1965 Coup Indonesia

[Elder Raman]

The Thirtieth of September Movement (Indonesian: Gerakan 30 September, also known as G30S, and by the syllabic abbreviation Gestapu for Gerakan September Tiga Puluh, Thirtieth of September Movement, also unofficially called Gestok, for Gerakan Satu Oktober, or First of October Movement) was a self-proclaimed organization of Indonesian National Armed Forces members. In the early hours of 1 October 1965, they assassinated six Indonesian Army generals in an abortive coup d'tat.[1] Later that morning, the organisation declared that it was in control of media and communication outlets and had taken President Sukarno under its protection. By the end of the day, the coup attempt had failed in Jakarta. Meanwhile, in central Java there was an attempt to take control over an army division and several cities. By the time this rebellion was put down, two more senior officers were dead.

In the days and weeks that followed, the army, socio-political, and religious groups blamed the coup attempt on the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Soon a mass purge was underway, which resulted in the imprisonment and deaths of many actual or suspected Communist Party members and sympathizers. Under the New Order, the movement was usually referred to as "G30S/PKI" by those wanting to associate it with the PKI, and this term is also sometimes used by the current government.[2]

Investigations and questioning of Suharto's version of the events were long obstructed in Indonesia. While the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) initially believed that Sukarno orchestrated all of it,[3] several outside sources found inconsistencies and holes in the army claims, notably Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey who wrote the Cornell Paper that challenged it.[4][5]

From the late 1950s, President Sukarno's position came to depend on balancing the opposing and increasingly hostile forces of the army and the PKI. His "anti-imperialist" ideology made Indonesia increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union and, particularly, China. By 1965, at the height of the Cold War, the PKI extensively penetrated all levels of government. With the support of Sukarno and the air force, the party gained increasing influence at the expense of the army, thus ensuring the army's enmity.[6] By late 1965, the army was divided between a left-wing faction allied with the PKI and a right-wing faction that was being courted by the United States.[7]

In need of Indonesian allies in its Cold War against the Soviet Union, the United States cultivated a number of ties with officers of the military through exchanges and arms deals. This fostered a split in the military's ranks, with the United States and others backing a right-wing faction against a left-wing faction leaning towards the PKI.[8]

When Sukarno rejected food aid from USAID, thereby exacerbating famine conditions, the right-wing military adopted a regional command structure through which it could smuggle staple commodities to win the loyalty of the starving rural population. In an attempt to curtail the right-wing military's increasing power, the PKI and the left-wing military formed a number of peasant and other mass organisations.[citation needed]

At around 3:15 am on 1 October, seven detachments of troops in trucks and buses dispatched by Lieutenant Colonel Untung Syamsuri (commander of Tjakrabirawa, the presidential guard), comprising troops from the Tjakrabirawa Regiment (Presidential Guards), the Diponegoro (Central Java), and Brawijaya (East Java) Divisions, left the movement's base at Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force Base, just south of Jakarta to kidnap seven generals, all members of the Army General Staff.[10][11] Three of the intended victims, (Minister/Commander of the Army Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani, Major General M. T. Haryono, and Brigadier General D. I. Pandjaitan) were killed at their homes, while three more (Major General Soeprapto, Major General S. Parman, and Brigadier General Sutoyo) were taken alive. Meanwhile, their main target, Coordinating Minister of Defense and Security and Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Abdul Haris Nasution managed to escape the kidnap attempt by jumping over a wall into the Iraqi embassy garden. However his personal aide, First Lieutenant Pierre Tendean, was captured after being mistaken for Nasution in the dark.[10][12] Nasution's five-year-old daughter, Ade Irma Suryani Nasution, was shot by the assault group and died on 6 October.[13] In addition a police officer guarding Nasution's neighbour, Police Chief Brigadier Karel Sadsuitubun, was shot and killed by the kidnapping group. A final victim was Albert Naiborhu, General Pandjaitan's nephew, who was killed during the raid on the General's home. The generals and the bodies of their dead colleagues were taken to a place known as Lubang Buaya near Halim where those still alive were tortured before being shot dead. The bodies of all the victims were then thrown down a disused well near the base.[10][14][15]

Following the news at 7 am, RRI broadcast a message from Lieutenant Colonel Untung Syamsuri, commander of the 1st Honor Guard Battalion (Army), Tjakrabirawa Regiment, to the effect that the 30 September Movement, an internal army organization, had taken control of strategic locations in Jakarta, with the help of other military units. They proclaimed that this was to forestall a coup attempt by a 'Generals' Council' aided by the Central Intelligence Agency, intent on removing Sukarno on Armed Forces Day, 5 October.[16] It was also stated that President Sukarno was under the movement's protection. Sukarno traveled to Halim 'after learning that there were troops near the Palace on the north side of Lapangan Merdeka' and also claimed (later) 'that this was so he could be near an aircraft should he need to leave Jakarta'. Further radio announcements from RRI later that day listed 45 members of the G30S Movement and stated that all army ranks above Lieutenant Colonel would be abolished.[17][18] While at Halim, the president met with AVM Dani and the other service commanders remaining to plan for a replacement to the post of Commander of the Army which was by now vacant.

At 5.30 am, Suharto, commander of the Army's Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD), was woken up by his neighbor[19] and told of the disappearances of the generals and the shootings at their homes. He went to Kostrad HQ and tried to contact other senior officers. He managed to contact and to ensure the support of the commanders of the Navy and the National Police, but was unable to contact the Air Force Commander. He then took command of the Army and issued orders confining all troops to their barracks.

Because of poor planning, the coup leaders had failed to provide provisions for the troops on Lapangan Merdeka, who were becoming hot and thirsty. They were under the impression that they were guarding the president in the palace. Over the course of the afternoon, Suharto persuaded both battalions to give up without a fight, first the Brawijaya battalion, who came over to Kostrad HQ, then the Diponegoro troops, which withdrew to Halim. His troops gave Untung's forces inside the radio station an ultimatum and they also withdrew. By 7 pm Suharto was in control of all the installations previously held by the 30 September Movement's forces. Now joined by Nasution, at 9 pm he announced over the radio that he was now in command of the Army and that he would destroy the counter-revolutionary forces and save Sukarno. He then issued another ultimatum, this time to the troops at Halim. Later that evening, Sukarno left Halim and arrived in Bogor, where there was another presidential palace.[20][21]

Most of the rebel troops fled, and after a minor battle in the early hours of 2 October, the Army regained control of Halim, Aidit flew to Yogyakarta and Dani to Madiun before the soldiers arrived.[21]

It was only on 4 October when the bodies of all seven casualties were recovered from the well in which they were thrown at Lubang Buaya. They were buried in a state burial on 5 October, Armed Forces Day, preceded by an address by Nasution. All seven Army officers and the police brigadier were, by order of President Sukarno, officially declared the very same day as Heroes of the Revolution posthumously per Presidential Decision No. 111/KOTI/1965.[22]

Following the 7 am radio broadcast on RRI, troops from the Diponegoro Division in Central Java took control of five of the seven battalions and other units in the name of the 30 September movement.[23] The PKI mayor of Solo, Utomo Ramelan, issued a statement in support of the movement.[24] Rebel troops in Yogyakarta, led by Major Muljono, kidnapped and later killed Col. Katamso and his chief of staff Lt. Col. Sugiyono. However, once news of the movement's failure in Jakarta became known, most of its followers in Central Java gave themselves up.[21] On 5 October, both Katamso and Sugiyono, the commander and executive officer of the 72nd Military Area at the time of their murders, were also posthumously named Heroes of the Revolution.[22]

Suharto and his associates immediately blamed the PKI as masterminds of the 30 September Movement. With the support of the Army, and fueled by horrific tales of the alleged torture and mutilation of the generals at Lubang Buaya, anti-PKI demonstrations and then violence soon broke out. Violent mass action started in Aceh, then shifted to Central and East Java.[25] Suharto then sent the RPKAD paratroops under Col. Sarwo Edhie to Central Java. When they arrived in Semarang, locals burned the PKI headquarters to the ground.[26] The army swept through the countryside and were aided by locals in killing suspected communists. In East Java, members of Ansor Youth Movement, the youth wing of the Nahdlatul Ulama went on a killing frenzy, and the slaughter later spread to Bali. Figures given for the number of people killed across Indonesia vary from 78,000 to one million.[27] Among the dead was Aidit, who was captured by the Army on 25 November and summarily executed shortly after.[28][29] Recently released records from the United States Department of State indicate that the U.S. embassy in Jakarta tracked the killings of these leftists, and that U.S. officials "actively supported" the efforts of the Indonesian Army to quell the labor movement.[30]

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