Fill us in on what this guy did wrong. I have no idea.
--
Karen Byrd
I don't drink and if I did it wouldn't be at Bridgewater's. gg1 are you a
railroader?
No; railfan. I only mentioned Bridgewaters because you have in other posts.
Frankly, it doesn't look as though too many people drink there -- I kinda
preferred the fruit stand it replaced.
Many things to numerous to mention. But here is just a few examples. On his
watch two major wrecks occured, one at Chase Md. where 16 people died. No, he
was not at the controls of the engine that ran the stop signal but the engr was
impaired and the supervision was too loose, in other words it was too easy for
an impaired person to go undetected. The other wreck occured at Chester when a
tower operator mistakenly gave a train a signal into a track that was out of
service. How is this Brown's fault? Prior to this wreck it was common practice
for signal maintainers to pull track fuses---- in other words put up occupancy
lights so the signals would reflect an occupancy ahead, so if a train were
inadvertanly routed to the out of service track , the train would get a 15 mph
signal instead of a clear aspect. This practice was discontinued to save money
namely the maintainers wages. By the way, the practice of pulling fuses was
restored after the wreck happened. As a leader, Brown was more concerned about
screwing workers out of their just due and he used his subordinates to do his
dirty work.
How many of CCB's henchmen are still around? I recall hearing that RWR
got a promotion into a position where he had no subordinates -- couldn't
happen to a nicer guy -- but what about others like JSL, CFD (IMO, fine
until
he moved into the Division Operator stop when EAS went back up to New
York)...
a bunch of others that I can't think off off the top of my head. Since
Brown
was around since 1983 or so (didn't he come up from Baltimore when the
Balto
Division was abolished?), he's had plenty of time to spread his
influence.
Conrail did it with 4800. Not sure about Amtrak ((4)927? maybe)
Or the last GG-1 restored to PRR colors?
Not sure; I think 4935 was the first restored.
Or how about the
> GG-1 painted powder blue that said American Association of Railroads?
4902
Or the
> number of the Savings Bond engine?
(4)921.
> I think Bridgewater's gets a pretty good crowd. Every time I walk by, the
> place seems to be jumping pretty good.
>
The Chase wreck was caused by a CONRAIL engineer who was "impaired" on THC,
operating a CONRAIL locomotive which had the cab signal warning whistle
disabled -- apparently for some time judging by the age of the duct tape
used. This "modification" should have been caught by CONRAIL mechanical
forces, let alone the CONRAIL train crew. The Supervision for all of above
"at fault" employees would also have been CONRAIL employees.
Clayton Brown worked for Amtrak.
SO.... by your logic, the PA Turnpike authority is responsible when a drunk
driver causes a wreck on the Northeast Extension?
Brian
"Gpsherxxxx" <gpshe...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:19991201012912...@ng-fb1.aol.com...
> Karen Byrd wrote>Fill us in on what this guy did wrong. I have no idea.
>
> Many things to numerous to mention.
[snip] -- see previous post on the Chase wreck.
> The other wreck occurred at Chester when a
> tower operator mistakenly gave a train a signal into a track that was out
of
> service. How is this Brown's fault?
Good Question!
Wasn't that the Night Owl wreck where the tower operator disappeared for a
few days
before his lawyer helped the guy turn himself in to the authorities -- long
after proof of drug use was unobtainable?
> Prior to this wreck it was common practice
> for signal maintainers to pull track fuses---- in other words put up
occupancy
> lights so the signals would reflect an occupancy ahead, so if a train were
> inadvertanly routed to the out of service track , the train would get a 15
mph
> signal instead of a clear aspect. This practice was discontinued to save
money
> namely the maintainers wages. By the way, the practice of pulling fuses
was
> restored after the wreck happened.
Monday morning quarterbacking is always a good chance for preening, chest
thumping, strutting and other male bonding activities. But since you
started....
_Equipment & Procedures Practices:_
Pulling fuses also led to delays during the early morning maintenance
clearing up process -- either the work crew had to abandon work earlier to
clear up in time to put the fuses back and run trains; or if the work
crew's work ran a little long, the first trains were delayed longer during
the fuse replacement procedure. Of course, you could feather bed and have
extra maintainers around, but you would still delay trains longer if the
track work ran overtime. Customer satisfaction surveys routinely put on
time performance at the top of their expectations -- you promised to get me
to Washington by 8 AM!!!!
There were ongoing discussions about allowing track equipment in the
maintenance gang to shunt the signals. If it worked, the signals would have
slowed the train down as well. Trouble is the light weight equipment the
maintenance folks use can not be counted on to shunt signals. You may
remember single car RDC's also having this problem -- RDC's are much
heavier than Ballast Regulators.
The procedures that were adopted after the wreck included having maintenance
workers bolt a small barricade to the track with metal electrical jumpers
that positively shunt the signal circuit. CETC has also replaced the PRR
style tower operator system on the NEC.
_The Tower Operator:_
The Night Owl goes through Marcus Hook (the location of the tower) at a VERY
quiet time of the night. It's not like the PRR days when the freight trains
came fast and frequently. The _only_ thing the operator would have to do at
that time of night was to put the Night Owl down a different track than the
maintenance crew. Back then there would have been only two tracks the
operator would have used for a north bound train. DUH... two tracks to
choose from -- two things to put on two different tracks. It's just too
hard for me to figure out... enee menee minee moo -- oops!
At the time the tower operator would have violated several nagging little
procedures that would have given him a clue that he was about to blunder --
blocking devices on the switch control levers, notes in his train log etc...
Besides, instead of the tower operator panicking and fleeing the tower, why
couldn't he have used the radio to contact the train? Yanked the signal
away from the train? Yanked the electric traction power away from the
train? Umm....notice the train went by? Hello?
In conclusion: Both wrecks you mention as Clayton Brown's fault were
believed to be caused by employee drug use. Amtrak's drug abuse policy is
not made at Clayton Brown's level. The policy includes routine random drug
testing, and probable cause drug testing, along with mandated procedures for
rule "G" violators. There is no evidence that Clayton Brown or his managers
failed to enforce the drug abuse policy. More likely they would
over-enforce the policy :-) Clayton Brown also very actively supported
Operation Red Block which is a successful employee run drug abuse program.
Neither the Chase nor Chester wrecks were Clayton Brown's fault.
Brian
"Gpsherxxxx" <gpshe...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:19991201012912...@ng-fb1.aol.com...
> > Karen Byrd wrote:
> > Fill us in on what this guy did wrong. I have no idea.
>
> Many things to numerous to mention.
[snip] -- see previous posts about the two wrecks
> As a leader, Brown was more concerned about screwing
> workers out of their just due and he used his subordinates to do
> his dirty work.
Clayton Brown was one of the few old line Amtrak managers too make the
transition from management by screaming at employees to management by
coaching them. He worked to make his subordinates do the same. When
Clayton first started Amtrak management culture was a Depression era -- rule
by fear -- military style bureaucracy. He could scream with the best of
them :-) Later the culture was changed to a more proactive employee focused
style. Like any change at a corporation as large as Amtrak, it was like
trying to turn a supertanker -- it takes some time. Some evidence that
Clayton succeeded was the Philadelphia Divisions domination of "Presidents
Safety Award" for many years. This was an award given to the Division with
the best employee injury statistics. When the Philadelphia Division was
merged with the mediocre Washington Division, it was joked that the main
reason for the change was to avoid the embarrassment of the Philadelphia
Division walking off with the President's Safety award _again_.
When Clayton Brown was Superintendent of the Philadelphia Division, he would
have had a few thousand employees directly or indirectly working for him.
Like any company, most of these employees were hard workers, with some
gifted geniuses, and some jerks who needed a wet nurse thrown in. With the
management culture change from screaming to empowering, the hard workers and
geniuses flourished.
Too bad the same couldn't be said for the wet nurse addicts. It seems they
needed the Supervisor nagging at them to perform. That way nothing was ever
_their_ fault. "That damn Boss (Spouse) is bitchin' at me again." Or "Look
what that damn Boss let _them_ get away with." With a coaching style of
management, it was pointed out to the employee that it was _his_ job, _his_
responsibility to get things done. If something went wrong you had to look
in the mirror to see who to blame -- not some nagging spouse. Jerks hate
being shown that it's the jerks who are a jerk :-) In the beginning of the
culture transition, you could tell that Clayton's first instinct was to
strangle some jerk on colostrum withdraw. As time went by, Clayton could
see that overall the Division, and Amtrak was better for the newer way of
doing business.
Success built on success, eventually even Clayton's subordinates stopped
depending on screaming to get things done. No matter what you think of the
personalities involved, the Philadelphia Division and Amtrak was better
after Clayton Brown than before him.
Brian