TPQs (11/14) Group 1 Posts, Group 2 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[Ian Dechow]

 If all life has intrinsic value and we eat that life giving it instrumental value then according to virtue ethics it would have transformative value. A crux of the issue discussed in the two articles seems to be to animals have intrinsic value. If they do, then it is our responsibility as the cultivator of a domesticated animal to give it a peaceful life.  If they don't then this seems unnecessary. If an animal has transformative value then it is only when we come in contact with the animal that we practice that value.   Thus watching the animal that you are going to eat get killed is better than buying the animals meet at a store. In that way we understand the choices we make.

 The argument that I have just made seems a little sketchy to me. Do you think watching the process of slaughter helps man achieve Eudaimonia?

[beaub]

Norcross presents a lot of very compelling arguments and does a nice job at addressing objections, responses, and providing thorough and creative examples that illustrate the issue at hand. While certainly not exactly the same, do you find his puppy/cocoamone example compelling or a bit of a stretch? If the latter, then why do you reject it? Norcross claims that he expects "near universal agreement" with his claim that it is unjust for Fred to be able to enjoy the taste of chocolate at the expense of so much suffering and so many deaths. Were you skeptical about agreeing with his proposition because you that it might entail a change in your actions? I find his arguments to be very compelling in swaying people against the consumption of animal products.

It seems that Norcross' piece is very focused on the treatments of animals, and his mentions of specifically factory-farmed meat are numerous. I wonder what he thinks about this semi-recent trend of "happy meat/dairy/eggs that many people—Portlanders specifically—attempt to purchase and consume to ease their consciousness. Is it the treatment of the animals on these factory farms wrong, or are there fundamental issues in raising animals for food? In other words, if Fred were to make the puppies' cages a bit bigger or allow them to go outside once a day—but still slaughter them in the end—would it be acceptable? Is it wrong because it is unvirtuous in and of itself, and the treatments just makes the situation worse, or is it simply wrong to take the lives of a sentient being simply for gustatory pleasure?

[rh...@lclark.edu]

Watching an animal be slaughtered may very well contribute something to eudaimonea that knowledge of the procedure itself might not.  However domesticated animals go through much more than slaughter and watching them being slaughtered wouldn't shed any light on the rest of their lives so the gains from this would be limited.    Additionally after gaining the benefits to eudaimonea from watching an animal be slaughtered there wouldn't be any morally relevant point in continuing to watch animals get slaughtered rather than getting meat from the store.  However there remains the problem of what to do with the experience one gains from watching an animal be slaughtered.  Some people might be horrified and others nonplussed and it would change them differently, perhaps not for the better.  People would still have to consider what the virtuous person would do in response, which kind of removes themselves from the situation when the point of watching an animal to be slaughtered is to be affected by it.  Watching an animal be slaughtered would only be uniquely useful to achieving eudaimonea if it provides information that people can use that they can't find elsewhere/

[mblak...@lclark.edu]

"Why is rationality morally relevant? It does not make us "better" than other animals or more "perfect"... But it is morally relevant insofar as it provides greater possibilities for cooperation and for the nonviolent resolution of problems" (321). This is Mary Anne Warren's argument on why NHAs are not as morally relevant as humans. Warren seems to be arguing that rationality allows humans the possibility to act in virtuous ways that NHAs cannot. While they may not be virtuous, Norcross would have us belive that NHAs are arguably innocent. What, then, is the difference between virtue and innocence? Could it be argued that some NHAs are not innocent? What do we say for attack dogs that have mauled people to death? Clearly their masters are guilty, but does some predisposition in certain dog breeds make them not or less innocent? How do you think Norcross would answer such a debate? 

[vmco...@lclark.edu]

Norcross' piece, "Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases", poses a strong argument for animal welfare. He creates a vivid scenario of a man named Fred who keeps 26 puppies in his basement and "raises" them extremely cruelly, living in their own feces and urine, until eventually they are brutally killed by the time they reach six months. His reasoning lies within obtaining "cocoamone" (an invented chemical that allows people to enjoy chocolate) for his gustatory pleasure. Norcross believes that this invented situation is no different than the reality of meat-eaters today, who are aware of the inhumane and unbearable lives the animals face in industrialized factory farms. He defends his points, while also refuting other authors about their objections to his work. He makes it clear that rationality is not a sufficient justification for treating animals the way mass factories do due to marginal cases. What do you think his opinion is on the matter? Seeing as though this is a reading under our topic of virtue ethics, I believe he would not agree with the Utilitarian principles of allowing the severely disabled or handicapped used for medical testing. Do you? He never mentions his opinion on the matter, he merely states that a large number of individuals would, and do, disagree.

[sbea...@lclark.edu]

In Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases, Norcross presents a hypothetical situation in which a man fred, extracts cocoamone by keeping puppies and torture them only to slaughter them and extract the cocoamone from their bodies in order to enjoy chocolate.  He claims this is morally equivalent to current factory farm meat production practices. Just like the puppies in his analogous example, the animals we pay to eat (if factory raised) are raised in harsh environments, and suffer most of their lives.  Norcross then claims that humans have higher moral status than animals because humans are rational beings and have interests that are morally considerable. Our intuitions would lead us to think that what fred is doing is wrong though ironically, many of us support the mass production and consumption of meat.  Why do you think we draw the line here? What makes the current treatment of animals in meat factories, for example the manor in which veal is produced, more permissible than fred torturing puppies to enjoy chocolate?

[ega...@lclark.edu]

I think that the Virtue Ethicist would say that having a personal stake in the slaughter and processing of an animal for your food does help you achieve Eudimonea, because it helps you achieve certain virtues, such as humbleness and conscientiousness. Seeing the animal be killed may not make you happy, but I believe that the Virtue Ethicist would argue that it makes you a better person in the long run than does ignorance about your actions and their consequences.