[Crack Lm Hash Nt Hash Decrypt
Amancio Mccrae
But, you can try every possible password, and see what the hash is of each password. Then, you have a list of all possible hashes, for all possible passwords from '0000' to '9999'. In that case, somewhere in that list of hashes is the one you are interested in: 'YOSGtSkJ41KX7K80FEmg+vme4ioLsp3qr28XU8nDQ9c='.
Note that your program has to hash the data in the same format as the password, which is 8 bytes of data, in the UTF-16LE encoding. Make sure you are hashing the same data format as the password was hashed with, or you'll never find a match.
I was reading a question about MD5, and it made me remember something that boggles me. Very simple question, and I'm sorry if it's not a good one. I just can't understand how you convert something to one thing using some algorithm, and there being no way to convert it back using the algorithm in reverse.
Here's a simple example: imagine an algorithm to compute the hash of a 10-digit number. The algorithm is "return the last 2 digits." If I take the hash of 8023798734, I get 34, but if all you had is the 34, you would have no way to tell what the original number is because the hashing algorithm discarded 8 digits worth of information. It's similar with MD5, except that the hash is computed via a complex procedure instead of just chopping off part of the data.
So then how can one hash be better than another? For one thing, different hash algorithms can be more or less resistant to collisions (when two inputs produce the same output). The probability of a collision is inversely related to the number of possible hash outputs. Collisions are an undesirable feature of hashes because if your data changes, you want the hash to change too, so one way to get a better hash algorithm is to use a hash with more possible outputs. In the digits example above, taking the last 4 digits instead of the last 2 digits reduces the probability of a collision with a given hash (technically called a preimage) to 1 in 10000 instead of 1 in 100, so it's more likely that all the 10-digit numbers in whatever set you have will have different hash values.
There's also the issue of cryptographic security. When you want to use a hash to make sure that some data is not tampered with, it's desirable that whoever's doing the tampering can't predict what inputs will produce a given output. If they could, they would be able to alter the input data in such a way that the output (the hash) remains the same. Going back to the digits example again, let's say I'm going to email you the number 1879483129 and it is critically important that this number gets to you unaltered. I might call you up and tell you the hash of the number, which would be 29, but since the "last 2 digits" algorithm is not cryptographically secure, a nefarious hacker could change the number en route to, say, 5555555529 and you wouldn't know the difference.
It's been shown that MD5 is not cryptographically secure (and SHA-1 is also compromised). That means that it is possible to find different inputs which correspond to any given output. It's still a fine algorithm for protecting against random bit flips and the like, but if there's a chance someone might want to intentionally corrupt your data, you should really use something more secure, like SHA-256 or greater, probably as part of an HMAC scheme.
In answer to the second part of your question (an answer to the first part having been more than adequately given by others above): MD5 is considered weak due the proofs of attacks against the cipher (i.e., changes that can be made in the plain-text that do not result in changes in the MD5 sum). Other hashing techniques may not be as easily susceptible to essentially arbitrary hash collisions (at least such arbitrary collisions have not, as yet, been shown to be possible with the SHA-2 set of hashes, etc.), and hence, an attacker is less likely to be able to replicate a hash hashed in a non-MD5 technique (theoretically, of course, hash collision attacks are possible against any hashing function; it would not succeed as a hashing function if this were not the case; the question is how easily an attacker can succeed in "faking" a "correct" plaintext, that is, one that hashes to the same hash value).
Incidentally, the MD5 sum of a plaintext is not necessarily safe because it contains "less" data or is "lossy", but because, from an arbitrary plaintext, it computes a sum-value within a fixed range (for plaintexts < 128 bits, the MD5 sum, in fact, contains more information than the plaintext...), and, therefore a number (theoretically infinite) of plaintext could all align to the same MD5 hash.
The main use of MD5, and similar cryptographic hash codes, is to encrypt passwords. In that case, I don't care whether it's possible to reconstruct the original string. All I care is whether I can construct any string that would hash to the same value.
Take a simplified example: Suppose our hash algorithm was "take the last two digits". So if my password is "12345678", the hash code is "78". Is there any way to go from "78" back to "12345678"? No. But if I'm hacking passwords, I don't care if I know what your original password was. I just want a password to let me in. So if I knew this was the algorithm, I'd say great, I'll use the password "99978". It hashes to "78", so the password validation algorithm will pass it, and I'm in.
Obviously MD5 is much more difficult to reverse, even in this "anything that will hash to the right value" sense, then a simplistic algorithm like "take the last two digits". But is it literally impossible? That puzzles me, too. So sure, information is discarded along the way. But couldn't I reverse to to an "any" value by filling in any random value at any point where information is discarded? I haven't looked at the actual algorithm for MD5. I presume it's not something easy to reverse, like change all the pluses to minues or something trivial like that, or somebody would have done it a long time ago. From the fact that there are millions of hackers out there who have tried to crack this, even if it is theoretically possible, it must be incredibly difficult.
Consider the following function: f(x) = xx. Now, given that you know f(x)=25, what is x? Well, the answer could be 5 or the answer could be -5. You cannot recover the input to f, because there exists some value in the range of f such that more than one element of the domain of f maps to that value under f. Consequently, the function f is non-invertible. The same concept applies to MD5; there are multiple inputs to the MD5 algorithm that will, despite being different inputs, yield the same hash value as a result. In other words, the MD5 algorith, like f(x)=xx, is not one-to-one and therefore not an invertible function.
However, this does not mean that you cannot recover the input to an MD5. It simply means you cannot recover the input to and MD5 with 100% certainty. To make this more concrete, let's look again at the function f(x)=x*x. Now what if I told you that for any given input to f the probability of it being positive is 99%? In that case, you could make a very good guess that a hash of 25 came from a value of 5, and not -5. This is, indeed, how people are able to break hash functions (including MD5, which is, it turns out, not a very good cryptographic hash function). When it comes to passwords, there are certain passwords which are used far more frequently than other passwords. All you need to do is take the MD5 of those password and compare it with some hash, and if they match, then it is a pretty reasonable guess that it came from that password.
An attack is known against MD5 which makes it possible for the attacker to create multiple documents with different contents but the same MD5 hash. This attack is computationally feasible, and as a demonstration, is was used to "predict" the outcome of a presidential election. (The attacker published a hash before the election, then afterward revealed a document with that hash giving the winner's name. But actually the attacker had a document for each candidate, all with the same hash.)
An even worse system would allow an attack whereby given access to any hash, you could create a document with that hash. The venerable CRC system, which is still used in many hardware systems (think Ethernet), is vulnerable to this attack. Like MD5, it is a hash function in which the output is not reconstructable from the input, but given any output, it is trivial to construct a document with a given CRC-32 or CRC-64 signature. Worse, you can put any text you like in such a document, then get the CRC you want just by adding junk at the end.
You might be thinking that one could just find collisions by calculating the hashes of random messages until you eventually get the same result twice. However, you'd be underestimating the size of the space of possible hash values.
However, some hash algorithms like MD5 have weaknesses that allow attackers to reverse it (i.e. find a message with a given hash) with significantly less effort compared to just brute force attempts. MD5 is considered completely broken in this regard.
Essentially, the bit operations involved mean that reversing it would be technically infeasible. In order to construct a set of outputs, you would require insane time complexity and huge memory complexity. It's not impossible at all - but it doesn't have to be, merely beyond the power of even our best supercomputers by a mile.
Most of the answers don't hit the real point of the question: the hashing transformations are non linear, and as such are very difficult (but not impossible, given enough computational power and time) to reverse.
Think about the relative difficulty of squaring a number and getting the square root. Add to that that you just have partial information and all the missing bits are important to yield the correct answer (not as in the example of cropping a number).
The MD5 message-digest algorithm is a widely used hash function producing a 128-bit hash value. Although MD5 was initially designed to be used as a cryptographic hash function, it has been found to suffer from extensive vulnerabilities. It can still be used as a checksum to verify data integrity, but only against unintentional corruption. It remains suitable for other non-cryptographic purposes, for example for determining the partition for a particular key in a partitioned database. The weaknesses of MD5 have been exploited in the field, most infamously by the Flame malware in 2012. The CMU Software Engineering Institute considers MD5 essentially cryptographically broken and unsuitable for further use. MD5 Decrypt.
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