TPQs (10/22) Group 4 Posts, Group 1 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[co...@lclark.edu]

I am curious to learn more about the deterministic & moral luck challenges to Kantianism. Shafer-Landau seems to leave them  undeveloped.

Ive tried to take a stab at what the Kantian response to these challenges might be. But I dont think they are very convincing. All I can think to do is reject the way the challenges are framed, rather than the challenges themselves. Can Kantianism offer a better response?

Potential Response:
It seems that a Kantian could argue that the problems that spring from thinking about the facts determinism and luck are not relevant, because they are empirical/application issues rather than issues to the theory itself.

1) In response to determinism, a Kantian could potentially say that humans experience the world from a first-person perspective. And from this perspective, we are forced to interact with the world in a way that accepts free-will / assumes our ability to make choices. So, even if we are wrong in this view, the fact remains that we are self-aware, conscious creatures that need to 'use' a decision-making procedure in our day-to-day life.  As a result, Kantian theory can act as a informative and useful metric when we think about our actions, even if it cant alter them.

2) Kantians can similarly shift the focus in order to respond to the problem moral luck. They can simply say that the maxim a person is operating on when she drives absent-mindedly through in a school zone is all that is morally relevant. The consequences of this maxim cannot be taken into consideration, even if a child is killed. This would force them to change the lex talionis doctrine, but it could potentially save the core theory.

However, neither of these responses are even convincing to me. Does Kantianism provide any material that can support a more direct response to the challenges of determinism and moral luck?

It seems that my responses might offer an a solution, but they end up making the theory pretty irrelevant. If Kantianism simply refuses to interact with these challenge by claiming they are not under its purview, why should we listen to its dictates? I know that an is does not imply an ought. But shouldnt we adopt normative views that at least try to ground themselves descriptive facts? If a theory is built upon incorrect/incomplete is facts, doesn't it seem likely that it will go astray?

[gru...@lclark.edu]

It seems perplexing that Kant would establish such a law as lex talionis to direct criminal judgement. The drive of Kantianism is a fundamental opposition of consequentialism, discrediting the value in quantifying costs and benefits of an action to measure its moral legitimacy because morality entirely rests upon the preceding genuine intentions, the maxim, of an act. It seems too obvious an inconsistency to be truly upheld by Kant. Do you believe lex talionis stated as, "treat criminals as they have treated their victims" is an implement of a perfect duty? I am curious how one might phrase such a maxim to endorse a verdict (ruling the same treatment be imposed upon a criminal that reflects the crime) enacted by a judge whose involvement with the crime is merely as an examining bystander.

The argument refuting human autonomous nature is strong and debatable, as well. Reviewing the proposed flaws in the second and third premise, I would like to draw attention to an illogical shift I see in the third, though I believe the second can easily deserve similar critical focus. The third premise states that if choices are not necessitated, then they are random. Random seems too broad of a label and neglects the complexity of free-will. Will anyone elaborate on ways of contradicting the "if-then" transition in the third premise? I think there are examples distinguishing what is random from what is unmotivated by desires, and yet driven by free-will. It could also likely be argued that any random action is not random because it is uniquely absorbed, analyzed, and motivated through the filtered lens of the individual.

[nse...@lclark.edu]

Though the logic of the argument against autonomy is sound, its truth seems questionable. This could be attributed to humans being in denial of their lack of freedom, or there could be something wrong with either premise 2 or 3. To review, the argument against autonomy states:
1. Either our choices are necessitated or they are not.
2. If they are necessitated, then they are out of our control, and so we lack autonomy.
3. If they are not necessitated, then they are random, and so we lack autonomy.
4. Therefore, we lack autonomy.

How might one use the principles of Kantianism to refute premise 2 or 3?

The first consideration for me would be what is meant by necessitated. If by necessitated a deterministic universe is implied, it would seem to me that premise 2 is true.
In premise 3, however, it seems there is a missing premise linking no choices being deterministic to choices being random. The premise leaves no room for a middle ground. It is not realistic to assume that someone would punch someone randomly. If nothing is caused, who is to say that one does not nonetheless have a choice in the matter? I might consider the nature vs. nurture argument in psychology with regard to twins. Is there not a third possibility that the choices people make are not only a result of past causes, but also how they freely choose to deal with those choices?

[mblak...@lclark.edu]

In regards to this third possibility, I would say that the freedom of our actions in dealing with the choices at hand are dependent on the origins of these past causes. If these past causes formed because of predetermined past effects and causes before that and before that and so on, our choice would not be free but rather the result of predetermined causes. Although, the knowledge that we can take different paths in a given situation leads to the belief that there could be a third possibility, as mentioned earlier, that we are experiencing the world from a first-person perspective and are therefore under the impression that we are in control of our actions when we are really being controlled by some outer force. That we are unable to fully trace our actions back to some sort of origin that tells us whether our actions are dictated or random, however, seems the biggest hindrance in the autonomy debate. 

[Lisa Bell]

The Principle of Humanity state that one should "always treat a human being (yourself included) as an end, and never as a mere means." Kant outlines the importance and correlation of rationality and autonomy with this principle. The idea seems very logical and well written, as it does not seem to be weak to any contradictions of specific examples that would disprove or weaken it. However, the principles blatant opposition to paternalism seems like a very strong statement. On this topic the text states “the principle of humanity easily explains our outrage at paternalism. To be paternalistic is to assume the rights and privileges of a parent toward another adult . Paternalism has us limit the liberty of others, for their own good, against their will. It is treating autonomous individuals as children, as if we, and not they, were best suited to making the crucial decisions of their lives.” In theory this seems like a nobel and very fair outlook on paternalism, because it strives to treat people with respect and not in a condescending or patronizing way. However, are there any situations in which making important decisions for people, against their will, would actually end in the best outcome for that person? There seem to be a few examples in which, perhaps one might have some information that another person does not have and they therefore act for someone which results in a better end result.

[sbea...@lclark.edu]

Determinism: we are conscious beings who must make choices to interact with the world, but those choices are limited by their root causes.  We are autonomous, but we are affected by pre-existing conditions that have lead to our current state of affairs; though I chose to come to class today on time, there are pre-existing conditions/consequences of previous actions beyond my control that have lead me to be here now.  Though we are limited in choices, we are still conscious and able to make them, though they may be limited by previous consequences beyond our control.

The Lex Taionis doctrine states that we should treat criminals in the same way that they treated their victims.  This is flawed because if someone was to discipline a criminal who murdered an innocent person, by murdering them, they would then become a criminal for having murdered the initial murderer.  This creates a never-ending chain because now that the authority figure has become a murderer, he must be disciplined in the same manor by someone else.  This doctrine embodies the saying "an eye for an eye makes the whole world blind."  

[estanbro]

The article lists five problems with the Principle of Humanity:

1. The notion of treating someone as an end is vague, and so the principle is difficult to apply.
2. The principle fails to give us good advice about how to determine what people deserve.
3. The principle assumes that we are genuinely autonomous, but that assumption may be false.
4. The principle assumes that the morality of our actions depends only on what we can autonomously control, but the existence of moral luck calls this into question.
5. The principle cannot explain why those who lack rationality and autonomy are deserving of respect.

I want to know what everyone thinks about problem number 3. Is the assumption that we are genuinely autonomous false? Does Kant's theory presuppose that we have free will?

[Ian Dechow]

Free will is not as many people suppose, just the ability to choose as you wish.  It is the ability to understand our choices in light of the consequences they will accrue. In other words having rationale allows us to be autonomous in that our aims can be directed not toward goals but our understanding of those goals i.e. why we want those goals. Think of it like climbing a mountain we may not get to choose which mountain to climb but we can certainly choose how we climb that mountain the only reason we can do that is because we will understand the implications of those choices.  A creature without rationale or autonomy like a heroin addict also cannot choose which mountain however he has also giving up his ability to choose how to climb the minute he took those drugs. The assumption that we are genuinely and autonomous is false however we can choose to be genuinely autonomous and we can choose to recognize our free will and our own agency.

[beaub]

There certainly would be some situations in which paternalism would be permitted and even preferable for us. Obviously, we need paternal care when we have not yet developed into rational beings and are willing to sacrifice our autonomy for this care. The level of paternalism decreases as our age increases. It would seem that we are allowing for paternalism and sacrificing our autonomy to some extent in academia. Every day we allow others to make decisions for us and limit our autonomy, although on a consensual basis. By enrolling in Lewis & Clark or another institution of higher education we are giving up some of our autonomy; we are no longer legally required to attend school and have made the decision to allow our professors to assign us work and our RAs and other staff to pose limits on our liberty by living in the residence halls. This decision was made by rational beings (our parents and ourselves) and we knowingly committed to four years of a paternal system. We have trusted our professors to provide us with knowledge that we deem useful for our post-graduation plans in which we desire to have autonomous lifestyles.