Plaintiff's bar Details
Saim Khan
Business & Professions Code sec-tion 17200; Treble Damages; Civil Code section 3345. {Clark u Superior Court (National Western Life Ins. Co., 50 Cal.4th 605 (Cal. Supreme 2010)) Senior citizens filed lawsuits against sellers of annuities under the unfair competition law, Business & Professions Code section 17200, et seq., (“UCL") seeking remedy of treble-damages recovery under Civil Code section 3345. Section 3345, subd. (b) allow's, in actions brought by senior citizens, up to three times the amount of a fine, civil penalty, or "any other remedy the purpose or effect of which is to punish or deter.’’ The corporate attorneys are knowledgeable in all areas of general corporate law.
The court held that section 3345 is not limited to actions under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act. But it further held that section 3345, by its terms, allows a trebled recovery only if the statute under which recovery is sought permits a remedy that is in the nature of a penalty. Since the UCL allows only restitution, and not damages, and since the purpose of restitution is not punitive, even though it may have some incidental punitive or deterrent effect, treble damages under section 3345 are not available in UCL actions.
Attorney’s fees; CEQA; appellate work; billing rates (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603.) Appeal by successful petitioners in CEQA action, where trial court cut lodestar hourly rate for CEQA expert based in Santa Monica to hourly rates for local counsel in Inland Empire, and cut lodestar hours for appellate work by 56 percent based on its finding that the difficult work in the case had been done in the trial. Reversed. Trial court abused discretion by basing fees on rates charged in the Inland Empire instead of on trial counsel’s “home market” rates; petitioners showed that it was impractical to hire qualified counsel locally. The fact that trial counsel did discounted work in some cases did not justify a reduction in hourly rates, because she produced evidence that the market value of her rates were what she sought in the trial court.
“The reason-able market value of the attorney’s services is the measure of a reasonable hourly rate. This standard applies regardless of whether the attorneys claiming fees charge nothing for their services, charge at below-market or discounted rates, represent the client on a straight contingent fee basis, or are in-house counsel.” The court also abused its discretion in cutting hours devoted to the appeal as duplicative, because it appeared that the trial court “dramatically undervalues the type and quantity of work normally done during the appellate process.”