question
cah...@uci.edu
Is there a way for a non-perfectionist reading of Mill to account for
the apparent discrepancy between the ideas in OL about the value of
experiments in living/individuality and the ideas in CRG about the
proper criterion of a good government being the extent to which it
inculcates intellectual and moral virtues in its citizens?
So here is where I see an apparent tension:
In OL, Mill argues for the importance of allowing (encouraging?)
individuals to develop and live out their own life plan; although one
of the arguments focuses on the benefits that society gains by making
room for the oddball geniuses whose 'experiments in living' open our
eyes to new and improved patterns of behavior (OL III.11), he later
argues that everyone should have the same freedom, even those who are
not as educated or brilliant (OL III.12)
"[Nor] is it only persons of decided mental superiority who have a
just claim to carry on their lives in their own way. There is no
reason that all human existence should be constructed on some one or
some small number of patterns. If a person possesses any tolerable
amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his
existence is best, not because it is the best in itself, but because
it is his own mode..."
There are many other passages about individuals being the best judges
of their own interest.
But in CRG, " The first element of good government, therefore, being
the virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing the
community, the most important point of excellence which any form of
government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of
the people themselves. The first question in respect to any
political institutions is, how far they tend to foster in the members
of the community the various desirable qualities, moral and
intellectual...We may consider, then, as one criterion of the
goodness of a government, the degree in which it tends to increase
the sum of good qualities of the governed, collectively and
individually." (CRG II.20-21)
On a perfectionist reading like Brink's, there is not a problem here
because the good qualities to be encouraged are the deliberative
capacities and so government arranges the public institutions for
that purpose (see SEP entry 4.0 - 4.1) But if our reading is not
that Mill's perfectionism is like this (deliberative capacities are
the good, count towards autonomy, etc.), then:
- The representative government (which even with all of Mill's
suggestions in place would still be a majority rule) will be the ones
deciding what policies, types of education, etc. conduce in 'good
qualities'. Don't we fear that the majority will tend to value the
qualities that they themselves possess? Wouldn't education, for
example, tend to become very practically oriented? What good
qualities are inculcated in those who study dead languages, or highly
abstract, theoretical fields of inquiry? I realize that Mill values
these, and sees a large benefit in the study of them - but the
majority most likely will not (see CRG VI - "We know how easily the
uselessness of almost every branch of knowledge may be proved, to the
complete satisfaction of those who do not possess it...Nothing but
that acquaintance with external nature, empirically acquired, which
serves directly for the production of objects necessary to existence
or agreeable to the senses, would get its utility recognized...")
I thought that the point of allowing for oddballs was somewhat
different...
-Also, what if my conception of a good life involves not developing
certain of my capacities because I prefer to focus on others? Or the
possibility that some future genius might demonstrate that the
deliberative capacities are not actually the good qualities that best
promote utility in the society. Will there be any room for that? Of
course it wouldn't be forbidden for someone to live the life of a ski
bum or an intuitive, but it seems that the society, education system,
etc. would be focused on indoctrinating the citizens not to even
consider those possibilities. It seems that a society that has
specific good qualities in mind and goes about trying to develop them
in the citizens might end up homogenized in a way the the Mill of OL
might find objectionable. Of course, the UT calculation might be
that having a population of good deliberators is better overall than
allowing individuality to flourish...
Casey
Cheers,Casey
Arneson, Richard
to have wide freedom to follow it according to her own judgment.
If we establish democracy, there is a danger that the majority might
disagree with Mill on this point, and (assuming Mill is right) wrongly
interfere with individual liberty.
If we don't establish democracy, the exact same worry arises. The king, the aristocracy, the
communist party, whatever, might disagree with Mill on this point,
and interfere wrongly with individual liberty.
(If conformity to the liberty principle were of paramount importance, we might choose between
democracy and nondemocratic alternatives according to our judgment as to which form of government
is more likely over the long run to conform to the liberty principle. we might opt for a bukharinist communist
party that is liberty-respecting, if we could find one.)
is your worry that a government, democratic or not, that is committed to the maximization
of perfectionist (objective list) utility, would reasonably interfere with
individual liberty, contra the liberty principle, in order to fulfill this commitment?
The worry then is that unless we privilege the individual's own autonomous use of her deliberative faculties
(maybe by lexical priority over other goods that might conflict with this), a la brink, we may be led
to adopt policies that violate the liberty principle and be correct in doing so? The claim then would be, we
get a consistent reading of mill only by adopting brink's version of mill as perfectionist.
nice point!
2 responses.
1. i don't think the brink reading sees mill's absolutism about the liberty principle as justified, so if other elements of mill's view put pressure
on the idea that the liberty principle should never be violated, that is ok, that is putting pressure on a door that is
blown wide open anyway.
2. otherwise, we would need clarity about what exactly the brink and non-brink readings are and how they differ.
mill has a lot of arguments of various sorts defending the liberty principle. even if they are not watertight, singly or collectively, they do
establish a reasonably strong presumption. they establish a reasonably strong presumption even if you think the best cleaned-up revision of mill's theory of good
would be an objective list view with a wide plurality of objective goods--including athletic achievement, simple pleasure, simple solidarity
and care for others relations that even nonhuman animals achieve , and so on on the list of objective goods. Still, there is astrong presumption
for individual liberty, established by the ensemble of OL arguments. For that matter, a straight simple hedonist (of the sort Mill surely is not), could still find much of OL attractive. the individual is usually the best judge of what is pleasing to her and what activiteis and plans of life will be pleasure enhancing for self and others.
small points.
you ask, might not a democratic majority make mistakes as to what qualities in people are truly worth cultivating. Answer: Yes.
you worry, OL gives guarantee of freedom to the person who pursues an idiosyncratic plan of life that seems laid-back or anti-perfectionist. Is there a problem here? Answer: Mill favors epistemic humility. Who knows what poetic thoughts and sublime intimations the person we see as a beach bum might be having. also, the on liberty arguments clearly envisage that with strictly guaranteed freedom, some will abuse it, but the gains to aggregate utility from the nonabusers especially the creative geniuses among them will outweigh the losses from abuse of individual liberty. also, we cannot design a policy that surgically separates the people who use liberty well and the ones who don't and treats the two groups differently. finally, in some types of case, i don't see a problem in acknowledging that the OL conclusion outruns the arguments offered in its support--some judicious paternalistic laws are a good idea all things considered. on this topic, see recent writings of peter de marneffe, phil and public affairs a couple of years ago on paternalism, also on drug laws, also (forthcoming) on prostitution.
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From: phi...@googlegroups.com [phi...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of cah...@uci.edu [cah...@uci.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2009 2:28 PM
To: phi...@googlegroups.com
Subject: question