Puntland and the Quandary of Somali Piracy
mohamed muuse kalakaan
Puntland and the Quandary of Somali Piracy
by
Mohamed Samantar[1] and David Leonard[2]
Draft of 20 August 2010.
Abstract
The issue of piracy off the coast of Puntland, on the north-east horn of Somalia, illustrates the complexities facing weak states and the mixed role members of the international community play regarding them. -- (i) the Somali piracy problem is at least as much a consequence of the failure of the international community to protect the fishing 'commons' as it is of Puntland's institutional weakness; (ii) the problem is now so big that Puntland is unlikely to be able to solve it by itself, even with considerable international financial assistance, because its management now will threaten the integrity of the state itself; (iii) if the international community attempts to force Puntland to take lead responsibility for dealing with piracy in Somali waters, it could well destroy the progress toward building state institutions that it has made to date; (iv) the international community therefore is going to have to bear the larger part of the burden of stopping piracy and factory fishing in Somali waters; and (v) if the international community does not take the lead is solving the piracy and fishing problems itself, the resource of piracy is going to be captured by Islamist rebels.
Introduction
The issue of piracy off the coast of Puntland, on the north-east horn of Somalia, illustrates the complexities facing weak states and the mixed role members of the international community play regarding them.
Recorded piracy of ships off Somalia began in 2005, with the details of three occurrences posted on Wikipedia. Sixty percent of known attempted captures were successful in 2005-06 and ransoms demanded were $315,000 and then $700,000. (Ransoms paid are unknown.) Success bred imitation and numbers and ransoms demanded rose steadily through 2009. Different sources vary in the numbers they give but the trends are clear. The apparent success ratio (derived from the Wikipedia data) peaked at 89% in 2007, the number of attempts topped out at 72 in 2009 and the latest known ransom demands were $4 million. [Costa (2008) suggests there were 217 attacks in 2009 and that the early success rates were a third.] The intervention of NATO and other navies in the region has had an effect, however. Using Wikipedia data as the basis for comparison, the statistics for the first half of 2010 suggest that the number of attempts may now be half of their peak and that successful capture has fallen to 50%. (Wikipedia 2010b). [Costa says 10%.] Whatever the base of measurement, it is clear that piracy was an escalating problem when it was subject solely to the jurisdiction of Somalia and that even if it has now diminished it remains an issue,
About 20,000 ships a year navigate the Gulf of Aden, which, as the southern gateway to the Suez Canal, is one of the most important trade routes in the world. The ships mostly transport oil from the Middle East and goods from Asia to Europe and North America. Having to change routes would add weeks of travel time and increase fuel consumption, driving up the cost of shipping. As a consequence this increases the prices of goods transported. Insurance premiums also have risen tenfold as a result of pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden.
Furthermore, pirates are hampering relief efforts in Somalia. Since 2005, many international organizations, including the International Maritime Organization and the World Food Programme, have expressed concern. as piracy has contributed to an increase in shipping costs and impeded the delivery of food aid shipments. Ninety percent of the World Food Programme's shipments arrive by sea, and ships now require a military escort. As a result of piracy the World Food Programme has been forced to temporarily suspend food deliveries to drought-stricken Somalia.
Puntland at the Centre
To date, almost all Somali piracy has been based in the fishing villages of Puntland, which face the major shipping lanes of both the Gulf of Aden (leading to Suez) and the Indian Ocean. Puntland is that part of the former Republic of Somalia that has jurisdiction over the largest part of the country’s coast – half or 1600 km. The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) nominal but internationally recognised authority over this coastline. But the TFG is a state only in international law, faces serious domestic resistance and has operational control over just a few areas in south-central Somalia. The territorial government of Puntland recognises the authority of the TFG but, unlike it, has established state institutions and a modicum of domestic order. In practice and for the moment, then, Somali piracy is a Puntland problem.
Nonetheless the government of Puntland is weak and under-financed[3] [4], with most of its tiny budget absorbed by still inadequate security services and less than 3% dedicated to social services. These conditions make it difficult for Puntland to impose solutions that serve the collective interests of its citizens. As a first consequence, Puntland has been unable to finance a navy or coast guard to control its coastal waters.
Thus in 2009, as a second order consequence, the British Royal Navy - backed by the ships of more than two dozen nations, from the US to China - sailed into Somali waters to take on Somali pirates. Before investigating the effectiveness of this mission and its relationship to state-building in Puntland, let us explore what prompted the irruption of the piracy problem.
International Abuse of Somalia’s Coast Waters
As a coastal state Somalia and therefore Puntland has jurisdiction over an exclusive economic zone of its surrounding waters, as provided for in the relevant provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention with regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Puntland, much less Somalia, lacks the resources for a coast guard to patrol these substantial waters and they came to be exploited by the ships of other nations. (UNEP 2005:47)
Illegal trawlers (known as jariif in Somali) began fishing Somalia's seas (Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden) with an estimated $300 million of tuna, shrimp, and lobster being taken each year. These foreign trawlers reportedly also use internationally prohibited fishing equipment, such as nets with very small mesh sizes and sophisticated underwater lighting systems. This process is undeniably depleting stocks previously available to local fishermen.
Puntland waters also have been used for the dumping of toxic wastes, including nuclear ones, which also is damaging the fisheries. The Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal makes illegal any trans-boundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes that results in deliberate disposal (e.g. dumping) of hazardous wastes or other wastes in contravention of the standards imposed by the convention (Basel Convention 1992).
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Allegations of the dumping of toxic and hazardous waste, as well as illegal fishing, have circulated since the early 1990s. But evidence of such practices literally appeared on the beaches of northern Somalia when the tsunami of 2004 hit the coastline (UNEP 2005). European companies found it very cheap to get rid of their waste in Somali waters, at a cost as little as $2.50 a tonne versus charges in Europe in the vicinity of $1000 a tonne. The materials dumped comprise radioactive uranium, lead, heavy metals such as cadmium and mercury, and industrial, hospital and chemical wastes. Such wastes have the potential to kill Somalis and to severely damage the fish stocks in Somali waters. Thus Somalia's fishing industry has collapsed in the past 19 years.
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We are reacting to the toxic waste that has been continually dumped on the shores of our country for nearly 20 years. The Somali coastline has been destroyed and we believe this money is nothing compared to the devastation that we have seen on the seas (Dan Eden).
Local fishermen started to group together to protect their resources in the absence of an effective government. Due to the clan-based organization of Somali society, the lack of a central government, and the country's strategic location in the Horn of Africa, conditions were ripe for the growth of piracy in the early 1990s. Pirates are mostly young unemployed men, many of them fishermen who had lost their boats and their jobs because of illegal large scale fishing foreign companies and the dumping hazardous waste in their waters. Through interception with speedboats, Somali artisanal fishermen tried to either dissuade the dumpers and trawlers or levy a "tax" on them as compensation. (Abdulahi 2008.) Indeed the data available on Wikipedia indicate that most of the early attacks were on such ships. Once it became evident how lucrative piracy could be, however, the attacks broadened and went out of control. Today, although those who make the attacks may be fishermen in their teens, they all have associates ashore seeking information, negotiating about ransom, etc. – the ‘big men’ who direct and derive most of the profit from the activity (Costa 2008). Nonetheless, there is some evidence that some of the fishing grounds are beginning to regenerate now that piracy has chased off many of the international trawlers.
Now that the high returns to piracy have been demonstrated, the cessation of illegal fishing and dumping, by itself, would not stop it. The original sources of Somali piracy were not just the weakness of the Government of Puntland, however, but were international as well. Whatever the registration of the ships violating the sovereignty of Puntland by factory fishing and the dumping of toxic wastes, many clearly have owners from within the European Union, including Italy and Spain, and from other major economic actors, such as India and the Philippines. While money is the primary objective of the Somali hijackings, environmental destruction off Somalia's coast initiated them and claims of their continuation have been largely ignored by international maritime authorities.
It's almost like a resource swap. Somalis collect up to $100 million a year from pirate ransoms off their coasts and the Europeans and Asians poach around $300 million a year in fish from Somali waters (Lehr 2008b quoted in Wikipedia, 2010).
The above figure of $100 million is almost certainly high. After interviewing a number of key informants in Puntland we estimate pirates collect an amount not exceeding a total of $20 million per year and individually not more than $50,000. Much of this money is re-invested in piracy activities with a failure of around 60 – 90% of total attempts. (Even at $20 million, however, this annual piracy figure comes close to the total government budget of Puntland of $26.8 million.)
Besides, a good number of the young pirates who go to sea remain destitute and seek the help of pirate colleagues who have had some success or from their extended families, to whom they distributed most of the money collected in the first instance. In addition their extravagant expenses on khat, alcohol, and prostitution are also high with respect to normalcy in Puntland (BBC News. 2009). Easy come, easy go.
The International and Puntland Responses
Since Somali piracy has been recognised as a serious threat to international shipping, vessels are taking more serious security measures and a number of international navies have begun to patrol Puntland's waters and to negotiate with elders in the coastal towns. International aid also has been provided to Puntland for a prison in Gardo. Meanwhile Bossaso prison was holding 268 pirates in mid-2010 and assistance for the beginnings of a small coast guard is under discussion.
A variety of private security firms are now providing guards on ships transiting the Horn of Africa and are also helping to recover hijacked ships. Some insurers will slash charges by up to 40 percent if boats hire their own security. Companies involved include a number of American and British firms: Blackwater, Hollowpoint, Saracen International, the Hart Group, Drum Cussac, and the Olive Group. Just the presence of armed guards on commercial vessels may not be a sufficient deterrent, however. Pirates get information on crews and cargos from contacts in ports or at shipping companies and avoid vessels with armed men on board. (AP 2008)
Since late 2008, 15 various international naval vessels have been patrolling the waters off the Horn of Africa as part of the duties of Combined Task Force 150. Included are a NATO task force of 5 ships (NATO, 2010). Single warships from India, Russia and others also have been involved in providing protection. NATO counter-piracy activities in the region now have been extended until 2012, adding to the recent agreement by the European Union (EU) Defence Ministers to expand the objectives of Operation Atalanta[5] to include improved surveillance of Somali ports harbouring pirates and to counteract mother ships. As we noted in the introduction, these interventions have led to a significant decline in both attacks and their success. But they have not eliminated all piracy. The U.S. Navy says the coalition, of which it is a part, cannot effectively patrol the 2.5 million square miles of dangerous waters by itself (Lehr 2008a).
Officials from Puntland have welcomed the NATO patrols and approve the presence of private security contractors in its waters (Horseed Media 2010). As well as fighting piracy, Puntland would like to see these international security efforts extended to combating illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping – although there is no evidence this has occurred as yet.
The NATO commander has been meeting with the elders in the major Puntland pirate ports in order to persuade them to force the pirates to leave. Puntland authorities have cooperated in this initiative, including the provision of police once the pirates have departed. It would appear that various forms of international aid have been offered to localities as an inducement to cooperation, but it also is true that the lifestyle of the pirates has been offensive to traditional Somali sensibilities (BBC News 2009). As a consequence pirates appear to have left the various ports and villages they have used in the northern Puntland districts of Sanaag, Bari and Nugaal. This has pushed them south into the district of Mudug, which is contested between the Government of Puntland and Islamist groups, a point to which we return below.
Other steps the Puntland government has taken in the first half of 2010 include:
1. March: Appointing an Anti-Piracy Commissioner to draft a strategy aimed at defeating the scourge of piracy;
2. April: Arresting and sentencing 62 pirates to jail terms ranging from 3-to-20 years in prison;
3. May: Raiding pirate safehouses, arresting 15 pirate suspects and seizing assets, including cash, speedboats, weapons, vehicles and fuel tanks;
4. Cooperating with international warships by jailing pirate suspects detained at high seas and charging the suspects in Puntland courts;
5. Actively using media tools and community gatherings to advocate against piracy and pirate gangs.
As of end of May the Government of Puntland has imprisoned up to 245 pirates in an internationally-financed prison in Bossaso[6] and also accepted to put on trial in a court of justice and imprison those captured and handed over by the Task Force Coalition.
Finally, Puntland has asked for international assistance to create and base a coast guard.
How Will the Anti-Piracy Campaign Affect State-Building in Puntland?
Will the foregoing measures be effective and will they contribute to the strengthening of Puntland as a state? There are many reasons for worry.
Now that the immense profitability of Somali piracy has been demonstrated, it is attracting many actors who would like to benefit from it. The extent of the waters in which the piracy is now taking place and the length of the Puntland coast from which it originates make it very unlikely that Puntland will be able to create a coast guard large enough to stop it by itself, even with a good deal of international aid.
And since the organisers of piracy are now among the wealthiest and most powerful people in Puntland, attempts by Puntland to arrest and imprison the leaders are likely to be very difficult or impossible and could threaten the strength of the state. (Only one of those currently being held in prison – Boyaah -- was an organiser of piracy and his operations were in decline. See also Abdulahi, A. 'Booyah' 2008, Thus the existing prisoners are very minor figures or the operatives of the less powerful pirate organisations. The planners, financiers, and negotiators for the pirates either are outside the country or have been able to maintain their anonymity within it.) Experiences elsewhere in the world suggest that any serious attempt by Puntland to go after the powerful piracy kingpins would corrupt it and/ or lead to a direct challenge to its nascent effectiveness.
Even more immediate is the danger that the revenues from piracy are attracting the Islamist contenders for power in the south of Somalia, who are now attempting to move north into coastal Puntland. Since the success of efforts to end piracy operating from Eyl in Nugaal District, Harardheere, and Hobyo in southern Mudug District are now two of the main bases for pirates operating out of Somalia. In Harardheere, close to Puntland border from the south, there is a vivid example of contention over resources left by the pirates on the run. The first move was made by Xizbul Islaam in May 2010, followed by Harakatu Shabaab, both rebel Islamist groups from the south of Somalia.
Hizbul Islam and al Shabaab have been fighting to topple the Western-backed government since the start of 2007 -- Islamist fighters with the Islamic Courts Union, a movement that briefly ruled the capital Mogadishu in 2006 before being ousted by Ethiopian soldiers. Neither Hizbul Islam nor al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab rebels have been directly involved in piracy to date. But Hizbul Islam already has indicated it does not support the anti-piracy strategy adopted by the international community as well as by the Puntland administration.
To make the eradication of Somali piracy a problem of the Government of Puntland alone threatens to undermine the slow strengthening of its state apparatus and to drive the pirates into an alliance with the Islamist rebels to the south.
Conclusions
All in all, there have been both positive and negative effects of the pirates' economic success.
(i) Local residents have complained that the presence of so many armed men makes them feel insecure, and that their free spending ways cause wild fluctuations in the local exchange rate. Therefore, there is a perception that pirates are the cause of the general increase of prices in Puntland. Others criticise them for excessive consumption of alcohol and khat. This gives them a bad image. (BBC News 2009)
(ii) On the other hand, many other residents appreciate the rejuvenating effect that the pirates' on-shore spending and re-stocking has had on their impoverished towns, a presence which has often provided jobs and opportunity where there had been none. Entire settlements have in the process been transformed into proper boomtowns, with local shop owners and other residents using their gains to purchase items such as generators -- allowing full days of electricity, once an unimaginable luxury.
(iii) Local fishermen in the Malindi area of neighbouring Kenya have reported their largest catches in forty years, catching hundreds of kilos of fish and earning fifty times the average daily wage as a result. They attribute the recent abundance of marine stock to the pirates scaring away the large factory trawlers of foreign fishing fleets, which it's claimed have for decades deprived local dhows of a livelihood. Marine biologists agree, saying that the indicators are that the local fishery is recovering because of the lack of commercial scale fishing.
(iv) Piracy has contributed to a rise in shipping costs and shipping insurance premiums, and impeded the delivery of food aid shipments.
(v) Piracy off the coast of Somalia has diminished but is continuing in spite of substantial international efforts deployed at sea. It has become a profitable criminal activity that contributes to worsening the security climate in Somalia and erodes economic prospects, business confidence, and human security. If these acts of piracy are to be contained, there is a need to create alternative opportunities for youth in the affected areas through community-based organizations, regional and local administrations, non-governmental organizations, UN agencies etc.
(vi) No one from the international community has publicly addressed the root cause of pirate’s emergence: Illegal fishing and the dumping of hazardous waste in Somali waters by the international ships (Waldo, 2009).
(vii) Now that the immense profitability of Somali piracy has been demonstrated, it is attracting many actors who would like to benefit from it, including both criminals and Islamist rebels. The extent of the waters in which the piracy is now taking place and the length of the Puntland coast from which it originates make it very unlikely that Puntland will be able to create a coast guard large enough to stop it, even with a good deal of international aid.
Our analysis suggests key several conclusions:
a) The Somali piracy problem is at least as much a consequence of the failure of the international community to protect the fishing 'commons' as it is of Puntland's institutional weakness;
b) The problem is now so big that Puntland is unlikely to be able to solve it by itself, even with considerable international assistance, because its management now will threaten the integrity of the state itself;
c) If the international community attempts to force Puntland to take lead responsibility for dealing with piracy in Somali waters, it could well destroy the progress toward building state institutions that it has made to date;
d) The international community therefore will have to bear the larger part of the burden of stopping piracy as well as factory fishing and dumping of toxic wastes in Somali waters;
and e) If the international community does not take the lead is solving the piracy fishing, and waste problems itself, the resource of piracy is likely to be captured by Islamist rebels.
References:
Abdulahi, A. 'Booyah', 2008, We Consider Ourselves Heroes - a Somali Pirate Speaks.
Guardian News & Media. http://www.buzzle.com/articles/237287.html (Accessed July 2010).
AP, 2008, Private security Firms Join Battle against Somali Pirates, Associate Press
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,444103,00.html (Accessed June 2010)
Basel Convention, Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 1992, http://www.basel.int/ (Accessed May 2010)
BBC News. 2009. Somali gunmen 'renounce piracy'. U.K. BBC News. May 25. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8066996.stm (Accessed July 2010).
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Costa, A.M., 2008, The War on Piracy must start on Land
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/The_War_on_Piracy_Must_Start_on_Land.shtml (Accessed June 2010)
Eden, D., n.d., “Somali Pirates: The Other Side of the Story”, Viewzone http://viewzone2.com/piratesx.html (Accessed July 2010)
Horseed Media: 2010, NATO Commander Meets Ministers From Puntland Government. Bosaso, Puntland State, Somalia, Horseed Media, July 12, http://horseedmedia.net/2010/07/12/somalianato-commander-meets-ministers-puntland-government/ (Accessed July 2010).
Lehr, P., 2008a, “A western armada is not the way to sink Somalia's pirates”, The Guardian, 19 November. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/nov/19/piracy-somalia (Accessed May 2010)
Lehr, P, ed. 2008b, Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism. London: Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit.
NATO, 2010, One Year on NATO Remains Vigilant in Gulf of Aden. http://www.manw.nato.int/pdf/Press%20Releases%202010/Jan%20-%20May%202010/SNMG2%202010%2004.pdf.
Somalia: Puntland to Start Construction of New Navy Base
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The Strategist, 2009, Hart Group: a private military company with fingers in many pies
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Waldo, Mohamed A., 2009, The Two Piracies in Somalia: Why the World Ignores the Other?
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[1] Professor of Economics at Puntland State University
[2] Professorial Fellow in Governance, Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex
[3] The Puntland State of Somalia has economic potential. However, its resources are not utilised fully, due to the absence of adequate technical capacities, governance institutions, and policies. It has a low resource base and its existing resources are not captured. The tax base is narrow and taxation policies are not properly designed. The main sectors in the economy are livestock, fisheries, and frankincense, but the full potential of these sectors (especially fishery and frankincense) is not exploited.
[4] The Puntland government revenue collection for 2010 amounts US$26.8 million Most of it is devoted to security issues but is not sufficient to cover even that.
[5] A European Union Naval Force to help deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia
[6] Puntland is looking for an international assistance for the cost of constructing a special prison for pirates as well as the creation of new navy.