soy-Milquetoast (?)

[Nat!!]

My question is basically just about how to understand Mill's
assertions in chapter 2 of "On LIberty" that censorship involves a
presupposition of infallibility. In "Mill and Milquetoast", Lewis
argues that Mill merely means that in order to be justifiably
confident in our own opinions, we must have considered opposing
viewpoints that have been vigorously urged against our beliefs. Lewis
bases this on Mill's statement, "Complete liberty of contradicting and
disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in
assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a
being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being
right" (II, 6). Well, this certainly sounds like what Lewis wants to
say, and the placement of this passage fits with it being an
explication of why infallibility is assumed by the silencing of
discussion. So, Lewis concludes that after hearing enough pros and
cons, a person can have rational assurance of being right, which
licenses acting on his or her opinions. These actions might include
censoring dissenters, but this won't be an assumption of infallibility
(leaving aside whatever else might be said against it).
But I'm struck by another passage in which Mill mentions
infallibility. He writes, "...it is not the feeling sure of a doctrine
(be that what it may) which I call an assumption of infallibility. It
is the undertaking to decide that question for others, without
allowing them to hear what can be said on the contrary side." (II, 11)
["for others" is italicized in the original] Notice that on Lewis's
reading what is important about tolerating heterodox opinions is that
it can improve the epistemic qualities of one's own beliefs. But, the
second passage emphasizes the importance of letting other people make
up their own minds.
Does this distinction help indicate why infallibility is assumed in
censorship? Is there some special epistemic value in letting other
people make up their own minds? I tried to argue in my paper that Mill
thought that human fallibility implied that there was value in having
a variety of opinions no matter how confident we become in a
particular belief. Lewis and Brink (in his comments) accuse this
position of being skeptical, I suppose because it betrays an
uncertainty about one's beliefs. I suppose (sometimes I forget that
some people aren't skeptics). Is that a problem? Is it crazy to
attribute this kind of skepticism to Mill? After all he does seem to
insist that every belief is fallible.
Also, the passage I'm focusing on occurs near the beginning of Mill's
litany of historical disasters caused by censorship. This is a
different kind of argument from the one he gives earlier in the
chapter. Is this a reason to discount this gloss on infallibility?
(because it's not his central argument, or this is just a careless
aside, or something like that?)

[Arneson, Richard]

response to Nat question

I think something else besides infallibility worries is at work in the "complete liberty of
contradicting" passage.

here's a line of thought, borrowed from saul kripke.

I surely know some propositions to be true. Lots of them So consider some
proposition P that I know.

1. I know that P.
2. If I know that P, I know that evidence against P is evidence against what is true.
3. Evidence against what is true is misleading evidence.
4. I ought to ignore misleading evidence.
5. So, I ought to ignore evidence against P.
6. In some such cases, evidence against P is tempting, and
can be ignored only if suppressed.
7. So, in some such cases, evidence against P ought to be suppressed.

There may be problems with the argument, but there is a puzzle, even if the argument is sound.
Go back to Mill. He says "Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our

opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for

purposes of action." If I know that P only on condition that I am open to counterevidence,
then acting on the conclusion of the argument above tends to render it the case
that a premise necessary for the truth of the conclusion becomes false. I cease to know that P.

It doesn't follow from this that censorship is never OK. Given that I have carefully weighed the evidence
and concluded, P is true, it might be immensely important to secure a certain result,
and free speech concerning P may hinder getting that result. If the environmental movement gains
power in a few countries, we may correctly see that strong pro-environment policies must be
put in place now, and won't be, if free speech on this topic is tolerated. (With some time lag, we
foresee we will then cease to know P, or run the risk of ceasing to know P. This is an epistemic loss we can
bear, given what is at stake.) All of this can be true, even if we drop talk of certain knowledge,
and replace it with probabilistic claims, eg we know it is at least .8 probable that the earth will shudder unless
we all stop using beer cans.

Given the extreme slipperiness of the concept of knowledge, maybe we can parlay
fallibilist concerns into a reconstruction of Mill's "assuming our own infallibility" talk.
Of a given list of 100 claims, each of which I believe to be true, I also believe,
for sure, at least ten entries on the list will eventually turn out to be false. I believe it is possible though unlikely that
all 100 claims will turn out false. I don't see an across the board argument against censorship
emerging here, but maybe I am missing something.
________________________________________
From: phi...@googlegroups.com [phi...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Nat!! [nja...@ucsd.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2009 3:10 AM
To: Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy
Subject: soy-Milquetoast (?)

[David]

I don't disagree that M often accuses the censor of assuming
infallibility. I just think that that is a philosophical mistake.
Even M doesn't think and needn't that censorship is wrong in all
circumstances, but he does think it often is. I just don't think we
expose what's wrong with it by making the false assumption that the
censor (in such cases) must be assuming infallibility. This seems to
me true even when the censor is deciding for others, as well as
himself. I may think that I need to avert a clear and present danger
through censorship. I need not think that my belief that danger will
ensue is infallible. But especially if I am someone holding a
position of public trust, I may need to decide if the probability of
the danger ensuing is sufficiently high. I can remind myself of my
fallibility, and perhaps recognition of my fallibility should make me
set the probability bar higher than a mere preponderance of the
evidence, perhaps clear and convincing evidence. But I would be
justified in censoring if the best evidence of danger (significant
harm to others) is clear and convincing There's no need for me to
assume infallibility.

It does seem to me like the paradox of the preface. I know I'm
mistaken somewhere, but I don't know where. I shouldn't retract my
claims just because I know that somewhere something I say will be
mistaken.

DB