-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
On Fri, Oct 10, 2025 at 01:52:23PM +0100, 'unman' via qubes-devel wrote:
> There are some issues with web site and documentation on the onion server.
>
> Many of the pages now contain redirects hard coded redirects to
doc.qubes-os.org.
This can be avoided, I think? I see some instances of "
doc.qubes-os.org"
in the qubes-doc repo, but there are like 8 of them and it should be
possible to replace them with relative links I hope. During migration
testing, we did several local builds, and accessing it via localhost
worked fine, didn't redirect to
doc.qubes-os.org.
> RTD offers the possibility of versioned documentation.
The switcher seems to be part of the rtd theme:
https://github.com/readthedocs/sphinx_rtd_theme
https://sphinx-rtd-theme.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring.html#confval-version_selector
But it says it depends on RTD addon. I think it's somewhere here:
https://github.com/clemfromspace/rtd-with-docsearch
but it looks complicated to setup standalone version of that.
> I do not think it will be possible to have a local instance of RTD on
> the server.
>
> I propose to:
> 1. Generate documentation for latest and stable (whatever names are
> used) on the server.
> 2. Rewrite the redirects to a doc instance on the onion server, using
> whatever the default view is in RTD.
> 3. If headers are included which reference another version, then rewrite
> THOSE links to point to the relevant onion site.
> 4. Generate PDF and EPUB versions and reference them from the
> documentation.
Looks like a good idea.
> There is an open issue for extending the explanation of mirrors and the
> onion sites on the download pages.
> I would like to rewrite the download links to point to the onion server,
> with pointers to the clear site download.
>
> The aim should be to minimise the possibility of users on the onion
> inadvertently clicking through to the clear.
As a safety measure, there can be sanity check that searches for
https://doc.qubes-os.org in built side. But in practice, the risk to the
user is not that big - since they access the onion site, they connect
via Tor. This means if it goes to
doc.qubes-os.org, it will still go
through Tor. Depending on exit node, might be slower, but should not
leak the user IP.
> There has been a suggestion that we could run a proxy on the onion
> redirecting to the clearnet sites. I do not think this is a workable
> solution because it raises significant risks to anonymity.
>
> Thoughts or input?
- --
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQEzBAEBCAAdFiEEhrpukzGPukRmQqkK24/THMrX1ywFAmjpC+YACgkQ24/THMrX
1yxm+gf8DibzjTERWGjJILiSiOIqnNm7it5X+xNwR/wSbj6d8xXd1IofpIAGFHcH
SSgypnWfaq3f6gfwGz6P0/WQK0e95/irG6wwmhO9VyY8lGRbTiIsa7Qp97zaNdrb
2gami3xEdfhi6Wqq/Ba8t/5V4xBzUL7AKjSbq/35+tD/DI+yGczMVisrW25hPhyK
Rn0E20qpsEtUWE0KNmf5nfXX1lsA8UDKnreQx+DFc0mUnK+xwCuD4Z5BcAO8tWKQ
mYTs/NLX5sQwfAjU2VmW+Hjny7QSvNoMxYRpxSsOLyr4NgtUEN3OXKoSYJeRTZC5
OlZ7qVp7kt2ya340Zc0KoIVbtaFB0w==
=JWNv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----