Re: The Singles 1992 No Doubt Torrent
Christopher
No Doubt went into hiatus in April 2003 after the release of four singles from their fifth studio album, Rock Steady, allowing the four members to spend time with loved ones. This also allowed their lead singer, Gwen Stefani, to work on her solo music side project, under which she has released three albums, Love. Angel. Music. Baby. (2004), The Sweet Escape (2006), and This Is What the Truth Feels Like (2016). The band regrouped in September 2003 to record the lead single for the album, "It's My Life", with producer Nellee Hooper. Additionally, in May 2010, the band regrouped again to start work on their latest record.
The album was a compilation of 13 commercially released singles by the band from their previous studio albums, Tragic Kingdom, Return of Saturn, and Rock Steady, as well as the independently released single "Trapped in a Box" from No Doubt's self-titled debut studio album, and a brand-new cover version of "It's My Life". However, The Singles did not include "Happy Now?" and "Hey You!", two singles from Tragic Kingdom, neither of which were commercially successful, or "Squeal" and "Doghouse" from The Beacon Street Collection, which were both independently released. "Girls Get the Bass in the Back", a remix of "Hey Baby", and a live acoustic version of "Underneath It All" were included as bonus tracks on international pressings of the album.
The Singles 1992-2003 es el primer álbum recopilatorio del grupo estadounidense No Doubt. Incluye un nuevo sencillo It's My Life. Este sencillo es considerado uno de los más famosos del grupo. Cuenta con trece de los sencillos de la banda de su tarde tres álbumes de estudio-Tragic Kingdom, Return of Saturn y Rock Steady y la pista del álbum "Trapped in a Box" de su álbum debut, "No Doubt".
As predicted earlier in the week by the band's official site, next week's Rock Band DLC will feature the No Doubt compilation album The Singles 1992-2003. Two songs, New and Trapped In A Box, have been taken out without explanation. The rest of the songs are as follows:
The band originally planned to release its first album in over ten years later this year but will now release it early next year, according to a statement from the band last week.
"Ideally our new record would be coming out this year but it's just not ready yet," No Doubt posted on its website. "We don't want to rush this album just to get it out. This collection of songs means everything to us and our only priority right now is to make sure that it's the best album we can possibly make. There is still more work for us to do."
No further details are yet available about the untitled album. In January, No Doubt guitarist Tom Dumont announced via the band's Twitter page their work on ten new songs for the album and plans to release it by the year's end.
No Doubt released its last studio album, Rock Steady, in 2001 but returned in 2003 with The Singles 1992-2003, which was re-released last year.
No Doubt has won two Grammy Awards and sold 28 million records worldwide to date. The band embarked on a US tour throughout the summer of 2009.
Stefani has since recorded two solo LPs, selling more than 12 million records worldwide. Her single "Hollaback Girl" was the first US digital download to sell one million copies.
Where this court's holding in Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 362 Mass. 672 (1972), foreshadowed Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 373 Mass. 116 (1977), sufficiently to alert post-Bumpus defendants to the infirmities in jury instructions addressed in that case, a defendant who was convicted in 1973 of armed robbery and murder in the first degree, and who failed to raise the issue of the trial judge's erroneous reasonable doubt instruction at trial or on direct appeal, waived the issue and could not raise it on collateral review. [473-474]
Where the holding of Sullivan V. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280-281 (1993), with respect to deficient jury instructions, was foreshadowed by earlier Federal cases cited by a defendant in his 1981, 1989, and 1992 motions for a new trial, the defendant waived any issue with respect to such deficient jury instructions in a later collateral appeal in 1997. [474-477]
On April 7, 1981, the defendant filed a pro se motion for a new trial alleging that the jury instruction on reasonable doubt was "far short of the minimum standards [required] by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." [Note 1]
the motion. The defendant filed a third motion for a new trial on October 1, 1992, arguing, inter alia, that it was not until the decision in Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski, 391 Mass. 123 (1984), three years after his first motion for a new trial, that we definitively recognized that our decision in Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 373 Mass. 116 (1977), should be given retroactive application. [Note 2]
The defendant supplemented his 1992 motion with a pro se memorandum in which he argued that the error in the reasonable doubt instruction at his trial was of a kind that can never be harmless. On February 23, 1993, the motion was denied, in part because error in the reasonable doubt instruction had been raised in the defendant's 1981 motion for a new trial.
On January 17, 1997, the defendant again petitioned a single justice, seeking leave to appeal from the denial of his 1992 motion. The single justice granted leave to appeal "on the issues of the retroactivity and waiver of the claim of error based on a Ferreira instruction." We now review the motion judge's denial of the defendant's 1992 motion for a new trial to determine whether the trial judge's reasonable doubt instruction may properly be attacked on collateral review.
In Commonwealth v. Ferreira, supra at 129, this court reversed a conviction where the judge defined reasonable doubt using examples from the jurors' daily lives that "tended to trivialize the awesome duty of the jury to determine whether the defendant's guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt." The court supported its decision with a long list of cases going back to 1972 criticizing this type of charge. See id.
We refuse to depart from controlling precedent and today reaffirm our holding that Bumpus foreshadowed Ferreira sufficiently to alert subsequent defendants to the issue. See Commonwealth v. Ambers, supra at 708-710. See also Commonwealth v. Limone, 410 Mass. 364, 365 n.2 (1991) ("no foreshadowing of the rule expressed in Ferreira until our decision in Commonwealth v. Bumpus"); Commonwealth v. Kelleher, 395 Mass. 821, 825-826 (1985) ("the defendant's challenge of the jury charge is founded on principles first enunciated . . . in Commonwealth v. Bumpus"); Commonwealth v. Grace, 381 Mass. 753, 760 (1980) (court relied on defense counsel's failure to object to Ferreira-type reasonable doubt instruction in wake of Bumpus). Therefore, because the defendant did not raise the Ferreira argument on direct (post-Bumpus) appeal, G. L. c. 278, s. 33E, precludes further review as the issue could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal but was not. [Note 4]
2. Waiver and retroactivity of the Sullivan principles. In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280-281 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that a deficient jury instruction describing the burden of proof inherent in the term "beyond a reasonable doubt" creates a structural defect that was not susceptible of harmless error analysis. The Court reasoned that an instruction that understates the reasonable doubt standard violates the defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be convicted only on a jury's finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The instruction in the present case is less obviously deficient than the one at issue in Sullivan. As part of his charge, the judge in Sullivan instructed the jury that reasonable doubt "must be such doubt as would give rise to grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the
Here the instructional Paw was a poor choice of demonstrative examples within the context of a charge. This charge also contained language emphasizing the presumption of innocence and the duty to convict based only on an independent and careful evaluation of the evidence. Although the judge strayed in using examples from the jurors' lives, he coupled them with a curative preamble: "What [reasonable doubt] really means is that after you discuss the evidence among yourselves, determining, as I said before, what part - all, part, or none - of any witness's story you believe, and what inferences you are going to draw, that you must be sure that the defendant is guilty. Otherwise you have to acquit him . . ." (emphasis added).
In Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 238 (1977), the Supreme Court reversed a conviction where the jury instruction did not comport with due process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. North Carolina had argued that reversing the conviction would compel reversals of countless other convictions, regardless of guilt. Id. at 239-240. The Court rejected this argument, but went on to point out that, because it was unlikely that many defense lawyers properly objected, States could "insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error" (emphasis added). Id. at 244 n.8. Notably, in Hankerson v. North Carolina, as in the case now before us, the Court dealt with a jury charge that had the potential to decrease the government's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 242. It follows then that, under Hankerson, defendants can waive even those errors that the Court in Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra at 282, later concluded were "structural."
In the instant case the defendant supplemented his 1992 motion for a new trial with a pro se memorandum in which he raises for the first time the argument that a flawed reasonable doubt instruction is not susceptible to harmless error analysis. Significantly, the defendant supported this argument with authorities predating his 1999 second motion for a new trial. One such authority is Lanigan v. Maloney, 853 F.2d 40, 48 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989), in which the court stated: "We continue to have serious doubts whether a conviction obtained without a proper reasonable doubt instruction could ever be upheld." The defendant's supplemental memorandum also cites Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 9 10 (1978), wherein the court states that "some constitutional errors may be so substantial that they can never be harmless." The defendant's 1992 supplemental memorandum also cites language from Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986), and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), similarly signaling the rule in Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra. That Jackson v. Virginia, supra, and Dunn v. Perrin, supra, predate
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