TPQs (10/3) Group 2 Posts, Group 3 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[rh...@lclark.edu]

On page 533 Singer uses the example of a society where people with an IQ under 100 are enslaved by people with an IQ over 100 to show that doing something like this is not much better than subordinating groups of people to each other based on race or sex.  Is this really a good comparison that helps his essay?  In our society its generally considered morally acceptable to discriminate based on intelligence or ability, which funnels those with less intelligence or ability due to any number of circumstances into dangerous professions and poverty.  While this is not as extreme as slavery, or for that matter a government policy, serious consequences remain.  Do you find this comparison with Singer's scenario valid?  Why or why not?  Finally, if you do find it valid, what implications does it have for Singer's statements on animal liberation?

[ega...@lclark.edu]

How would the idea of the 'circle of life' fit into Singer's theory? He doesn't seem to specifically cover the killing of animals for food, but how would he address this issue of the natural facts of life? Does the fact that all animals feel pain make it wrong for us to kill them? But then it seems that it would also be wrong for animals to kill each other, which we can see is not the case. Or does this not even matter to Singer's case because he is concerned with the fact that animals feel pain, and therefore a 'humane death' would not qualify under his terms of infringement on the rights of animals?

[afin...@lclark.edu]

"The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but Can they suffer?" (535)

This quote clearly plays into a utilitarianism framework, in which the potential pain or pleasure of sentient beings should guide our actions. Singer makes a strong case for the utilitarian-minded, but are there other arguments for animal liberation that don't center on utilitarianism? 

[Maggie McQueston]

I think it is interesting that Singer primarily addresses pain and suffering in this article. I think that his reasoning as far as animal suffering is very clear. However, I do wonder about the explanation of pleasure/happiness in the animal context. I think that this is a slightly more difficult task especially when factoring in the concept of "higher pleasures" outlined for us in Mill's article. It seems there is at the very least an issue of incommensurability. I find it interesting that Mill's writing on utilitarianism contrasts Singer's article in this way. As far as other arguments, I wondered how much of our thinking about animal liberation is based in our own reaction of pain or pleasure as related to the issue. This seems to be an area in which I have many intuitive thoughts which seem to contradict themselves.

[sluh...@lclark.edu]

The problem with talking about hierarchical structures of the kind described, that those with lower IQs are funneled into dangerous or undesirable jobs while those with higher IQs are given higher status/paid positions in society, is that such a distribution occurs through a combination of policy and the natural limitations that a person with lower intelligence will have in having her skill set applied to possible work environmemts. The jobs such a person will have are as much the product of her capacities as they are of any externally enforced hierarchy. There is still volition in that paradigm, whereas in Singers conception those with lower intelligence are mandated to the position of slave, a situation exemplifying absolute determinism.

What, I think, Singer is trying to point out is that the quality of "intelligence" is not a quality that can be used to determine a persons rights (or animals rights) by taking such a distinguishing quality and carying the logic to its maximum degree of absurdity of using intelligence (as when/if we apply it to humans) to establish it as grounds for the basic right of freedom.

[ep]

Certain animals have not evolved to a point where they could survive and remain in good health without killing other animals for food.  Genetic composition and habitat are two major factors.  Still, when these factors are not obstacles, would these animals have the mental capacity to decide that killing other animals (for food) is wrong and change diets?  It seems unlikely.  If we humans understand that an animal, if at least, could have a right to life and happiness that we should not compromise and that the majority of us are able to live successfully (and without much trouble) maintaining a vegetarian diet, is it then our duty to?  Would killing animals for food be permissible only when it is our only realistic option?

[eh...@lclark.edu]

Singer's argument is that the equality of consequences of action (such as levels of pain felt) is more important than equality of action themselves.  This appeared in his slapping a horse vs. slapping a baby scenario.  He gave a very interesting perspective on the treatment of animals compared to that of (unaware) humans based on their ability to understand the situation and to suffer. In this regard, could we say, then, that if we are not inclined to hunt small children or those who are mentally challenged for food, we should not be inclined to do so towards animals who would be equally unaware of their danger.  But we surely disagree with this in our society.  Should we not disagree? Would more universal good come from disregarding our strongly held hierarchical arguments to why we are morally inclined to hunt defenseless animals?  What would the world be like?