TPQs (11/12) Group 4 Posts, Group 1 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[co...@lclark.edu]

I found Are All Species Equal? compelling. I think it does a good job of illustrating just how nuanced 'respect' is.

How do you think Schmidtz views endangered species protection? It seems that protecting endangered species is clearly instrumentally good (because if forces environmental protection that wouldn't otherwise be mandated).

 But it is less clear to me that protecting endangered species is intrinsically good. If we imagine that a species is going extinct either naturally or for justifiable reasons (if there are any), is there any intrinsic reason to protect it? Are there any species that are valuable in and of them selves? Or is the value we profess to protect when advocating for endangered species really something else that just happens to be coextensive with a given species?

[hwhi...@lclark.edu]

It seems paradoxical that the egalitarian view of animals leads to seemingly unjust treatment of creatures, however Schmidtz presents a very rational argument about the faults of equality in terms of animals. The fact that speciesism generates a more rational base for determining the moral value of an animal seems to contradict some moral intuitions. By claiming that certain animals hold traits beyond just their sentience which give them more moral value, Schmidtz seems to go against Utilitarian values and enter a realm of virtue theory. He believes there are virtues in certain species that make them more morally significant than others. If this is true, wouldn't it logically follow that it is okay to harm the individual with less virtues if your only other option is to harm the individual with more virtues? In turn does one's virtues grant her moral significance that protects them? Wouldn't it also follow that the individual pursuing the development of her virtues is less morally valuable than the completely virtuous person?

[vmco...@lclark.edu]

To understand how Schmidtz would answer the question of endangered species,
first one would have to consider what that would mean of the humans
allowing an entire species to go extinct. It was a bit unclear of the
stance Schmidtz took on having an egalitarian view of all species,
therefore I am unsure if he would make note of the tyype of species going
extinct. Either way, I believe he would respond along these lines. I think
he would argue that to have respect for other species, and being highly
rational beings, we should do our best to save one from extinction. And
even further, we should continue the efforts we make as humans to keep
species from becoming endangered in the first first.
 In essence, we have the ability and capacity as homo sapiens to
self-reflect on another species going extinct. We have the ability to
realize the consequences that may stem from multiple species being
completely abolished, and should take action to prevent this downfall.
Overall, I am unsure of the exact response Schmidtz would give, but I do
think he would advocate saving endangered species.

[nse...@lclark.edu]

The argument against biocentrism states that choosing a single unifying trait as what makes a thing have moral standing is not enough because there could be other traits that also contribute to moral standing. This argument against biocentrism is confusing because its argument does not explain why it would make a difference that other traits might also exist. If the one unifying trait of living things is what constitutes a thing's moral standing, does the existence of other traits (e.g. an elephant's intelligence vs. a rabbit's speed) really change a living thing's moral standing, even if we do value those traits on some level? Does it follow that because we value a trait, that trait should contribute to a living thing's moral worth? Is this view not in itself anthropocentric in that it would base a living thing's moral worth on traits valued by humans?

[jshaw]

Do you guys feel that carrots and and chimpanzees are equal? 

[jswe...@lclark.edu]

Considering that human beings are probably the least beneficial beings on the planet in their blatant disregard for ecosystems and reckless consumption of resources, do we really deserve better or equal consideration that more productive beings?  We are certainly distinct from nature in our ability to rationalize, but that doesn't we aren't part the interdependent community that is our planet.  The actions of every being have effects, small or large, on every other being.  Considering this, and our present role in this community, do humans deserve the same consideration as other beings?  Is the life of a money grubbing CEO really equally or more valuable than that of a tree?

[hdon...@lclark.edu]

I think that Schmidtz is looking at human beings on a far less individual basis. He does claim at one point that it shouldn't be on a case by case basis that we analyze the moral worth of a species. Although I agree that our ability to rationalize does not allow us to ignore how destructive human beings have been for the planet, I think that human beings in general should be viewed as equally or more valuable than trees. Although there are money grubbing CEOs, there are also environmental advocates and other humans that have much more to offer to the planet and to society. Looking at humanity as a whole I think that we do in fact deserve better or equal consideration than other beings. 

[mblak...@lclark.edu]

Based on Schmitdz's argument surrounding the dispersion of moral significance amongst the animal kingdom, I would argue that it is possibly morally permissible to harm a less virtuous human over a more virtuous one. To me, this is distantly comparable to killing a mosquito over a dolphin. The dolphin is quite virtuous in that it displays immense intelligence and grace. Humans' ability to recognize and value such virtue is a form of self-respect. To admire and value the mosquito as a species, however, would be a form of self-hatred. To respect the carrier of a deadly virus like West Nile would be to, in turn, show complete disregard for life. The same applies for someone placed in a circumstance in which she has to choose between harming a nonvirtuous or a virtuous person. The nonvirtuous person in this situation could be guilty of incredibly harmful vices. If choosing just one to help was the only option, it is arguable that she would be respecting life most were she to spare the virtuous person. 

[beaub]

On the question of endangered species, I also believe that Schmidtz would advocate for their protection. However, there do seem to be some issues associated with our current model of endangered species protection that I believe he would raise. Nonetheless, at least they are important to contemplate while we consider this notion of species egalitarianism. 

First, why do we put more effort (aka time) into protecting some endangered species than others? I first think of the giant panda, which has become the poster-child for endangered species protection. But why? I would argue that it is because we find them extremely cute, thus making them profitable in zoos. We can also relate to them in some sense since their anatomy resembles ours in some way. Or, at least, it does more than an endangered snake or beetle that gets much less thought and attention. 

We also need to consider how we preserve endangered species. I wonder if Schmidtz would be a fan of zoos. Probably not. But what about zoos who have endangered species and claim to be engaged in reproductive projects? The answer is unclear. I doubt that he would advocate for the objectification we engage in my placing sentient creatures in cages, no matter how spacious or seemingly resembling of their natural surroundings. 

We also need to keep in mind Schmidtz' notion of self-respect. 

All of the above relate to the idea of intrinsic vs. instrumental value. Are we really putting so much time and effort into saving endangered species because it is the virtuous thing to do? Or do we value individuals of endangered species because they give us happiness and the idea of their survival gives us happiness? 

[Ian Dechow]

This article and some of the questions posted make me think.  There are different ways to determine superiority of species, but why not look at ethical values to see which species is greater.  Humans seem to have the most developed ability to share and create fairness, not to say that other creatures can't but we seem to obsess over it.  Doesn't that alone make humans superior to other creatures. Animals and nature, while they can be instrumentally good to us, we can be intrinsically  good to them, i.e. prevent their extinction, we have this power and as such we have the responsibility to take care of those creatures that directly and indirectly are instrumental to our survival.  This should be sufficient reason to protect our world. If then we happen to find later or that we find now in a personal since that a creature has intrinsic value then that can only further our respect for nature, but should not remove from the conclusion that we have a responsibility for our planet. Since we can share best, we can most certainly share our planet.

[sbea...@lclark.edu]

I agree that there are issues related to the priority we place on the protection of a certain species, and that often times, we let our eyes deceive us (as in the panda example).  We are often more concerned with the wellbeing of non-human animals that exhibit or share similar structure or behavior to humans, though most often, there is a smaller less-humanlike species of bees for example, whose protection is far more crucial than that of a panda or frog for human survival.  Sometimes people value a species that may be less important for our survival, because being able to observe them can bring someone happiness.  I think that people have different reasons for why they want to protect a species; some may want to preserve a species for their own wellbeing or happiness, or for the good of that species, and both could be equally as virtuous reasons.  The survival of many species is inherently valuable, but to many people, the value of those species that ensure our survival are more important than others. 

[estanbro]

I would like to focus on the question "is species egalitarianism hypocritical?" Paul Taylor's species egalitarianism belief holds that all species have equal moral worth. Thus, a potato has the same moral worth as a dog or a human. In this belief, it is wrong to hold dogs or humans superior to potatoes. Yet, Taylor states that in times of conflict, nonhuman interests can be sacrificed for vital human interests. That is, a human can kill a dog if the dog is threatening to kill the human, etc. Schmidtz then uses the soldier example to point out that this stand on species egalitarianism may not be hypocritical, because killing something does not entail that you are not respecting that something (much like Kantianism, where killing someone in combat does not entail that you are not respecting that person as an end in itself). But where do we draw the line? Can a human kill a deer to put meat in the freezer? This probably changes dependent on the circumstances, that is, whether or not killing the deer will save the human's life. What about efficiency? As we have noted before, using grain to feed cattle that will in turn be slaughtered is a very inefficient process. The raw grain would go much further than the end meat will. So should we all be vegetarians? This poses another problem though, that being the problem of placing ourselves or animals above plants.

[gru...@lclark.edu]

Does Schmidtz' interpretation of anthropocentrism suffice as reason for abiding to natural commands for respect? It agrees with a biocentric perspective that every living being is deserving of respect, but is its centering around persons a comfortable explanation for people? I liked the argument because he made clear that the only important impression of whether an act towards nature is right or wrong is our own. Whatever element of nature receiving the consequences of a person's acts holds no opinion. It deserves respect by the same means of our impression, for we are the only ones bearing the agency to rationalize an impression. Aesthetics may provoke inspiration, and in the reading's example of redwood trees, a sense of appreciation for a tree's age and size. It is our own positive impression of nature that promotes our sustainment of it. Respecting the environment would be an extension of respecting oneself. That line of logic is convincing to me, but it also strips our surroundings of significant intrinsic value. Does anyone think nature must be valued by more intrinsic means than Schmidtz suggests? Would that modification result in acknowledging and acting towards nature differently or would it just offer a different reason for how we acknowledge and act towards nature?