TPQs (2/9) Group 3 Posts, Group 4 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[sluh...@lclark.edu]

The author states that the major obstacle of human beings cultivating humility is self-importance. Likewise, it is a very rare case to imagine that one may learn to cherish and value as important other human beings without also having learned to cherish other beings (both sentient and non-sentient) as well. This is remarkably similar to Kant’s defense of why we should seek to avoid kicking animals even though we have no strict moral duty to observe this behavior. Remember that Kant suggested that we are prone to emotionally dissolving the rationalizations that tell us why we shouldn’t kick other human beings when we consistently go out and kick, say, a dog. How much of Hill’s argument on this point can be said to arise out of virtue ethics and how much of this smells of Kantianism?   

[co...@lclark.edu]

I dont know what influenced Hill, but I think you are right in saying he hits on themes central to both Kantianism and virtue theory.

The agent-centered/first-person analysis Hill uses maps easily onto virtue theory. By comparing the differences between the inner lives of people who do and dont appreciate nature, he seems to be using other words to say that the people who appreciate nature have a more eudemon life.

However, as you point out, Hill's heavy emphasis on the specific virtue of humility seems to give his argument a Kantian twist. I think this can be explained by what we've talked about in class. ie. that most Kantians are also virtue theorist. In this way, it seems that Hill uses the agent-centered lens of virtue theory as an adjunct piece of a fundamentally Kantian line of thought. Instead of focusing on the idea that people who appreciate virtue have a certain skill or virtue, Hill seems to say that once all the relevant information is taken into account, proper application of reason leaves us no other option except to appreciate nature. Or in other words, that we are acting irrationally when we do not appreciate nature.

This seems to be a clever way out of the objection from animals. The addition of virtue theory allows Kantianism reject the objection and keep rational autonomy by making respect for animals/nature a fringe benefit/logical outgrowth of the Kantian project of rational self-improvement.

[estanbro]

Hill's article discusses the question of why we feel discomfort at those who use nature only as a resource. When Hill continually points out the difference between respecting nature as intrinsically important vs. instrumentally important I too immediately think of Kantianism. Hill's question could roughly be restated as "why do we feel discomfort at those who use nature only as a mere means?" Why do we feel discomfort at those people that do not treat nature as an end in itself?

I like the point made that Hill's heavy emphasis on humility can likely be explained by remembering that "most Kantians are also virtue theorists." One of the main points Hill brings up is a point we have discussed in class. Is there a correlation or uniformity of the virtues? Hill argues that those who treat nature as an end in itself, that is, respect nature for its intrinsic value, possess many virtues that qualify that person as a virtuous person. Hill states "the main idea is that, though indifference to nonsentient nature does not necessarily reflect the absence of virtues, it often signals the absence of certain traits which we want to encourage because they are, in most cases, a natural basis for the development of certain virtues." This gets at the idea of those who possess certain traits may be moral exemplars.

[jswe...@lclark.edu]

It's hard to say what is original, and what builds off of Kantianism.

I think that many moral theories arrive some at similar conclusions as for the most part they all have the same aim, do the good.  However, virtue theory and kantianism definitely have some differences.  

Self acceptance did not seem like a component of being a kantian, while in in virtue theory one must really be aware of their character.

[jshaw]

Someone told me that virtue theory was vague and thus unconvincing. But I feel that this sort of roundness is what allows this theory to be so flexible to our objections and natural to our instincts. 

I don't think it has to be either virtue theory or kantiansim. As long as a kantian acts virtuously, with humility, virtue theorists would still support the kantian in that respect.

[nse...@lclark.edu]

To the extent that Hill argues that not cherishing non-sentient beings would lead to not cherishing other human beings, or vice versa, it is clear that the logic underlying the argument resembles Kant's attempt at refuting the argument that Kantianism endorses the abuse of nonhuman animals. That said, that Hill argues for humility and the cherishing of other beings (sentient or not) lines up more with Virtue Theory than Kantianism because he uses the word virtue himself in the same sense as Aristotle. That is, humility is an admirable trait that one ought to cultivate if one wants to start caring about the preservation of the environment because, it is hard to have humility and not have some appreciation for the animals and plants in nature although they may not affect you or those you associate with in a direct manner. The argument for cherishing human beings without cherishing other nonhuman beings finds its background in Kantianism, but it cannot be denied that Virtue Theory, too, had a large influence on Hill's ability to construct this argument. It is also important to note that Kantianism and Virtue Theory agree on many levels, so perhaps the influence of both theories is more or less equal.

[hwhi...@lclark.edu]

I find it interesting that you see in Hill's writing a discussion of the uniformity of virtues. It seems to me that he makes it a point not to assume that there is unity in the virtues. Hill seems to explain the ethical reasoning behind cherishing the environment in terms of a few different virtues, i.e. humility and aesthetic sensibility, but does not attempt to directly relate these with a rational universal argument. Instead he is suggesting the manners in which the virtues, and humility specifically for the most part, are fostered. He believes that a crucial element to developing virtue is consistent with the capability of a human to cherish something, and in this case nature, for its own sake and not merely for its utility. This appears to be a stance directly criticizing Utilitarianism in that it denies the sole value of nature to be its utility for human aesthetic pleasure. It seems that valuing something solely for its use runs counter to efforts to develop oneself as a virtuous person. Perhaps, this suggests a general incompatibility between Utilitarianism and Virtue Theory.

[epro...@lclark.edu]

The ongoing argument that Hill proposes between the environmentalist and the anti-environmentalist reveals that neither side can prove the importance or the unimportance of non-sentient nature beyond its instrumental value.  However, both sides can agree that the virtues individuals hold that relate to the preservation of nature are good.  Just because environmentalists have yet to find an argument to prove the destruction of non-sentient nature as wrong does not justify the destruction of it.

[Maggie McQueston]

Does Hill indicate that it is problematic to treat nature as a mere means or simply as a means? How can we make this distinction? Does this article effectively account for the discomfort surrounding the treatment of animals we encountered in Kantianism? Does Hill's analysis face it's own kind of demandingness objection? How are the virtues that Hill suggests (humility, etc.) reflected in the Moral Exemplars we discussed in class? Are there other Moral Exemplars that better address the particular issue of environmental conservation?