Court of Appeal
Saim Khan
A trial court's failure to rule on defendant's multitude of evidentiaiy objections does not necessarily waive those objections on appeal, and uniform application of the federal "stray remarks" doctrine may be unfair to some discrimination plaintiffs 'Ilie trial court granted Google’s motion for summary judgment, finding Google had legitimate nondiscriminato- ry reasons for terminating Reid’s employment. It further found Reid had failed to raise a permissible inference of pretext or that Google terminated Reid on the basis of his age. Google filed 31 pages of written objections to Reid’s evidence. Some of those objections were raised at the hearing. The business attorneys work within a business setting, usually representing larger businesses.
On review, the Court of Appeal found the parties had established a prima-facie case of age discrimination and a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Reid’s employment. (Id. at p. 521.) It also found Reid had presented a triable issue of material fact as to whether the stated reasons for termination were pretextu- al. It further held that the trial court’s failure to rule on the evidentiary objections did not waive those objections on appeal, finding the filing of written evidentiary objections before the summary judgment hearing was sufficient to preserve the objections, and as a result, the Court of Appeal reviewed Google's evidentiary objections on the merits. The Court of Appeal also refused to apply the “stray remarks doctrine” to exclude certain statements made by Reid’s supervisors and coworkers.
The California Supreme Court held:
We agree with the Court of Appeal's conclusions. Regarding the waiver issue, the Court of Appeal correctly determined that a finding of waiver does not depend on whether a trial court rules expressly on evidentiary objections and that Google’s filing of written evidentiary objections before the summary judgment hearing preserved them on appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (b)(5), (d).) After a party objects to evidence, the trial court must then rule on those objections. If the trial court fails to rule after a party has properly objected, the evidentiary objections are not deemed waived on appeal.
Regarding the stray remarks issue, the Court of Appeal also correctly determined that application of the stray remarks doctrine is unnecessary and its categorical exclusion of evidence might lead to unfair results at Biljac, a case that had seemingly fallen out of favor with the courts in California. In Bil Jac, the plaintiffs filed voluminous evidentiary objections and requested that the trial court rule on them. The trial court declined to do so based on time consumption and that the rulings ``would serve very little useful purpose.” Plaintiffs argued this refusal constituted reversible error, but the Court of Appeal rejected their argument, holding that express evidentiary rulings were unnecessary because the motion would be reviewed de novo. According to Biljac, a trial court may decline to rule on specific objections as long as it stated it was relying on “competent and admissible evidence."
Even though the plaintiff argued express rulings are necessary for appellate review, so the reviewing court knows what evidence was considered by the trial court, the court rejected that approach:
flj here is no use in such a procedure. We review summary judgments de novo . . . , and the parties remain free to press their admissibility arguments on appeal, the same as they did in the trial court. Also, being able to identify particular flaws in the lower court’s reasoning has no value because, as appellants themselves note, summary judgment must be upheld if correct on any ground - regardless of wrong ‘reasons’ which may have guided the court. . . More generally, it is presumed on appeal that a judgment has not relied on irrelevant or incompetent evidence.