Crystal Bank Tbilisi

[Katrine Freggiaro]

Inthe early 1990s, Georgia and its breakaway South Ossetia region had agreed to a Russian-mediated ceasefire that provided for Russian "peacekeepers" to be stationed in the region. Moscow extended citizenship and passports to most ethnic Ossetians. Simmering long-time tensions escalated on the evening of August 7, 2008, when South Ossetia and Georgia accused each other of launching intense artillery barrages against each other. Georgia claims that South Ossetian forces did not respond to a ceasefire appeal but intensified their shelling, "forcing" Georgia to send in troops. On August 8, Russia launched air attacks throughout Georgia and Russian troops engaged Georgian forces in South Ossetia. By the morning of August 10, Russian troops had occupied the bulk of South Ossetia, reached its border with the rest of Georgia, and were shelling areas across the border. Russian troops occupied several Georgian cities. Russian warships landed troops in Georgia's breakaway Abkhazia region and took up positions off Georgia's Black Sea coast.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy, serving as the president of the European Union (EU), was instrumental in getting Georgia and Russia to agree to a peace plan on August 15-16. The plan called for both sides to cease hostilities and pull troops back to positions they held before the conflict began. It called for humanitarian aid and the return of displaced persons. It called for Russian troops to pull back to pre-conflict areas of deployment, but permitted temporary patrols in a security zone outside South Ossetia. The plan also provided for a greater international role in peace talks and peacekeeping, both of seminal Georgian interest. On August 25, President Medvedev declared that "humanitarian reasons" led him to recognize the independence of the regions. This recognition was widely condemned by the United States and the international community. President Sarkozy negotiated a follow-on agreement with Russia on September 8, 2008, that led to at least 200 EU observers to be deployed to the conflict zone and almost all Russian forces to withdraw from areas adjacent to the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by midnight on October 10.

On August 13, former President Bush announced that then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice would travel to France and Georgia to assist with the peace plan and that Defense Secretary Robert Gates would direct U.S. humanitarian aid shipments to Georgia. Secretary Rice proposed a multi-year $1 billion aid plan for Georgia. Several Members of Congress visited Georgia in the wake of the conflict and legislation has been passed in support of Georgia's territorial integrity and independence. P.L. 110-329, signed into law on September 30, 2008, provides $365 million in added humanitarian and rebuilding assistance for Georgia for FY2009.The August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict is likely to have long-term effects on security dynamics in the region and beyond. Russia has augmented its long-time military presence in Armenia by establishing bases in Georgia's breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. Georgia's military capabilities were at least temporarily degraded by the conflict, and Georgia will need substantial U.S. and NATO military assistance to rebuild its forces. The conflict temporarily disrupted railway transport of Azerbaijani oil to Black Sea ports and some oil and gas pipeline shipments, although no pipelines were reported damaged by the fighting. Although there have been some concerns that the South Caucasus has become less stable as a source and transit area for oil and gas, Kazakhstan has begun to barge oil across the Caspian to fill the oil pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Ceyhan, Turkey (the BTC pipeline) and the European Union still plans to begin construction of the Nabucco gas pipeline from Azerbaijan to Austria in 2010.

At the Munich Security Conference on February 7, 2009, Vice President Joe Biden stated that "the United States will not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. We will not recognize a sphere of influence. It will remain our view that sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and choose their own alliances."1 The Vice President met with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who later stated that the "main message" he received in Munich was that "it has been confirmed that we have very serious, unequivocal, detailed support from the new U.S. Administration."2

Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg, representing the European Union (EU), warned Belarus on February 23, 2009, that recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia would remove Belarus from the "European consensus" not to extend diplomatic recognition to the regions, and might make it less eligible to participate in a prospective EU Eastern Partnership Program of expanded economic cooperation.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) approved a resolution on January 28, 2009, criticizing Russia for failing to abide by the ceasefire agreements. PACE reaffirmed its commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and again called on Russia to withdraw its recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It called for full access by international monitors and humanitarian aid workers to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the establishment of international peacekeeping forces in the regions. It condemned Russia for building military bases in the regions, and censured Russia and the de facto authorities of South Ossetia for failing to halt ethnic cleansing. It condemned cross-border shootings and other violence emanating from the regions. PACE demanded immediate Council of Europe access to the regions in order to protect human rights. It requested that Russian troops withdraw from areas of Georgia that were controlled by Georgia before the August 2008 conflict, such as the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, the Georgian enclave around Tskhinvali and the Perevi village, and the Akhalgori district in South Ossetia. Reportedly, the vast majority of Akhalgori's 7,700 mostly ethnic Georgian residents had fled. The Assembly called for both Russia and Georgia to sign the U.N. Convention banning Cluster Munitions.4

Although gas shipments through a pipeline from Russia to South Ossetia were renewed in January 2009, the region remains cut off from Russia due to winter weather and faces an economic and humanitarian crisis, according to some observers.

Tensions in Georgia date back at least to the 1920s, when South Ossetia made abortive attempts to declare its independence but ended up as an autonomous region within Soviet Georgia after the Red Army conquered Georgia. In 1989, South Ossetia lobbied for joining its territory with North Ossetia in Russia or for independence. Georgia's own declaration of independence from the former Soviet Union and subsequent repressive efforts by former Georgian President Gamsakhurdia triggered conflict in 1990. In January 1991, hostilities broke out between Georgia and South Ossetia, reportedly contributing to an estimated 2,000-4,000 deaths and the displacement of tens of thousands of people.

In June 1992, Russia brokered a cease-fire, and Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian "peacekeeping" units set up base camps in a security zone around Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. The units usually totalled around 1,100 troops, including about 530 Russians, a 300-member North Ossetian brigade (which was actually composed of South Ossetians and headed by a North Ossetian), and about 300 Georgians. Monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) did most of the patrolling. A Joint Control Commission (JCC) composed of Russian, Georgian, and North and South Ossetian emissaries ostensibly promoted a settlement of the conflict, with the OSCE as facilitator. According to some estimates, some 20,000 ethnic Georgians resided in one-third to one-half of the region and 25,000 ethnic Ossetians in the other portion. Many fled during the fighting in the early 1990s or migrated.

Some observers warned that Russia's increasing influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia over the years transformed the separatist conflicts into essentially Russia-Georgia disputes. Most residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia reportedly were granted Russian citizenship and passports and most appeared to want their regions to be part of Russia.5

In late 2003, Mikheil Saakashvili came to power during the so-called "rose revolution" (he was elected president in January 2004). He pledged to institute democratic and economic reforms, and to re-gain central government authority over the separatist regions. In 2004, he began to increase pressure on South Ossetia by tightening border controls and breaking up a large-scale smuggling operation in the region that allegedly involved Russian organized crime and corrupt Georgian officials. He also reportedly sent several hundred police, military, and intelligence personnel into South Ossetia. Georgia maintained that it was only bolstering its peacekeeping contingent up to the limit of 500 troops, as permitted by the cease-fire agreement. Georgian guerrilla forces also reportedly entered the region. Allegedly, Russian officials likewise assisted several hundred paramilitary elements from Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Russia to enter. Following inconclusive clashes, both sides by late 2004 ostensibly had pulled back most of the guerrillas and paramilitary forces.

In July 2005, President Saakashvili announced a new peace plan for South Ossetia that offered substantial autonomy and a three-stage settlement, consisting of demilitarization, economic rehabilitation, and a political settlement. South Ossetian "president" Eduard Kokoiti rejected the plan, asserting in October 2005 that "we [South Ossetians] are citizens of Russia."6 The Georgian peace plan received backing by the OSCE Ministerial Council in early December 2005. Perhaps faced with this international support, in mid-December 2005, Kokoiti proffered a South Ossetian peace proposal that also envisaged benchmarks, but presumed that South Ossetia would be independent.

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