned above (and
also because she recalls the expression of pleasure on her
sister's face whenever they sneak a curry), she decides to
put in not the required 1/2 teaspoon, but several tablespoons
of curry. The result is inedible, of course, but to this day,
at least two people (and the readers of this episode) can
whisper "Hindu Eggs" to each other whenever the cook has
gone overboard.
At $12.95 for the paperback, _The Art of Eating_ is a steal.
I'm now looking forward to Fisher's fiction, and to her memoirs.
Annette
Ian G Batten
> them. Interpretations of Shakespeare ebb and change throughout the years
That implies that at any point in time there is an agreed
interpretation. I don't believe that to be the case --- for a strong
example compare the National Theatre and Royal Shakespeare Theatre
productions of the Tempest a few years ago. Both major productions with
the A-Team involved, and yet both very different.
ian
Dan'l DanehyOakes
>I agree with everything Dan'l wrote above.
Excuse me. I think I feel faint.
Mike and I *agree* about interpretation?
>He said what I wanted
>to say more clearly than I did.
Thank you, Mike. That's praise indeed.
(Actually, I think that's *why* we agree. I've been so distressed
by the disagreement in the past that I've put a lot of energy into
finding clear ways to say what I'm trying to say about this topic,
and suspect that we always agreed on more, behind the terminological
differences, than we disagreed on.
Hi.)
Ten billion sushi dinners cried out for vengeance.
-- Gaiman and Pratchett, GOOD OMENS
The Roach
Joan Shields
>That implies that at any point in time there is an agreed
>interpretation. I don't believe that to be the case --- for a strong
>example compare the National Theatre and Royal Shakespeare Theatre
>productions of the Tempest a few years ago. Both major productions with
>the A-Team involved, and yet both very different.
In certain instances there may be a general agreement in the interpretation
of certain works - I'm not saying that everyone agrees but enough so that
there is an obvious trend. Please remember I said that an interpretation of
a work depends largly on the interpreter's cultural and personal background
as well as the interpreter's time and place. It is not only possible and
reasonable but pretty certain that everyone is going to have a slightly
different interpretation of a work although those differences (at times)
may be so small as to be insignificant. This is not always the case.
Shakespeare is notorious for being widely (and wildly) interpreted - his
work has supported many different interpretations and will probably
continue to do so.
Joan
Mike Godwin
>We are very much bound by our own personal and cultural biases - it's the
>way we see our world.
I disagree. One of the great blessings of literature is its ability
to put us into other people's heads.
>To deny
>that is to claim complete objectivity and I for one have yet to be convinced of that.
You are mistaken to conclude that denying that we are bound by our
biases entails a claim that we can be completely objective. I
would never make so extreme a claim.
Empathy involves just such an adoption of another world view, but
it does not require objectivity. Quite the opposite, in fact.
>I said nothing about interpreting Freud ....
Neither did I.
>... - I said that to use Freud to
>interpret a work is using an interpretation (rather biased, IMO, in many
>respects) to interpret a work.
Right. That's exactly what it is. And I don't have to be a Freudian
to generate Freudian interpretations of a work.
>I'm sorry but I do not understand this statement. How can one present an
>interpretation of a text if one does not believe in that interpretation?
For the sake of discussion, for example. I might say something like
"A Freudian would see Hamlet's interaction with his mother as an
instance of repressed sexual attraction, but the Freudian interpretation
is not the only valid one, and I personally believe this interaction
is better explained by focusing on a child's sense of betrayal."
>I
>see that as being somewhat hypocritical but perhaps I'm just mistaken or
>overly naive.
What is hypocritical about imagining how a Freudian literary critic
would interpret scenes in "Hamlet"?
>I'm afraid it is a matter of bias as Freud's interpretations are biased in
>the first place.
Right. But it's not *my* bias. It's Freud's bias. If I can apply
*his* bias to generate an interpretation, then I'm not applying my
own (very different and non-Freudian) biases to do so.
> When you use a tool, any tool, you must be aware of any
>and all flaws that tool possesses. For instance, it is very dangerous to
>use a hammer that has a cracked handle - dangerous for the person behind
>you at least :-).
This comment is inapposite. No one has posted anything contradicting
this.
>Interpretations of Shakespeare ebb and change throughout the years
>and throughout the world.
No one has posted anything challenging this.
>I say again, though in terms a bit clearer and more agreeable, any
>interpretation of any work is valid in the time and place it was made. It
>is also subject to the inevitable personal, cultural, and time bias of the
>interpreter.
That applying one's own bias is "inevitable" is not an inevitable
conclusion. It is not difficult to learn of other interpretive schemes,
which one may not share, and discover how those schemes might be
applied to the work at hand.
John Mazzocchi
>In article <42...@beguine.UUCP> jo...@med.unc.edu (Joan Shields) writes:
>>We are very much bound by our own personal and cultural biases - it's the
>>way we see our world.
>I disagree. One of the great blessings of literature is its ability
>to put us into other people's heads.
This statement is too vague and it begs the question. When you are "put into
other people's heads", do you leave your "personal and cultural biases" at
the gate before entry? Consider that you may have biases that you
may not realise you have.
>>To deny
>>that is to claim complete objectivity and I for one have yet to be convinced of that.
>You are mistaken to conclude that denying that we our bound by our
>biases entails a claim that we can be completely objective.
>Empathy involves just such an adoption of another world view, but
>it does not require objectivity. Quite the opposite, in fact.
Sensitivity, I would have thought, rather than objectivity should be the
key word here. I do agree, however, with your point.
>>... - I said that to use Freud to
>>interpret a work is using an interpretation (rather biased, IMO, in many
>>respects) to interpret a work.
>Right. That's exactly what it is. And I don't have to be a Freudian
>to generate Freudian interpretations of a work.
But how meaningful would they be?
>>I'm afraid it is a matter of bias as Freud's interpretations are biased in
>>the first place.
>Right. But it's not *my* bias. It's Freud's bias. If I can apply
>*his* bias to generate an interpretation, then I'm not applying my
>own (non-Freudian) biases to do so.
As stated before, I find it difficult to believe that you can "filter out"
biases you have no knowledge of.
>>I say again, though in terms a bit clearer and more agreeable, any
>>interpretation of any work is valid in the time and place it was made. It
>>is also subject to the inevitable personal, cultural, and time bias of the
>>interpreter.
>That applying one's own bias is "inevitable" is not an inevitable
>conclusion. i
Just what kind of conclusion is it?
>It is not difficult to learn of other interpretive schemes,
>which one may not share, and discover how those schemes might be
>applied to the work at hand.
You're assuming that these schemes could be applied in a pure sense, with
no distortion by your own biases, inevitable or not.
--
+ John Mazzocchi + "The mind is not a vessel to be filled, +
+ Melbourne, Victoria + but a fire to be lighted" - Plutarch +
+ Australia +
+ rx...@minyos.xx.rmit.oz.au +
INFIDEL
>I say again, though in terms a bit clearer and more agreeable, any
>interpretation of any work is valid in the time and place it was made.
Well I went out one Saturday night looking for the "real cultural
hermitage uhem, heritage, of the working class Australian and for a bit
of light reading I took along Dostojevskkii's "Crime and Punishment"
Yeah, that's what it was.
I walked past this drunk who was abusing the shit out of everything that
moved. What terrible words he was using , oh my! I thought. Can I find
the real cutlural hermitage of Oz from this guy? But he was saying
terrible terrible words, and in an effort to run away from him whilst
covering my ears, I dropped the book. Poor Fjodor, I know.
The drunk opened up the book and he appeared to be reading it --- while
he read it (what an amazing sight it was, indeed so !) he said some terrible
terrible things, even worse than Joan Shields can imagine, including
various permutations of nasty nasty words (which I shall not mention
here in the interests of protecting Joan's sensitive ears) . Finally he
threw down the book, stepped on it, pissed on it, puked on it farted
and sat back down on the bench from whence he came.
Confident of Joan's infinite wisdom I listened very carefully to what he
had said (and watched carefully every manner of his expression , so as
not to lose even one bit of information emanating from that region of
space-time on this sparkling fine Saturday night) and now in the
comfort of my own home fuck it I'm gonna find his interpretation of "Crime and
Punishment" from the morass of drivel before me if it's the
LAST THING I DO!
John Wojdylo
Perth
Western Australia
Mike Godwin
>This statement is too vague and it begs the question.
What do you think the question is, John?
>When you are "put into
>other people's heads", do you leave your "personal and cultural biases" at
>the gate before entry?
Sure. Don't you?
But when I put on the persona of the person into whose head I'm
going, I don't for a moment pretend that what I'm doing is "objective."
>Consider that you may have biases that you
>may not realise you have.
Consider that we can only talk about the biases we know about.
As Wittgenstein said in another context, "Whereof we cannot speak,
thereof we must be silent."
If you could prove the existences of biases of which I am unaware,
then you could simply tell me about them, and I'd become aware of
them.
I'll trust you to do this for me when the mood strikes you.
>>Right. That's exactly what it is. And I don't have to be a Freudian
>>to generate Freudian interpretations of a work.
>
>But how meaningful would they be?
What would prevent them from being meaningful?
>As stated before, I find it difficult to believe that you can "filter out"
>biases you have no knowledge of.
Let's talk at a somewhat less abstract level. Which non-Freudian biases
would prevent me from doing an adequate Freudian interpretation of
"Hamlet"?
>>That applying one's own bias is "inevitable" is not an inevitable
>>conclusion.
>
>Just what kind of conclusion is it?
An unproved one.
>You're assuming that these schemes could be applied in a pure sense, with
>no distortion by your own biases, inevitable or not.
Feel free to demonstrate that a non-Freudian cannot generate a
Freudian analysis of "Hamlet" without distorting it with non-Freudian
biases. I await your proof here.
Your servant,
Joan Shields
>In article <42...@beguine.UUCP> jo...@med.unc.edu (Joan Shields) writes:
>
>>We are very much bound by our own personal and cultural biases - it's the
>>way we see our world.
>
>I disagree. One of the great blessings of literature is its ability
>to put us into other people's heads.
Your above statement has nothing to do with what I've been saying. Yes,
it possible to put aside some of you biases in order to see the world
through another's eyes - I, for one, cannot put all my biases aside, perhaps
you can, I don't know.
>>I say again, though in terms a bit clearer and more agreeable, any
>>interpretation of any work is valid in the time and place it was made. It
>>is also subject to the inevitable personal, cultural, and time bias of the
>>interpreter.
>
>That applying one's own bias is "inevitable" is not an inevitable
>conclusion. It is not difficult to learn of other interpretive schemes,
>which one may not share, and discover how those schemes might be
>applied to the work at hand.
I have not said that it isn't possible to appreciate and learn from
other's interpretations I've only said that when a person makes an
interpretation it will be colored by their own personal and cultural
biases, or, if you prefer, their experiences. It is also influenced by
the time the interpretation is made. As I explained in my earlier
example, HENRY V has been interpreted differently according to the time
the interpretation was made. In the 1940s it was a wonderful pro-war
piece, in 1990 it made an equally beautiful anti-war piece. Both
interpretations are valid - one does not invalidate the other.
From the time we pick up a book we are being influenced by our biases, our
past experiences. Do you wander into a bookstore with your eyes closed,
groping for a selection, letting whatever falls into your hands be your
purchase for the day? Of course not, you go to the sections that interest
you. There are certain genres I have no interest in and others that I
adore. We all have favorite writers, favorite genres, favorite periods
because of our individual experiences and biases. These even change with
the years - what subjects I read as a child are not always the same I
read as an adult.
While reading a book we have our biases. There are some books that bore
me, I tend to like strong plots and tight writing, overly descriptive
passages tend to put me to sleep or cause me to skip ahead. I may find
that I identify more with a supporting character than with the main
character. When I read Flaubert's MADAM BOVARY I found that I could not
stand the main character - I despised her. Good book - nasty woman. Not
everyone agrees with me, some think her sympathetic, that's ok - neither
interpretation is invalid. We all have different opinions and a wide
variety of ways of looking at things. That's what makes life interesting.
It makes me uncomfortable to invalidate someone's interpretation of a
work because I may disagree with the interpretation.
I guess that's my problem, I try to respect everyone's right to an opinion
and that's basically what an interpretation boils down to - although I
must admit, some are more thoughtful and better researched than others.
Is there such a thing as a definitive interpretation of a work? I doubt
it.
Joan
"...what can a decent, respectable man talk about with the greatest
pleasure?
Answer: himself."
INFIDEL
to their conversation...
Joan Shields writes:
Joan >>>We are very much bound by our own personal and cultural biases - it's >>>the way we see our world.
Sounds like Joan's got something here. But it needs elaboration...
Mike >>I disagree. One of the great blessings of literature is its ability
>>to put us into other people's heads.
Sounds like Mike's got something here too. I mean, when reading
Dostoevskii it certainly feels like you're inside the head of an
"idiot".. There is a degree of privacy, of direct contact with the
writer's mind...or is this just an illusion ? What are you really feeling?
The Maoists of 1975-76 , inspired by the "Gang of Four"really thought
they were inside Marx's mind when they carried out their study of the
"dictatorship of the proletariat". Trouble was, so did the
conservatives led by Deng Little Bottle. (The conservatives had military
might on their side, and they eventually won.) Eventually Deng's
"economic modernization" view of Marx was accepted (forced) as what Marx
really thought.
Who is really inside the writer's head ?
Or is Mike really inside his own head trying to build an interpretation
of the outside world ? (As Joan suggests.)
>it possible to put aside some of you biases in order to see the world
>through another's eyes - I, for one, cannot put all my biases aside, perhaps
>you can, I don't know.
Faced with a challenge that sounds authoritative, Joan backs off from her
original assertion . What does this tell us about Joan's mind ? Or is
it merely Joan's present state of being ?
Is "mind" a long-term thing, an aposite to "present state of being" ?
When Mike feels that he is inside the writer's mind, is he feeling the
"mind" or the "present state"?
Joan >>>I say again, though in terms a bit clearer and more agreeable, any
>>>interpretation of any work is valid in the time and place it was made
Joan backs off too far, gets confused and comes up with a ridiculous assertion
(see my previous post).
Perhaps Joan will never escape from her present state of being. Perhaps
we really are witnessing her mind in action in these posts.
Joan >>> It
>>>is also subject to the inevitable personal, cultural, and time bias
of the >>>interpreter.
A rehash of her previous statement. Perhaps Joan is trying to tell us
something about Mike. Alas, no, I doubt Joan is subtle enough.
>>That applying one's own bias is "inevitable" is not an inevitable
>>conclusion.
That's debatable. A body of anthropologcal opinion disagrees with that
--- they disagree with Levi-Strauss and his "systems".
Personally,...no I won't tell you which side I lean towards. It is not
necessary.
It is not difficult to learn of other interpretive schemes,
>>which one may not share, and discover how those schemes might be
>>applied to the work at hand.
The story goes, that whatever systems you come up with are according to
rules of semantics you think in terms of ... and so depend on you.
There is no objective reference frame (according to this view).
It is not surprising that Mike thinks along these lines...him coming
from a natural science/technological background.
Joan continues:
>I have not said that it isn't possible to appreciate and learn from
>other's interpretations I've only said that when a person makes an
>interpretation it will be colored by their own personal and cultural
>biases, or, if you prefer, their experiences. It is also influenced by
>the time the interpretation is made. As I explained in my earlier
>work because I may disagree with the interpretation.
And reveals the cog of her mind to which I have alluded above:
>I guess that's my problem, I try to respect everyone's right to an opinion
>and that's basically what an interpretation boils down to - although I
>must admit, some are more thoughtful and better researched than others.
Awash in a sea of arbitrariness, Joan despairs ( :-) ) :
>Is there such a thing as a definitive interpretation of a work? I doubt
>it.
Alas there is. It is decided by peers.And so possesses their semantic
prejudices.
Finally, what can I say about Mike's mind? Well, Mike plays the game of
establishing a group of peers who will later judge his work as
"definitive".
And what about Mike's interpretive systems ? Supposing that Levi-Strauss
is right, can Mike come up with some set of systems (not necessarily
explicitly describable) that will alow him to understand Dostoevskii's
mind as accurately as it will allow him to understand the Chinese mind
(for instance) ?
I doubt it. Because Mike Godwin holds grudges.
INFIDEL
Joan Shields >>I have not said that it isn't possible to appreciate and learn from
>>other's interpretations I've only said that when a person
makes an
>>interpretation it will be colored by their own personal and
cultural
>>biases, or, if you prefer, their experiences.
Mike Godwin >What does "colored" mean here? Are you saying that you can tell
>whether a Freudian interpretation of a work has been generated by
>an honest-to-Sigmund Freudian or by an academic who is doing such an
>interpretation for a pedagogic or heuristic purpose?
Postulate:
If I were Sigmund Freud I would be able to tell the difference between
the two provided the work was long enough. (So Ziggy knows himself and
can recognize attempts at reconstructing his way of thinking.)
As I am not Ziggy then my ability to distinguish depends on my ability
to adopt Ziggy's biases. Joan is saying that I cannot adequately adopt
Ziggy's biases; Mike Godwin is saying that I can (assuming I
were as divinely gifted as Mike).
Let us see where Mike's way of thinking leads us (assuming I have his
biases right).
As I am not a greater genius than Ziggy was, my emulation of Ziggy's
thought is gained from years of practice and reflection.
So Mike claims that my spending umpteen years in Australia and
Japan does not affect my ability to think like Ziggy (at least for long
enough to evaluate a piece of work in the abovementioned aim).
Nor does my personality, bodily functions over the years, educational
opportunities --- including peers with whom I have chance to discuss my
views of Ziggy --- the state of the modern world (the "modern
consciousness" has evolved since Freud, has it not?) etc. etc.
Mike's bias is a positive assertion of the power of the mind over the
body.
Of objectivism over relativism.
So Mike asserts there is an objective reality the knowledge of which we can
acquire through years of practice. There is something about Freud which
can be known to all of us so that we may all emulate Freud, at least for
a little while.
Well, so what. Everybody's entitled to their little dreams, are they not?
Proposition: there is no objective reality.
Proof. Very long. See any one of the thousands of books in Western
philosophy that have dealt with the subject. See also novels by
Dostoevsky, Turgenev, Camus, Sartre, White, ... as none of these authors
believed in the existence of an objective reality, and their novels may
be regarded as arguments against such a perception.
>This is not apposite to the issue. I've never written that one can
>be utterly without biases. The issue is whether one can adopt another
>set of biases, for the sake of understanding a character. I think one
>can; you, apparently, think this is impossible.
Depends on how well you want to understand the character. If you want to
understand the character as well as the author does then that is impossible if
there is no objective reality.
Your objectivist slip is showing, Godwin.
Mike Godwin
>Your above statement has nothing to do with what I've been saying.
I'd have said that none of your responses to my postings have had much to
do with what *I've* been saying. But I've been playing along in the hope
that you'd eventually see what I was getting at.
>I, for one, cannot put all my biases aside, perhaps
>you can, I don't know.
It is, perhaps, a matter of faith to you that you cannot do this. I,
however, do not have so limited a view of your abilities.
>I have not said that it isn't possible to appreciate and learn from
>other's interpretations I've only said that when a person makes an
>interpretation it will be colored by their own personal and cultural
>biases, or, if you prefer, their experiences.
What does "colored" mean here? Are you saying that you can tell
whether a Freudian interpretation of a work has been generated by
an honest-to-Sigmund Freudian or by an academic who is doing such an
interpretation for a pedagogic or heuristic purpose?
You can alwaysbtell Because of the "coloring," I guess.
>From the time we pick up a book we are being influenced by our biases, our
>past experiences.
This is not apposite to the issue. I've never written that one can
be utterly without biases. The issue is whether one can adopt another
set of biases, for the sake of understanding a character. I think one
can; you, apparently, think this is impossible.
I await your proof.
>When I read Flaubert's MADAM BOVARY I found that I could not
>stand the main character - I despised her. Good book - nasty woman. Not
>everyone agrees with me, some think her sympathetic, that's ok - neither
>interpretation is invalid.
But surely you agree that Flaubert's triumph is his ability to let us
see what it is like to be Madame Bovary, shallow, selfish, and vain though
she is.
>Is there such a thing as a definitive interpretation of a work? I doubt
>it.
This is inapposite, since no one has been talking about "definitive
interpretations."
Bob Ingria
I started reading this thread only when all discussion of Saussure had
actually disappeared from it. Can someone summarize what was said
about Saussure? I'm particularly interested, since destructionists
like Derridada use a misreading of Saussure to justify their idiocies.
(The major bone I have to pick with Camille Paglia is that her opinion
of Saussure seems to be based on destructionist misuse of Saussure's
idea of the sign, rather than on an actual reading of Saussure.) I'm
curious to know if Saussure was being unjustly calumnied again.
-30-
Bob
R o d Johnson
>I started reading this thread only when all discussion of Saussure had
>actually disappeared from it. Can someone summarize what was said
>about Saussure? I'm particularly interested, since destructionists
>like Derridada use a misreading of Saussure to justify their idiocies.
. . .
>I'm
>curious to know if Saussure was being unjustly calumnied again.
How is this alleged calumny any different than glib, feeble digs like
"destructionist" and "Derridada"? (Yes, I'm tired of people making
cracks about Derrida without making an honest attempt to come to terms
with his work, and the conjunction of "Derrida" and "dada" is silly
enough to indicate a certain lack of this.) I'm sure it sounds clever
at faculty parties, but it really has little to do with scholarship,
nor does content-free stuff like "idiocies".
"Saussure" is something of a fiction to begin with, unless you're
talking about the laryngeal theory--the publication of the Cahiers has
demonstrated how much of the Cours is a creation of Bally and
Sechehaye, and the English translation is notoriously bad, adding one
more layer of difficulty for most people. So Saussure interpretation
is something of a muddle to begin with. Apparently you think you have
a line on the One True Interpretation, at least to the extent that you
can identify *mis*interpretations. I commend you for this
achievement--a few generations of Saussure scholars undoubtedly wish
they had such a clear view of a complex problem.
Moreover, structuralism in general used Saussure more as a jumping-off
point than as a matter for faithful explication; "misunderstandings"
and "misuses" of Saussure are legion (though they might be more
charitably be considered "understandings" and "uses"). The fact that
you condemn Derrida for this thoughtcrime but not the many others that
have committed it indicates more an urge to engage in some fashionable
deconstruction-bashing than any real concern for Saussure, if you ask
me.
If you have any more concrete points to make, I'd be interested in
hearing them--I'm sure there's a lot of fascinating stuff there. But
epithets and vague accusations aren't really a substitute for
discussion.
--
Rod Johnson * rjoh...@vela.acs.oakland.edu * (313) 650 2315
"Don't con me with your mind expansion slop!"
--Joe Friday
John Mazzocchi
mnem...@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes:
>In article <1991Jul2.2...@minyos.xx.rmit.oz.au> rx...@minyos.xx.rmit.oz.au (John Mazzocchi) writes:
>>This statement is too vague and it begs the question.
>What do you think the question is, John?
I'm a bit hazy on it myself now, to be honest. After 7 days since posting my
comments, I thought you'd (a) ignored, (b) not noticed, (c) forgotten,
(d) not deemed worth replying or (e) any combination of the above - umm.. them.
(I am typing THESE comments on 15th July, 4:12 pm - just for purposes of
comparison.)
At the time, I remember thinking that discussion seemed more like an argument
on perceptual realism vis-a-vis idealism, or nominalism, apriorism?? Something..
As it turns out, I'm the one whose being vague now.
>>When you are "put into
>>other people's heads", do you leave your "personal and cultural biases" at
>>the gate before entry?
>Sure. Don't you?
I don't know. If I have biases of which I have no knowledge, then how can I
park them? I don't know that they're there, do I?
>But when I put on the persona of the person into whose head I'm
>going, I don't for a moment pretend that what I'm doing is "objective."
Pretence has nothing to do with it. You can certainly adopt this persona,
but as to how faithfully (to yourself), or how much value this may be is
always left in question.
>>Consider that you may have biases that you
>>may not realise you have.
>Consider that we can only talk about the biases we know about.
Not at all. We can know about biases, and never suspect
ourselves of having them, and only see them in others.
>As Wittgenstein said in another context, "Whereof we cannot speak,
>thereof we must be silent."
In *another context*, ........
>If you could prove the existences of biases of which I am unaware,
>then you could simply tell me about them, and I'd become aware of
>them.
I have no intention of proving anything, nor do I need to do so. Any
biases which you may or may not have, and which you may or may not be
aware of, do or don't exist whether I make you aware of them or not.
Got that?
>I'll trust you to do this for me when the mood strikes you.
I wouldn't if I were you.
>>>Right. That's exactly what it is. And I don't have to be a Freudian
>>>to generate Freudian interpretations of a work.
>>
>>But how meaningful would they be?
>What would prevent them from being meaningful?
I assumed it would be up to you to state how they would be made meaningful.
If you are not a Freudian yourself, then what meaning could this interpret-
ation have for you?
>>As stated before, I find it difficult to believe that you can "filter out"
>>biases you have no knowledge of.
>Let's talk at a somewhat less abstract level. Which non-Freudian biases
>would prevent me from doing an adequate Freudian interpretation of
>"Hamlet"?
How in hell would I know what biases you possess, non-Freudian or otherwise?
Do you have a psychological profile of yourself handy? What I am saying is that
you MAY have these biases. Keeping on an abstract level for just a little
longer, you MAY have some - even Freudian - bias which makes it unbearable for
you to interpret any sexual (for instance) regression in a character. I really
don't know you well enough to say. Maybe your interpretation (Freudian or not)
could be limited by some non-Jungian bias. Does the manifestation or the
character (sic) of the bias make any difference, give that it can have an
effect?
>>>That applying one's own bias is "inevitable" is not an inevitable
>>>conclusion.
>>
>>Just what kind of conclusion is it?
>An unproved one.
Just so.
>>You're assuming that these schemes could be applied in a pure sense, with
>>no distortion by your own biases, inevitable or not.
>Feel free to demonstrate that a non-Freudian cannot generate a
>Freudian analysis of "Hamlet" without distorting it with non-Freudian
>biases. I await your proof here.
A proof is what you require? Alas, I cannot provide you with one. I fear
it's not worth the effort, in any case.
>Your servant,
You're too kind.
Mike Godwin
>I don't know. If I have biases of which I have no knowledge, then how can I
>park them? I don't know that they're there, do I?
You seem awfully certain that you have biases "of which you have no
knowledge." Me, I am not quite so quick to claim such knowledge.
>Pretence has nothing to do with it. You can certainly adopt this persona,
>but as to how faithfully (to yourself), or how much value this may be is
>always left in question.
Lots of things are left in question. Anything can be questioned.
But questions are not the same as disproof.
>Not at all. We can know about biases, and never suspect
>ourselves of having them, and only see them in others.
Oh, but I suspect myself of having biases. In fact, I know I
have them. (Of course, they are not biases "of which I have no
knowledge." By definition.)
>I have no intention of proving anything, nor do I need to do so. Any
>biases which you may or may not have, and which you may or may not be
>aware of, do or don't exist whether I make you aware of them or not.
>Got that?
No. What are you trying to say here?
>I assumed it would be up to you to state how they would be made meaningful.
>If you are not a Freudian yourself, then what meaning could this interpret-
>ation have for you?
Well, at least two types of meaning. First, even though I am not a
Freudian, I may think that Freudian interpretations provide useful
insights now and then. Secondly, I may want to know what a Freudian
would think about a certain literary work without actually being a
Freudian.
Thus, one doesn't have to be a Freudian to generate meaningful
Freudian interpretations.
>How in hell would I know what biases you possess, non-Freudian or otherwise?
A good question. How in hell do you know enough to tell me that I
can't filter out my biases when I imagine how someone different from
me would regard a literary work?
>Do you have a psychological profile of yourself handy?
No. I do have my psyche handy, however. Is there some physical law
that requires a "psychological profile" before one can imagine
how another person, with different biases, thinks?
>>Feel free to demonstrate that a non-Freudian cannot generate a
>>Freudian analysis of "Hamlet" without distorting it with non-Freudian
>>biases. I await your proof here.
>
>A proof is what you require? Alas, I cannot provide you with one. I fear
>it's not worth the effort, in any case.
Then I take it you grant my point: namely, that a non-Freudian can
generate a Freudian analysis of a literary work.
--Mike
--
Mike Godwin, |"But the thing is, you don't have many suspects who
mnem...@eff.org | are innocent of a crime. That's contradictory. If a
(617) 864-1550 | person is innocent of a crime, then he is not a
EFF, Cambridge, MA | suspect." Ed Meese, US News & World Report, 10-15-85
INFIDEL
Mike Godwin writes:
>Well, at least two types of meaning. First, even though I am not a
>Freudian, I may think that Freudian interpretations provide useful
>insights now and then. Secondly, I may want to know what a Freudian
>would think about a certain literary work without actually being a
>Freudian.
Mike, this is either trivially true or impossible, depending on how good
a Freudian interpretation you want to generate. There is never an
unbiased viewpoint even if you think you are generating an
interpretation from a Freudian perspective, because there is no
objective reality. My proof lies in a previous post on this subject.
I will elaborate on it if you wish.
>Thus, one doesn't have to be a Freudian to generate meaningful
>Freudian interpretations.
"Meaningful" is a subjective term which depends on the agent
interpreting it. Some people think that a man getting nailed to a stick
was a meaningful event; they go so far as letting that image be a
central influence in their lives.
Just what are _you_ getting at ?
John Mazzocchi
mnem...@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes:
>In article <1991Jul15....@minyos.xx.rmit.oz.au> rx...@minyos.xx.rmit.oz.au (John Mazzocchi) writes:
>You seem awfully certain that you have biases "of which you have no
>knowledge." Me, I am not quite so quick to claim such knowledge.
I am not certain, I concede the possibility. You, it seems, are not willing
to do this.
>Lots of things are left in question. Anything can be questioned.
>But questions are not the same as disproof.
Right you are, but I never claimed that I would provide one.
>Oh, but I suspect myself of having biases.
You did not seem so willing to admit this earlier. Maybe it was just the
way I interpreted your statements.
>In fact, I know I
>have them. (Of course, they are not biases "of which I have no
>knowledge." By definition.)
Yes they are. Unless you believe in them, and can justify their existence, and
can show them to be true, you do not KNOW them. As you said, you suspect them.
>>I have no intention of proving anything, nor do I need to do so. Any
>>biases which you may or may not have, and which you may or may not be
>>aware of, do or don't exist whether I make you aware of them or not.
>>Got that?
>No. What are you trying to say here?
I'm not sure anymore. It must've been the hour.
>>I assumed it would be up to you to state how they would be made meaningful.
>>If you are not a Freudian yourself, then what meaning could this interpret-
>>ation have for you?
>Well, at least two types of meaning. First, even though I am not a
>Freudian, I may think that Freudian interpretations provide useful
>insights now and then.
No question that they might be useful.
>Secondly, I may want to know what a Freudian
>would think about a certain literary work without actually being a
>Freudian.
I may want to know what Einstein thought about string field theory, without
being Einstein. Doesn't help me much. I may be able to work out "what I think
he would have thought". As to the validity or meaningfulness of my interpret-
ation, who can say?
>Thus, one doesn't have to be a Freudian to generate meaningful
>Freudian interpretations.
Thus?? I'm lost. How "thus"? Assertions = logic?
>>How in hell would I know what biases you possess, non-Freudian or otherwise?
>A good question. How in hell do you know enough to tell me that I
>can't filter out my biases when I imagine how someone different from
>me would regard a literary work?
Presumptuous, on my part, I know. I assumed you had certain things in common
with everyone else on the planet.
>>Do you have a psychological profile of yourself handy?
>No. I do have my psyche handy, however. Is there some physical law
>that requires a "psychological profile" before one can imagine
>how another person, with different biases, thinks?
Not that I know of. I only pointed out that you "see through a glass darkly".
You seem to think (maybe I inferred this?) that the Windex is always available.
>>>Feel free to demonstrate that a non-Freudian cannot generate a
>>>Freudian analysis of "Hamlet" without distorting it with non-Freudian
>>>biases. I await your proof here.
>>
>>A proof is what you require? Alas, I cannot provide you with one. I fear
>>it's not worth the effort, in any case.
>Then I take it you grant my point: namely, that a non-Freudian can
>generate a Freudian analysis of a literary work.
Yes, oh yes, a non-Freudian CAN generate a Freudian analysis of a literary
work. It's the quality I question. Are you saying you would provide a better
analysis than a Freudian could?
Bryan Solie
>
>Well, at least two types of meaning. First, even though I am not a
>Freudian, I may think that Freudian interpretations provide useful
>insights now and then. Secondly, I may want to know what a Freudian
>would think about a certain literary work without actually being a
>Freudian.
>
>Thus, one doesn't have to be a Freudian to generate meaningful
>Freudian interpretations.
>
>>How in hell would I know what biases you possess, non-Freudian or otherwise?
>
>A good question. How in hell do you know enough to tell me that I
>can't filter out my biases when I imagine how someone different from
>me would regard a literary work?
This Freud thing is a remarkably poor example of throwing aside biases. It's
kind of like saying you can't do a calculus problem correctly without having
your biases get in the way. Certainly a non-Freudian can generate a
Freudian analysis. But said non-Freudian does not mystically become Freud.
Mike hits a key point when he says "imagine." There's no throwing aside of
biases. Rather, there's a set of logical tools added to your inventory (or
mounted over it, if you prefer). I suspect, for instance, that Mike would
still be argumentative even in "Freud mode."
-bryan
--
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bryan Solie
I owe my allegiance to no organization. I am a citizen of the world.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Mazzocchi
bry...@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Bryan Solie) writes:
>This Freud thing is a remarkably poor example of throwing aside biases.
That's why I tried to steer the argument around and away from it.
>It's
>kind of like saying you can't do a calculus problem correctly without having
>your biases get in the way.
Not exactly, it's more like saying you can solve the problem, but you don't
believe in the fundamentals of calculus.
>Certainly a non-Freudian can generate a
>Freudian analysis. But said non-Freudian does not mystically become Freud.
I don't think that either Mike or I implied this at any stage.
>Mike hits a key point when he says "imagine." There's no throwing aside of
>biases. Rather, there's a set of logical tools added to your inventory (or
>mounted over it, if you prefer).
My impression is that Mike was saying that he could throw them aside.
>I suspect, for instance, that Mike would
>still be argumentative even in "Freud mode."
Who can say? I should point out that I don't believe that
"Freud mode" = "Freudian mode".
Jeff Dalton
>In article <1991Jun24.2...@eff.org> mnem...@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes:
>>One can generate interpretations without agreeing with those
>>interpretations.
>
>I'm sorry but I do not understand this statement. How can one present an
>interpretation of a text if one does not believe in that interpretation?
It's no mystery, as the quoted example shows. Indeed, one can take
courses to learn how to do feminist interpretations, marxist
interpretations, new-critical interpretations, etc. Presenting
it merely means saying something like "A Marxist interpretation
would be ...". There's no need to believe such interpretations
are correct or even reasonable.
As a very trivial example, there's the 27 interpretation in which
everything is just a way to say the number 27. I've just presented
that interpretation, but I don't believe in it. (Whether the
"all fiction is about the problematic of writing fiction"
interpretation is isomorphic to the 27 interpretation is
left as an exercise for the reader.)
>>It's not an example of a bias if I, a non-Freudian, use Freudian
>>theory to interpret "Hamlet." It's an example of my using an interpretive
>>tool.
>
>I'm afraid it is a matter of bias as Freud's interpretations are biased in
>the first place. When you use a tool, any tool, you must be aware of any
>and all flaws that tool possesses.
That is simply false. For example, I am not using Emacs to edit this
message, but I don't need to know all the flaws in Emacs before I can
do it successfully. Indeed, if I _had_ to know all the flaws in a
program before being able to use it safely, there would be hardly any
program I could use. This is not confined to programs. For example,
for all I know the F1 key on this keyboard does not work.
>I say again, though in terms a bit clearer and more agreeable, any
>interpretation of any work is valid in the time and place it was made. It
>is also subject to the inevitable personal, cultural, and time bias of the
>interpreter.
I suspect you just mean something different by "valid" than MG does.
-- jd
Jeff Dalton
>In article <1991Jun24.2...@eff.org> mnem...@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes:
>>I agree with everything Dan'l wrote above.
>Mike and I *agree* about interpretation?
I had the same experience a little while back (ie MG agreed with an
explanation of my position on intentions and interpretation, something
we'd been disagreeing about forever). There's a lesson in here somewhere.
N.B. I still think Mike is wrong about whether it helps to be able
to see _Pretty Woman_ as a "good Pygmalion story", and I now have a
copy of _Illiberal Education_ to compare with his favorable remarks,
so we'll see.
Jeff Dalton
>
>mnem...@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes:
>>Oh, but I suspect myself of having biases. In fact, I know I
>>have them. (Of course, they are not biases "of which I have no
>>knowledge." By definition.)
>
>Yes they are. Unless you believe in them, and can justify their existence, and
>can show them to be true, you do not KNOW them. As you said, you suspect them.
Oh no! It's knowledge as justified true belief! I knew those
philosphy courses would be handy.
>>Then I take it you grant my point: namely, that a non-Freudian can
>>generate a Freudian analysis of a literary work.
>
>Yes, oh yes, a non-Freudian CAN generate a Freudian analysis of a literary
>work. It's the quality I question. Are you saying you would provide a better
>analysis than a Freudian could?
Why the hell not? Some Freudians are turkeys.
John Mazzocchi
>In article <1991Jul16.0...@minyos.xx.rmit.oz.au> rx...@minyos.xx.rmit.oz.au (John Mazzocchi) writes:
>>
>>mnem...@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes:
>>>Oh, but I suspect myself of having biases. In fact, I know I
>>>have them. (Of course, they are not biases "of which I have no
>>>knowledge." By definition.)
>>
>>Yes they are. Unless you believe in them, and can justify their existence, and
>>can show them to be true, you do not KNOW them. As you said, you suspect them.
>Oh no! It's knowledge as justified true belief! I knew those
>philosphy courses would be handy.
Knowledge is NOT justified true belief.
>>>Then I take it you grant my point: namely, that a non-Freudian can
>>>generate a Freudian analysis of a literary work.
>>
>>Yes, oh yes, a non-Freudian CAN generate a Freudian analysis of a literary
>>work. It's the quality I question. Are you saying you would provide a better
>>analysis than a Freudian could?
>Why the hell not? Some Freudians are turkeys.
And some turkeys are Freudians?