Fwd: IMPA Fw: The Libyan War of 2011
Mahamoud Hussein
From: cui-zy <cui...@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Date: Sun, 20 Mar 2011 23:30:39 +0800
Subject: IMPA Fw: The Libyan War of 2011
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The Libyan War of 2011
March 19, 2011 | 2333 GMT
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Libya Unrest: Full Coverage
By George Friedman
The Libyan war has now begun. It pits a coalition of European powers
plus the United States, a handful of Arab states and rebels in Libya
against the Libyan government. The long-term goal, unspoken but well
understood, is regime change — displacing the government of Libyan
leader Moammar Gadhafi and replacing it with a new regime built around
the rebels.
The mission is clearer than the strategy, and that strategy can’t be
figured out from the first moves. The strategy might be the imposition
of a no-fly zone, the imposition of a no-fly zone and attacks against
Libya’s command-and-control centers, or these two plus direct ground
attacks on Gadhafi’s forces. These could also be combined with an
invasion and occupation of Libya.
The question, therefore, is not the mission but the strategy to be
pursued. How far is the coalition, or at least some of its members,
prepared to go to effect regime change and manage the consequences
following regime change? How many resources are they prepared to
provide and how long are they prepared to fight? It should be
remembered that in Iraq and Afghanistan the occupation became the
heart of the war, and regime change was merely the opening act. It is
possible that the coalition partners haven’t decided on the strategy
yet, or may not be in agreement. Let’s therefore consider the first
phases of the war, regardless of how far they are prepared to go in
pursuit of the mission.
Like previous wars since 1991, this war began with a very public
buildup in which the coalition partners negotiated the basic
framework, sought international support and authorization from
multinational organizations and mobilized forces. This was done quite
publicly because the cost of secrecy (time and possible failure) was
not worth what was to be gained: surprise. Surprise matters when the
enemy can mobilize resistance. Gadhafi was trapped and has limited
military capabilities, so secrecy was unnecessary.
While all this was going on and before final decisions were made,
special operations forces were inserted in Libya on two missions.
First, to make contact with insurgent forces to prepare them for
coming events, create channels of communications and logistics and
create a post-war political framework. The second purpose was to
identify targets for attack and conduct reconnaissance of those
targets that provided as up-to-date information as possible. This,
combined with air and space reconnaissance, served as the foundations
of the war. We know British SAS operators were in Libya and suspect
other countries’ special operations forces and intelligence services
were also operating there.
War commences with two sets of attacks. The first attacks are
decapitation attacks designed to destroy or isolate the national
command structure. These may also include strikes designed to kill
leaders such as Gadhafi and his sons or other senior leaders. These
attacks depend on specific intelligence on facilities, including
communications, planning and so on along with detailed information on
the location of the leadership. Attacks on buildings are carried out
from the air but not particularly with cruise missile because they are
especially accurate if the targets are slow, and buildings aren’t
going anywhere. At the same time, aircraft are orbiting out of range
of air defenses awaiting information on more mobile targets and if
such is forthcoming, they come into range and fire appropriate
munitions at the target. The type of aircraft used depends on the
robustness of the air defenses, the time available prior to attack and
the munitions needed. They can range from conventional fighters or
stealth strategic aircraft like the U.S. B-2 bomber (if the United
States authorized its use). Special operations forces might be on the
ground painting the target for laser-guided munitions, which are
highly accurate but require illumination.
(click here to enlarge image)
At the same time these attacks are under way, attacks on airfields,
fuel storage depots and the like are being targeted to ground the
Libyan air force. Air or cruise missile attacks are also being carried
out on radars of large and immobile surface-to-air (SAM) missile
sites. Simultaneously, “wild weasel” aircraft — aircraft configured
for the suppression of enemy air defenses — will be on patrol for more
mobile SAM systems to locate and destroy. This becomes a critical part
of the conflict. Being mobile, detecting these weapons systems on the
ground is complex. They engage when they want to, depending on visual
perception of opportunities. Therefore the total elimination of
anti-missile systems is in part up to the Libyans. Between mobile
systems and man-portable air-defense missiles, the threat to allied
aircraft can persist for quite a while even if Gadhafi’s forces might
have difficulty shooting anything down.
This is the part that the United States in particular and the West in
general is extremely good at. But it is the beginning of the war.
Gadhafi’s primary capabilities are conventional armor and particularly
artillery. Destroying his air force and isolating his forces will not
by itself win the war. The war is on the ground. The question is the
motivation of his troops: If they perceive that surrender is
unacceptable or personally catastrophic, they may continue to fight.
At that point the coalition must decide if it intends to engage and
destroy Gadhafi’s ground forces from the air. This can be done, but it
is never a foregone conclusion that it will work. Moreover, this is
the phase at which civilian casualties begin to mount. It is a paradox
of warfare instigated to end human suffering that the means of
achieving this can sometimes impose substantial human suffering
itself. This is not merely a theoretical statement. It is at this
point at which supporters of the war who want to end suffering may
turn on the political leaders for not ending suffering without cost.
It should be remembered that Saddam Hussein was loathed universally
but those who loathed him were frequently not willing to impose the
price of overthrowing him. The Europeans in particular are sensitive
to this issue.
The question then becomes the extent to which this remains an air
operation, as Kosovo was, or becomes a ground operation. Kosovo is the
ideal, but Gadhafi is not Slobodan Milosevic and he may not feel he
has anywhere to go if he surrenders. For him the fight may be
existential, whereas for Milosevic it was not. He and his followers
may resist. This is the great unknown. The choice here is to maintain
air operations for an extended period of time without clear results,
or invade. This raises the question of whose troops would invade.
Egypt appears ready but there is long animosity between the two
countries, and its actions might not be viewed as liberation. The
Europeans could do so. It is difficult to imagine Obama adopting a
third war in Muslim world as his own. This is where the coalition is
really tested.
If there is an invasion, it is likely to succeed. The question then
becomes whether Gadhafi’s forces move into opposition and insurgency.
This again depends on morale but also on behavior. The Americans
forced an insurgency in Iraq by putting the Baathists into an
untenable position. In Afghanistan the Taliban gave up formal power
without having been decisively defeated. They regrouped, reformed and
returned. It is not known to us what Gadhafi can do or not do. It is
clear that it is the major unknown.
The problem in Iraq was not the special operations forces. It was not
in the decapitation strikes or suppression of enemy air defenses. It
was not in the defeat of the Iraqi army on the ground. It was in the
occupation, when the enemy reformed and imposed an insurgency on the
United States that it found extraordinarily difficult to deal with.
Therefore the successes of the coming day will tell us nothing. Even
if Gadhafi surrenders or is killed, even if no invasion is necessary
save a small occupation force to aid the insurgents, the possibility
of an insurgency is there. We will not know if there will be an
insurgency until after it begins. Therefore, the only thing that would
be surprising about this phase of the operation is if it failed.
The decision has been made that the mission is regime change in Libya.
The strategic sequence is the routine buildup to war since 1991, this
time with a heavier European component. The early days will go
extremely well but will not define whether or not the war is
successful. The test will come if a war designed to stop human
suffering begins to inflict human suffering. That is when the
difficult political decisions have to be made and when we will find
out whether the strategy, the mission and the political will fully
match up.
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Mahamoud Mohamed Hussein
Dean, Faculty of Social Science
Puntland State University
Garowe, Puntland, Somalia
Tel: +252 90 756027
Email: raya...@gmail.com
Website: http://www.puntlandstateuniversity.com