TPQs (9/28) Group 4 Posts, Group 1 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[co...@lclark.edu]

Both Darwall and Hooker seem to focus their papers on the pragmatic application of utilitarianism, rather than the fundamental tenets asserted in the theory. This limited framework makes complete sense. For, if both philosophers tried to analytically tackle the theory of utilitarianism as a whole, their papers would explode in size. However, are certain pressing considerations in moral theory lost in this type of specific analysis? The advancement of utilitarian theory seen in the progression from Bentham's original proposition to Mill's expansion to Darwall's update of act-utilitarianism to rule-utilitarianism and finally to Hooker's refinement of rule-utilitarianism certainly seems valuable. But, isn't Hooker's considering if utilitarianism is palatable somewhat less important? Should Darwall and Hooker be so willing to accept the foundation of Utilitarianism if they feel that the principles cant justify a distasteful dictate in a specific hard case?

[vmco...@lclark.edu]

I believe all the readings were transitionally well put together, however Hooker's explanation of Rule Utilitarianism seemed rather important to me. He made it very clear that rule consequentialism and act consequentialism evoke very different outcomes (consequences, particularly). Moreover, that rule consequentialism can cover many of the "holes" that are found in act consequentialism. As for Darwall and Hooker, I believe from the readings that both men are already grounded in believing utilitarian principles. Therefore, by going through rule consequentialism and pulling apart all the specific disagreements and refuting them, they can come to a more clear sense of what rule consequentialism truly entails. And clearly, they both agree that it is the most sound theory, by bringing the greatest amount of good to the greatest amount of people, while still abiding by a set of moral rules.

[jshaw]

What do you guys make of the symmetrical "harm and benefit" deal? It is a reasonable theory, however I can't think of a single instance where a benefit is exactly equal to some sort of harm.

[beaub]

Darwall's addressing of the harm/benefit objection proposes that according to Act-Utilitarianism, all other things equal, it is not worse to cause harm than it is to provide a benefit. I wish Darwall would have devoted more space to this principe because it seems, upon further thought, to go against our moral common sense. Or at least mine. It seems rational to believe that doing harm to one is worse than doing good to another, even if they are supposedly of the same measure. It seems, according to common sense, that inflicting pain/bad/harm/etc. to someone is worse than doing an equal amount of pleasure/good/happiness/etc. to another simply due to the nature that it is bad you are inflicting bad. For example, suppose I were to punch one baby but give another baby a room full of teddy bears. And suppose these acts would inflict equal amounts of harm and good, respectively, given there was indeed some way we would evaluate this (hedons, possibly?). According to AU I have done nothing wrong. However, it is against our commonly-held societal norms to punch a baby, and I would expect that people would not think my actions justified even after I informed them of all of the happiness that the teddy bears provided the other baby. It seems that, if I were to extrapolate this a bit, I could go around distributing teddy bears to some babies while hitting others and be a morally neutral person. 

I am aware that I have done a poor job of expressing this in writing (and perhaps I am interpreting Darwall's writing in another way than is meant), but to me this just seems to go against our ingrained moral code: that doing bad is bad in and of itself. There just seems to be something extra hurtful about inflicting harm. 

[hwhi...@lclark.edu]

Darwall briefly assesses our capability to evaluate the general happiness from a disinterested standpoint. This aspect of Utilitarianism is fundamental to its application but at times it seems extremely difficult to adhere to and may in fact violate the determinacy of the moral theory because it may in fact be outside of an individual's capacity to judge net happiness with complete disinterest. Is there such a viewpoint we can judge from? And if so how we might we be able to reach it?

Regarding the subject of Rule Utilitarianism in the manner it is portrayed by Darwall, it appears as if there must be finite set of rules from which we should determine the best rule that will be most beneficial to the most people when applied to our actions. Perhaps I am interpreting this wrong, but unless we are only choosing from so many different rules, there will be endless debate about which will cause the greatest net happiness. If this is the case, how might we formulate a finite set of rules?

I find it interesting in Hooker's text the discussion of demandingness. What is especially important is the fact that within rule utilitarianism a greater population is required to contribute to helping others. I think it is interesting in the sense that it perpetuates the publicity of the theory inherently because it makes those who participate in the theory also want the population of followers to increase. If there were a decline, or a failure of one's peers to participate, do you think the motivation to publicize of those still "buying in" will increase or decrease?

[Ian Dechow]

Humanity tends to be rational but still self interested, our rationality allows us to reach for the viewpoint you speak of, however our rationality also tells us that we cannot reach that viewpoint.  There is a term called the “veil of ignorance” this is a position in which we pretend to not know who or what we are in an attempt to make a completely fair decision.  This is an imperfect method, but it is a start.

If I had a good answer to your second question I’d be in Congress right now making my voice heard…

According to the theory it should increase, because if they use more advertising then in all likely hood more people would buy in, thus even further helping the greater good.

[nse...@lclark.edu]

Darwall argues that "only an act's consequences determine whether it is right or wrong."  It also holds that it does not matter if happiness or good is evenly spread, as long as the act produces the same total net happiness in either act. Rule-utilitarianism says that an act is wrong only if it breaks an enforced societal rule. Rule-consequentialism is allegedly most in line with common sense or intuitive moral instinct, while at the same time incorporating rules and their consequences in deliberation of what makes an act right or wrong. If we consider the corporate corruption that has continued to escalate over the past several decades and its repercussions on the majority of Americans to the benefit of a few CEOs, which moral theory would do the best job explaining why those CEOs should share some of their wealth to act in such a way as to produce the largest net happiness?

[mblak...@lclark.edu]

As far as publicity goes in the Hooker article, it should be taken into account the reason for the decline/failure to participate when determining whether or not individuals should keep publicizing rule utilitarianism. If the decline is due to the fact that people slowly caught on to the major benefits of being, say, an ethical egoist in a rule utilitarianist society, there would likely be little hope in converting these people back to a lifestyle that they often times cannot directly reap or see the benefits of. 

[larr...@lclark.edu]

I agree that the harm-benefit system is not morally intuitive. Even if you gave teddy bears to every baby in the world that does not morally outweigh or undo the fact that you punched a baby. The notion that there is a net good and bad is one of the things that I find so frustrating about utilitarianism. Similarly, if there are a set of choices and all are morally looked down upon via intuition, but one produces more well-being than the others, than that choice, no matter how repugnant, is morally required by utilitarianism. Is bad then "bad" not because of how much bad it creates in the world, but because the form of "bad" is such unto itself? What is bad?