MV Prinsendam
David Ring
the SOS from ms PRINSENDAM/PJTA.
I don't see how his version regarding USCG Commsta Kodiak, NOJ and the
SOS differs from me other than he says that it was CAMSPAC (then USCG
Commsta San Francisco) was the first to alert the USCG Pacific Area
Search and Rescue Center for which they should be acknowledged.
In reading the write up on my web page, www.qsl.net/n1ea/ I see this:
The vessel's master declared the fire out of control one hour later
and the Prinsendam sent a radio call requesting immediate assistance.
The United States Coast Guard at Communications Station Kodiak, Alaska
(NOJ) requested that the ms Prinsendam send out an SOS, the Captain
declined, but Chief Radio Officer, Jack van der Zee sent out one
anyway about a half hour later which resulted in the alerting of
nearby vessels, such as the 1100 foot supertanker, Williamsburgh which
was operated by Avon Marine of Lake Success, NY. Jack v.d. Zee kept
this secret until just before his death because what he did could have
resulted in loss of his Radio Officer's license - but by doing what he
did, he was responsible for saving the lives of all aboard. The Queen
of the Netherlands was just about to give Jack lifetime knighthood for
his actions when he died. Jack van der Zee is a true hero of the
Netherlands..
I haveI have a tape recording of this being said on the MF WT working
frequency with them both. I didn't hear that of course, because I
only commenced listening after the auto alarm bells rang and I was
awoken by a telephone call by our chief R/O, J.N. Phister to come to
the R/R quickly!
I have a recording of the XXX that was given to me by the USCG Commsta
Kodiak/NOJ and I had thought that it was posted along with the SOS
from Prinsendam on this groups WT recordings page
http://mikea.ath.cx/www.n1ea.coastalradio.org.uk/index.html
but it looks like it was not.
Actually should the recording show that what RM Fisher says, it would
be even more support for what J.A.A. van der Zee told me on the
telephone (and also R/O Dirk Harms (PA2DH) who spoke to him in Dutch).
I have listened to the XXX recording several times, and I must have
missed this important detail. My recollection that CRO v.d. Zee told
me on October 5, 1980 when he was in the R/R of the Williamsburgh
talking to J.N. Pfister and myself that the USCG had told him to
broadcast the SOS. This made sense because because of the time of
night (midnight) only an SOS could be preceeded by the auto alarm
signal and awaken the sleeping R/Os and put them on watch.
I will try to post the recording as soon as possible - check back
during the day. I will post it to the TOP of the page so that it can
be played, but unless you need to play it instead of downloading it
and saving it and then playing, I ask that you do so as the repeated
playings costs money to our host provider. In other words, PLEASE
save the file then play.
I will keep you posted on this.
73
DR
---------- QSP ----------
From: Bryan Fisher <marin...@yahoo.com>
Date: Thu, Feb 28, 2008 at 12:53 AM
Subject: MV Prinsendam
To: N1...@arrl.net
Dear Sir,
I noted with great interest your webpage regarding the MV Prinsendam.
I have looked at the log for WILLIAMSBURG and your description of
events, which are obviously accurate. But I have other information to
give you - admittedly, from my own memory - that you may find
interesting.
As it happens, I was on watch at Coast Guard Communication Station
(now CAMSPAC) San Francisco, Point Reyes Station, California on the
night PRINSENDAM sent her SOS. I was manning the HF AMVER CW position
and my friend RM3 Mike McIlwain was at the 500kHz position. I was
walking in and out of the CW booth (3 positions in one) delivering OBS
messages I had copied to our teletype operator when Mike suddenly sat
up, pressed his earphone to one ear with one hand and gestured to me
with the other. He told me that he was copying an XXX (urgency
message) from PJTA, who was reporting a fire onboard. He noted that
PJTA was in communication with USCG Commsta Kodiak/NOJ and had shifted
off 500kHz to their MF working frequency, but he was shaking his head
because the operator at NOJ was evidently new and/or a little inept
and seemed unable to copy PJTA's message; the operator at NOJ kept
asking for repeats.
Finally, PJTA told NOJ (I remember this clearly) "QTA XXX NOW UP 500
FOR SOS" Evidently the operator was either tired of trying to get
through to NOJ or his onboard situation had changed (from your
narrative, I will now assume that he had made his own decision to go
ahead and send the SOS). We dialed up 500kHz on two positions and had
two operators copy the PJTA's initial SOS message, then I took it out
to the landline operator, who dispatched it to the USCG Pacific Area
SAR Center by the SARPAC teletype loop. I'm sure that by this time
NOJ had put a more senior operator on 500kHz, since PJTA and NOJ were
now communication like (pardon the expression) a house on fire. But
we at NMC were actually the first station to notify our Pacific SAR
controller of the sitatuation.
This is trivial in nature, and of course the lion's share of the
credit goes to the units in Alaska (NOJ, USCGC BOUTWELL, AirSta Kodiak
and/or Sitka (I think), as well as the tanker WILLIAMSBURG and others)
but I just wanted you to know that their signals were copied, and
appropriate notifications were made, by NMC that night.
73s OM
Bryan Fisher
ex-RMC, USCG
________________________________
Looking for last minute shopping deals? Find them fast with Yahoo! Search.
R/O David Ring - N1EA
uploaded to the 500 kHz WT sound files server and can be accessed by
going to that page: http://mikea.ath.cx/www.n1ea.coastalradio.org.uk/index.html
Secondly but MOST importantly is this:
I listened to the recording again - stupid me - I soon realized that
the recording was that from the "turtle logger" at NOJ - the very slow
speed recorder which was used by organizations needing to record tapes
- like police dispatchers etc. Usually they recorded for 8 hours and
were changed at the end of a shift.
But while I was recording, I was thinking. The only thing I heard
about the XXX broadcast from Prinsendam/PJTA was from Chief Radio
Officer J.A.A. van der Zee, and I was sure that he told me that the
USCG told him to send a SOS on 500 kHz.
Well, he did. Remember, he kept it a secret for over 20 years what he
had done by sending the SOS on his own authority.
If CRO v.d. Zee had told me that he had told the USCG that he was
going up on 500 kHz for SOS, it would perhaps led to questions from
CRO Pfister or myself.
The initial announcement of the XXX is on this recording, but NOJ
shifted PJTA off to 480/470. CRO v.d. Zee didn't send the XXX as a
CQ, he called NOJ and told him he had XXX traffic. But instead of his
saying that he was going up to 500 for a CQ XXX, he said up for SOS on
500 kHz.
Very interesting and this makes a lot of sense knowing what v.d. Zee
was keeping secret for so long.
73
DR
David Ring
I will make my reply to him via the list as soon as this posts.
73
DR
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Bryan Fisher <marin...@yahoo.com>
Date: Thu, Feb 28, 2008 at 2:59 AM
Subject: Re: MV Prinsendam
To: David Ring <n1...@arrl.net>
Dear David,
Given what you've told me, the sequence makes perfect sense. Where I
witnessed this was (a) extreme DX, and (b) secondhand, standing next
to the 500 operator as he relayed what was going on to me (although I
could hear the code transmissions). When you describe the situation,
it seems possible that NOJ might have advised PJTA to go back up to
500khz and send an SOS and Mike McIlwain may not have mentioned it to
me.
My only problem is that the Coast Guard has no more authority to
'order' a radio operator to send an SOS (overriding the authority of
the vessel's master) than the operator has to send one of his own
volition (although you've already described PJTA's R/O's decision in
this regard, and circumstances proved that his decision was correct).
So I strongly suspect we were listening at the moment when Mr. van der
Zee actually made the decision to send an SOS and advised us all "QTA
XXX NOW UP 500 FOR SOS." We gathered from the QSO with NOJ that the
fire had gotten out of control, and that's why he was shifting back to
500 to generate his SOS.
I don't mean to dispute Mr. van der Zee's assertion that he was
'ordered' to send SOS, but it would make sense that he might seek some
other reason for having done so of his own accord.
73s
BDF
David Ring
Thanks for the additional information - it will even become clearer
for you as it has for me this very day! I finally got another piece
of the puzzle about the Prinsendam and Chief Radio Officer Jack van
der Zee. CRO v.d. Zee lied to us as part of the cover up.
Yes, I am sure Jack lied to the CRO JP and myself.when he was in the
R/R of the WILLIAMSBURGH/WGOA. I didn't not even think of that for
the past 27 years. (See your last paragraph, below.). For all these
years, I just didn't have this piece of the puzzle.
CRO Jack van der Zee lied to us - it was part of the cover up. In
retrospect, it makes even better sense.
v.d. Zee was not new to the profession - he knew as all of us merchant
seamen Radio Officers do - no one except for military ships and
someone coming on watch to send a message for the Old Man (Captain)
would hear an XXX.. He knew (I'm sure ALL of us on the list know
this!) that the Autoalarm could only be used 1) On land to announce a
cyclone or typhoon which was on water or soon to be on water, 2) from
a ship to announce a "Man Overboard" message, 2) from a ship to send a
distress message, 4) from either ship or shore to relay a distress
message according to the provisions of ITU or national regulations.
We all knew that - so did CRO
Part of the problem was that the Captain according to CRO v.d. Zee
didn't want to send out an SOS. Others on the ship have expressed
doubt that this was so, but this latest information as well as
evidence of the XXX (urgent signal) from PRINSENDAM being sent with a
message that "everyone" knew should have been sent out as SOS. It
wasn't a case of incorrect preceedance and coding by the radio officer
clerk. The message was an SOS that the Captain didn't want to send
out as SOS, so Jack v.d. Zee took the only option he had: He sent it
as an XXX.
USCG RM Fisher says that the CRO of the PRINSENDAM was frustrated by
the inexperienced and slow operator on duty at USCG Commsta Kodiak.
RM Fisher also assums that the USCG put a better operator on the
circuit. They didn't. Soon PRINSENDAM had lost their emergency power
panel to the Bridge and Radio Room, and CRO van der Zee was on battery
lights, battery receiver, and battery transmitter, the Bidge had no
power - the mains were gone first, then the emergency panel from the
emergency generator.
By this time the situation was obviously worse, we now had a passenger
ship without steerage, propulsion or electrical power with both main
and emergency generator systems having failed. It was obvious that
the fire could not be contained without power as that meant that there
would be no fire pumps.
Most Captains didn't know the details about the use of the Auto Alarm
(which rings after a correct four dash sequence is received), but any
CRO or anyone who has taken his Wireless Telegraphy examinations for
T2 license knows this. They also had TTT XXX and SOS and what each
meant at many times in their studies and at work.
So it was up to CRO van der Zee to instruct the Captain in the use of
the auto alarm - only SOS can it be used. XXX for medical assistance
or serious navigation message or warning, didn't apply, nor could it
be used for TTT. Just SOS.
Chief Radio Officer Jack v.d. Zee knew better. That was the missing
item. His story about the USCG telling him that he should send an SOS
on 500 kHz (good advice though) was something to mislead us.
CRO v.d. Zee tried to convince the Captain, but he was told to send
not as SOS. So he did that.
Perhaps the USCG told him that they had no resources near by and told
him that the best he could do was to send an SOS. It still is
plausable, but unlikely. I'll let you USCG men tackle that.
Remember Morse radiotelegraphy is sometimes shorthand - that message
would have been informal. "BEST FOR YOU TO SEND SOS ON 500 KHZ OM"
would have been recognized as meaning the best thing PJTA could do was
send SOS on 500 kHz.
Maybe this was said - my recording only has the 500 kHz call of PJTA,
not his conversation with Kodiak / NOJ.
I've puzzled for years with the "USCG told me to send SOS on 500 kHz"
- foreign ships aren't under the USCG, USA ships have different
requirements which are tempered by the USCG and the US ship are the
same nation. I'll let the Navigation officers and Maritime Admiralty
lawyers among you answer that (I expect some of you Admiralty lawyers
to answer!)
Looking back, I see that it was very doubtful that Jack misunderstood.
Jack then told me that he told the Captain that the USCG told him that
they should send an SOS.
This is where the story gets fuzzy for me. I can't remember if Jack
went twice to the Captain and told him that he needed to send an SOS.
Maybe JP (J.N. Pfister who was the CRO) can recall.
Either Jack went again to the Captain or he didn't. I think he
probably did, I would have.
But evidentially according to Jack the Captain still didn't want to
send out the SOS.
Or maybe Jack was just too frustrated by the USCG Morse operator who
couldn't copy 18 words per minute signals, and sent out his "own" SOS
and signed "Master".
Eventually Jack had to tell the Captain as his Captain and my Captain
(the late Arthur H. Fertig) in the radio room on 2182 kHz.
When the PRINSENDAM was sending out SOS by battery, I saw the
situation clearly: Burning ship, 500 plus people on board, fire
spreading, no pumps no electricity.
I asked him if I could take over the SOS for him. He said yes, and
then I told the operator at USCG Commsta that "if you don't put a
competent operator on this circuit within five minutes, I will take
over the SOS myself.
Five minutes went by, I called Kodiak / NOJ and it he still couldn't
copy 10 wpm.
This was not time for novices We can not do SOS with 500 people and
send only 10 words in a minute.
I then sent out the first of my three auto alarms. According to our
FCC these auto alarms were received by 350 ships and even as far as
New Zealand. During the day, KPH was copying my signals from my
transmitter - and due to a relay failure the only transmitter I could
use was the 60 watt battery transmitter. From the Gulf of Alaska to
San Francisco during 12:00 noon and to New Zealand at night with 60
watts from a battery transmitter is fabulous - it shows what 500 kHz
can - and did - do.
73
DR
On Thu, Feb 28, 2008 at 2:59 AM, Bryan Fisher <marin...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Dear David,
>
> Given what you've told me, the sequence makes perfect sense. Where I
> witnessed this was (a) extreme DX, and (b) secondhand, standing next to the
> 500 operator as he relayed what was going on to me (although I could hear
> the code transmissions). When you describe the situation, it seems possible
> that NOJ might have advised PJTA to go back up to 500khz and send an SOS and
> Mike McIlwain may not have mentioned it to me.
>
> My only problem is that the Coast Guard has no more authority to 'order' a
> radio operator to send an SOS (overriding the authority of the vessel's
> master) than the operator has to send one of his own volition (although
> you've already described PJTA's R/O's decision in this regard, and
> circumstances proved that his decision was correct). So I strongly suspect
> we were listening at the moment when Mr. van der Zee actually made the
> decision to send an SOS and advised us all "QTA XXX NOW UP 500 FOR SOS."
> We gathered from the QSO with NOJ that the fire had gotten out of control,
> and that's why he was shifting back to 500 to generate his SOS.
>
> I don't mean to dispute Mr. van der Zee's assertion that he was 'ordered' to
> send SOS, but it would make sense that he might seek some other reason for
> having done so of his own accord.
>
> 73s
>
> BDF
>
>
R/O David Ring - N1EA
73
DR
---------- QTC ----------
From: Matthew Oosterwijk
Date: Thu, Feb 28, 2008 at 11:41 AM
Subject: Re: MV Prinsendam
To: David Ring <n...@arrl.net>
David,
Thanks for your emil, which I must say the least that is is very
interesting and I look very much forward to see your communication
(and hear it of course).
What I do miss in this email is thementioning of times, either gmt or
Ship's time or local time at the various shore installations. It s not
that I wish to dispute what transpired at the time and not to
contradict anything that may have been said/sent and on whose orders.
Yes, I have asked you initially about information on this radio
subject, you being a radio officer at the time, but then again on the
other hand after now reaching the final stages of my little book that
I decided to write (and which is supposed to be published in the 2nd
part of this year both in the Dutch and english languages), I do wish
to remain with the set up of the book, which the description of MY
PERSONAL EXPERIENCES AT THE TIME OF THE FIRE AND SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS
UNTIL THE END OF THE VESSEL.
Yes, of course, I do know a lot of stories from shipmates, colleagues
within the company, reporters and other maritime inclined persons, of
what they did, heard or thought to have understood about the entire
situation.
So therefore I think in order to keep it as fair as possible to all
and seeing that Jack has passed away and can no longer confirm his
actions at the time and on whoese orders/requests, and it should
therefore not form an important section of this book.
For your information I have made a short comment in the book:
[There is a persistent story that indicates that the Chief Radio
Officer, Mr. J. van der Zee issued the SOS message on his own, without
the apparent instructions to do so by the vessel's Captain.
Unfortunately the Chief Radio Officer is no longer among us, so full
and final clarification will not be able to be written down.]
I think this comment is correct and void of any type of accusations
towards others involved either on board or ashore.
Kind regards,
Matthew
--
M.J. Oosterwijk,
R/O David Ring - N1EA
moment that there IS one other person that I know who copied the XXX.
That person was Chief Radio Officer of the WILLIAMSBURGH/WGOA - James
N. Pfister who is a member of this list. (I expect you to tell us
your recollections, Jim!)
He was also with me when JAA van der Zee spoke to us about the XXX and
SOS in the Radio Room of WILLIAMSBURGH.
So hopefully we will have some more information on this subject.
73
DR
Glenn Dunstan
Fascinating, Dave.
After reading this thread, I have to say that if I was in the same
situation, I would have sent an SOS - whether the old man wanted to or not.
And, I wouldn't have lied about it, nor blamed anyone else for 'ordering me
to do it'.
Rgds
Glenn
Kilobravo
I really cant see why the R/O on the PJTA would be so worried about the fact
that he sent the SOS on his own authority.
I realize the "book" says only on the authority of the Master, but you can't
always go by the book, which was proven in this incident.
Do you think they would have taken away his ticket???
I think the authorities, would have ruled in his favor if that situation
would have been cause for some inquiry regarding his conduct.
73
KB
Bryan Fisher
I'm sorry but I have to disagree with you. In spite of the extenuating circumstances, it is NEVER the R/O's responsibility to override the master/captain and send signals, especially distress signals, of his own accord. If we agree that the R/O has that discretion, we set a very dangerous precedent for the entire maritime communications community and override an ancient and time-proven law of the sea - that the Captain of the ship is the final, overriding authority in any vessel.
I see how the decision by PJTA's R/O was exonerated by the rescue of every soul on board...but I still disagree with his decision on principle, and as a long-time seagoing radio operator and radioman-in-charge.
73
BDF
Kilobravo <kbur...@eastlink.ca> wrote:
Never miss a thing. Make Yahoo your homepage.
Ian Keyser
David Ring
rooms nearby the Radio Room, I might do as Jack v.d. Zee did - but I
would accept the situation that I'd loose my license and go to jail.
The very real alternative was that Jack would have died in the
terrible weather that was experienced later that night. Death at the
telegraph key or death from exposure in a life boat are no fun. I'd
rather be alive in jail than dead from the SOS. Throw the book at me,
but the people, crew and myself would be alive. I'd bet that he would
have gotten a pardon from the Queen of the Netherlands.
On board the Prinsendam there was the fight between the "Hotel
Captain" and the Master. I and others have long disagreed with giving
the "Hotel Captain" such status as four stripes. This could be
moderated by giving the "Hotel Captain" position for a navigation
officer who took hotel management courses, signing him on the shipping
articles as a "Third Officer" or 3rd mate - non-watch standing - and
giving him an arm decoration of a wide single gold decoration -
impressive to say the least, but a reminder to him that he was a 3/O.
There is a difference between a 3/O who has a 8 cm wide single band
gold braid on his arm who runs the Hotel for the Company under the
authority of the ship's Master, and a Hotel manager who is
non-maritime in training, who wears the 4 stripes of the Captain and
who entertains in the dining room as "The Captain".
Perhaps the decoration should be a wide red braid with a small gold
ribbon through it - the ribbon being the same as a 3/O. This would
tend to remind him and others that he has authority, as the hotel
manager, but also as a 3/O. But only that- as an officer, only that
as a 3/O.
Such arguments which happened on the Prinsendam between the 4 stripe
Hotel Manager and the ship's Master over the opening of the fire
screen doors would have been avoided, and perhaps the vessel could
have contained the fire in due time when the temperature of the Engine
Room had cooled. As I understand it, the Hotel Manager in seeking to
allow the passengers on deck to return to inside the ship bow beat the
poor Captain until he was exasperated and gave the orders that the
fire screen doors were to be opened in the dining room.
I also understand that when the ship was retrofitted some how hot
engine room spaces were placed under the dining room without
sufficient insulation. This never made sense to me because it would
seem to me that the entire structure immediately above the E/R would
always be insulated to prevent heat conveyance and that ventalation
systems would be installed throughout the engine spaces to reduce the
engine heat throughout the E/R spaces.
Johan Onnink of Holland-America Line is a member of this group,
perhaps he could comment and clarify this matter.
73
DR
Matthew Oosterwijk
Regarding the remarks made in your email concerning the fire screen doors having been opened or not I can only comment (and would assume confirmation from John Onnink) that yes a number of fire screen doors were opened again after they had been closed centrally from the bridge. This was done by the order of the vessel's Master, after a request from the Hotel Manager. However, I do emphasize here that this concerned mainly the fire screen doors on the Promenade Deck. The reason was rather simple, namely to establish a draft of air to dissipate the smoke in the Lounge and Lido areas. These were the areas where the pasengers were congegrated at the time. SO THIS SEEMS A PROPER DECISION TO A REQUEST MADE. It should also be clear that opening this minimal amount of doors had no physicslimpact on the developing fire within the vessel.
M.J. Oosterwijk,
7, Staghorn Coral Road, Beacon Hill,
St. Maarten, Neth. Antilles
Tel: 00599-545-2512
Cell: 00599-523-2318
Email: matthew.o...@gmail.com
Spud Roscoe
Glenn Dunstan
I'm terribly sorry, perhaps it is my Australian nature, but I was never one
to sit timidly in the radio room, waiting patiently for the old man to give
me messages.
As for going to jail for sending an SOS....hardly.
I would not have hesitated, and would have been more than happy to tell all
that I sent the SOS, on my own authority.
-----Original Message-----
From: radio-o...@googlegroups.com
[mailto:radio-o...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of David Ring
Sent: Friday, 29 February 2008 02:20
To: Bryan Fisher
Cc: Kilobravo; Radio Officers &c; Onnink, Johan (HAL); HPA...@aol.com; Mark
D. Heleniak
Subject: [Radio Officers, &c] Re: MV Prinsenda
Bryan Fisher
73
BDF
Glenn Dunstan <gl...@gmdss.com.au> wrote:
David Ring
73
DR
Ian Keyser
----- Original Message -----From: Bryan Fisher