[qubes-announce] QSB-100: Incorrect handling of PCI devices with phantom functions (XSA-449)

[Marek Marczykowski-Górecki]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

Dear Qubes Community,

We have published [Qubes Security Bulletin 100: Incorrect handling of PCI devices with phantom functions (XSA-449)](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-100-2024.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.

## Qubes Security Bulletin 100

```

---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 100 ]===---

2024-01-30

Incorrect handling of PCI devices with phantom functions (XSA-449)

User action
- ------------

Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.

Summary
- --------

On 2024-01-30, the Xen Project published XSA-449, "pci: phantom
functions assigned to incorrect contexts" [3]:

| PCI devices can make use of a functionality called phantom functions,
| that when enabled allows the device to generate requests using the IDs
| of functions that are otherwise unpopulated. This allows a device to
| extend the number of outstanding requests.
|
| Such phantom functions need an IOMMU context setup, but failure to
| setup the context is not fatal when the device is assigned. Not
| failing device assignment when such failure happens can lead to the
| primary device being assigned to a guest, while some of the phantom
| functions are assigned to a different domain.

Impact
- -------

The impact as described by the Xen Project:

| Under certain circumstances a malicious guest assigned a PCI device
| with phantom functions may be able to access memory from a previous
| owner of the device.

In Qubes OS this means a PCI device that should be assigned to some qube
(like sys-net or sys-usb) may retain access to dom0 memory. When that
happens, the qube to which that device is assigned can compromise the
whole system. But, a malicious qube cannot itself cause this condition,
as it happens before it is running. For such attack to be feasible, it
needs to be combined with some other method to cause PCI device
assignment to fail.

Affected systems
- -----------------

All Qubes OS versions are affected. Only systems on which at lest one
passed-through PCI device has phantom functions are affected.

Patching
- ---------

The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:

For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.14.6-6

For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.17.3-2

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]

Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.

If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.

Credits
- --------

See the original Xen Security Advisory.

References
- -----------

[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-449.html

- --
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

```

**Source:** <https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-100-2024.txt>

## [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-górecki)'s PGP signature

```
- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmW5Di0ACgkQ1lWk8hgw
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H4Ninf3Tfhq4zA8bfjmxp10uI3VsYNOH3Tgv2MgmOcxsqdK6ZoA=
=/jv7
- -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
```

**Source:** <https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-100-2024.txt.sig.marmarek>

## [Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)](https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)'s PGP signature

```
- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmW5Db4ACgkQSsGN4REu
FJC+mg/+Kvsi4u0Xoem+j7DW+D2FDbFZfD/6k7vacUmOVZ27gKGZiVODdBc/+dUN
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fXXjOT8mc5B6D1kNdvHVez3Q6dKO3eTgGdUSUvmOrHYbPUeLq/E=
=LKzj
- -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
```

**Source:** <https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-100-2024.txt.sig.simon>

## What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.

## What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?

A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the [Qubes security team](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see [Qubes security bulletins (QSBs)](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).

## Why should I care about QSBs?

QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by [updating normally](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.

## What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?

A [PGP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic [digital signature](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the [OpenPGP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like [GNU Privacy Guard (GPG)](https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

## Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?

A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

## How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with `git` and `gpg` installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see [OpenPGP software](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).)

1. Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

```shell_session
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
```

(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see [How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)

2. View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: `gpg>` indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)

```shell_session
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.


pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key

gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
```

3. **Important:** At this point, you still don't know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you *must* authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. **Do not skip this step!** The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from *multiple independent sources in several different ways* and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see [How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).

**Tip:** After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don't have to repeat this step in the future.

4. Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 ("ultimate"), then quit GnuPG with `q`.

```shell_session
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key

Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)

1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu

Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y

pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.

gpg> q
```

5. Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.

```shell_session
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
```

6. Import the included PGP keys. (See our [PGP key policies](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.)

```shell_session
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
```

7. Verify signed Git tags.

```shell_session
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100

Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
```

The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with `gpg: Good signature from...` followed by an appropriate key. The `[full]` indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.

8. Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:

```shell_session
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
```

Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each `gpg --verify` command should always start with `gpg: Good signature from...` followed by an appropriate key.


For this announcement (QSB-100), the commands are:

```
$ gpg --verify qsb-100-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-100-2024.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-100-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-100-2024.txt
```

You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-100 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.

This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/01/30/qsb-100/
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