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What would be interesting and think has been reported earlier on
already, would be an option to tell Play! to use an alternative
configuration file, both when being run via "play run" and when being
deployed as a WAR.
Some ideas that come in my mind:
- a JVM arg for WAR deployment, and another way of passing an option
in the command line when running "play run"
- a redirect in the default application.conf: in the first line you'd have e.g.
prod.configuration=/some/file/some/where.conf
(note that then only the production configuration is redirected, not
the dev one)
But will "the new guy" get an access on a production database machine?
I would think that if you start having sensitive data in your
database, you wouldn't give away this kind of user privileges to
everyone, with or without passwords stored in plaintext for everyone
to see. And without connecting to the database machine, you have not
much of a chance to login to the db console and do evil data theft
things.
(not that it doesn't happen though, witnessed it at one of my former's
employers - though it was not a developer stealing data from the
database somewhere on a terminal late at night, but a sales dude who
got laid off and took all the big juicy client contacts with him right
before being kicked out, by comfortably using the company-wide CRM UI)
my point is: security usually involves more than just encrypting
passwords and you shouldn't rely on a framework to provide "The
Solution"
On Wed, Feb 9, 2011 at 9:10 AM, grandfatha <dki...@googlemail.com> wrote:But will "the new guy" get an access on a production database machine?
> I guess there are databases out there that store personal data/
> critical business data that shouldnt be open to every developer of an
> organization. Thats why the credentials are not allowed to be stored
> in SCM for everyone to see. What if 'the new guy' creates a CD of your
> business secrets, quits the job and sells it to your competitor?
I would think that if you start having sensitive data in your
database, you wouldn't give away this kind of user privileges to
everyone, with or without passwords stored in plaintext for everyone
to see. And without connecting to the database machine, you have not
much of a chance to login to the db console and do evil data theft
things.
(not that it doesn't happen though, witnessed it at one of my former's
employers - though it was not a developer stealing data from the
database somewhere on a terminal late at night, but a sales dude who
got laid off and took all the big juicy client contacts with him right
before being kicked out, by comfortably using the company-wide CRM UI)
my point is: security usually involves more than just encrypting
passwords and you shouldn't rely on a framework to provide "The
Solution"