My (Punctual) Question

[Veronica]

In the first paragraph of the first chapter in /The Subjection of
Women/, Mill offers the principle of equality: “The principle which
regulates the existing social relations between the two sexes – the
legal subordination of one sex to the other – is wrong in itself, and
now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; […] it ought to
be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or
privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other.” This passage
clearly illustrates a concern for de jure inequality, but there is
reason to believe Mill thinks something stronger is necessary for a
utile society, viz., de facto equality between the sexes. For
instance, Mill claims that “the only school of genuine moral sentiment
is society among equals” (SW, II 12); he goes on to say “the true
virtue of human beings is fitness to live together as equals. […]
[The family] should be a school of sympathy in equality, of living
together in love, without power on one side or obedience on the
other” (Ibid.). The important thing to note is Mill’s worry about
power (this also comes out when he talks about physical domination of
men over women); power suggests far more than legal domination since
sexist inequities of power pervade many other social institutions.

My question is how this principle of de facto social equality between
the sexes fits into the arguments for freedom of expression in
chapters II and III of /On Liberty/. Particularly, how might Mill
deal with women who want to partake in the institutions that maintain
their subjugation (I’m thinking of women who do sex work)? How would
he deal with the institutions themselves? If we take what he says in
SW seriously, then inequality is wrong in itself and harmful to both
the dominated and the dominator. It seems that the harm principle
could justify restricting those acts or ‘expressions’ that cause harm
in this way, i.e., by perpetuating sexism. This raises practical
questions of what could or could not be censored and what would count
as sexist, but I think it’s more interesting to ask if there is
theoretical space for Mill to support (or even demand) censorship of
acts or speech that produce sexual inequality, e.g., violent or
degrading pornography.

[Arneson, Richard]

question about your question.
we distinguish de jure and de facto equality, and assert, plausibly, that mill cares for
de facto equality, of some sort.

my question: What sort?

You seem to assume equality of power, i dunno. mill finds certain unchecked power relations
clearly bad, i'm not sure how or whether his points should be generalized.

suggestion: we prize a society of democratic equality, in which people relate as equals,
as persons with the same fundamental status. This is opposed to caste hierarchy.

not all social distinctions or hierarchies or power imbalances offend against this ideal.
which ones do?

in a meritocratic society, the talented will have more power,
attached to competitive positions and offices, than the untalented.
This doesn't per se amount to caste hierarchy, though there is a danger here.

in a market economy society, some will be richer, but perhaps some
inequality of wealth and income is compatible with the ideal of a caste-free
society.

with respect to men and women, subordinate caste status could be imposed on women
in the absence of de jure inequality, so something is needed, beyond legal equality.
but i'm not sure how to characterize the desired equality.

You might try saying: some inequalities militate against maximizing aggregate perfectionist utility,
and those inequalities we deem bad caste status inequalities. Other inequalities don't--eg inequality of political power
in well-functioning indirect democracies, inequalities of rank and authority in well-functioning
bureaucracies, inequalities of authority in a well-functioning scientific community . These are ok.
Some egalitarians of various stripes might resist this move, say equality understood in certain ways matters per se not just as
a means.

anyway, i don't think it is open to mill, given his commitments, to say inequality per se is harmful.
me having less power, authority, status than you might contribute to all of us, me included, being better off.

you might be able to find millian arguments for censorship of certain kinds of speech that qualifies as anti-female
propaganda, without settling the what-is-a-caste-free society question posed above.
________________________________________
From: phi...@googlegroups.com [phi...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Veronica [vap...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2009 11:58 PM
To: Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy
Subject: My (Punctual) Question

[David]

Lots of interesting issues here.

(1) Not sure how you're thinking of the difference between de jure and
de facto equality. There's formal or legal equality, substantive
social and economic equality, and equality of opportunity at least.
In SW M seems to be in favor of something close to formal or legal
equality. Not sure M ever commits to substantive equality or equality
of outcome. In SW and PPE he does favor some form of equality of
opportunity, and in PPE thinks this limits (but does not eliminate)
substantive equality or equality of outcome.

(2) I wouldn't lump together prostitution and pornography. (a) In the
case of prostitution, I'd distinguish a Millian attitude toward many
forms of actual prostitution (that involve force and fraud) from a
Millian attitude toward prostitution per se. Not sure that the
Millian has to be concerned about prostitution (the exchange of sex
for money) per se if there's no force or fraud. (b) In the case of
pornography, some questions might be whether censorship could be
justified on either harm-prevention or autonomy-enhancing grounds.
That is likely to depend, among other things, on the kind of
pornography we're talking about. Censorship of pornography as such
would cast a pretty wide net, including lots of high-value speech.
But narrower classes of pornography -- e.g. violent misogynist
pornography or snuff films -- might not include much high-value
speech. Insofar as you're focused on harm-prevention arguments, there
are also causal questions to address, such as whether the relevant
subclass of pornography causes sexual inequality or is (simply?
primarily?) and expression of it.

DB