TPQs (11/16) Group 2 Posts, Group 3 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[rh...@lclark.edu]

On page 566 the author states "But when we consider rationality from the standpoint of the first three elements of the ecological outlook, we see that its value lies in its importance to human life.  other creatures achieve their species-specific good with-out the need of rationality, although they often make use of capacities that humans lack."  The author seems to be using the logic that qualities can only be useful to certain species if the quality helps them achieve their good.  They have no other significance.  Do you agree with this assessment?  Does the author's position strike you as relativist?  Why or why not?

[ega...@lclark.edu]

After making his argument that non-human animals possess inherent worth, Taylor then states "I have not asserted anywhere in the foregoing account that animals or plants have moral rights" (pg. 567). Do you think that having inherent worth without having moral rights is a contradiction? Is inherent worth essentially a moral-based scale that cannot be separated from the issue of morality and moral rights? Or is Taylor right to say that the two are different?

[eh...@lclark.edu]

At the very end of the sections on "the good of the being and the concept of inherent worth" Taylor states that "When rational, autonomous agents regard such entities as possessing inherent worth, they place intrinsic value on the realization of their good and so hold themselves responsible for performing actions that will have this effect and for refraining from actions having the contrary effect."  Taylor has yet to give an argument as to why any instrumental value should be ignored when contemplating actions that may have a negative impact on an organism, species population or community of life.  Is it reasonable to completely disregard all instrumental values and base our decisions solely on inherent values?

[sretzlaff]

On page 560, Taylor holds "that the rules of duty governing our treatment of the natural world and its inhabitants are forms of conduct in which the attitude of respect for nature is manifested" (Taylor, 560).  List an example when our attitude of respect for nature is manifested.  What connection is being made between the attitude of respect for nature and the duties of a life-centered system of environmental ethics?

[epro...@lclark.edu]

Applying moral rights to non-rational non-human animals may strike Taylor as problematic because such animals do not behave from the motivations of morality but rather from instinct. Taylor suggests that the concept of morality arises in our (human) relationships with nature.  It seems Taylor is proposing that we recognize the inherent worth in non-human animals apart from the moral projections we can so easily cast upon them.  Though we should support the well-being of these animals, “moral rights” may not properly apply.

[Maggie McQueston]

I think that our attitude of respect for nature is manifested so long as we find value in things being able to fulfill their "proper function". In the same way that we buy into the purpose of human life in a big sense as being the ability to flourish, we must also consider nature as having a proper function. This made me think about why it is that we want natural things to have value, but not so much that we can use them for our own benefit. Thinking in terms of what something is "naturally" intended to do, I considered something that I think we inherently think of as having no rights: a book. Books have a "proper function", that is, to be read, to educate people, to bring about imagination and thought, etc. So, although books are not commonly thought of as having rights, we do have a sense of them having inherent value. People become outraged by book burning, censorship, etc. They have a sort of symbolic value to our society. I think they might even be thought of as having transformative value.