History of Logic Seminar Series - Talk: Colin G. King, "The riddle of deduction in Aristotle’s Topics" (22.04.2026)
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We are pleased to announce the eighth session of the second annual cycle of the History of Logic Seminar Series. The session will be held on Wednesday, April 22, from 3 to 6 p.m. CEST.
Now that we are more than halfway through the second annual cycle, we are celebrating with a special hybrid session. The talk will take place in the Ex Cataloghi Lignei Room, at the Department of Humanities of the University of Naples Federico II (Via Porta di Massa, 1).
It will also be streamed via Zoom as usual. To have the Zoom link, please reach out to us via the e-mail address indicated below.
On this occasion, we will host a talk by Colin G. King (Providence College). His talk is titled The riddle of deduction in Aristotle’s Topics. Here is a short abstract:
There is robust (though not universal) agreement that Aristotle's Topics provides a method for making deductions (Solmsen 1929; Brunschwig 1969; Primavesi 1996; Slomkowski 1997; Rapp 2000; Malink 2015; but see Maier 1900, 78–82 n. 3; Barnes 1981, 43–47; and Fait 2023, 47). There are two main ways in which deductions are supposed to be theorized. On both views, Aristotle presupposes propositional logic in his method of dialectic, but in different ways. The first holds that dialectical deductions are premise–conclusion arguments shown to be valid through certain untheorized but recurring propositional schemas, such as modus ponens and modus tollens (Brunschwig 1967; Primavesi 1996; Rapp 2000). The second maintains that the arguments presented in the Topics are hypothetical syllogisms, that is, arguments with at least one compound premise (Slomkowski 1997), which include, but are not exhausted by, argument schemes governed by the rules of modus ponens and modus tollens. I propose to interpret the emergence of a theory of deduction in the Topics in a different way. I observe that, notwithstanding his later criticism of “division by genera” as a “weak deduction” (An. Pr. A31, 46a31–b3), Aristotle can use the term syllogism to refer to a division (Top. A8). The notion of deduction underlying the Topics targets divisions. I argue that the Topics began as a project aimed at operationalizing rules of division for dialectical argument but later evolved into a critical appraisal of these rules through a theory of predication. The fourfold method of predication constitutes the basis for Aristotle’s observations about valid inference in the Topics. The source of necessity in valid dialectical inference is derived from the various types of predication and their truth conditions. For this reason, it is misleading to reduce the dialectical theory of deduction to a single overarching approach, whether in terms of argument schemes involving modus ponens or of hypothetical syllogisms. I develop this interpretation with examples drawn from the core books of the Topics.
We will also have the pleasure of hosting a related talk by Venanzio Raspa (University of Urbino Carlo Bo), titled Aristotle on Identity.
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We look forward to seeing you in Naples next Wednesday!
Kind regards,
Francesco, Antonio, and Francesco