Qubes Canary #12

[Andrew David Wong]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Dear Qubes community,

We have just published Qubes Canary #12. The text of this canary is
reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be
available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).

View Canary #12 in the qubes-secpack:

<https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-12-2017.txt>

Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read it:

<https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/>

View all past canaries:

<https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canaries/>

```
---===[ Qubes Canary #12 ]===---


Statements
- -----------

The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is June 2, 2017.

2. There have been 30 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
two weeks of September 2017. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.

Special announcements
- ----------------------

None.

Disclaimers and notes
- ----------------------

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO
downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.

The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.

Proof of freshness
- -------------------

$ date -R -u
Fri, 02 Jun 2017 11:09:50 +0000

$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{title}' -u https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss
Bernie Sanders: The Man Who Knows Trump's Voters
Irascible Erdogan: Trump Wasn't Only Problem at NATO Summit
A Trans-Atlantic Turning Point: What Was Merkel Thinking?
EU Commissioner Malmström: 'Millions of U.S. Jobs Depend On Trade with EU'
Battling Islamic State: A Visit to the Mosul Front

$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{title}' -u http://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
Hours After Fires, 36 Bodies Are Found at Manila Casino
As Trump Exits Paris Agreement, Other Nations Are Defiant
Maybe Private Russian Hackers Meddled in Election, Putin Says
Reinhold Hanning, Former Auschwitz Guard Convicted a Year Ago, Dies at 95
Protest at Kabul Bomb Site Turns Deadly

$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{title}' -u http://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml
Paris climate deal: Dismay as Trump signals exit from accord
Resorts World Manila: At least 36 bodies found at casino complex
US travel ban goes to Supreme Court
Kabul bomb: One killed as angry protesters march in Afghan capital
Global diarrhoea deaths down by a third

$ feedstail -1 -n5 -f '{title}' -u http://feeds.reuters.com/reuters/worldnews
Gunman torches Philippine casino, killing at least 36 people
Twin suicide bombing kills at least four people in Cameroon
Putin asks U.S. businessmen to help restore normal dialogue with Washington
Trump dismays, angers allies by abandoning global climate pact
UK PM May's lead over Labour shrinks to 5 points: Ipsos MORI poll

$ curl -s 'http://blockchain.info/blocks/?format=json'

$ python3 -c 'import sys, json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['\''blocks'\''][10]['\''hash'\''])'
000000000000000000780d3632921175b58a7e1e97ec81398a9e0347b8f8b1af


Footnotes
- ----------

[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
```

- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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[Andrew David Wong]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 2017-06-05 08:42, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> Dear Qubes community,
>
> We have just published Qubes Canary #12. The text of this canary is
> reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be
> available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
>
> View Canary #12 in the qubes-secpack:
>
> <https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-12-2017.txt>
>

Here's the correct link:

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-012-2017.txt

- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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[7v5w7go9ub0o]

On 06/05/2017 01:42 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:

<snip>

> 1. The date of issue of this canary is June 2, 2017.

<snip>

>
> 5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
> two weeks of September 2017. Special note should be taken if no new canary
> is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
> plausible explanation.

<snip>


Thanks for the note.

IIUC, the canary system is now quarterly and three months until the next
canary. That also means that a back-door and gag order could be placed
into effect against Qubes today, and users would be clueless about it
'til September - up to three months of user jeopardy if there are Summer
updates.

The cautious user will reason that his system updates should be only
applied immediately before the Quarterly canary; thereby assuring -
after the canary is issued - that his quarterly update(s) was not
back-doored. This could be a disaster if an accidentally flawed update
happened to get out.

Please consider *increasing* the frequency of canaries - not decreasing.
Alternatively, consider issuing additional canaries shortly after
important system updates, and scheduling "minor" system updates a week
before the quarterly canary.

A weekly canary would be much more useful and reassuring, as I wouldn't
have to wait to do updates. Also, ISTM weekly would be easier for ITL to
manage.

[Unman]

I agree on the frequency point. But surely a cautious user will not
install updates until immediately AFTER the Quarterly canary, not
before. And since the canary dates are not fixed, how is one to know
when "immediately before" might be?

[7v5w7go9ub0o]

1. The canary needs to be issued on a fixed date for the system to work;
otherwise a "late" canary is meaningless.

2. Certainly the back-door and gag order will be mandated immediately
after the canary. So any updates after the canary are no longer
trustworthy. Any updates after the date of the most recent canary can be
compromised.

IF you update immediately before the date-certain canary, and then
discover that the canary is not updated or otherwise untrustworthy, you
then restore to the last known-good backup (and seek an explanation).

[Tomei Ningen]

This is an interesting point to consider, thanks 7v5w[...]. Some thoughts this brings to mind:

•      I know that we all understand that the canary system is little more than a matter of reassurance - as I understand it, it's not a security feature so much as a security blanket. That said, I would imagine that avoiding the chilling effect which often accompanies undue paranoia is a practical priority and I also feel that the community would be better served if the frequency was increased rather than decreased. As has been said, should the worst occur we'd be better equipped to mitigate damages and/or minimize exposure.
  
•      I wonder if the debate over whether there's a 'better' time to update the system with respect to the canary schedule is a moot point. I would think that the risk of having unpatched vulnerabilities would greatly outweigh the ostensible benefit(s) that might be afforded to those intent on avoiding a TAO-type situation, no? Regardless of the threat model you subscribe to there are tons of players on the field and most will take the path of least resistance if it should be available to them.
       To that end, if the worst were to occur would any of us actually trust a backup to be trustworthy? We know now that many of the methods of evading detection and achieving persistence are sophisticated and disturbingly effective. I'd consider it Game Over at that point.
  
• Why aren't the canaries date-specific? I'm sure this is done with good reason but I'm curious to know what that reasoning is.
  

- TN

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