TPQs (10/24) Group 1 Posts, Group 2 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[mblak...@lclark.edu]

In her piece, Onora O'Neill refers to two duties: Duties of Justice to others and Duties of Beneficence to others. Duties of Justice are analogous to perfect duties, stating that one may not act on any maxim that uses another as a mere means through coercion and deception. Duties of Beneficence are analogous to imperfect duties, designed to develop or promote the ends of others and facilitate their ability to pursue and meet these ends.O'Neill clearly spells out the ways in which one in the midst of a famine may not and must act on these duties, as well as the ways in which someone in an affluent situation may not act in regard to those suffering. The role of the affluent becomes muddled, however, with their Duty of Beneficence--imperfect duty--toward those suffering. While the imperfect duty is often considered the more lax of the two, as it requires us to act in some way of our choosing that helps others pursue their ends, it seems to take on a different role when the 'others' at hand are incapable of pursuing their basic, essential ends without outside help. In such cases, we have a greater duty to these suffering people than those nearer to us with the ability to carry out a variety of ends. At this point, however, has Kantianism shed it's undemanding doctrine for a more Utilitarian one? Should a new form of duty be created because of this? If so, what would the facets of such a duty be? 

[beaub]

"Kantians generally would play down any distinction between a person's own responsibilities and his or her role responsibilities. They would not deny that in any capacity one is accountable for certain things for which as a private person one is not accountable...When we take on positions, we add to our responsibilities those that the job requires; but we do not lose those that are already required of us" (542). 

I thought of the Eichmann trial when reading this portion of O'Neill. (More info here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adolf_Eichmann#Analysis.) A Nazi train commander was executed after the war for his acts, but some have argued that he was not particularly anti-Semitic and was simply following his orders and job requirements, even though he allowed carts of Jews to be shipped to concentration camps. 

What would Kant say about Eichmann? I am sure that we are all involved in acts today that will be morally repugnant to future generations (continuing to eat meat and utilize dirty energy sources when alternatives are plentiful are two examples that immediately come to mind) . Should we be judged on them? Do you think it is ever just for someone to perform an act as part of their job that they find immoral? If so, why? Have you found yourself in a scenario like that?

Feel free to answer any or all of the questions above. 

[rh...@lclark.edu]

I don't believe it would be fair to say Kantianism has moved towards Utilitarianism in response to the famine argument.  Kantianism still does not take consequences into account, and therefore does not demand that people maximize happiness.  This is also related to Kantianism's relatively lower scope.  In Utilitarianism it is fairly obvious that one would have to make large sacrifices to end famine but it is less clear in Kantianism.  While there is a duty to do something, it is not clear what that is.  There wasn't an indication in the reading that this duty, whatever it is, is so important that one must drop everything to pursue it.  Since Kantianism doesn't have a clear answer the demandingness objection is objection is difficult to understand since it's unclear what it's objecting to.

[hdon...@lclark.edu]

I don't particularly get the impression that O'Neill is claiming Kantianism is moving more towards Utilitarianism, but rather that both moral theories are significantly lacking in different ways. She highlights the key part of Kantianism, which claims that despite how sometimes "good intentions...lead to bad results, and correspondingly, bad intentions sometimes do no harm," and claims this to be an objection. If O'Neill is objecting to the main idea of Kantianism, can this narrow yet precise moral theory actually meet the criterion of evaluation and prove to be effective or useful at all?

[Lisa Bell]

In regards to Kantian duties of justice, Onora O'Neill states that "if they are, Kantian ethical theory would not judge wrong the acts of a person who had done her or his best.” However, could a person plausibly put themselves in certain situations that are easier then others to “try their best”? For example, could a person choose to live in one neighborhood opposed to a different neighborhood because there is more need to “to fulfill one' s duties to particular others” in the second living situation? Is this considered unethical or a way of copping out of ones requirements to their community?

[vmco...@lclark.edu]

Onora O'Neill's piece, "Kantian Approaches to Some Famine Problems", begins with explaining the Kantian theory in general. She then focuses on the Duties of Beneficence towards others, and frequently reminds the audience of the differences between Utilitarian principles and Kantian principles. While supporting the Duties of Beneficence in famine situations, a rational agent should be donating to charity, to benefit some other's ends, rather than to support your friend's end in golf by buying a pair of clubs to participate. This is because an rationally autonomous individual should realize the importance of supporting an end of starvation being stronger than an end of an important talent. She provides clear examples, and recognizes that there is not an exact formula to decide how much one should try to benefit others, just that it is sometimes necessary. I found it strange that O'Neill did not offer ways for Kantians to contribute to the humanity effort. In many of the Utilitarianism articles we read earlier in the semester, the authors gave specific charities to look towards. Why wouldn't O'Neill at least offer some sort charitable programs for overseas aid? The article is titled "Kantian Approaches to Some Famine Problems", after all, and O'Neill neglects to mention any specific way for Kantian's to help.

[larr...@lclark.edu]

In "Kantian Approaches to Some Famine Problems" O'Neill highlights the differences between Kantianism and Utilititarianism using common objections to Consequentialist Ethics. For example, "for Kantians, the important moral choices are above all those in which one acts directly not those in which one decides which pattern of actions to encourage in others." Such is not the case for utilitarianism, which seeks to promote a pattern of net "good". Kantianism places a greater emphasis on an individual's actions and their ability to discern what the best choices would be. This call for responsibility in personal decision making contrasts sharply with the consequentialist's explanation of moral intuition as irrational to decision making, and relates directly to the Integrity Objection to Consequentialist ethics discussed in the Williams article we read not too long ago. This objection states that Utilitarianism violates the instinctual notion that each of us is personally responsible for his or her own actions over those of others. O'Neill goes on to talk about personal and role responsibilites, and the lack of a kantian exception for morally impermissible acts due to the "its my job" objection.

 

How important is the notion of personal responsibility? Can exceptions be made in extrenous circumstances? And how important is the distinction between personal and role responsibilities?  What would utilitarianism say to these?

 

 

[sretzlaff]

Yes, there are plausible situations when people people put themselves in easier situations. Everyone has different interpretations of what their best actually entails.  Some people lack the hard-work and determination that others acquire. For example, if put in a situation where you are asked to participate in a group project, you may choose to place yourself in the situation where you can do much less work than others, but it is the ideal amount of work for you to do your best. People make the choices to live in certain neighborhoods rather than another one often because they feel they could impact the community to a greater extent and better themselves. Acting in this way shouldn't be considered unethical because the people are acting in a certain way to maximize their happiness along with others, possibly their future family.  However, it would be unethical to opt out of work or decisions that you are well capable of doing and using the excuse of "I'm trying my best."  This would be a lie.  

[afin...@lclark.edu]

I agree that Kantianism hasn't necessarily moved towards Utilitarianism when thinking in a famine context. In addition to the discussion on sacrifices, I think the other side of the famine situation is worth talking about: actions that are or aren't justifiable when you're on the famine side. O'Neill briefly touches on the idea of actions that might be tempting as a member of a famine-stricken community, which include cheating, stealing or being otherwise devious in order to secure enough sustenance for those you care about. While Kantianism would hold that these actions are wrong because they involve using others as mere means and deceiving people, thus taking away their ability to act as free, autonomous being, Utilitarianism also sees these as wrong, but on an individual scale, because it would be placing your happiness above others'. Yet both of these moral theories go out the window in times of famine, as people frequently cheat, steal or lie to ensure their survival. I'm curious, however, about whether we can call frightened, starving people who act out of desperation more so than rationality "free, autonomous beings". Is it really fair to hold them to the same moral standards that Kantianism and Utilitarianism expect? 

[Ian Dechow]

Many including Onora O'Neill share the belief that Kantianism has less scope than Utilitarianism.  Her basis for this is that Kantianism, since its focus is intentional acts, does not give attention to unintentional acts.  This may be the case but, if Kant were to respond to this how would he do it?  Maybe he would say that if you act unintentionally, then you did something to give up your free intention? But what of "shit happens," it seems that events can't be good or bad in themselves, but human actions can.  Thus saying the hurricane is bad is really just saying "Oh Darn."  But saying you are bad has to do with your intention and what you have done.  If your action is unintentional, either at one point you fell short in which case you are ether completely at fault or "Oh Darn."  I don't see lack of scope, just a different idea of what is Good.  But as pertaining to morality it has just as much scope.