predicting the jasmine revolutions
CIFP
http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1330.pdf
It draws from a paper we published in International Economics two
years ago.
The analysis is not pure prediction (for that additional kinds of
data are necessary) but highlights the underlying causes of the
current unrest. Had someone in our governments taken note, additional
resources could have been allocated to identify the relationship
between the underlying risk factors in our analysis and the more
dynamic behaviors of political agents (which is the essence of early
warning and which is discussed in our book: _Security, Development and
the Fragile State: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Policy).
Our profile of Yemen which I am happy to distribute highlights the
upward trend that the region is experiencing generally.
On a related note - there will be a panel at ISA this year on
forecasting state failure and conflict with contributions from DARPA
and our own work with DRDC.
(PS) This message may bounce from the listerv - so please distribute.
http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1326.pdf
dc
Jack A. Goldstone
I am happy to point out the Marshall-Goldstone State Fragility Index had Egypt as fairly high risk, but NOT Tunisia or Bahrain. The Political Instability Task Force forecasts, by contrast, had Egypt at lower risk (as a stable autocracy and middle income country).
What I would say we learn from this is a need to better adapt our objective indices to theories of revolution. The latter stress that poverty itself is never a cause of revolt; rather it is perceived INJUSTICE in the income distribution or level that leads to popular mobilization. So perhaps we need to weight the political and economic legitimacy indicators (which was the one area in which our SFI had Bahrain and Tunisia at above-average risk)somewhat higher than the effectiveness (e.g. income per capita) indicators.
Best,
jack G.