Qubes Canary 033

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Andrew David Wong

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Dec 4, 2022, 6:09:56 PM12/4/22
to qubes-devel, qubes-users
Dear Qubes Community,

We have published Qubes Canary 033. The text of this canary is
reproduced below.

This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be available in
the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack).

View Qubes Canary 033 in the qubes-secpack:

<https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-033-2022.txt>

Learn how to obtain and authenticate the qubes-secpack and all the
signatures it contains:

<https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/>

View all past canaries:

<https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/>

```

---===[ Qubes Canary 033 ]===---


Statements
-----------

The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is December 04, 2022.

2. There have been 87 Qubes security bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of March 2023. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.


Special announcements
----------------------

None.


Disclaimers and notes
----------------------

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.

The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.


Proof of freshness
-------------------

Sun, 04 Dec 2022 03:11:56 +0000

Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Friends or Frenemies?: Significant Trans-Atlantic Divides Emerge in Global Chip War
The Russian Mobilization: One Soldier's Effort to Avoid the War
Tragedy in Mariupol: The Boy Who Lost His Family But Not His Hope
A Year with Angela Merkel: "You're Done with Power Politics"
Fears of Chinese Aggression Grow in Taiwan: "Where Are We Supposed to Go?"

Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
He Returned a Dazed Soldier to the Russians. Ukraine Calls It Treason.
Landslide Tragedy Turns Italy’s Focus to Illegal Construction
Why Is Rahul Gandhi Walking 2,000 Miles Across India?
How China’s Police Used Phones and Faces to Track Protesters
Ukraine Calls for Evacuations From a Russian-Controlled Area

Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Cyril Ramaphosa: South Africa leader won't resign, says spokesman
Ukraine war: Zelensky calls West's Russian oil cap 'weak'
Ukraine war: New images show Russian army base built in occupied Mariupol
Elnaz Rekabi: Family home of Iranian climber demolished
Columbia peace talks with leftist ELN rebels make progress

Source: Blockchain.info
00000000000000000000955f2976b1fbff0d0c47c262ea3ae6410e43f8218fb7


Footnotes
----------

[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary
in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
```


This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/12/04/canary-033/
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