India's experience with securities shows a way to help create a market for land, by adopting the demat model for land titles, writes Ashok Lahiri in the Business Standard, on Nov 4, 2014
--
Relative to how to improve markets for labour or capital, or even
entrepreneurship, in India, the discussion on what to do with the
markets for land is scarce. Land is the first of the four classical
factors of production; you cannot produce anything - not crops, not even
software (given the need for office space) - without land.
After independence, the debate was mostly about land reforms. Then it
got focused on the three "R"s - relief, rehabilitation and resettlement -
associated with acquisition for infrastructure, urbanisation and
industry. This culminated in the controversial Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act of 2013.
Land titles got short shrift. How do you carry out
land reforms if
you do not know who owns what? Or, how do you implement the three "R"s
if you do not know who to provide relief to, rehabilitate or resettle?
Land title has been the proverbial elephant in the room for Indian
policy.
Dematerialisation of
securities has
ushered in remarkable progress in Indian capital markets. Gone are the
bad deliveries, deliveries held "under objection". No more buying of
thick wads of paper with the risk of transfer and uncertainty about what
you are buying. No more risk of theft, mutilation and the loss of
certificates.
For most people, land is more important than financial securities. Yet,
relatively, the arrangement about land continues to be extremely
primitive.
The Seventh Plan (1985-90) launched two ambitious centrally sponsored
pilot schemes - the Computerisation of Land Records, and Strengthening
of Revenue Administration and Updating of Land Records. The 11th Plan
(2008-12) combined the two and launched the
National Land Records Modernisation Programme (NLRMP)
in August 2008. It aimed "to modernise management of land records,
minimise scope of land/property disputes, enhance transparency in the
land records maintenance system, and facilitate moving eventually
towards guaranteed conclusive titles to immovable properties in the
country".
A visit to the
NLRMP website
reveals a horror story. Practically no progress, even in entry of
textual data, in all states except Gujarat, Karnataka and Maharashtra.
Delhi is no exception. Furthermore, in the column "If no, by which date
it will be completed", it often mentions dates that are either pure
gibberish or a date in the past!
Why are the records in such pathetic shape? Records exist in the names
of persons long dead. Or, land has been transferred without mutation of
the records. They are not up to date, and sometimes not even available.
When available, they are often torn and brittle.
The reasons are not far to seek. First, there is an incentive problem.
In olden times, land revenue was by far the largest item of public
income. In 1856-57, for example, in total receipts of about £33 million,
land revenue of £17.5 million was the largest contributor, followed by
opium! Starting from Raja Todarmal, Akbar's minister of finance, right
up to British colonial times, recording land rights was important
primarily for the collection of revenues.
Predatory land taxation under various rulers, including the British, was
considered a major cause of poor agriculture. It agitated people during
the freedom movement. For example, after the poor harvest in 1917-18,
Mahatma Gandhi, assisted by Sardar Patel, advised the peasants in
Gujarat's Kheda district to stop paying land revenue. After
independence, land revenue - a state subject in the Constitution -
gradually became an insignificant source of revenue for the states. For
instance, in Madhya Pradesh, its share in the state's own tax revenue
declined from 43 per cent in 1957-58, to nine per cent in 1970-71 and
further to 1.4 per cent in 1989-90. In 2011-12, for all the states
combined, land revenue constituted 0.85 per cent of own revenue. There
was no financial incentive in maintaining land records.
There are two more reasons for the lack of progress in the NLRMP.
Updating of record of rights is a prerequisite for entering the data in
the computer. And that requires a survey. Poor governance leads to
popular fear of manipulation by the rich and the powerful. N C Saxena, a
veteran civil servant, quipped that "the surest way for an incumbent
government to lose an election in any area is to announce a survey in
that constituency". Survival anxiety of governments, especially in the
coalition era from 1989, has militated against progress. Furthermore,
the Left has seen the computerisation and updating of land records as
the "rightward drift in Indian politics" and virtual abandonment of
state-led land reforms. What is difficult to understand is: how do you
carry out land reforms if you do not know who owns what?
Perhaps in moving forward in the land titling system, there is a lot to
be learnt from India's 18-year own experience with the dematerialisation
of financial securities.
Following the enactment of the Depositories Act in 1996, voluntary
dematerialisation of financial stocks started only from December 1996.
Even now, if you do not wish to trade, you may hold the old stocks in
paper form. Scepticism was reflected in an initial poor investor
response. But with a bunch of dedicated professionals guiding its
progress, the value of dematerialised securities crossed the $1-billion
mark by June 1997. By end-September 2014, there were more than 22.4
million dematerialised account holders with a value of securities of
about Rs 121 lakh crore ($200 bn)!
Why not have an Act on land depositories on the lines of the
Depositories Act of 1996 for securities, and set up an organisation with
a name such as the National Land Depository Ltd (NLDL)? The NLDL may be
set up jointly by a few state governments, the central government and
some financial institutions (both public and private). It may have
branches in state capitals with the consent of the relevant state
governments. Upon payment by the "land owner" holding a registered deed -
correct or otherwise - the NLDL can dematerialise the ostensible land
title on a tentative basis with the same status as the registered deed.
The fee received may be shared with the relevant state government with
jurisdiction. For a competitive market in fees, an alternative land
depository (such as the Central Depository Services Ltd competing with
the National Securities Depository Ltd) may be set up as well.
Once the land title has been dematerialised on a tentative basis, it may
be put on the website of the depository for receiving objections within
a period of one year. The relevant village
patwari, district
administration and elected leaders may also be informed to raise their
objections. If no objection is received, the title will be moved from
tentative basis to a title guaranteed by law. Once the voluntary
dematerialisation of land records makes some progress, governments can
think of subsidising small holders the fees payable for such
dematerialisation.
The original article is available here.