TPQs (12/7) Group 1 Posts, Group 2 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[beaub]

Little, a self-proclaimed "card-carrying moral particularist who makes a living doing something I'd be happy to call moral theory" (32) provides an account of the incompatibility of particularism and the big overarching theories we have discussed earlier in the term. Generalizations are rampant, she holds, as we rely on them frequently to prove our point about various moral problems, including, perhaps most infamously, the idiom for the most part (36). Little places a lot of emphasis on the fact that theory can be necessary when used to understand, but it is often misused or misinterpreted by moral agents. 

"The particularist is not, as the usual image has it, confined to the sidelines of theoretical moral debate," Little claims. Instead, they can certainly do more than "watch the play from the bench, at most throwing in the occasional story or concept' (p. 39). What do you make of the particularist critique of the fundamental utility and form of moral theory/theories? Do you believe generalizations are overused, or do they have their place in advocating a general course of more clear-cut moral action? Do particularists miss out on the game or can they provide as much input to the field of ethics as Little claims they can? 

[vmco...@lclark.edu]

Little's piece, "On the Why: Particularism and Moral Theory" clarifies some of the quick assumptions critics make when hearing that Particularism disregards general moral principles. Little makes notes of the defeasible generalizations that particularists, like herself, adhere to. There are a variety of different morally significant "generalizations" that can be made, like deciphering the nature of certain things. Overall, her piece was well thought out, however, I found it a bit winded, and hard to follow her complex language. 

Do you think she made a clear point to how moral particularists include defeasible generalizations in their theory? I think I understand, there are specific aspects of a certain action, like lying, that have to understood before you can make exceptions. But even this explanation seems to lack clarity. Did anyone else seem to have a better grasp of the bigger picture she was trying to make?

[Ian Dechow]

Ok i'm convinced, actually i've been convinced all along.  Morality is circumstantial. Morality follows principles.  Yes I do truly believe that morality is a summation of everything we have learned this semester.  Since this is my last TPQ my only question for you guys is will you take another Philosophy class and why?  Actually more specifically will you take another Ethics class? Especially, if what today's reading says is true, which it sound rather spot on. :) Have a good rest of the year.

[sbea...@lclark.edu]

Just because from human perspective it seems that the morality of an action can only be determined by the particular circumstance in which it takes place, do you believe that there could still exist an objective morality, perhaps one far beyond the human ability to know or conceive of it, granted we do only have 5 senses? Thoughts please...

[hdon...@lclark.edu]

"Someone persuaded of the above criticisms could nonetheless find a moral theory to make her happy-one that is pluralist about values and duties and non-reductive about what carries theoretical weight, that admits of dilemmas and the importance of directives specific to idiosyncratic ways of life, that addresses imperfection directly rather than by approximation to an ideal, and that requires judgment in its application. In short, the "antitheory" objections just canvassed are perfectly consistent with the idea that we can and should build a moral theory" (33).

This idea that Little is presenting is simply advocating taking pieces of other moral theories and combining them in a way that would satisfy someone for a certain moral dilemma. Isn't that simply denying the idea of a moral theory though? It is encouraging one to use what they know about all moral theories and decide, based on the context, what is morally right and wrong. This is very particularist, and seems to be supporting the idea of rejecting moral theory, not opposing it. Is Little's argument advocating moral theories sound, or just ultimately highly particularist?

[rh...@lclark.edu]

I also found the reading convincing but I'm not sure I really know enough about philosophy to reach a conclusion with confidence.  I would like to take another philosophy class to increase my understanding but I'm not sure that I will since I have other priorities.

[sretzlaff]

I also found Little's piece very interesting.  However, I do not believe that because Little is declaring taking pieces of other moral theories and combining them in a way that would satisfy someone in a certain moral dilemma denies the idea of moral theory.  Her arguments surrounding the idea of encouraging one to use what they know and what they have experienced about all moral theories to make a decision, based on context, what is morally right and wrong is in fact particularist.  I also find that studying moral theories is very relevant to many of us in the class and I find it very appealing.  I might possibly consider taking another philosophy course as an elective because it is very useful when determining reasoning and has aided in my critical thinking skills.