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On 2017-05-22 23:13, Jean-Philippe Ouellet wrote:
> On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 9:41 PM, Andrew David Wong <
a...@qubes-os.org> wrote:
>> On 2017-05-16 16:42,
hg...@e.shapoo.ch wrote:
>>> I verified signature about qubes ISO file by gpg.Then I burned it to DVD.
>>> But I can't trust that DVD was burned without corruption.
>>> So I want to verify integrity against the DVD too.
>>>
>>> Is someone know how to verify signature against DVD?
>>>
>>>
>>> At moment, I want my privacy to be protected.
>>>
https://mytemp.email/
>>>
>>
>> I'm not aware of a method to gpg --verify an ISO directly from a DVD
>> after it has been burned, but you can re-create the ISO from the DVD,
>> [1] then gpg --verify the re-created ISO. [2]
>>
>>
>> [1]
https://www.thomas-krenn.com/en/wiki/Create_an_ISO_Image_from_a_source_CD_or_DVD_under_Linux
>>
>> [2] If you're worried that the re-created ISO might not truly represent
>> what's on the DVD because you're worried that your software environment
>> might be compromised and lying to you, then I'd point out that the same
>> compromised software environment could also lie to you about the results
>> of verifying the DVD directly.
>
> IIRC it is legal and works as expected to pass a block device as the
> file to be verified with gpg, e.g.
> $ gpg --verify Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso.asc /dev/sr0
>
I could never get it to work for some reason.
> However, I know I have just done:
> $ sudo cat /dev/sr0 | sha256sum -
> and compared against a known-good hash.
> or
> $ sudo head -c $((1024*1024*4)) /dev/sr0 | sha256sum -
> in the case of larger devices (like flash drives) which do not report
> a certain size (like burned DVDs), and then verified that the rest of
> the media is zeroes (dd skip=...) because I'm paranoid like that and
> don't know what might read past the end of intentionally written data
> and what parsers it might reach.
>
> I'm happy to be corrected, but I do not see the need for re-creating
> an ISO on your disk unless you find your DVD to be wrong and want to
> do some forensics.
>
I mean, either way you're reading the contents of the disc. It's just a
matter of whether you write them (back) to the disk or pipe them
directly to whichever program is doing the verification, right? I don't
see any meaningful security gain from piping directly, since a
compromised environment could still be lying to you. Since I make lots
of mistakes, though, I'd probably prefer to have it on the disk so that
I don't have to re-read the whole disc when I inevitably screw up the
verification step the first time. :)
> Non-write-once media, or media with embedded computing capability and
> persistent and mutable state (like flash drives) have other concerns
> however.\
>
> Cheers,
> Jean-Philippe
>
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