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This enormous release of gamma radiation is absorbed by the surrounding air, heating it to a point where it releases radiation itself. This process forms a fireball--a glowing ball of gas--and decreases the energy of the radiation: from gamma rays to x-rays to ultraviolet (what causes sunburn), visible light, infrared (heat radiation), and radio waves. An electromagnetic pulse--a very brief pulse of radio waves--is emitted, collecting in metal objects and creating a power surge which damages or destroys electronics. In 0.00005 seconds nearly every computer chip in Brownsville is ruined. In 0.0007 seconds the fireball is 130 meters (400 feet) across. Continuing to expand at many times the speed of sound, the fireball forms two distinct regions: the center remains extremely hot while the temperature of the outer part falls as it pushes the surrounding air away. The heat radiated by the outer layer produces an initial flash of light as bright as the Sun to an observer 40 km (25 miles) away at 0.005 seconds after detonation. The fireball brightness decreases until 0.08 seconds after detonation, when the fireball is as bright as the Sun to an observer 7.5 km (4.5 miles) away, and breakaway occurs: a blast wave separates from the fireball's surface. The blast wave is an expanding sphere of highly compressed and fast moving air--similar to a sonic boom but much more powerful. Initially the blast wave travels at ten times the speed of sound. The wave pushes the air away before it so that a partial vacuum is created behind it. As a result, the passing wave produces enormous pressures and severe momentary outward winds, followed by less intense inward winds. The blast wave is reflected from the ground and thereby reinforces itself. It was partly cloudy over Brownsville, but now the blast seems to push the clouds away. At a distance of 9 km (5.5 miles) it finally drops to the speed of sound, 19 seconds after detonation.
United States:
The President
The Secretary of State
Dr. Seaborg
Mr. Brown
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Bundy
United Kingdom:
The Prime Minister
The Foreign Secretary
Mr. de Zulueta
Ambassador Ormsby Gore
Sir William Penny
The Prime Minister asked whether the Christmas Island group had reported. The experts replied that the advance party had given its report. The Prime Minister asked how long a time would be needed for preparations. Mr. Brown answered that they must start in early January in order to be ready for testing between April and the first of July.
The Prime Minister asked about underground testing. Dr. Seaborg replied that underground testing could usefully be done at levels up to 100 KT and that the United States would expect to continue with underground testing even if atmospheric testing should be decided on. The Prime Minister asked whether underground testing could be detected. Dr. Seaborg replied that we could certainly expect to detect Soviet tests at the level of 20 KTs but that detection would be less certain at lower levels, down to a point which could not be definitely stated, at which detection would not be possible.
The Prime Minister said that what worried him was that the Soviets had negotiated when they were behind, although they were preparing tests. He said there was a theory that the U-2 really did give them a shock because they did not know how much we could learn from such photography. Now we are even, and the question was how to prevent them from further testing. If they did any in the atmosphere, the tests could be detected. Now we have a situation that may be decisive. (The Prime Minister remarked that the British played only a small part in this situation, through having convenient facilities.) He asked whether we could make a new try toward some agreement. Here he remarked that he must have Cabinet consent to any decision on these matters. He thought it might be possible, with no real delay, to embark upon an attempt to break through. On one side was Berlin, which could be settled if people wanted to settle it. On the other side was this problem which might involve twenty-five years of terrible effort in a travesty of the purposes of human life.
The Prime Minister then read a draft paper/2/ proposing in essence that a new effort should be made to spare future generations these costs and dangers, even though on a fair assessment it was agreed that the United States should make all necessary preparations and that Christmas Island should be used in such preparations. The paper proposed that the final decision should be postponed until this effort had been made. What the Prime Minister hoped for was that this effort might have its effect both in Berlin and on disarmament. He hoped for a new phase of understanding. He believed it might be possible to summon Khrushchev to a meeting for such purposes and that we could thus get a great moral advantage.
/2/Not found.
The President said that he could not believe that the Soviets would give us such a propaganda advantage. If we embark on such new discussions, it would delay us another year. We would not have a better case a year from now, and what could we expect the Soviets to agree to in such a period? He agreed that we should have had an agreement before, and that the problems of underground testing had been greatly exaggerated, but now the Soviets had tested and could prepare secret tests again, while we on our side could not stay in the posture of real preparedness.
There followed a discussion of the disarmament proposals of the United States and of the optimum time for the proposed new test series. Dr. Seaborg stated that if this were the last series, and if we knew it, and if we knew that it would happen, we would go somewhat later.
The President restated the position as he saw it: we must decide to test, but we could couple the decision with a restatement of our purposes of disarmament. He thought we should not announce a decision now but only that we were making preparations. The Prime Minister wanted to make it clear that we would make a new and real effort for disarmament. If real progress could be made we would not test. We should only have to defend our preparations, on the first round; the President agreed to this last point. The Prime Minister teased the scientists about their destructive powers, but in reply to their remonstrances he said that they were really only "the innocent victims of the folly of politicians."
The President asked the Prime Minister if he could agree on Christmas Island with an understanding that tests would occur if the situation did not change. The Prime Minister replied that he wished to think of the two countries as partners in this. Whether testing occurred on Christmas Island or not, we were in it together and Britain would have to back up the United States. But could we not announce our plans so that they would be less a threat than a hope. The President said we could do this as long as we did not use any words that would trap us.
The Prime Minister repeated his hope that we could "summon this fellow." After all, on paper the disarmament plans were close together, and historians looking back from the distant future may wonder why it had been so hard to reach an agreement.
The Secretary of State thought it was extremely important not to think of our testing as opening a new chapter. It was the Soviet tests which opened the new chapter.
The Prime Minister said that a great deal depended on what the Soviet Union really wanted in the nuclear field. He thought that these tests had occurred because Khrushchev was frightened.
Lord Home asked if the President really intended to link the testing decision to Berlin. The President replied in the affirmative. If a really good settlement could be achieved on Berlin, he believed--as a private matter, not for publication--that it would be easier to make a decision not to test. The Secretary of State emphasized that these two propositions would never be linked formally with the Soviets.
Lord Home asked again if we could not summon the Soviet leaders to a disarmament meeting.
The Prime Minister asked if there were really a grave problem of keeping teams together. Secretary Rusk restated the American view quite simply. The Soviet Union can agree not to test and still prepare in secret for a new series. The United States cannot; no democracy could take that course. Dr. Seaborg remarked that we had been accused of preparing even when we were not, and now any such course would be doubly difficult.
Ambassador Ormsby Gore remarked that we could say that we now have an absolute justification for testing and mean to prepare, but before we execute tests we will make a further great effort. The Prime Minister said that there must be a private agreement, subject to Cabinet understanding, and that meanwhile a simple public statement should be made. The President asked Ambassador Bruce to work with Ambassador Ormsby Gore and the technical experts in preparing such a statement. It was later decided not to reach a private agreement at this time; the Prime Minister instead gave the President a letter explaining his intentions./3/ Meanwhile the technical experts did reach a tentative agreement ad referendum, on rules for the use of Christmas Island.
/3/In his letter of December 22, Macmillan stated that the experts should agree on the terms of a formal agreement for the use of Christmas Island, that the matter would be subject to a decision of the British Cabinet, and that "it would be unreasonable for the British Government, should it approve in principle of the use of Christmas Island, to be in a position to disapprove the tests if you and I feel ourselves unable to reach agreement." He did not think the "decision should rely only upon the state of the world at the time, as if this was something that could not be changed by human effort. I should like to feel that we had done everything possible to control events and not merely to follow them." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy 1960-1961)
113. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, December 29, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/21/61-1/8/62. No classification marking. A handwritten note reads: "President saw."
SUBJECT
Resumption of Atmospheric Testing: A Proposal
1. On November 2, you said that the atmospheric testing decision would rest on a prior technical decision as to whether "the orderly and essential scientific development of new weapons has reached a point where effective progress is not possible without such tests." Unfortunately, as we now know, technical evidence will not yield a clearcut answer to this question. Our most expert scientific judgment is that the recent test series enabled the USSR to make gains--but not breakthroughs. Mr. Wiesner, after a study of the data, has reached the conclusion that, while atmospheric tests "would certainly contribute to our military strength, they are not critical or even very important to our over-all military picture." The decision, in short, is back in the political field.
2. In the meantime, opinion around Washington is crystallizing in favor of the decision to resume atmospheric testing. Even some who see no overriding security need for resumption are fatalistic about the possibility of avoiding it. The essential arguments behind this crystallization are (a) that, if we deny ourselves the right to do what is necessary for our security, nuclear superiority may pass to the Soviet Union by default--not this time, but next time, or the time after that; and (b) that there is nothing to be gained by non-resumption except the transient, illusory and meaningless favor of "world opinion."
3. I would agree that non-resumption per se is a pallid and negative position, and that an unexplained failure to resume might even be construed as weakness. However, I wonder whether it might not be possible to put non-resumption in a positive and dramatic context--and, at the same time, protect ourselves against the threat of a new cycle of Soviet tests.
4. The underlying reason for world concern over the resumption of atmospheric testing, I believe, is not so much the fallout problem (which will become of diminishing importance as we move into a clean-bomb period) as it is a spreading fear that the arms race is getting completely out of control and the world is sliding hopelessly into chaos. The pattern over the last few years shows rather clearly that, if we start a series of atmospheric tests (especially if at the same time we continue to proclaim that we still have a commanding lead over the USSR), this will precipitate and--for some people--validate the next Soviet cycle and thereby induce further degeneration. At present we are holding the arms race in check; if we go ahead, then the sky becomes the limit. What the world yearns for is a leader who will point out the ominous significance of this process and make one mighty effort to arrest the slide into international anarchy.
5. Would it not be worthwhile for you to consider issuing a statement containing two elements:
a) the announcement that, in a last effort to halt the process of degeneration, we have decided that we will not resume atmospheric testing;
b) the statement that at the same time, we will, in the interests of our own security and that of other free nations, complete all necessary standby preparations for the immediate resumption of atmospheric testing and, if the USSR conducts one more atmospheric test, we will instantly begin a massive group of militarily significant atmospheric tests.
6. The serious arguments against this are (a) that the USSR is going to resume atmospheric testing anyway, and that a unilateral moratorium would give them time to digest the 1961 series and prepare for new strides forward in, say, late 1962; and (b) that, in the meantime, the morale of our own laboratories would so decline that we would be unable to resume our own momentum.
7. As for argument (a), if we kept our testing program in a state of continuous ground alert, ready to go at the first new Soviet test, we would lose, at the most, six months.
As for argument (b), we very much need an impartial evaluation of the extent to which we can, if we put our minds on it, maintain readiness to test. AEC and DOD scientists tend to say that it is impossible to maintain the morale of scientists and the pace of scientific advance unless the men in the laboratories know that they can test their hypotheses. However, the reasons cited for this are not very persuasive. It would seem to me (and I think that Bill Foster agrees) that this is one of those cases where what is convenient and what is necessary are confused; i.e., that it would clearly be nice if all devices could be tested in the open air; but the essential work can still probably be done without such tests. I have raised this subject with Ros Gilpatric, who has now ordered a DOD analysis of the issues involved./2/
/2/See Document 118.
I do not believe that the real problem has yet been posed: that is, how to maintain morale and advance in the laboratories without assurance of atmospheric testing. If some one were given an order to do this, I am sure it could be done. If a disgruntled set of scientists went out of the laboratories, for example, another set would respond to the very possibility of avoiding atmospheric tests. Moreover, the present proposal would not exclude testing underground or in outer space, nor would it exclude bringing testing atmospheric tests to the very brink of fulfillment. And it commits us to resumption as soon as the USSR resumes; so that those who argue that the USSR will resume in any case should not (if they believe their own argument) suffer any loss of morale at all. I see no reason why this could not be a time of vigorous technical advance in our weaponry.
8. There is also the argument that non-resumption would show us to be weak and would strengthen the Soviet claim to be the greatest power in the world. But it can be argued with equal plausibility that it is resumption which would produce this effect because it would suggest that we have to go into the atmosphere in order to make up for our deficiencies. We are, indeed, in a logical dilemma as a result of repeated statements that we are "ahead." If we are "ahead," why test in the atmosphere? If we do test in the atmosphere, does this not constitute a confession that we are "behind"?
The arguments in terms of political effect tend to cancel each other out, though I agree that any nation indisputably ahead in the nuclear field would have a major psychological advantage. But since an indisputable lead is hardly possible for any nation, it would seem better to stick to your assurance that "no nuclear test in the atmosphere will be undertaken, as the Soviet Union has done, for so-called psychological or political reasons."
9. On the other side, conditional non-resumption would not necessarily make the essential balance of military power more insecure than it would be if we resumed atmospheric tests; for the relative gains we would make by resumption would probably be cancelled out by the next Soviet cycle which our resumption would provoke and legitimatize. In other words, we would presumably prefer to have our nuclear superiority (or the nuclear standoff, whatever the situation is) at the lower rather than higher stages of the nuclear apocalypse; and presumably the cessation of atmospheric testing, as compared with what would be the case if both sides pressed on in the atmosphere, would--at least by precluding the development of a reliable AICBM system--tend to maintain more stability as well as to halt the slide into chaos.
Everyone agrees, in short, that the serious danger to the US comes, not from the past series of tests, but from the next series. Everyone seems to agree that we would be ready to settle for things as they are now, if we had absolute assurance that the USSR would not start a new sequence in the atmosphere. The problem, in other words, is to deter the USSR from atmospheric resumption--and the threat of a series of our own, ready to go, is probably the best possible deterrent.
10. More than that, with Khrushchev discredited by Hungary, testing and a thousand other things, with Nehru discredited by Goa, with the UN discredited by Goa and the Congo, the US has an unmatched opportunity to recover the moral and political leadership of the world. I know that it is currently fashionable to say that "moral leadership" could not matter less. But history refutes this contention. For years, we rested our policy in Latin America on the employment of force--and our position, by all power criteria, grew steadily worse. Then FDR renounced the use of force, established the Good Neighbor policy--and our power position in Latin America was transformed. Wilson and Roosevelt enjoyed an influence on world events out of all proportion to the military power at their disposal simply because they regarded "world opinion" as a basic constituent of power. Even Soviet policy is not based on a rejection of "world opinion"; it is based rather on the belief that world opinion can be more successfully manipulated by terror than by ideals--an option not open to us unless we change the whole character of our society.
The good opinion purchased by the refusal to resume atmospheric testing would not be in itself a great accretion to our power. But it would enable us to move swiftly ahead in a number of areas which can mean a genuine strengthening of our world position. We should not consider this as an act in isolation but as a prelude to a number of planned actions and demands which would enable us to cash in on our self-restraint.
Nor is it necessarily so that a conditional refusal to resume atmospheric testing would be unpopular in the United States. The most recent Gallup Poll shows the general public evenly divided on the question of whether, in the light of Soviet testing, the US should go into the atmosphere (yes 44%, no 45%). This showed a decided swing of opinion against atmospheric resumption; 4 months earlier 55% favored resumption and only 26% opposed.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
114. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, December 30, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/21/61-1/8/62. Secret. A handwritten note reads: "President saw." In a covering note to Clifton, not found attached, Bundy stated that this memorandum and Schlesinger's memorandum (Document 113) needed to be "called to the President's attention for careful consideration." The President had "several times indicated to me his desire to have the other side of the atmospheric case sharply stated," as Schlesinger's memorandum did. "Since it will be very important, if the President should ever take this course, not to have the author of this memo blamed for it, I am emphasizing the quality of the argument and not the name of the creator." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/12/61-1/8/62)
SUBJECT
Atmospheric Testing
Attached is a really powerful paper/2/ arguing for a last effort to avoid atmospheric testing, by announcement that we will not test in the air unless and until the Soviets do it again. This is the best statement of the case I have seen, and it satisfies a feeling I have had for some time that you have a right to hear a better argument against testing now than you have yet heard from advisers nearly all of whom personally favor testing.
/2/Reference is to Document 113, not found attached.
I believe that if you personally care enough, and want to make the argument strongly enough, you can carry a decision against atmospheric testing with the Congress and the country. I also believe it is safe. The missile/anti-missile balance is the only serious area of possible danger, and we can be confident that Soviets are not decisively ahead here on what they have done so far. I know no one who believes they can deploy an effective AICBM system without further tests and long lead time of construction. If I myself, on balance, prefer to test, it is because I think the net military advantage is real, and the political balance a very even one. But this case for the other view deserves your close attention. Especially you should weigh the consequences of unlimited testing on both sides, through time.
An alternative to the course in the memo would be to keep our April 1 deadline and simply renew--perhaps first privately and earnestly--the Kennedy-Macmillan offer of September, with a sixty-day time limit. This would put quite a lot of heat on Khrushchev, and if he is prepared to come along at all, it would offer him the carrot of preventing some tests of ours which otherwise will surely happen.
The Soviet answer to either of these proposals will probably be, at first anyway, to demand also a moratorium on underground tests. We cannot accept such a moratorium, as I think nearly everyone agrees. We need underground tests to maintain the readiness and morale of our nuclear laboratories and to avoid falling behind decisively in the case of new Soviet secret preparations and massive tests. But I now believe that underground testing would be enough to keep our labs alive, and I think this point was seriously neglected in our Bermuda talks.
If you like either of these proposals enough to want to go further with them, I believe we should schedule a prompt small meeting for extended discussion. I would limit such a meeting to yourself, Vice President, Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, Brown, and me. I regret to say that every one of these men, except yourself, favors atmospheric testing. But a decision to go the other way, if you take it, should be yours alone--not yours with support from politically vulnerable disbelievers like Wiesner, Sorensen, and the author of the attached memo. I believe that every one of these men, except perhaps John McCone, will do his best to support and defend whatever decision you do take--and even John would try--though he's deeply committed the other way.
McG. B.
115. Editorial Note
In his memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting on January 2, 1962, Colonel Legere reported that Arthur Schlesinger complained "that the Disarmament Advisory Committee, which consists of 15 individuals, includes only one person who could be fairly described as a liberal: Ralph McGill of the Atlanta Constitution. Mr. McGill has had no exposure to disarmament matters, and, besides, Mr. Schlesinger felt that a group as big as 15 could well have included 2 or 3 persons of liberal persuasion. Mr. Bundy shut this off rather firmly when he said that the President himself had approved the list and felt that it was important to have the Administration's disarmament policy supported by the Republicans, who in general were not as likely to be quite as liberal as some might like. Anyhow, almost everyone agreed that the immediate future of disarmament activity would be largely in the nature of a propaganda exercise, although Carl Kaysen entered a moderate dissent to this view by saying that we must always stand willing to negotiate substance if the Soviets appear forthcoming." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62)
116. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, January 4, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 12/21/61-1/8/62. Secret. A notation in Bundy's handwriting reads: "Put in folder of things to talk to Pres. about."
SUBJECT
Resumption of Atmospheric Testing
The Foster group met today./2/ Most of the talk was in terms of a Presidential announcement of the resumption of atmospheric testing early in February./3/ (At my behest, however, and in order to hold the balance even, a paper has been prepared entitled "Program to Explain U.S. Decision to Refrain from Testing in the Atmosphere"!)/4/
/2/A memorandum by Goodby of this meeting of the Subcommittee of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing, chaired by Foster and established by NSAM No. 116 (Document 105), is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-462)
/3/On January 5, Foster submitted the Subcommittee's report to the President. It recommended that the United States, in announcing a test resumption, avoid a defensive or apologetic attitude and demonstrate forcefully that U.S. national security required atmospheric testing. The Subcommittee suggested Presidential announcement of a decision in mid-February, with atmospheric tests to begin in Nevada at the end of February and in the Pacific 2-3 weeks later. The series would conclude by the end of June. Text of Foster's letter and a summary of the report are in Seaborg, Journal, vol. 3, pp. 22-26.
/4/Not found.
1. If this is the way the decision is going to go, I would like to make the following proposal: that the President announce early in February (a) that we have no choice but to begin atmospheric testing on April 1, (b) that spectacular test preparations are under way, but (c) that we will cancel these tests on one condition--that the Soviet Union sign the test ban treaty submitted at Geneva.
2. This proposal has some obvious advantages:
a) it puts testing in the context of disarmament and makes clear which we prefer;
b) it puts the USSR in the position of triggering our test series and may therefore do something in the weeks before actual resumption to transfer popular indignation from the USA to the USSR. Pressure will be applied to the Communists to sign the treaty as well as on us to suspend the tests.
3. I see no disadvantage in our making this proposal if we still want the Geneva treaty. This suggests the need for a thorough reappraisal of the Geneva treaty in the light of recent developments.
4. The USSR could respond by accepting the Geneva treaty. Or it could respond by denouncing the whole proposal (most likely). Or it could respond by throwing the Kennedy-Macmillan offer of last September back on us--that is, by proposing a moratorium on atmospheric testing.
5. What should we do then? My view is that we should reject a moratorium on the ground that experience has defined a moratorium as a space of time in which the Soviet Union prepares for its next series of tests.
But what if the USSR proposes a treaty banning atmospheric tests? Because it would be harder for the USSR to violate a treaty than to end a moratorium, I think that a treaty might well be considered in a different category. Query: would such a treaty be disadvantageous to us? Since our underground testing capability is greater than the Soviet Union's, we would surely stand to gain by an arrangement which allowed underground testing but banned atmospheric testing.
6. Anyway what is wrong with saying that, if the USSR will sign the treaty, we will stop the tests?
A.S.jr
117. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, J