This
96 page 'Information note' illustrates that the so-called
climate change emergency is an emergency in name only.
It makes two brief references to tipping points but policy goals
are not referenced to them other than to make the obvious comment
that if temperature rises more slowly, there is likely to be more
opportunity to avert the dangers of tipping points. But these
comments do not appear to reflect recent research (e.g. Hansen et
al, Armstrong MacKay et al) that provide compelling evidence that
tipping points are more imminent than previously thought and
climate response time and climate sensitivity are both much
greater than previously thought. Both of these contributions make
the climate emergency more of an emergency than is reflected in
IPCC AR6, requiring decisive action now..
The great bulk of the note is an economic argument for ranking
the cost-effectiveness of a range of alternative options. This is
consistent with the historically adopted policy approach to
climate change
of almost all governments. It is not an approach that is
consistent with climate change being an emergency. It treats
climate change as an economic problem amenable to the
prescriptions of neoclassical economic theory, and fails to
recognise that it isn't. Responses to existential threats are
generally measured in terms of their immediate effectiveness at
preserving life and human well-being. Cost-effectiveness is a
second order consideration. Markets do not have the capacity to
deal with climate change at the speed and scale necessary to avert
dangerous human interference in the climate system (UNFCCC
Constitution Art 2), because the internalisation past
environmental costs from fossil fuels is too great a burden to
deliver effectively through future pricing adjustments, and even
more so when simultaneously the environmental costs of future
fossil fuel use must also be internalised. Markets can contribute
but their impact is likely to be modest given the speed and scale
at which action is now needed.
So long as policymakers persist in framing climate change largely as an economic puzzle, we will continue to slide, at an ever accelerating rate, towards a full-blooded devastating climate crisis.
This Information note should be treated as a textbook example of how not to construct climate change policies likely to avert the dangers of human intervention in the climate system.
Its structural weakness lies in its failure to address a) the distinction between necessary and sufficient policies and b) the risks from not including CDR (and greenhouse gas removal (GGR) more widely to include, for example, methane and nitrous oxide). There is now ample evidence (not listed in this short response) to the effect that while emissions abatement is necessary, it is no longer sufficient to avert dangerous human interference in the climate system, already apparent with only 1.2C of warming and disproportionately worse at 1.5C and above. 1.5C is not a safe harbour, it is merely a less perilous one. GGR is also necessary but, on its own is not sufficient. It is now virtually certain that abatement and GGR combined, even if we achieved net zero emissions tomorrow, would not be sufficient to avert dangerous human interference in the climate system, and that to make them part of a sufficient policy response, some direct cooling through one or more approaches to enhance Earth's albedo must also now be added into the policy mix (e.g. Hansen et al. Warming in the Pipeline).
It is facile and unhelpful to note that some, indeed perhaps all, of these responses may have some undesirable side effects and that these risks are often difficult to quantify because of a lack of knowledge and data. The question is not whether they entail some risk but whether that risk can be mitigated by appropriate research and development so that the benefits to be derived from them make it more likely that in aggregate the dangers from human interference in the climate system can be lessened. There are risks from not acting, and from not acting at sufficient speed and scale, and these must also be accounted for in any sound decision making process.
In this brief response it is not possible to provide suggestions about how this Information note might be improved. My advice is that it should be abandoned and a more balanced and diverse panel convened with wider and more appropriate terms of reference.
I close with an extract from Article 3 of the UNFCCC Constitution:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures.
While this remark is followed by a recognition that 'policies and
measures' should deliver 'global benefits at the lowest possible
cost', climatic effectiveness remains the primary criterion. That
requires policymakers to focus on policy regimes that are in
aggregate sufficient and not make the mistake of assuming that
because one policy (e.g. emissions abatement) is necessary, it is
also sufficient and other policies are not therefore needed.
Dr. Robert Chris
Honorary Assiociate Open University UK
Associate of Centre for Cliamte Repair, Cambridge UNiversity
UK.