TPQs (11/2) Group 4 Posts, Group 1 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[co...@lclark.edu]

Is it possible for a "radical" virtue theorist to claim that their ethical theory is complete without picking a first-principle guide like Rachels suggests? If yes, how would this argument work?

Rachels argues that virtue theory must pick some first-principle, because he sees the theory's current guideline for decision-making ("for any good reason that may be given in favor of doing an action, there is a corresponding virtue that consists in the disposition to accept and act on that reason")  as offering insufficient moral guidance in many situations. He uses the example of a legislator trying to decide how to allocate funds between AIDS research and another equally valuable endeavor to prove this point.

If we accept the way Rachels frames this thought experiment, then he seems to be right. But can a virtue theorist argue that this argument misunderstands their theory and does not doom their complete theory because the decision the legislator must make is not moral?

Rachels already makes the case for us to accept the virtue theorist's argument that morals should be judged in terms of virtues like courage and justice instead of "right-action". So why shouldnt we extend this doctrine to this case and say that as long as the two choices the legislator can make are truly are equal in terms of their virtue, then both choices are morally acceptable and are no longer governed by moral considerations?

As a result, a virtue theorist could make her decision based on one of the general principles Rachels proposes. But it would merely be a matter of preference, rather than part of their moral theory.

[estanbro]

Rachel's article is mostly review and discussion of the points that Aristotle makes in explaining virtue theory. She discusses what the virtues are, how someone becomes a "virtuous person," and how virtue can be different from person to person or culture to culture. The main point of the article is that virtue theory is very old, and for a number of centuries it was somewhat put to rest. However, she states "recently a number of philosophers have advanced a radical idea: They have argued that modern moral philosophy is bankrupt and that, in order to salvage the subject, we should return to Aristotle's way of thinking." (page 2)
There is one subtle point made in the article that I would like to bring to question. Rachels refers to Elizabeth Anscombe's idea that modern moral philosophy rests on the notion of "law" without a "lawgiver" and that this is what is wrong about modern moral philosophy. Modern moral philosophy is concerned with the "laws" of humanity, that is, how one should act, without there being a "lawgiver" to enforce these laws. Is morality in and of itself not the lawgiver though? I believe modern moral philosophy is based on the laws of right and wrong with morality in and of itself being the lawgiver. No matter what the theory, whether it be utilitarianism or kantianism, there will never be a lawgiver to enforce the law when one is "wrong." No lawgiver will make sure that you don't steal an extra apple when no one is looking. The only lawgiver with this power is morality for the sake of morality. All moral theory (whether virtue theory or modern moral theory) is based on being moral in and of itself, that is, being moral for the sake of morality.

[beaub]

This notion that Virtue Theory is old and possibly outdated is an interesting one. Isn't philosophy old and subject to temporal criticisms? Yet it remains just as relevant today, if not more so, as it did thousands of years ago, because the moral issues we face today are exponentially more complex than any other time in human history.

Anscombe's idea that Cory brought up about the dated nature of claiming something to be a "morally right action" is, I believe, a valid one. We need to replace the notion of an act being morally right with an effort to locate the root virtue that makes it moral, she argues. This seems to make sense to me, since we have examined Consequentialism, Kantianism, and now Virtue Theory and are able to see that they are not all compatible with one another. Thus, at least for the case of Virtue Theory, which seems to be so rooted in the nature of these virtues and within whom they reside, focus should be placed on justifying actions with specific virtues rather than ambiguously labeling it as moral. 

[nse...@lclark.edu]

Anscombe's analysis of virtue theory as a moral theory asserts that is more viable than other moral theories because it seeks to measure what is right in terms of the good, the good in this case being what makes a person good. Virtue Theory posits that a good person consistently acts in accordance with her virtues. What I found most interesting in the article was the section asking whether all virtues are the same for everyone. Is one combination of traits something that everyone should strive for? Are there not circumstances in which one set of virtues would be better for one person than they would for another? Aristotle reconciles this by arguing that even in vastly different situations, people tend to deal with the same problems in life and that there are some virtues that all people need at one point or another e.g. courage because no one is safe all the time and will at some point meet a dangerous situation.

My question, then, is that if there are some virtues that all people need at one point or another, are there some virtues that should be considered better than others? If this is possible, would this resolve the trouble at the end of the article regarding a choice between violating one virtue or another (being honest and unkind or being dishonest and unkind)?
Though this might indeed provide a solution to the problem, the distinction between certain kinds of virtues would most likely lead to another objection or make Virtue Theory look more like a different moral theory.

[jswe...@lclark.edu]

Virtue theory seems to imply that people can inherently distinguish virtues and vices.  However, in an environment full of vices I think the ability to distinguish virtue from vice becomes heavily impaired.  Is our understanding of virtue and vice merely a product of our environment?   Given the variety of cultures on can live in, is virtue relative?

[mblak...@lclark.edu]

This question somewhat relates back to rule utilitarianism and the problem of partial compliance. In such a case, it could be considered more wise to act in morally wrong way in order to prevent catastrophe. Here, however, morality is not based on net happiness so the cause of people acting on vices instead of virtues would not matter. It is hard for me to imagine an environment in which no one would be born with at least one of the means necessary in leading a virtuous life. Even so, if the politics and people governing said environment were completely virtueless and that was carried down through the rungs of society, the society would simply be without virtue. Have any societies in history existed that have displayed complete lack of virtue?

[Ian Dechow]

Virtue within different societies does seem to be relative. However that is not to say that there is not a set that can best lead one to a life of eudaimonia.  Thus the study of politic.  It is harder for the nazi soldier to live the life of virtue due to his government.  Virtue and vice need to be a product of our logos not our mythos.  

[gru...@lclark.edu]

Rachels' description and analysis of Virtue Theory presents what I believe to be the most considerate theory of individuals' normal occupations and relationships, but as stated in the article, needs more concreteness. The theory most wholly addresses moral character, but in sacrificing instruction on morally just action. This seems critical. The Anscombe citation suggesting that analytical claims such as "morally wrong" could be rejected in lieu of virtue-based critique is inadequate. All of our prior course readings outlining morality as independently existing have convinced me otherwise and I do believe a proper law of moral action can be formulated. As is, I do not believe virtue theory can sufficiently stand independent. However, offering it "as a supplement to a theory of right action" seems incompatible because too many components of the other theories present discrepancies (187). The solution I believe lies in the element unifying all the theories, which is the distinct human quality of reason. Perhaps the ending comment on the 'virtue of wisdom' may be involved, as well. 

Is there a way wisdom and reason can be applied to rules of action as rationally as they are employed in virtue theory's construction and favoring of humanly personal qualities over arbitrary senses of duty? Virtue theory tends to normal human behavior and nature unlike any of the others, but it needs a law. Rachels offers one possible formula: "We ought to do those actions that have the best reasons in their favor". I think this should be modified. Does anyone have suggestions? I like that Rachels' formula relies so heavily on instinctual reasoning and tries to accomodate differences in people's personalities, but I would like to see a more distinguished and certain formula.