Password Crack Time

[Cristoforo Kanoy]

Onetime passwords (aka One-time passcodes) are a form of strong authentication, providing much better protection to eBanking, corporate networks, and other systems containing sensitive data.

Robust authentication systems address the limitations of static passwords by incorporating an additional security credential, such as a temporary one-time password (OTP), to protect network access and end-users' digital identities.

They are inherently more secure than other OTP tokens because they generate a unique, non-reusable password for each authentication event, store personal data, and do not transmit confidential or private data over the network.

Stronger authentication can also be implemented with two-factor authentication (2FA) or multiple-factor authentication. In these cases, the user provides two (or more) different authentication factors.

I know there has been a couple of other incidents like this. But I dont want to reinstall Dropbox to be honest.

So just like the subject say: Mac Finder asks for password each time I rename a file or move in Dropbox. And now comes the weird thing. This all is hapening on my iMac Pro (Sonoma v14.5). While when on my Macbook Pro (Sonoma v14.5) it just works fine. So its really only happening on the iMac. Got the same other programs installed on both machines. Yes, also Onedrive. But I closed it to test if that is the problem, but it isnt. Checked online if I can edit the file name there; and yes, I can.

Installed in the right way and it always worked. It just stopped working like a week ago. I also checked the sharing & permissions, gave everyone read & write and also applied to enclosed items. Really lost atm.

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Thanks for the reply. I checked the things you asked.

The filepath is: Macintosh HD/Users/XXX/Dropbox

No specific update has been taken place, just like I told you earlier I got the same things installed and same updates on my macbook, where everything works fine.

All the permissions are there!

I found out something new. So when I do the following things it will give me a popup from Finder where it say something like: Finder wants to change the name of "...". Enter your password to allow this.

This is only happening in the finder. When I go online, browser, it works.

But when I copy a total new item inside a folder which was previous lets say on my desktop. It works. I can just copy it in there. Also I can change the name of that item, or move it somewhere else. How on earth.

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Still trying some stuff. So when I drop and drag a folder to my desktop, it just works. After I was trying to delete the map from dropbox (via Finder). So I can drag the desktop folder back towards Dropbox and it would work again (since new things just works, its only the old maps/items that doesnt work). But I can even delete the map, also not when entering my password. It says:

Through the collaboration of several OATH members, a TOTP draft was developed in order to create an industry-backed standard. It complements the event-based one-time standard HOTP, and it offers end user organizations and enterprises more choice in selecting technologies that best fit their application requirements and security guidelines. In 2008, OATH submitted a draft version of the specification to the IETF. This version incorporates all the feedback and commentary that the authors received from the technical community based on the prior versions submitted to the IETF.[2] In May 2011, TOTP officially became RFC 6238.[1]

Both the authenticator and the authenticatee compute the TOTP value, then the authenticator checks whether the TOTP value supplied by the authenticatee matches the locally generated TOTP value. Some authenticators allow values that should have been generated before or after the current time in order to account for slight clock skews, network latency and user delays.

Unlike passwords, TOTP codes are only valid for a limited time. However, users must enter TOTP codes into an authentication page, which creates the potential for phishing attacks. Due to the short window in which TOTP codes are valid, attackers must proxy the credentials in real time.[3]

TOTP credentials are also based on a shared secret known to both the client and the server, creating multiple locations from which a secret can be stolen.[4] An attacker with access to this shared secret could generate new, valid TOTP codes at will. This can be a particular problem if the attacker breaches a large authentication database.[5]

OTP generation algorithms typically make use of pseudorandomness or randomness to generate a shared key or seed, and cryptographic hash functions, which can be used to derive a value but are hard to reverse and therefore difficult for an attacker to obtain the data that was used for the hash. This is necessary because otherwise, it would be easy to predict future OTPs by observing previous ones.

OTPs have been discussed as a possible replacement for, as well as an enhancer to, traditional passwords. On the downside, OTPs can be intercepted or rerouted, and hard tokens can get lost, damaged, or stolen. Many systems that use OTPs do not securely implement them, and attackers can still learn the password through phishing attacks to impersonate the authorized user.[1]

The most important advantage addressed by OTPs is that, in contrast to static passwords, they are not vulnerable to replay attacks. This means that a potential intruder who manages to record an OTP that was already used to log into a service or to conduct a transaction will not be able to use it, since it will no longer be valid.[1] A second major advantage is that a user who uses the same (or similar) password for multiple systems, is not made vulnerable on all of them, if the password for one of these is gained by an attacker. A number of OTP systems also aim to ensure that a session cannot easily be intercepted or impersonated without knowledge of unpredictable data created during the previous session, thus reducing the attack surface further.

There are also different ways to make the user aware of the next OTP to use. Some systems use special electronic security tokens that the user carries and that generate OTPs and show them using a small display. Other systems consist of software that runs on the user's mobile phone. Yet other systems generate OTPs on the server-side and send them to the user using an out-of-band channel such as SMS messaging. Finally, in some systems, OTPs are printed on paper that the user is required to carry.

A time-synchronized OTP is usually related to a piece of hardware called a security token (e.g., each user is given a personal token that generates a one-time password). It might look like a small calculator or a keychain charm, with an LCD that shows a number that changes occasionally. Inside the token is an accurate clock that has been synchronized with the clock on the authentication server. On these OTP systems, time is an important part of the password algorithm, since the generation of new passwords is based on the current time rather than, or in addition to, the previous password or a secret key. This token may be a proprietary device, or a mobile phone or similar mobile device which runs software that is proprietary, freeware, or open-source. An example of a time-synchronized OTP standard is time-based one-time password (TOTP). Some applications can be used to keep time-synchronized OTP, like Google Authenticator or a password manager.

Each new OTP may be created from the past OTPs used. An example of this type of algorithm, credited to Leslie Lamport, uses a one-way function (call it f \displaystyle f ). This one-time password system works as follows:

RSA Security's SecurID is one example of a time-synchronization type of token, along with HID Global's solutions. Like all tokens, these may be lost, damaged, or stolen; additionally, there is an inconvenience as batteries die, especially for tokens without a recharging facility or with a non-replaceable battery. A variant of the proprietary token was proposed by RSA in 2006 and was described as "ubiquitous authentication", in which RSA would partner with manufacturers to add physical SecurID chips to devices such as mobile phones.

Recently,[when?] it has become possible to take the electronic components associated with regular keyfob OTP tokens and embed them in a credit card form factor. However, the thinness of the cards, at 0.79mm to 0.84mm thick, prevents standard components or batteries from being used. Special polymer-based batteries must be used which have a much lower battery life than coin (button) cells. Semiconductor components must not only be very flat but must minimise the power used in standby and when operating. [citation needed]

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