TPQs (10/15) Group 1 Posts, Group 2 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[beaub]

Kant declares:

"Man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must always be regarded at the same time as an end" (146). 

How does this claim stand up to the applicability/demandingness criterion? Doesn't our society, whether we like it to or not, use other people and other rational beings as means all the time? In other words, do you agree with this claim? Don't we turn person into things on an everyday basis, such as when we use our friends as means to copy their notes from class or use our parents as means to pay for our tuition so we can continue going to school? (This is a really open-ended question, so do what you want with it!)

[Lisa Bell]

“Kant's thesis is that human history can be made theoretically intelligible to us only by finding in it a natural end, which is the full (hence temporally endless) development of the natural, predispositions o f the human species (I 8:18).”

If this is Kant's final thesis, what can we say that he has discovered in definite terms? He seems to suggest that history can be defined in how things ended, but how does this help people in current situations? If things are only explained at the end, how do people understand things in the moment with out relying on outdated and possibly irrelevant stations?  

[hdon...@lclark.edu]

"Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law." (144)

Kant's use of "should", previously mentioned as being necessary when describing imperatives, reveals the problem that arises in his following four examples. The main objection seems to be that while there are many things that people do that should be considered universal laws, there is no way for people to enact them as universal laws. Is there a way to surpass this objection, or should one simply, as Kant suggests ("Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature."), act as though the objection does not exist?

[rh...@lclark.edu]

I did not see anything in this reading that adequately addressed these objections.  One possible argument against these objections is that in the examples given the people being used know they are being used and perfectly willing to help.  They could view giving aid as a duty of interpersonal relationships.  Problematically this leads to all participants being turned into means to support the interpersonal relationships, but assuming all participants want the relationship to continue for their own purposes they are then treating themselves as ends.  However, it could be argued that by acting to support an interpersonal relationship on the basis of bringing oneself the happiness associated with an ongoing interpersonal relationship one is treating the other simply as a means for one's own happiness, even if one is acting apparently altruistically by freely giving aid making the whole argument circular.  I'm not questioning that interpersonal relationships are good at bringing happiness, but it does seem that there is a lot of using people as means involved in it, even if that isn't the overall point of the relationship.  Kant would therefore force us to completely rethink how we conduct interpersonal relationships which would be rather demanding.

[mblak...@lclark.edu]

Kant states, “…the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our action is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature’s, have nevertheless, if they are nonrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be used merely as means…” (p 146). Kant is placing intrinsic value on humans, while placing instrumental value on all things used by humans to fulfill their objective ends. This principle has some flaws, however. How does such a theory play out in the example of murder? If one human kills another to help fulfill her own objective end, does the victim now lose all intrinsic value and become a thing? How does human control (or lack thereof) play into the objective principle? 

[Ian Dechow]

Kant calls it man's duty to obtain self perfection.  In this endeavor man will be moral, right and good. Kant's philosophy seems to act more as a religion and less as law; for the man that rejects Kant's notion of duty to oneself is not subject to the consequences of his own conscience.  That man can only be subject to the consequences of law and order. How could Kantian ethical theory alone be used to create a judicial system? And if it could be created would it be practical?

[sretzlaff]

In the example of murder, Kant's theory has some flaws. If one human chose to kill another, the victim does not lose all their intrinsic value.  This is because the victim has, in one way or another, impacted others in their past.  The victim's death would likely also impact some people and thus it still adds value to the person although she is dead. Thus, the victim is not a thing until all their value has been lost.  Human control plays into the objective principle because it acts out the human's will.  People make decisions based on their preferences and what causes the best consequences, and therefore, "that which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself." 

[sbea...@lclark.edu]

Kant states that a good will is good in and of itself, "and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favor of any inclination, nay, even the sum-total of all inclinations (p. 141)." According to Kant, good will is an intrinsically good human quality.  Good will can take many forms, for example, two people's (A man's and woman's) good will could lead instrumentally to the reproduction of a human life, a baby.  Interestingly, the life and subsequent will of their child then exists indirectly as an instrumental product of the actions brought about by the good will of its parents (creators).  Human reproduction allows for the existence of a new human being, a being with potential to have good will.  According to Kant, the good will of the child's parents is esteemed higher than the good will of the child because the good will of the child is an instrumental product of the good will of its parents.  Do you think this is accurate? Wouldn't this mean that the good will of everyone who lives right now is less valuable than the good will of our ancestors?