Modern Warfare 3 2011 English Language Pack

[Jackie Bullinger]

Byand large it has been possible to talk about the Russo-Ukraine war without resorting to the more arcane military terminology. While the detail of specific encounters may be hard to grasp the core challenges faced by both sides are not. The range and detail of the combat images available on social media has shown fighting resembling that of the world wars, including soldiers hiding in trenches as the shells come in or tanks trying to avoid mines as they cross fields, and often failing to do so. Generals of earlier times viewing all of this would soon recognise what was going on and readily engage on such matters as the relative strength of the defence over the offence, the possibilities for manoeuvre and encirclement against the hard slog of attrition, and the vulnerability of supply lines to interdiction. They might note how the influence of the Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) can still be felt in the discussion of decisive battles (the scale of the defeat necessary to persuade the enemy to give up), friction (why military operations rarely proceed as planned), centres of gravity (the point at which if you hit the enemy hard it is most likely to collapse), and the culminating point (when an army on the offensive becomes exhausted and can advance no further).

The same conceptual clarity has been lacking when discussing all those developments associated with the digital age. This has also been transformational but has yet to generate an accompanying and generally agreed framework for describing and evaluating its impact. This is in part because the changes have been incremental, not sudden and stark as with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The microchip was invented in the 1950s and the circuits printed upon them have become progressively more complex since. Computers have moved from performing basic calculations faster than humans to outthinking humans in a whole range of areas with the promise of more to come with the advance of artificial intelligence.

What then is non-kinetic war? In physics, potential energy is stored within an object by virtue of its position relative to other objects. Only when they are acted upon to produce motion do they acquire kinetic energy. So strictly speaking the proper contrast with kinetic warfare is potential or latent warfare, that is one for which preparations have been made and can be threatened. On this basis a very good example of non-kinetic warfare would be nuclear deterrence. The weapons do not have to be used to have an effect; the thought of the potential energy that might be released suffices.

In some recent discussions cyber weapons are presented as having serious benefits compared to the kinetic. One artillery shell can at best destroy one target and often many are needed to do so. The effects are permanent and cannot be reversed. To get greater effects a greater volume of shells will be needed, and there is then the risk of the stockpiles running out before the war aims can be achieved. By contrast cyber weapons can be used in the grey zone, and against many targets all at once, and they can be used over and over again. While they can do permanent damage their effects are often reversible. On the downside these effects are not always predictable and may be limited, and because they are often used covertly their meaning can be ambiguous to the victim.

The attack on Viasat was only one of a number of efforts to jam Ukrainian communications, interfering with links between the central command and front line soldiers. Once the initial offensives faltered this Russian effort lost its focus. Moreover, it was also struggling with the same problems that had afflicted its conventional military operations: underestimation of Ukrainian defences. There was soon an evident disconnect between the tempo of the Russian offensive and the Ukrainian counters, and the management of the sabotage, propaganda and intelligence-collecting operations, conducted by the spy agencies, the FSB and GRU. Despite the talk of hybrid operations, these were not well synchronised.

First, it takes time to prepare these attacks. It is necessary to get to know the target systems and infiltrate them (increasing the risk of detection as this is done). The Viasat attack might have taken a year of preparation. Nor is it that easy to switch the same cyber weapons from target to another.

Lastly, and most importantly, having suffered from these attacks from 2014 Ukraine had invested in security and resilience. With the help of governments and international companies it was able to cope. Cyfirma, a company advising on cyber security, explains what was done:

For professional disciplines, "jargon" is essential in order to precisely express the meaning of the complex concepts used. However, since language can mislead as well as enlighten, it is just as important to carefully examine the terminology against the evidence, to ensure that it does serve a useful purpose. Perhaps this has never been so important as in our post-modern era, but this article makes very clear the eternal verity of objective truth. Thus, it appears, "kinetic" loses it's place in the lexicon. Or does it, entirely? In the UK, as successive defence reviews shrink the size of the professional army (almost a combat division) and the navy's surface fleet (with it's 1.5 aircraft carriers, ready at a moment's notice to launch a 100m fighter into Davy Jones' locker) because of the need to provide resources for non-kinetic, or hybrid or cyber warfare, or whatever, it may be worth remembering that, whilst computers can hack or be hacked, they generally do not land on your head from a great height. Other, kinetic, things do and at great cost to personnel and expensive equipment.

The distinction between cause and effect remains murky. The enormous effort Russia and China have already put into malware and the 'capture' of others' systems, means that the West is well versed in their approaches, but less so in the effects: the polarising of views on NATO matters little excepting its effects on how NATO works. The enhancement of friction is relevant only when artificial friction exceeds the natural sort. The ability to overload commanders' decision-making powers has not yet been detected and publicised.

In discussions of contemporary war, including the current one between Russia and Ukraine, one can find many references to \u2018kinetic warfare\u2019. This is a term that entered the military lexicon quite recently. A kinetic war is normally described as one involving the use of lethal force, though that might be thought to be a natural feature of all wars and not just a special sort. This raises the interesting question of what might constitute a \u2018non-kinetic war\u2019. In this post I consider how this kinetic/non-kinetic dichotomy, and other developments in the language used to describe contemporary conflict reflect an attempt to find a place for activities which can be hostile and hurtful but not necessarily lethal alongside those which are unambiguously lethal. As the most prominent of these is cyberattacks I conclude with an assessment of their limited impact in the Russo-Ukraine war.

The language military professionals use to talk about war reflects their need to manage its inherent complexity and chaos, often cloaking naturally brutish and vicious activities in technical terminology, a role \u2018kinetic\u2019 performs. In this they are perhaps not different from other professions, for example medicine, where ways must also be found to discuss deeply unpleasant subjects dispassionately, without constantly dwelling on their full human meaning. The tranquilising effect of the language is not helped by the military propensity for acronyms, especially when referring to weapons systems, which can make conversations bewildering, especially for those who don\u2019t know their ATACMS from their HIMARS (Army Tactical Missile System which can be fired from the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System).

Where lasting innovation has come in military language it tends to be because of the impact of new types of weapons or modes of warfare. The most obvious example of this came with the arrival of nuclear weapons in 1945. This was a transformational moment as the focus shifted from fighting wars to deterring them, leading to the generation of a whole set of new concepts \u2013 such as \u2018first and second strikes\u2019 and \u2018assured destruction.\u2019 The language of deterrence and escalation is present as we try to work out where Putin has his red lines and how far he is prepared to go if he thinks they are being crossed.

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