TPQs (11/28) Group 2 Posts, Group 3 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[rh...@lclark.edu]

"Let us call the point of view from which we consider what kinds of lives are good lives, and what kinds of persons it would be good for ourselves and others to be, the point of view of individual perfectionism (437)."  Given this statement how do you think the author would apply the moral saint issue to rule utilitarianism?  This statement reminds me of RU in that it references how people should be.  RU differs from AU in that those who follow RU follow the rules or policies that, if everyone followed them, would result in the greatest good, leaving them much freer than those fully dedicated to AU to pursue their own interests.  Do you find this assessment correct?  Why or why not?

[eh...@lclark.edu]

Wolf states that "there seems to be a limit to how much morality we can stand," (423).  Is it really the quantity of morality or perhaps is it the intensity of morality that we can't stand?  Is a long life lived simply "doing the right thing" when circumstances arise as bothersome to us as a short amount of time where an individual is a "moral saint" even if the amount of morality is consistent? 

[afin...@lclark.edu]

I found the section on Wolf's "alternative" path most interesting; "an alternative that naturally suggests itself is that we revise our views about the content of morality", namely that we broaden or replace the views we currently hold about what it means to be virtuous or vicious, and what constitutes "morally worthy" activities. Though Wolf discusses the impacts of this alternative on Kantianism and utilitarianism, there's no talk of what effects this would have on Virtue Theory. How would Virtue Theory adapt to additions such as creativity or self-awareness? To some extent, it would seem like this alternative path would make virtues and vices individualized. Are virtues universal or relative? 

[sretzlaff]

Wolf notes that, "it is not a coincidence that the ways of comprehending the world of which these ideals are the extreme embodiments are sometimes described as 'moralities' themselves.  At any rate, they compete with what we ordinarily mean by 'morality'" (424-425).  In what ways do these ideals compete with what we usually mean by morality?  How is the realization of these ideals "straightforwardly immoral" (425)? 

[epro...@lclark.edu]

When we commonly address morality, we address beliefs or actions that stand within the guidelines of morality: things that are “permissible” or “good”, for example (or things that are not).  The life of moral sainthood competes with this concept in that by desiring goods that do not directly benefit the welfare of others, we are acting immorally.  We do not commonly regard spending money on French lessons as immoral and most of us regard it as a positive thing.  However, from the standpoint of moral saintliness, we should be donating this money to charity and this is what makes the French lessons immoral.