More of an Issue than a Question

[Vidit]

In "Bentham" (CW X, 77-115), Mill remarks that there are two criteria
for the success of a political or ethical reformer. These are "the
degree in which his own nature and circumstances furnish him with a
correct and complete picture of man's nature and circumstances; and
his capacity of deriving light from other minds" (90). Mill claims
that Bentham failed at the latter condition. So, despite his having
secured an accurate understanding of human nature, Bentham failed to
communicate the truth of his convictions to others, or convince them
to follow the appropriate rules of "all human conduct" (93) that would
yield the greatest utility. This failure derives from Bentham's
"disqualifications" as a philosopher (91). In particular, Bentham
failed to learn and fully appreciate "other schools of thinkers" and
also lacked sympathy (91). Later, Mill clarifies the importance of
these qualities in a specific context. Taking the example of
improving a national character in order to further the moral
development of a society, one needs to understand the particular
national character. This requires knowledge of the conditions
(philosophical, historical, cultural, social) that led to the
development of this particular character and also a sympathetic
understanding (perhaps including motivations, interests, and
"feelings" in general) of the people (99-100).

This sympathetic understanding requires that one have a diverse range
of experiences, both pleasant and unpleasant, including "adversity",
"the experience which sickness gives", "dejection", and "heaviness of
heart" (92). While allowing that this diversity of experiences can
exclude serious harm or suffering above some threshold, this still
allows for a great deal of harm, suffering, and generally unpleasant
experiences and periods in one's life. In fact, the "qualifications"
to be a philosopher demand it. Similarly, there are intimations in
*Utilitarianism* (Ch. 2, 12-13) that a certain balance between pain
and pleasure is necessary for a contented life. However, it seems
that the requisite balance requires a great deal of pain and suffering
to be allowed.

With the exception of certain environmental influences, Mill claims,
"All the grand sources, in short, of human suffering are in a great
degree, many of them almost entirely, conquerable by human care and
effort" (*Utilitarianism* Ch.2, 14). Thus, the experience of
suffering seems to require a degree of inequity and injustice to exist
extensively enough to allow for each individual to have the necessary
diverse range of experiences. There seems to be tension here in
Mill's claims. These necessary conditions (hence, Mill's brand of
Utilitarianism) seem to require that there be injustice and inequity,
in order to ensure the effectiveness of moral and political
reformers. However, Mill’s theory also calls for minimizing such
suffering as much as possible. Given the moral injunctions of
utilitarianism, it's unclear whether Mill can maintain both his
perfectionist tendencies (perhaps seeking an ideal state in which all
individuals attain a good life) and his necessary qualifications for
an individual 1) improving the lot of others and 2) attaining a good
life. Is there perhaps a perfect balance of justice and injustice in
the world? Is such a balance plausible (either in principle or
practically)?

[David]

The Imperfection Hypothesis that you take up at the end (must the best
whole have bad parts) seems to me a ways from M's discussion of B.
But that's ok. It's an interesting Q. If the IH is true, then U
should not aim for a perfect world. But that doesn't mean U has to
accept man-made injustice. U need not value poverty for making
charity possible. I'm sure there's enough natural or unavoidable bad
things in the world to cultivate the proper moral attitudes. And
there's always history and fiction -- and their depictions of
injustice -- the appreciation of which can develop and maintain moral
sensibilities without requiring actual (current or ongoing) injustice.

DB