TPQs (12/10) Group 2 Posts, Group 3 Responds

[Becko Copenhaver]

[rh...@lclark.edu]

In particularism there can be no general principles.  However, Little in this paper argues that moral generalizations can be very useful for explanatory purposes to particularists.  These generalizations can't be used as principles, and they must be defeasible.  In this way particularism starts to act more like like the ethical systems we've studied that use general principles.  It solves the issue of not being able to apply anything one has learned to new situations, but it also opens up particularism to the same problems as ethical systems reliant on general principles sine now the particularist will be, in part, basing his decisions on generalizations.  Do you think the author's solution is a good one?  Does it do more harm than good?  Do you have a better solution? 

    

[sretzlaff]

Hooker states that, "in holding that general moral considerations do not come in a strict order of priority, Rossian generalists hold that none is necessarily always overriding.  Rather, each is capable of being overridden by the others.  In just this sense, general moral duties (general moral considerations) are in Ross's terminology "prima facie" (349).  What is an example of a general moral duty being "prima facie"? How does Rossian generalism determine the right from wrong?