Johnny English 2011 Trailer

[Cristy Borovetz]

Point Break is back, and it's getting, well, extreme.

The first trailer for the remake of the Keanu Reeves/Patrick Swayze classic looks a lot more serious and contains a lot more extreme sporting than Kathryn Bigelow's 1991 original. Like, there's a lot of extreme sports. The two and-a-half minute trailer contains rock climbing, sky diving, wingsuiting, motorbiking away from a rock slide, snowboarding and, of course, surfing. The plot seems familiar, Luke Bracey is Johnny Utah, an FBI agent going undercover with a group of thrill-seeking criminals, but the spectacle level is definitely up. We'll have to wait until this Christmas to find out how it measures up to the original.

You can read more about Point Break in USA TODAY's first look at the new movie.

We confront today a question of first impression: whether a boat qualifies as a homestead under article XVI, sections 50 and 51 of the Texas Constitution. Since 1845, our state constitution has protected a homestead from forced sale to satisfy the claims of creditors.[1] Thomas Norris claimed his 68-foot yacht as a homestead to shield it from bankruptcy creditors, prompting the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to certify this question to us: Does a motorized waterborne vessel, used as a primary residence and otherwise fulfilling all of the requirements of a homestead except attachment to land, qualify for the homestead exemption under Article 16, 50 and 51 of the Texas Constitution? [2] Under the facts presented in this case, and given the Constitution s explicit realty-based language, we answer the question, No.

In September 2003, Norris filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.[3] Under the Code a debtor may claim a homestead exemption as allowed by state law.[4] Norris claimed his 68-foot yacht as exempt property under the Texas homestead exemption. The boat, which Norris valued at $399,000 in his bankruptcy schedules, has four bedrooms, three bathrooms, a galley, and an upper and lower salon. Although his petition indicated that his street address was 13909 Nacogdoches Road, San Antonio, Texas, Norris testified at a January 2004 bankruptcy court hearing that the address is a business postal center where the Norrises receive mail. Norris further stated that he took up permanent residence on the boat after the Norrises sold their previous home in Lake McQueeny, Texas, in 2000, and that the boat is his only home. Norris s attorney stated at the hearing that primarily, [Norris] lives on that boat while it s dry-docked at Corpus Christi, and that the boat received water, phone service, and electricity through connections to a dock. Norris also testified at the hearing that since purchasing the boat in 1997 he had cruised extensively to places such as New Orleans, Florida, and Alabama. At the time the bankruptcy petition was filed in September 2003, the boat was docked in Port Aransas, Texas. Norris testified at the January 2004 hearing that he had moved the boat to a marina in Corpus Christi, Texas, where he had a month-to-month lease. Although the boat is described in the record as dry-docked, there is no indication that Norris ever permanently affixed the boat to real estate or intended to do so.

The bankruptcy court held that the Texas homestead exemption, even broadly construed, does not include boats. The federal district court agreed, concluding that the boat was a movable chattel by virtue of its self-powered mobility and not entitled to homestead protection.[5] Norris appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which certified the question to this Court.

Neither the Texas Constitution nor the Property Code defines homestead with specificity. Section 50 of article XVI shields homesteads from forced sale, providing generally that [t]he homestead of a family, or of a single adult person, shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts . . . . [8] Section 51, in turn, restricts the maximum size of a protected homestead, limiting rural and urban homesteads by acres of land and including any land-based improvements.[9] The Texas Property Code resembles section 51 and likewise describes a homestead as a home or a home and business with certain acreage limitations with any improvements thereon. [10] Though neither of these provisions expressly exclude boats from homestead protection, they both discuss homesteads in terms of land and any improvements that sit atop the land.[11] More specifically, when describing the scope of the protection, section 51 and the Property Code state the acreage limitation and then variably say, when describing any attached structures, with the improvements thereon or with any improvements on the land or with any improvements thereon.

Texas s strong pro-homestead tradition pre-dates statehood, and the Republic of Texas was determined to protect homesteads from creditors.[12] In 1886, roughly a half-century after Texas homestead laws originated,[13] we opined on their reach and limits. In Cullers v. James, we held that a house may be a homestead even if the owner has no proprietary interest in the land on which the house stands.[14] The James family leased a three- or four-acre tract of land from Robert Walker (though the property was actually Walker s wife s separate property).[15] The land contained improvements such as a house, a gin-house, gin machinery, and a mill that were so fixed as to make [them] part of the land. [16] But since James had no interest in the land,[17] the Court viewed the improvements as personal property instead of realty.[18] Nonetheless, the Court held that the house and gin-house qualified as a homestead.[19]

Cullers established that a house can be a homestead even if the owner has no ownership interest in the land. It also made clear that the term improvements as protected by article XVI, section 51 includes the residence itself. In the 121 years since Cullers, we have defined improvements to real property with greater precision, distinguishing them from mere personalty, and holding that personalty does not constitute an improvement until it is annexed to realty. [20] This Court put it plainly in Sonnier v. Chisholm-Ryder Co.: There can be no improvement without annexation to realty, and until personalty is annexed to realty, it by definition cannot be an improvement. [21] Not only that, but the annexed object cannot be deemed an improvement to land unless it is intended to be a permanent addition to the realty. [22]

Since Cullers, the courts of appeals have issued several homestead-related opinions that bear more directly on today s issue, and they share a common thread: homestead protection turns not on who owns the underlying land, but on the degree to which the residence thereon or on the land is attached to it. This Court reviewed four of these pertinent cases, refusing the writ in the first and finding no reversible error in the others. We continue to believe that their attachment-based analysis is correct.

In Clark v. Vitz, Vitz built a house-trailer that his family used as its primary residence for two years.[23] He later purchased a lot with a brick house, placed the house trailer twenty-five feet from the house, and set the trailer on four wooden blocks.[24] Vitz ran electrical service to the house trailer from the residence and planned to connect the trailer to the residence s plumbing.[25] The court held that Vitz s attachment of the house-trailer to his residence made the trailer part of the homestead.[26]

In Gann v. Montgomery, the Ganns owned a house trailer, mounted on wheels, of the type usually pulled behind an automobile. [27] After a few years, the Ganns moved the trailer to Mr. Gann s parents backyard.[28] Gann executed a promissory note secured by a chattel mortgage on the trailer.[29] Gann then entered the United States Army and was stationed at the Fort Worth Army Airfield.[30] His family still lived in the trailer, now parked at the airfield and still on wheels.[31] The mortgage holder brought suit to foreclose on the chattel mortgage lien.[32] The court, citing Cullers, noted the distinction between a chattel that is attached to realty and a chattel that is not.[33] After quoting from Cullers, the court said:

Taken alone, this language might indicate a belief by the Supreme Court that the homestead exemption could attach to any chattel, such as a covered wagon, or a houseboat, or any other type of movable vehicle or conveyance, which for the time being might be occupied by the claimant and his family as living quarters. But when we examine the opinion in the light of the facts of the case, and consider the disposition made of the entire case, we come to a different conclusion.[34]

The court then noted the distinction between personal property such as the gin machinery in Cullers and a permanent fixture attached to realty that is personal property only because the owner of the fixture does not own the land.[35] The court cited Clark as consistent with this dichotomy in that the house trailer was only a homestead because it had been attached to the realty and set alongside the house, essentially becoming an extra room.[36] The court held that house trailers without the characteristics of permanent fixtures attached to realty are not protected homesteads.[37]

In Capitol Aggregates, Inc. v. Walker, the Walkers owned a mobile trailer home connected to the gas, water, and sewage systems of a trailer park.[38] They removed the wheels and set the house on cement blocks.[39] The court found it persuasive that the house was as physically attached to the land as frame houses and held that the trailer house was a homestead.[40]

Finally, in Minnehoma Financial Co. v. Ditto, Ditto purchased a mobile home. [41] He attached the mobile home to his property by removing the wheels, placing it on concrete blocks secured by eight-foot buried anchors, and connecting it to electricity and water.[42] The court held that the mobile home was a homestead:

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