TPQs (10/19) Group 3 Posts, Group 4 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[sluh...@lclark.edu]

Allen Wood gives 4 different statements regarding Kant's moral theory, specifically regarding categorical imperatives:

1. Categorical imperatives are supposed to be unconditionally valid. Therefore, any principle! that is seen as a categorical imperative (for example, 'Do not lie') must be viewed inflexibly as having no exceptions whatever.

2. But it does not imply that the obligation to keep promises might not be conditional in other Ways - for instance, that this obligation might cease to exist if

keeping the promise would somehow violate the dignity of humanity or if we knew that the person promised would release us from the promise if they knew of the unforeseen situation in which we find ourselves when it comes time to keep it. 

3. When we have good and sufficient grounds to make exceptions to a moral rule, this means only that the rule (under those circumstances) no longer binds us categorically (or, indeed, in any other way). Thus whether there are any moral rules at all that hold without exceptions is not decided by accepting Kant's claim that all moral obligations involve categorical imperatives.

4. Human dignity is also seen as providing reasonable grounds for making exceptions to moral

rules against lying or suicide in certain cases.

There seems to be a rather subtle argument being made that I imagine I'm not quite competent to grasp. On the one hand, no exceptions are to be made regarding categorical imperatives (beyond the release of our promise by that person we made the promise to, thus removing the possibility of exception by removing the situation where the potential to break the imperative is possible), while on the other we're given the right to break certain imperatives for the state of human dignity. I was interested of what others made of this thread within the paper? Perhaps clarify how these aspects of Kant's theory fit together?

[co...@lclark.edu]

I am unclear on how the pieces of Kant's theory fit together as well. But it seems that some of the tension between the theory's flexibility v. inflexibility is eased if we dont think about any of Kant's formulas as strict decision-making procedures. Instead, I think Wood suggests that we can think of each formulation as an (imperfect) aphorism that gets at the broader spirit of deontology. In this way, Kantianism can temper our reading of otherwise sweeping claims, such as one should never lie in any situation.

I dont think fuzzy answer really resolves the tension you bring up. But it does seem to make the theory less formalistic.  Which, if nothing else, make the tension less of a dire concern, even though it also seems to leave the theory a bit sloppy and hard to act on.

[ma...@lclark.edu]

Wood mentions Kant’s view that, “The opponent that respect for morality must overcome is always ‘self-conceit’, which arises not out of our animal nature but from our humanity or rationality. “ The ultimate moral aim for all humanity is then to change our rational nature so that we do not conceitedly treat ourselves as an exception, but act in harmony to create a realm of ends. Do we think that morality ultimately demands humanity to change its nature? Are there any other reasons that prevent us from acting morally outside of self-conceit?

[nse...@lclark.edu]

It seems to me that there is a distinction that is not as clear as it should be if we are to make sense of this apparent contradiction between ideas of categorical imperatives allowing for no exceptions and the possibility of exceptions when they would prevent the violation of someone's humanity. This distinction is that Kant's personal beliefs are probably more extreme than his ethical theory. Wood writes, "it is very questionable whether Kant's convictions about specific topics really follow from ethical theory... Kant's theory, if it is correctly understood, seems more vulnerable to the charge that it is too lax than to the charge that it is too strict." In a sense, because Kant's philosophy has been translated from another language and because his ideas are so dense, it is easy for philosophers to come to very different conclusions about what Kant actually believes in terms of moral behavior. If we are to try to apply Kant's theory to the real world, it might make the most sense to take into account the idea of perfect duties, but also to understand that perfection is more of an ideal than something that someone could achieve 100% of the time.

[gru...@lclark.edu]

I understood Woods' remarks regarding the formalism in Kant's argument as most heavily reliant on the claim that rational autonomy is the ground of morality. Rational nature is the preexisting end, end in and of itself, that structures and motivates purpose of action. There are subsequent categorical imperatives that can be suggested from this because by respecting every autonomous individual as possessing a rational nature that has an ultimate value, Woods follows that ends we set for ourselves and consider objectively valuable are inherently operating by course of a system of human reasoning that has been established as an end in itself and thus are bound duties upon their prescription by a rational will. That still does not explain to me how immoral behavior is factored into this argument regarding humanity in any possible being as rational nature.

[estanbro]

"Categorical imperatives are supposed to be unconditionally valid. Therefore, any principle that is seen as a categorical imperative (for example, 'Do not lie') must be viewed inflexibly as having no exceptions whatsoever . But this ridiculously fallacious argument rests on a very simple confusion. For Kant, a rational normative principle (or "imperative" ) guiding our action is "categorical " if its validity is not conditional on having set some end to which the action is to serve as a means. This does not entail, however, that the validity of rules which, when they are valid, are categorical imperatives, cannot be conditional on particular circumstances, or that there cannot be grounds for making exceptions to a generally valid moral rule."- Page 3

I think the above paragraph from Wood (page 3) best summarizes the dilemma we are dealing with, which is whether or not exceptions can be made regarding categorical imperatives (whether it be for the sake of human dignity or any other reason).

To this point, I best understand this argument as being able to make exceptions to rules when the rule is not binding as a categorical imperative. Let's remember the basic Kantian principle "treat every rational being as an end in itself." Exceptions to rules can then be made if the basic principle does not require strict adherence to that rule.Thus, as a made up example, a Kantian rule may be that "one should never force another to eat something they do not want to eat." Exceptions may be made to this rule, if the basic principle of "treat every rational being as an end in itself" does not require strict adherence to the rule "never force another to eat something they do not want to eat." An example may be a mother forcing her child to eat her vegetables. As noted before, exceptions to rules may be made for 1) the sake of human dignity (which could possibly be claimed here because it is healthy for the child to eat vegetables) and 2) if the basic principle of "treat every rational being as an end in itself" does not require strict adherence to the rule, which I believe it does not, because forcing a child to eat vegetables does not entail that you are not treating the child as a rational end in itself.

[hwhi...@lclark.edu]

It seems that the formula of humanity allows for such exceptions as to maintain human dignity or preserve of life (in the case of the murderer at the door) even if it violates the categorical imperative in other aspects (the formula of universal law for example). I may not fully grasp the manner in which these formulas interact, but I believe treating them in this manner allows some of these exceptions that maintain certain deontological beliefs to be permissible. In fact, these ideas may be permissible under the formula of universal law if it is included within the maxim that the act is for the sake of humanity. In this sense I believe the categorical imperative generates some flexibility. The maxims, if treated in less generalized manners and instead with reference to the ends by which we choose to act, will provide support by the categorical imperative for some seemingly commonsense moral beliefs.

[ep]

If we perform an action that benefits humanity but is intended purely for self-recognition, can the action itself be virtuous?  It seems unlikely.  Should the action then be refrained from if this is the only circumstance that it would come about?  From a slightly different perspective, if we do something because it satisfies our desire to serve our moral duty, is that acting out of virtuousness or self-interest?  

[jswe...@lclark.edu]

I think that The Formula of Universal law builds a foundation for determining all moral action, while The Formula of Humanity focuses more intensely on intricacies of human to human relation.  The two combined form a decision procedure, but the process is no spelled out or as strict as utilitarianism.  There is moral responsibility, and room for good intention, thus the apparently looseness of the theory.