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System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration.
And then Boeing fired the mechanics, and then the doors started blowing off of Boeing airplanes, and then Boeing was worth 40 billion dollars less than it was before the doors blew off its airplanes.
So the analysts crunched more numbers. If another door blows off of another airplane, they estimated, the FAA will require us to ground 12 percent of our fleet. Revenue will decline by between 15 and 18 percent over the next two quarters. Our stock will lose another 40 to 50 billion dollars. We will all get fired. A report was produced that contained many alarming charts.
First - I am sad to hear of the events of this week, and at the same time I feel like I had excellent timing in my own departure. Second - I appreciate that you make something as serious as the Boeing situation with doors blowing off planes hilariously funny to read about. Third - only you could figure out a way to weave major current event headlines (Boeing's shitshow, Kahneman's passing and What Went down on Wednesday) into a thought provoking and truly engaging read for this week. Whatever you find yourself doing in the coming weeks (spending quality time with family, pursuing other interests and exploring options), I hope this substack remains a constant. I feel incredibly privileged to have worked with you, albeit only briefly and in an at best tangential manner, and I will continue to be an avid fan of Benn.substack, as I have been a loyal subscriber for well over a year and get truly excited every Friday to read this.
First, oops. Second, for the sake of my career prospects after I return from spending more time with my family,1 a counterpoint: Analytics is not a Ponzi scheme! That post was some moron trying to go after us with false rumors. Analytics is fine. We have a long history of creating shareholder value, and that remains true today. And I\u2019d love it, fellow optimists, if we could work together for the ecosystem.
System 1 is reactive, and makes decisions instinctively. While this system can be trained\u2014it includes \u201Clearned skills such as reading and understanding nuances of social situations,\u201D which are hard when we\u2019re young but eventually become reflexive\u2014it isn\u2019t driven by the careful study of a particular situation. Instead, it responds automatically, using assumptions that we develop about how the world works.
When we think about thinking, Kahneman says, \u201Cwe identify with System 2, the conscious reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think about and what to do.\u201D Though we might assume that this second system\u2014our brain\u2019s logical processor\u2014constructs the mental models that System 1 uses, the opposite is true: Much of System 2 is built by System 1. The impressions and feelings that originate from System 1 \u201Care the main sources of the explicit beliefs and deliberate choices of System 2.\u201D According to Kahneman, in the study of how we make decisions, we often focus on the analytical brain\u2014but the real action is in the autonomous brain.2
Organizations, I\u2019d say, think in an analogous way.3 Some decisions are made relatively slowly, with intention, and based on reasoned analysis. But most decisions are made quickly and instinctively, based on heuristics, experience, and some rough estimation of how the company works. For example, a business that struggles to bring in new customers with Facebook ads will eventually decide that online advertising doesn\u2019t work for their market\u2014and that will become an unspoken operational assumption that everyone \u201Cjust knows.\u201D If a CEO talks loudly about their product\u2019s usability issues, people will begin to assume that product quality is one of their organizational weaknesses. If an executive spends too much time on Hacker News, they\u2019ll make decisions based on the principle that they should do things that don\u2019t scale, or that a company\u2019s market matters more than their product, or that the best leadership teams are the ones that fight.4
When we talk about helping a company make better decisions\u2014and particularly when data teams talk about it\u2014we\u2019re naturally drawn to improving how well System 2 works, and how it can counteract the impulsive nature of System 1. We need to rely less on intuition and more on insight, we say; we need everyone to be more comfortable reasoning about data. We need to invite more analysts into the rooms in which decisions get made. In many ways, this is how analysts define our jobs\u2014to be System 2.
But I think that\u2019s misguided, and why a lot of analysts are often frustrated by their position on the corporate seating chart. One of the key arguments in Thinking, Fast and Slow is that we can neither outrun or out-reason System 1\u2019s unconscious engine. The same is true for how companies think: They have to make too many decisions to analyze all of them. No matter how fast we are or how good our tools get, most decisions will be made using System 1; we can\u2019t whack-a-mole them away, by putting an analyst in every room or a BI tool on every laptop.
Nor can ever fully override System 1. Once executives have theories about how the world works, developed by their professional experience and confirmed their professional success, a bean counter with a disagreeable spreadsheet is unlikely to change their mind.5 If we are the company\u2019s second system, we\u2019ll always be second chair.
A while ago, some Boeing executives developed a belief that Boeing planes were good, that their manufacturing standards were reliable, and that a variety of their quality assurance programs were more expensive than they needed to be. I imagine they asked some analysts to run the numbers: \u201CIf we cut some corners, will the doors start blowing off of our airplanes?\u201D
\u201CIt depends,\u201D the analysts probably responded. Today, we employ 300 door latch mechanics, and the probability of a door blowing off of an airplane this year is 0.456 percent. If we fire half of our mechanics, the probability of a door blowing off goes up to 1.661 percent. Here are various precise figures and statistics that say this might be dangerous.
\u201CEh,\u201D the executives must\u2019ve said, \u201C1.661 percent still sounds very low. It sounds like our general theory is right; we can still make good planes with good door latches even if we cut our safety program\u2019s budget. Plus, if we fire half of our mechanics, the probability of us saving 20 million dollars is 100 percent, which is a lot higher than 1.661 percent. George, fire the mechanics.\u201D
One way to look at this story7 is that executives made several data-driven decisions, based on the careful research of their analytics team. But that\u2019s almost certainly not what really happened? Though System 2 was present, it was overwhelmed by the executives\u2019 System 1 assumptions for how Boeing works\u2014first, that Boeing had highly reliable but overly expensive quality assurance programs, and then, all of the sudden, that product quality is an existential problem and that Boeing should put \u201Csafety and quality at the forefront of everything that we do.\u201D
Obviously, Boeing\u2019 executives didn\u2019t change their mind because of some analyst\u2019s report; they changed their mind because the doors started blowing off of their airplanes. Years ago, analytical warnings from engineers didn\u2019t change any executives\u2019 minds about the need to invest in quality and safety; now, I suspect, no amount of analysis could change their minds that anything matters more than quality and safety. And that\u2019s the point\u2014when companies make decisions, analysis will almost always be the lower order bit. The mental model dominates.
Today, if you ask an analyst what their job is, the Very Smart answer is that they help people make better decisions by providing them with actionable insight. We\u2019re at our best, we say, when we can study a strategic problem and make concrete recommendations about how to address it.
But these sorts of recommendations are individual fish. Best case, they\u2019ll feed a company for a day.8 The much more powerful thing that we could do is teach a company a theory\u2014or as Ahbi put it, our job shouldn\u2019t be to look for insights, but to mutate mental models.
In other words, we shouldn\u2019t work against an organization\u2019s System 1 thinking; we should work through it. Don\u2019t veto biased thinking; update the bias. Don\u2019t protect companies from making decisions with rough heuristics; make sure the heuristics are still current.
Which, easier said than done\u2014it took the several massive tragedies for Boeing\u2019s executives to update theirs. Still, for those of us who work on more trivial problems than keeping planes in the air, I think there are a couple relatively simple things we could all do to nudge ourselves in that direction.
I would keep a list of every comment I overheard in any discussion that sounded like an opinion, a thought, or a disagreement that I thought might possibly be proved, debunked, or clarified with some form of analysis. I would source these comments in meetings, water-cooler chats, over lunch, happy hour, or any other forum of discussion. Tune your ear, and you\u2019d be quite surprised at the number of conversations with no resolution, or worse yet, that decisions are made from unfounded, unproven opinions.
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