Carte Ma
Nguyet Mahrenholz
The Africa programme analyses the geopolitics of the Africa-Europe relationship. In particular, the programme delves into relations between the African Union and the European Union to find creative foreign policy tools and strategies. It also focuses on two regions that are particularly relevant for Europe: the Horn of Africa and the Sahel.
The Middle East and North Africa programme seeks to support a coherent European agenda in pursuit of regional interests. The programme works with European and regional governments, local voices, and civil society to advance channels of dialogue as well as providing direct policy prescriptions to secure conflict de-escalation, regional stabilisation, and democratic transition.
The US programme helps Europeans create policy responses to developments in US domestic politics and foreign policy. The programme seeks to strengthen transatlantic relations by exploring the obstacles to a more balanced partnership and developing ideas to overcome them.
This second round of ECFR and Oxford polling in what we call the CITRUS countries (China, India, Turkey, Russia, and the US) and 11 European countries (Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Switzerland), together with five other major non-European countries that we have polled for the first time (Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and South Korea), reveals a complex geopolitical landscape in which people in great and middle powers around the world do not want to accept only one fixed set of partnerships.
Indeed, many people outside the West regard the unique importance attributed to this European war as an example of Western double standards. Now, with the war in Ukraine continuing beyond its 600th day, another major war under way between Israel and Hamas (which erupted after our polling was completed), and a real medium-term threat of armed conflict between the US and China over Taiwan, it looks as if the world is becoming one of multiple wars as well as ever changing alliances.
One of the most fundamental questions you can ask people is where they would want to live, if they were to emigrate. For people from every continent we polled, the EU and the US appear to be very attractive destinations. When asked which country they would choose if they were to move and start living outside their own country, clear majorities in Brazil, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey indicated the EU or the US. Russia and Indonesia were the only exceptions. But even there, as elsewhere, few people chose China or Russia. The highest cumulative result for China and Russia was 16 per cent in South Africa, still far below the 65 per cent of people who chose the EU or US in that country.
Much of this appeal likely stems from their relative prosperity, including perceptions of economic opportunity and quality of life. But our poll suggests that some of their soft power also derives from the kind of liberal, tolerant, and open societies of which they are made up, and the values that underpin them.
On human rights, for example, clear majorities of people in Brazil, India, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey would prefer their country to be closer to the US and its allies (that is, the West) than China and its partners. This is even a prevailing opinion in Saudi Arabia, where almost half of the respondents indicated a preference for their country to be closer to Western (47 per cent) instead of Chinese (21 per cent) approaches to human rights. Encouragingly, younger respondents in Turkey and Russia (those aged 18 to 34) are more inclined than older ones to favour the West, not just as a place to live but also in respect of their attitude to human rights.
In fact, the only facet of hard or soft power in which China and its allies pip the West is their appeal as economic partners. When asked if they prefer their country to be closer to the American or Chinese bloc on trade, respondents in many countries we polled chose the latter. This is a majority opinion in Russia, but also in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. People in South Korea are divided on this point, while only in Brazil and India did respondents prefer closer trade with a US-led bloc.
But what is most striking about the results of the poll is that so many people in such a variety of countries appear to think that they can get away without having to choose. Instead, it seems as though they would prefer to combine a Western way of life and US-led security cooperation with China as an economic partner.
This explains why a degree of dissonance exists between some European and American policymakers and many of the people that we polled around the world. Western policymakers sometimes assume that because other countries have benefited from the existing order, they will be partners in upholding it. Whereas for other countries, the changes that seem like disorder for Western policymakers may look like a reordering that they can use to their own advantage.
That said, most people in most of the countries we surveyed (except Turkey) say good leaders will prioritise international cooperation over national independence. Europeans and South Koreans stand out as expressing the strongest preference for international cooperation (both at 61 per cent), while respondents in the US are almost equally divided between those prioritising international cooperation and those favouring national independence. (We may imagine which response Donald Trump and his MAGA compatriots would give.)
Yet, these findings should give no grounds for Western complacency. In a world in which people in many countries prefer to choose their partners depending on the issue, the insurgent or challenger power does not need to be as attractive as the established one. It just needs to exist to provide a choice. If your government does not think that the West or China will be able to force it to choose sides, then the presence of a Chinese option simply puts it in a better position to bargain with the US and the EU. This strategy is practiced not just by powers outside Europe, but also by European countries such as Serbia, and even EU member states such as Hungary under prime minister Viktor Orban. They all conclude that in an la carte world you can have a major economic relationship with China and security relations with the US, while also enjoying what Europe has to offer.
The appeal of Western countries and values demonstrated in this poll often does not translate into support for Western policies. As in our previous poll of the CITRUS countries, there remains a clear preference in China, India, and Turkey (and obviously Russia) that the war should end as soon as possible, even if Ukraine has to relinquish control of some of its territory. Our new poll shows that this is also the prevailing view in Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa.
Overall, it seems that large numbers of people outside the West appear to think that the war in Ukraine could be less of a moral struggle than a proxy war between great powers. Majorities in China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey believe the US and Russia are at war. People in the US and Europe are joined only by those in India and Brazil in having a prevailing view that the US is not at war with Russia (though there are countries in Europe where the opposite view prevails).
People in many of these countries also do not accept that Russia is at fault for perpetuating the war. Indeed, Europe, the US, and South Korea are the only places where a clear majority of respondents say that Russia constitutes the biggest obstacle to peace between Russia and Ukraine. The West (Ukraine, the EU, or the US) is seen as a bigger problem not just by people in Russia and China, but also by those in India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
Only in the US does a view clearly prevail that Ukraine will win this war. Even in Europe, 30 per cent of respondents expressed a view that Russia is likely to win the war within five years, while only 38 per cent say that Ukraine is likely to win. This is sobering news not just for Ukrainians, but also for everyone who believes that a Ukrainian victory is essential for the future of European and international order.
In recent months, two powerful EU member states, France and Germany, have been locked in a bad-tempered argument about the acceptability of even civil nuclear power. Meanwhile, majorities in China, India, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and the US believe that their own country should have access to nuclear weapons. Only in Brazil, Europe, and Indonesia does a clear majority oppose gaining nuclear weapons.
This loss of faith in the West will likely also resonate in other theatres as well. There is, after all, a third potential major war, an armed conflict between the US and China over Taiwan. No less than 52 per cent of Chinese believe this is likely, as do 39 per cent of Americans and 35 per cent of Europeans.
It is also high time that Europeans invest more in the military and security dimensions of hard power, building on what they have already done to support Ukraine. A successful further eastward enlargement of the EU, even before the war in Ukraine has reached a conclusion, would also make the EU more powerful and credible in a world of fierce geopolitical and geoeconomic competition.
Each photograph was the size of a visiting card, and such photograph cards, in an early form of social media,[1] were commonly traded among friends and visitors in the 1860s. Albums for the collection and display of cards became a common fixture in Victorian parlors. The popularity of the format and its rapid uptake worldwide were due to their relative cheapness, which made portrait photographs accessible to a broader demographic,[2] and prior to the advent of mechanical reproduction of photographs, led to the publication and collection of portraits of prominent persons. It was the success of the carte de visite that led to photography's institutionalisation.[3]
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